THE LAST NIZAM

THE LIFE & TIMES OF MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN

V.K. BAWA



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THE LAST NIZAM

Dr V.K. Bawa was born in Ferozepur, Punjab, and was educated at Poona, Georgetown and Tulane Universities. An IAS officer of the 1954 batch, he has held a number of posts in the government, and was Director of the Andhra Pradesh State Archives for many years. He was also the first Vice-Chairman and Chief Executive of the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority. He is the author of *The Nizam between Moghals and British: Hyderabad under Salar Jang I.*

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

History

Aspects of Deccan History (Edited)
Hyderabad: Institute of Asian Studies, 1975.

The Nizam between Mughals and British: Hyderabad Under Salar Jang I
New Delhi: S. Chand and Co. 1986

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New Delhi: Inter India Publications, 1987.

International Affairs

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V.K. BAWA

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
INDIA SHOWING
HYDERABAD STATE
(AUGUST, 1948)
W. PAKISTAN
DELHI
E. PAKISTAN
INDIA
Calcutta
BERAR
Bombay
HYDERABAD
STATE
Bay of Bengal
Goa
Arabian Sea
Masulipatnam
Pondicherry
Land above 500 Mts
pnrao

HYDERABAD STATE
(NIZAM'S DOMINION)
(AUGUST, 1948)
BOMBAY
BERAR
HYDERABAD
MADHYA PRADESH
Aurangabad
Parbhani
Warangal
Secunderabad
Hyderabad
R. Wardha
R. Wainganga
R. Penganga
R. Godavari
R. Manjira
R. Bheema
R. Krishna
R. Tungabhadra
Territory Claimed by Nizam
Land above 500 Mts
0 20 40 60 80 Kms
BAY OF BENGAL

pnra

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Introduction

A biography of the seventh Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, has been long overdue. He had been the undisputed and autocratic ruler of the premier Indian state for so long that he had become a legend in his lifetime. Now that it is over four decades since the Indian states became part of history, it is possible to look at their rulers in a comparatively unbiased manner, seeing them not merely as fabulous rulers in the Oriental tradition, or as all-powerful exploiters of the common man, but also as representatives of traditions, institutions, and a way of life which, with all its weaknesses and defects, constitutes a part of the history of the Indian subcontinent.

Mir Osman Ali Khan suffers from even more handicaps than most of his fellow-rulers. He ruled a state which, in spite of its superficial modernization through the acceptance of railways, telegraphs, banking, and a modern educational and industrial system, retained a value system which went back at least to the Mughal era in India, and the Bahmani and Qutb Shahi kingdoms of the medieval Deccan. He faced the difficult task of trying to bring the state out of the financial difficulties which he inherited from his father, whose name Mahboob significantly meant Beloved. Osman Ali Khan achieved a good deal in the direction of administrative and financial reform during his early years as ruler. Less than a decade after he became ruler, however, his name was associated with allegations of pecuniary greed. Throughout his reign he faced the criticism of his own subjects, as well as the British officials of India, on account of his personal idiosyncrasies. However there many in Hyderabad who venerate his memory and cannot see any major defects in his character.

The book is primarily intended to describe the life and to assess the personality of Mir Osman Ali Khan. However it also has necessarily to go into the political events of his long reign in order to place him in the context of his times. The book is also a history of nineteenth century Hyderabad.

The study of Hyderabad State has been a long-term commitment for me. Having been appointed to the Indian Administrative Service in 1954, I was allotted to the state of Andhra which had been formed a year before as a breakaway from the Madras state. The new state had its headquarters at Kurnool. Soon after the formation of Andhra Pradesh, my senior

colleague and friend J.P.L.Gwynn of the Indian Civil Service, who was the Education Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, asked me if I would be willing to serve as Director of the integrated record office of the new state, which was a successor to the earlier states of Hyderabad and Andhra, both of which had ceased to exist on 1 November 1956. The appointment gave me an insight into the history of the area known as the Deccan. My doctoral dissertation for the Political Science Department of Tulane University was written on the work of Salar Jang I, but for whom the state of Hyderabad would have faced financial and economic collapse, and may not have survived into the twentieth century. My tenure in the Archives also gave me the opportunity to explore other topics relating to the history of Andhra Pradesh and the Deccan, of which the present work is the latest.

*

Today in Hyderabad there is a tendency, both among his supporters and his denigrators, to identify Hyderabad State with the last Nizam's rule. This tendency is to be deprecated. Although he cast a long shadow over the last four decades of its history, trends in Hyderabad State cannot be dissociated from the Indian scene. Developments in Hyderabad in the twentieth century have been greatly influenced by trends in British India, in the British Empire, and in the world of Islam. To ascribe to the state an entirely benevolent or malevolent disposition based on the personality of the last Nizam is unreasonable and a-historical.

A leading political figure of the former Hyderabad State, P.V.Narasimha Rao, became Prime Minister of India in 1991. He was a close follower of Swami Ramanand Tirth and had taken part in the Vande Mataram movement at Osmania University. Another follower of the Swami, S.B.Chavan, a former Chief Minister of Maharashtra, who belongs to the Marathwada area of old Hyderabad State, was appointed Home Minister of India at the same time.

In the New Year honours for 1992, a number of people associated with the Hyderabad freedom struggle received awards. The third highest honour, Padma Vibhushan, was awarded posthumously to Ravi Narayan Reddy, the leader of the Telengana revolt, who had died a few months earlier. The Padma Vibhushan was also awarded to two other leading figures in the Hyderabad freedom struggle, both of whom are alive today. They are Govinddas Shroff, a freedom fighter based at Aurangabad (the

original capital of the Deccan under the Mughal emperors, which since 1956 has been part of Maharashtra State), and Kaloji Narayan Rao, a Telugu poet and writer of great repute who hails from Warangal, the former capital of the Kakatiya dynasty. Both Aurangabad and Warangal were headquarters of Divisional Commissioners (Subedars) during the last Nizam's rule.

It may be pointed out that technically, Mir Osman Ali Khan was not the last Nizam, as his grandson Mir Barkat Ali Khan, Mukarram Jah, held the title from 1967 till 1971, when the titles and privy purses of all Indian rulers were abolished by an Act of the Indian Parliament. The title of this book is however based on the fact that Mir Osman Ali Khan was the last Nizam who actually ruled.

*

The writing of this book would not have been possible without the grant of a Senior Fellowship from the Indian Council of Historical Research for a period of three years commencing 1987. The Chairman, Professor Irfan Habib, Dr Raj Kumar, Dr T.R. Sareen and Professor M.G.S.Narayanan administered the Senior Fellowship through the Centre for Deccan Studies, Hyderabad.

In 1982, the Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge University, was good enough to provide a grant, to enable me to visit the Centre for about two months. During this period I was able to make several trips to the India Office Library and Records, London, and to survey the materials relating to Hyderabad, which had swelled considerably since my earlier visits in 1961 and 1969.

For access to research materials, I should like to express my thanks to the Directors and staff of the National Archives of India, the State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, the India Office Library and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. The officials of the Bahadur Yar Jang Academy at Karachi, and Khurshid Hasan, the son of the late Shamsul Hasan, both of whom have collections of papers of M.A. Jinnah, were good enough to allow me to see the Jinnah papers in their possession.

All those who have been listed as interviewees in the Note on Sources were good enough to spare the time, sometimes for a number of discussions. Professors Ravinder Kumar, Parthasarathy Gupta, Mrs Narayani Gupta,

A.R. Kulkarni, Sarojini Regani, V.Vaikuntham contributed to the evolution of my thinking. Two successive Directors of the State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, Dr V.V.Krishna Sastry and H. Rajendra Prasad were helpful in many ways, apart from making records available for research. Professor Karen Leonard of the University of California, Professors M. Naimuddin, S. Sirajuddin and Taqi Ali Mirza, all of Osmania University, were good enough to read the mannscript and comment on it in detail.

Omar Khalidi of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the officers and staff of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, were extremely helpful in enabling me to obtain copies of important materials required for my research.

In Hyderabad my librarian friends, Sri Inamdar, Dr. M.K. Fatimy, Srimathi Isaacs, Sri Ishwar Bhat and Sri L.S. Ramiah were always obliging in enabling me to locate materials in their libraries.

For most of the photographs in this book, I would like to thank Sri Abid Ali Khan editor of *Siasat*, who had obtained them from the collection of the late Raja Deen Dayal, photographer of Hyderabad, and kindly permitted their use in this volume. Several citizens of Hyderabad helped me to identify individuals in the photographs. These include Nawab Rashid Nawaz Jang and Nawab Mujib Jang of the Paigah family, Mir Gulam Ali Khan, Nawab Kazim Nawaz Jang (Ali Pasha) of the Salar Jang family, Sri and Srimati Taqi Bilgrami, Sri and Srimati Naqi Bilgrami, Nawab Ahmed Yar Khan, Srimati Genevieve Dougherty, Srimati Nargis Toorki, Sri and Srimati A. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, Sir Abid Ali Khan and Sri Raza Ali Khan. I would also like to express my gratitude to Nawab Zainulabidin, Begum Hassan Nawaz Jang, Lt. Col. Yusuf Ali Mirza, and Mr Raza Ali Khan for identification of names in certain photographs. For the preparation of the maps I am indebted to Professor Afzal Mohammad of the Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad.

Prologue

At 1.22 p.m. on 24 February 1967, Mir Osman Ali Khan, the seventh Nizam, and the last absolute ruler of the Deccan, breathed his last at Nazri Bagh, which forms part of the sprawling shabby palace known as the King Kothi, close to the heart of Hyderabad's main business centre, Abids Circle.

His death had been prematurely announced two days earlier. News agencies had flashed the news, but a denial had been issued after an hour. When death actually came to the Nizam, All-India Radio cancelled its regular programmes and broadcast condolence messages from the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh, the Chief Minister and other distinguished citizens. As the funeral procession wound its way from King Kothi past the Moazam Jahi Market and the Siddiambar Bazar, across the Musi river to the Mecca Masjid near Charminar, hundreds of thousands of local citizens thronged the streets to get a glimpse of the frail body of their eighty-year-old former ruler, whose delusions of grandeur had come to naught. Flags flew at half mast in Hyderabad and the burial took place with full state and military honours, although the former ruler, and later Rajpramukh, held no formal position at the time of his death. A day's holiday was declared by the State of Andhra Pradesh, to enable government staff and officials to attend the funeral. A black-bordered Government Gazette was issued, mourning the death of the Nizam.

After prayers were offered for the soul of the last Nizam at Mecca Masjid, the body was transferred from the ambulance to the gun carriage and carried to the nondescript Judi Mosque near King Kothi, which he had built to house the grave of his mother. The body was wrapped in the flag of the Asaf Jahi dynasty. The Chief Minister, Brigade Commander and other dignitaries were present at the burial. Wreaths were laid on behalf of the President and Prime Minister of India, and the Chief of Army Staff.

It was at his own request that he was buried in the Judi Mosque instead of in the grand pavilion constructed in the Qutb Shahi style adjacent to the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad, where the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth Nizams lay buried. Mir Osman Ali Khan's desire to be buried in a

simple grave is reminiscent of the last wish of Aurangzeb, who was buried in Aurangabad, in a grave paid for out of the income he earned by copying the Quran with his own hands.

Both Hindus and Muslims waited side by side in the mosque throughout the night for the funeral prayers. The Christians of Hyderabad mourned the former ruler's death. Some women broke their bangles as they saw their Nizam going past for the last time, as though in mourning for a member of their family. Half-a-million people expressed spontaneously their love and respect for the departed ruler.

On 27 February, President S. Radhakrishnan notified the succession to the gaddi of Hyderabad of Prince Mukarram Jah, the eldest grandson of the late Nizam, to all the privileges of his grandfather, including a privy purse of Rs 20,00,000 per annum. He would be known as His Exalted Highness, Mir Barkat Ali Khan.

The young man was thirty-four years of age, having been born in 1933. He was the grandson of the last Caliph of Turkey, as well as of the Nizam. His grandfather had informed the Government of India of his wish to nominate his grandson as his successor instead of either of his sons.

At a press conference on 27 February, the eighth Nizam answered a volley of questions. He declined to give an estimate of his grandfather's wealth, saying that everybody knew about the wealth which the late Nizam had invested. When asked about the hidden wealth of his grandfather, he said: 'There is no such thing as hidden wealth. My grandfather was indifferent to wealth.'

In reply to a question, he said he anticipated some difficulty in maintaining thousands of employees at King Kothi, where the Nizam had died, as well as the four hundred khanazads or adopted sons who had been brought up by the late Nizam. He said that he would try to utilize their services and along with his brother would try to modernize the administration of King Kothi. He had already set up a Board to consider some of these matters.

The young Nizam disclosed that although he could see his grandfather whenever he wished, the latter strictly followed the tradition of the Mughal court which required him to converse with his grandson only through an interpreter. The young man decided to have his office at King Kothi but to stay on in the suburb of Banjara Hills.

When an old jagirdar tried to present the traditional nazar of five gold ashrafis, the eighth Nizam refused to accept the gift. He shook hands with all the visitors at the end of the press conference and thus broke with two of the old traditions of the State. In a public statement, he expressed his deeply felt thanks at the manner in which the citizens of Hyderabad participated in the funeral ceremony, irrespective of caste and creed. This showed how he still ruled the hearts of the people, although his rule had ended eighteen years ago. The secret of the people's selfless sentiments lay, he said, in the thirty-seven years of the Late Nizam's rule.

What was the strange fascination this man had for the people of Hyderabad? What did his death signify to Hindu, Muslim, Jain, Sikh, Parsee and Christian citizens of an independent India which had rejected the principle of royalty in favour of a plebian democratic system? Were they mourning the passing of the Asaf Jahi dynasty or the death of its last ruler? Or did the mourning merely signify a nostalgia for the past?

On 21 March, in the impressive white Rajput-style State Legislature building of Andhra Pradesh in the Public Gardens, tributes were paid to Mir Osman Ali Khan in the Assembly by Chief Minister K.Brahmananda Reddy and in the Legislative Council by the Revenue Minister V.B.Raju. Members of all political parties including the Congress, the Majlis Ittihadul-Muslimeen (MIM), the Republican Party, the Jan Sangh and both Communist Parties of India, paid tributes to the former ruler. They praised him for his administrative skills, his promotion of the Urdu language, the assistance rendered by him to the poor and downtrodden, the construction of irrigation dams, and other achievements. The CPI(M) leader, T.Nagi Reddy, said that the late Nizam's death symbolized the end of an era—the era of feudalism. But, he said, the good things bequeathed to posterity by the outdated feudal system should not be discarded.

The Urdu poet, Makhdoom Mohiuddin, who had taken part in the Marxist revolt against the Nizam in the late 1940s suggested that the literary works and poems of the late Nizam should be collected and published.

The London *Times* in its obituary published on 25 February 1967 said that the Nizam once had an annual income of 2,500,000 pounds and ruled supreme over a State the size of Italy. Later, his privy purse had fallen to five million rupees or about 238,000 pounds per annum. Yet he was far from being a pauper. Although he had to pay three million rupees per

annum in taxes and was incurring an annual deficit of 30,000 pounds, he had priceless assets such as antique porcelain, gold doubloons, and a solid gold dining service for 150 persons.

The paper conjured up a picture of a decrepit old man shuffling around his palace in carpet slippers and a battered fez cap, worrying about the grocery bills for his large contingent of wives, concubines, children and servants as well as his private army armed with muzzle-loaders. He was described as an opium addict, whose hobbies were writing Urdu and Persian poetry, watching surgical operations, and looking after poor Muslims, who served as his retainers. The simplicity of his way of life, the obituary said, was close to miserliness. His strong support for the British in two world wars, and his attempt to retain the link with the British Empire at the time when Britain was leaving India in 1947, were highlighted.

The grandson and successor of the Nizam who was living in London, took objection to the tone and content of the *Times*' obituary. He pointed out the achievements of the Nizam's reign which included the separation of the judiciary from the executive (this was done for the first time in a princely state in India), the abolition of capital punishment, the setting up of the Hyderabad Civil Service, the maintenance of communal harmony, and the establishment of Osmania University, the first Indian University to use a national language as the medium of instruction. He refuted the charges of meanness, arguing that he used his income not on himself but to maintain others, and that he was unfairly treated by the post-independence governments in regard to civic and property taxes.

Most of the ladies living in his harem, the grandson argued, were there because they needed the security of a home. The Nizam took a small medicinal dose of opium, which remained unchanged for sixty years and kept him in, 'exceptionally good health to the last....' He had a love for art and literature and was a 'major poet' in Persian and Urdu. He was fully alert and aware of political developments. It was therefore unjust to describe him as a, 'shabby man shuffling through his dream world ..., if he shuffled it was because he was a frail man advanced in age. But in that frailty and in that stoop there was the nobility and the dignity of character of a man who had done as he had considered best throughout his long life, and who felt that now he need answer only to God....'

In the morning of 6 April 1967, the *masnad nashini* (enthronement) of the eighth Nizam, the nominated successor of Mir Osman Ali Khan, took place at the Khilwat Palace, part of the Chow Mahalla complex of

palaces. It was perhaps the last time that this magnificent hall, constructed during the reign of the sixth Nizam in Indo-Islamic style of architecture, was used for the purpose for which it was intended—that is the formal accession of a ruler. The title of the Nizam carried with it some princely privileges, but not the rulership of the State. But the court function observed all the rituals that were intended to be performed at a princely function. Rows upon rows of noblemen and officials were seated in accordance with protocol, dressed formally in their traditional court dress of sherwani, the tight-fitting Churidar pyjamas, derived from a Central Asian riding costume, the close fitting shoes and (the most important part of the get up for the court ritual), the yellow conical-shaped *dastar* (turban) and the gilt yellow belt, known as *bagloos*. Perhaps the only item missing in the costume from the early Nizam's rule was the traditional sword, which the courtier was supposed to always have in his belt, in order to protect his lord and master against attack whenever required.

Among the dignitaries of the ruling family who graced the occasion were the two sons of the late Nizam—prince Azam Jah the Prince of Berar and his younger brother, Moazam Jah; Durreshahvar, the princess of Berar who was the daughter of the last Caliph of Turkey and the mother of the eighth Nizam; Nawab Basalat Jah, the younger brother of the late Nizam; Nawab Kazim Nawaz Jang, his son-in-law and confidant (better known as Ali Pasha); and Prince Mufakham Jah, the new Nizam's younger brother. Apart from the ruling family, there were Nawab Deen Yar Jang, who had been close to the Nizam, having served as Kotwal of Hyderabad for many years; S.N.Reddy, who belonged to the family of the famous Raja Bahadur Venkatarama Reddy, who had also served as Kotwal; Zaheer Ahmed, a former civil servant, who was then the Chairman of Nizam's Charitable Trust; and several others who had seen the Nizam's rule and lived through the traumatic days of 1948.

Both the *Times* obituary and the reply by the eighth Nizam are notable for their neglect of two major issues of the thirty-seven-year rule of the Nizam—his frequent interference in the administration of the State, and his infructuous attempts to assert his independence, especially at the time of Indian independence. Sir Theodore Tasker, who served the Nizam's government as a high official and as a member of the Council for many years, attempted to fill the gap by pointing out in his papers that the Government of India had to, 'exercise its paramountcy in 1936 in order to save the State from ruin.'

In fact, Tasker's role in the Nizam's government was a direct result of that intervention, which forced the Nizam to appoint one member of the Council and two top officials (the Director-General of Revenue and the Director-General of Police) from among the British officials nominated by the British Government of India.

Sir Theodore Tasker had had his own differences with the late Nizam, and had done his best to curb the latter's interference in State affairs. He had also upheld the interests of the Nizam's dominions against the attaeks of 'Hindu politicians and associations in British India.' In his comments on the death of the Nizam, he pointed out that those who paid tribute to Osman Ali Khan at his funeral, 'were not of the generation who knew the Nizam of 1916–26,' implying that they could not know how bad his administration had been at that time.

Tasker considered the intervention of 1926 a turning point in the last Nizam's rule. By the time of his death the reason for the intervention had been 'overlaid' and 'forgotten'. The Nizam, who was himself the cause of the intervention, had acquiesced in it as he mellowed.

Taking a stand about halfway between the *Times* and the young Nizam, Tasker pointed out that, despite his eccentricities and external appearance, no one could mistake the force of Mir Osman Ali Khan's personality. No one, he said, 'should grudge him his farewell from the people. It was a historic as well as a personal occasion.' He felt that the *Times* obituary was unworthy of its subject. The grandson was, 'right to protest, but he goes too far in the opposite direction.' After all, Tasker pointed out, 'he was born in 1933.'[1]

A balanced assessment of Mir Osman Ali Khan, placing him in the context of the ambience in which he lived, is long overdue.

Transliteration and Abbreviations

I.Transliteration

Words in Indian and other Eastern languages, including proper names and titles, have been spelt in a way that approximates to the pronunciation in the original language. Thus Salar Jang is preferred to Salar Jung because the former is closer to the different ways by English or German-knowing readers.

Place names have been spelt so as to be easily recognizable to those who have lived in India or are familiar with English language literature on the country.

II. Abbreviations of Archival References

NAI	: National Archives of India, New Delhi
Acc. No.	: Accession No: This refers to the serial order in which certain materials microfilmed in the India Office Library London, have been classified in the NAI, New Delhi
A-Pol.I	: A-Political I
F & P Dept.	: Foreign Department
For.Secy.	: Foreign Secretary
Intl	: Internal
Pl.Cons.	: Political Consultations
Pol.Dept.	: Political Department
Proc.	: Proceedings
GOI	: Government of India
HRR	: Hyderabad Residency Records
SOS	: Secretary of State
SA, AP	: State Archives, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad
Inst.	: Instalment
Ms.	: Manuscript
OML	: Oriental Manuscript Library
Pvt. Secy.	: Private Secretary's Papers
IOL	: India Office Library and Records, London

III. Abbreviations of Journal Titles

IESHR	: Indian Economic and Social History Review

FAMILY TREE

THE NIZAMS OF HYDERABAD

Khaja Abid Qilij Khan

Mir Shahabuddin Khan Feroz Jang

(1)MIR QAMRUDDIN KHAN NIZAM-UL-MULK ASAF JAHI 1724 - 48
(b. 1671 d. 1748)

- Ghaziuddin Khan Feroz Jang (b. 1708 d. 1752)
- (2) MIR AHMAD KHAN NASIR JANG 1748 - Dec. 1750 (d. 1750)
- (4) SYED MD. KHAN SALABAT JANG 1751 - 1762 (b. 1718 d. 1762)
- (5) MIR NIZAM ALI KHAN, ASAF JAH II 1762 - 1803 (b. 1734 d. 1803)
- Mir Md. Sharif Khan Basalat Jang
- Mir Mughal Ali Khan Humayan Jah
- Khair-un-Nisa Begum
  - (3) MUZAFFAR JANG Dec. 1750 - Feb. 1751 (d. 1751)

(6) MIR AKBAR ALI KHAN SIKANDAR JAH ASAF JAH III, 1803 - 1829
(b. 1768 d. 1829)

- Bashir-un-Nisa Begum m. Shamsul-Umra II Amir-i-Kabir I
  - M. Sultanuddin Khan
  - M. Rafiuddin Khan Shamsul-Umra III Amir-i-Kabir II
  - M. Fariduddin Khan

(7) MIR FARKHUNDA ALI KHAN NASIRU'DDAULA ASAF JAH IV, 1829-57 (b. 1794 d. 1857)

- Hashmat-un-Nisa m. Rashidud-din Khan Shamsul-Umra IV Amir-i-Kabir III
- Sultan-un-Nisa

(8) MIR TAHNIYAT ALI KHAN AFZALUDDAULA ASAF JAH V 1857-69 (b. 1827 d. 1869)

- Khurshid Jah
- Iqbaluddaula

(9) MIR MAHBOOB ALI KHAN ASAF JAH VI, 1869 - 1911 (b. 1866 d. 1911)

- Hasan-un-Nisa m. Khurshid Jah
  - Zafar Jang
- Parwarish-un-Nisa m. Asman Jah
- Jahandarunnisa m. Iqbaluddaula
  - Sultanul-Mulk
    - Farid Nawaz Jang
    - Nazeer Nawaz Jang

(10) MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN ASAF JAH VII 1911-1950 (b. 1886 d. 1967)

- Ghous-un-Nisa m. Farid Nawaz Jang
- Dawood-un-Nisa m. Nazeer Nawaz Jang

- Mir Himayat Ali Khan Azam Jah (b. 1907 d. 1970)
  - Mir Barkat Ali Khan Mukarram Jah (b. 1933)
  - Mir Karamat Ali Khan Mufakham Jah (b. 1938)
- Mir Shujaat Ali Khan Moazzam Jah (b. 1907 d. 1987)

Note :- The ten rulers of Hyderabad State are shown in capitals. (Seven of these only are treated as successors to the title of Asaf Jah. No. 2, 3 and 4 not so treated).

CHAPTER ONE

DYNASTY

Dakhan hai nageena, angoothi hai jag
Angoothi kon hurmath, nageena hi lag

(The Deccan is the precious stone, the ring is the world the ring is valued only because of the jewel)

-Mulla Wajhi, a poet of the Qutb Shahi court

Dilli se chalo Dagh, karo sair Dakhan ki
Gauhar ki hui qadr samundar se nikal ke
Haidarabad rahe ta ba qayamat qaim
Yehi, ai Dagh, Musulmanon ki ek basti hai

(O Dagh, leave Delhi, and enjoy a trip to the Deccan
A pearl has value only when it comes out of the sea
May Hyderabad live forever
This, O Dagh is the only place
For Muslims to live)

– Dagh, court poet of the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, who belonged to the former Mughal ruling family of Delhi

There were two men in late medieval India who could have provided role models for Mir Osman Ali Khan, the seventh Nizam. One was the founder of the Nizam's own dynasty, the first Asaf Jah, while the other was the last great Mughal Emperor, Aurangzeb, who spent much of his long life in an attempt to subjugate the Deccan. Aurangzeb had first come to the Deccan as a young man, appointed as Subedar or Viceroy by his father, the Emperor Shah Jehan. All his life he tried to establish the Mughals as the rulers of the whole of southern India. He apparently succeeded in this task, as Bijapur and Golconda, the last two independent kingdoms of the Deccan, fell to him twenty years before his death. But in attempting to subjugate the south, Aurangzeb failed to establish a stable system of governance for the empire as a whole. Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I was a protégé of Aurangzeb's who held the post of Subedar of the Deccan on more than one occasion. Ironically, it fell to his lot to make

the Deccan in fact, though not in name, independent of the Mughal Empire in Delhi.

The seventh Nizam went a step beyond his distant ancestor. While the first Nizam always showed the greatest respect for the Mughal emperors of Delhi, Mir Osman Ali Khan tried to become in name, as well as in fact, the ruler of the Deccan. He felt that British rule in India would come to an end, perhaps in his lifetime. During the Thirties, he declared a public holiday and began to hold an annual banquet to commemorate the alleged declaration of independence by the first Nizam, an event which never in fact took place. Even after he ceased to be the ruler, he was delighted to know that the Indian journalist, D.F.Karaka, was writing a book about him which was to be called *Fabulous Mogul.* He enjoyed the phrase, repeating it once or twice with gusto. Evidently he considered it an eminently suitable description of himself. He was astonished to know that some people thought the phrase referred to the Aga Khan. He pointed out that the Aga Khan was a Persian and not a Mughal. In contrast, he implied, the Nizam's family was of Central Asian origin, and came of Mughal stock.

By putting forth a claim to independence, the last Nizam rejected the advice of his own constitutional advisers, including Sir Walter Monckton, a close friend of Lord Louis Mountbatten, who hoped to ensure that Hyderabad enjoyed a high status in the Indian Union. Thus Mir Osman Ali Khan asserted an independence which was not justified by historical evidence or by the actual position.

In 1947, when the British handed over power to India in New Delhi, he actually declared himself independent. The idea of acceding to India or even to Pakistan was contrary to his concept of his State's power and dignity, and the State was, in his view, inseparable from himself.[1]

It has been stated that, 'Both Aurangzeb and the Nizam, fanatically religious as they were, had drawn their inspiration for plain living from Abu Bakr, the first Khalifa of Islam. For Nizam Usman Ali it was even more natural to make Abu Bakr his model in this respect as he and the preceding Nizams traced their descent from him.'

This interpretation by D.P. Misra is however not likely to be acceptable to a student of Islamic history.

The Asaf Jahi dynasty was thus the successor to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, a post created by Emperor Shah Jehan in order to administer

his territory in the southern part of India. Aurangzeb himself held the post of Subedar for a total of thirteen years, between 1636 and 1658.

Aurangzeb's original task had been to suppress the revolt of Shivaji, the leader of the Marathas, whose remarkable fighting qualities, administrative skills and personal charisma gave rise to the Maratha state which survived till 1819 and continues to inspire many in India even today.

Shivaji's father, Sambhaji, had been a high official of the Bijapur court. Bijapur and Golconda were the last two surviving states of the Deccan which had withstood the depredations of the Mughals. The Qutb Shahi rulers of Golconda had accepted the suzerainty of the Mughals during Shah Jehan's time, but Aurangzeb was determined to annex the state. He was prevented from doing so in 1656 only by the personal intervention of Shah Jehan.

Aurangzeb found a pretext to invade and conquer Golconda only in 1687. Bijapur had been annexed the previous year. Thus two additional provinces of Bijapur and Hyderabad were added to the Mughal viceroyalty.

In 1591, the fourth ruler of Golconda, Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, had founded the city of Hyderabad as a planned city, with the Charminar as its central point. This new city was built to take care of the overflow of population from the fort of Golconda. After Aurangzeb captured Golconda, the city of Hyderabad was reduced to a provincial headquarter under the viceroy at Aurangabad. Thus Aurangabad became the headquarters of almost the whole of South India with subordinate Nawabships at Srikakulam, Rajahmundry, Kurnool and Arcot.

Aurangzeb died at Ahmednagar in his eighty-ninth year in 1707 and was buried at Aurangabad. He was succeeded by Bahadur Shah. In 1713, Aurangzeb's grandson, Farrukhsiyar, succeeded to the title of Mughal Emperor at Delhi. He appointed Asaf Jah as Viceroy of the Deccan at Aurangabad. The latter considered the Deccan the most suitable place where he could build a secure refuge, which he could rule undisturbed by the intrigues at the court of Delhi and the threats of invasion from the North-Western Frontier. In 1720, Asaf Jah rallied his followers after crossing the Narmada river. Again in 1724 he broke away from his post, defeated and killed Mubariz Khan, the officially appointed Viceroy, and found himself in possession of almost the whole of South India.

During the next seventy-six years till 1800, he and his successors maintained their control at least of the core area of the Deccan, although

they were challenged by the Marathas in western and southern India—Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan of Mysore and the French and English from their respective headquarters at Pondicherry and Madras.

The last will and testament of Asaf Jah I is a document of great interest, because of its combination of practical advice based on common-sense, its respect for the imperial power at Delhi, and the generally low profile which he wanted his successors to maintain in order to avoid provoking their enemies.

The founder of the Asaf Jahi rule in the Deccan never declared himself independent, although he could easily have done so. He pointed out that the family had laid its fortunes when Aurangzeb appointed his ancestor, Abid Quli Khan to a high post. It was necessary for the family to respect the trust reposed in them. In time of war they should take the help of elders and saints and follow the Sunna (sayings and practice of the Prophet). The Mughal Emperor should be given due respect as the suzerain of the Government of the Deccan. 'Do not make yourself a sinner in this respect,' he urged his successors and said:

> 'When Nadir Shah came to Delhi, he offered me the Sultanate of Delhi, but I said no benefit will accrue to me. I will become *namak haram* (untrue to my salt) and you will also be guilty of breach of trust. He appreciated my reply and the next day he offered me Mukhtar-i-Kul (full powers) and went away from Delhi.'

He wanted his successors (whom he referred to not as rulers but as nobles, or Rais-i-Dakhan), to treat the Marathas, 'who are the Zamindars of the country (mulk),' with respect and peacefully. He did not want them to kill people unnecessarily. 'People are not wheat or *jawar*. Hand over criminals to the *Qazi* (judge) for justice.'

He referred to the Deccan as 'Hukumat' or government, of a 'Riyasat' or country. He never referred to it as a kingdom or sultanate, let alone as an empire. He did not wish his successors to take the initiative to begin a war for the sake of wealth or glory, or to express war-like sentiment,

> because God does not like such things... . Only when the enemy considers us to be weak, then we have no option but to go to war. In this situation ask God for help and try to defeat the enemy.[2]

Thus the founder of the Asaf Jahi rule in the Deccan, although cast in the mould of Emperor Aurangzeb, realized his limitations, and never claimed to be king.

In keeping with the first Nizam's advice, the third Nizam, Sikandar Jah refused in 1810 the title of King which was offered to him by the British Governor-General, Lord Hastings, who was anxious to make it clear that the British power was not dependent on the Mughal name for its authority. The rulers of Awadh at Lucknow accepted the title, but the kingdom was wiped out by the British in 1856, while the Nizam continued to rule. In 1858, the Nizam had to be informed by the British that the Mughal Emperor had now been removed from the throne of Delhi and hence it was no longer necessary to issue coins in his name. The first Nizam ruled the Deccan from Aurangabad and is buried in that city. It was his son, the second Nizam, Mir Nizam Ali Khan, who shifted his capital from Aurangabad to Hyderabad.

The so-called independence of the Nizams did not last long. The main challenge to the first Nizam came from the Marathas, who claimed the right to levy *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*, a tax in the form of booty, enforced by arms.

The death of the first Nizam in 1748 was a signal for the emergence of a struggle between the French and English, using the various claimants to the Nizamate as pawns in the game. In spite of the weakness of the Mughal Empire as a centre of power, it still enjoyed enormous prestige, but the real power struggle took place in the south. The contest for power between 1748 and 1750 was between Nasir Jang, Nizam-ul-Mulk's second son, and Muzaffar Jang, his grandson. The former, who was the British nominee, defeated Muzaffar Jang in battle, with the help of a small English force. But Muzaffar Jang obtained armed support from the Raja of Mysore, as well as an additional French armed force, under the command of de Bussy, one of the closest associates of Dupleix, which defeated and killed Nasir Jang in the battle at Arcot. Muzaffar Jang was in fact little more than a French puppet. Bussy established his armed force at Hyderabad. When Muzaffar Jang was murdered only two months later, Bussy promptly put on the gaddi, his uncle, Salabat Jang, who managed to hold on to power for eleven years, before he was ousted by a younger brother, Nizam Ali Khan.

The emergence in 1751 of the son of Nizam-ul-Mulk as the ruler of the Deccan with French support signalled a major change in the pattern of political power in the south. While the Marathas and the *de facto* rulers of Mysore, Hyder Ali and his son, Tipu Sultan, continued to dominate southern India by their military prowess, the only power of the Deccan

which enjoyed legitimacy by virtue of its link with the Mughal Empire was to be propped up by outside forces.

The Peshwas of Poona, the rulers of Mysore, the French and English, each had their diplomatic envoys who sought to influence events within the Nizam's dominions by propping up one or another individual as Diwan. This pattern continued till the definitive treaties of 1798 and 1800 under which the Nizam signed away his independence to the English East India Company.

The 1750s were the high point of French influence in the Deccan. The French adventurer, Bussy, was so powerful that he was the real kingmaker of the State. It was his military prowess that kept Salabat Jang on the gaddi of the Deccan. Aurangabad was the capital of the viceroyalty till about 1770, but the balance of power was maintained by Bussy from his armed forces' headquarters at Hyderabad. Hyderabad's Troop Bazar still bears the name which it acquired when it housed the barracks of Bussy's troops and the storehouse of arms located nearby.

Bussy's power can be gauged from the fact that almost the entire northern circars (the area from Srikakulam to Guntur) were allotted to him as his personal jagir as a reward for his defence of Salabat Jang's gaddi. Any whiff of revolt against Salabat Jang was immediately suppressed by Bussy with his well-trained armed force, owing personal loyalty to him. The famous war between the states of Vizianagaram and Bobbili near Vishakhapatnam, celebrated in Telugu legend, took place at this time.

Although the French were able to defend the Nizam's interests with great tenacity, the latter was unable to understand the French policy of recalling their officials. They were used to soldiers of fortune like those from Central and Western Asia who remained with a ruler as long as he desired their services, if not for life.

In 1758, Nizam Ali Khan, the younger brother of Salabat Jang, marched from Aurangabad to Hyderabad with a large body of troops and forced his acceptance by his brother as Diwan. Three years later he was able to depose and imprison Salabat Jang and declare himself Nizam. Unlike Nasir Jang, Muzaffar Jang and Salabat Jang, Nizam Ali Khan was able to obtain the formal sanction of the Mughal Emperor for his appointment to the viceroyalty of the Deccan. Hence he is listed in the textbooks as the second Nizam, although technically he was the fourth ruler from the family.

In 1756, the Seven Years' War between France and England broke out. Two years later Bussy was recalled from the Deccan by the French Government. This was a severe blow to the second Nizam. Bussy's successor was defeated in battle by the English Colonel, Forde, and the French lost control of the northern circars. The Nizam thus lost his most valiant defenders, the French, and now sought support alternately from the Marathas, the rulers of Mysore, and the British. The attempts by the French to recover their lost territories in India after the Seven Years' War were unsuccessful, and they had to content themselves with rendering support from outside to Indian rulers who were fighting the English East India Company. Among these powers were Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan of Mysore, who played a major role in South Indian politics from the 1760s till 1799. A number of French adventurers served the Indian courts at the time, including Benoit de Boigne in Gwalior, Perron in Poona, Claude Martin in Oudh (Awadh), and Raymond in Hyderabad. These adventurers maintained their position by their military skills and the force of their personalities. Monsieur Raymond became a major force in the Nizam's dominions, although, unlike his predecessor, Bussy, he did not command any French troops, but only an Indian force which he had trained himself.

The Mughal Empire had acquired such prestige that none could challenge the concept, however powerful they were in practice. The British won control over Bengal, Bihar and Orissa by conquest, but accepted a position of subordination to the Mughal Emperor, and even to the Nawab of Bengal, who was only a puppet. As we have seen, this acceptance of Mughal legitimacy by the British in Bengal had its parallels in French and English policy in the Deccan and South India.

In 1759, the circars of Machchlipatnam and Nizampatam and other districts were formally ceded to the English East India Company by the Nizam. In 1765, Robert Clive obtained a grant from the Mughal Emperor for the entire northern circars, and the English fortified the fort of Kondapally. The situation was accepted by the Nizam only in the following year 1766 when four circars were permanently transferred to the English Company by treaty, in consideration of a rent of nine lakh rupees per year. A Subsidiary Force of armed troops was also set up by the English to assist the Nizam in case of need. The Nizam was also required to assist the English with troops. A further Treaty of Perpetual Friendship and Alliance was signed in 1768, after a period of flirtation with Hyder Ali.

The third Mysore War (1790–1792) was the consequence of a Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance, signed in 1790 between the Nizam, the Peshwa, and the English Company. The war led to the defeat of Tipu Sultan and the Nizam gained Gooty, Cuddapah and other areas, along with a tribute of ten lakh rupees.

A few years later, in 1795, the Nizam suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Marathas in the Battle of Kharda and had to cede a lot of territory. He resented the English refusal to assist him in spite of treaty commitments and began to depend more and more on his French-trained forces, consisting of 14,000 men, commanded by M. Raymond. Unfortunately for the Nizam, Raymond died suddenly in 1798, and the Nizam was therefore thrown back into the arms of the British.

In 1798, the British Governor-General, Lord Mornington took the bold step of offering to guarantee the Nizam against an attack by the Marathas, on condition that the French Corps was disbanded. He was afraid that if he did not do so, the Nizam would be forced to ally himself with Tipu Sultan, who would thus become invincible. The Treaty of 1798 followed the Nizam's acceptance of the English offer. It made the Subsidiary Force (created by the 1759 treaty) permanent, and raised it to six batallions costing twenty-four lakhs per year. The Nizam's French Corps was to be disbanded; all disputes between the Nizam and the Peshwa were to be handled by the English Company, and their decision given 'full approbation and acquiescence' by the Nizam.

The Nizam's decision to allow the English to disband his Corps, officered by Frenchmen and other Europeans, created a stir in other native courts. A major Indian power, perhaps for the first time had, 'definitely decided to trust to the British alliance, and had, for good or evil, resolved to throw in his lot with theirs, to trust to their protection and to heed their advice.'[3]

Although there had been a British Resident at the Nizam's court since 1779, it was only after the death of Monsieur Raymond in 1798 that the Resident came into his own. The warm personal relations that characterized the Nizam's dealings with Raymond were also seen in his relations with Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, whom he showered with honours and titles and who was able to negotiate the Treaty of 1798. He also married Khairunnisa, a Hyderabad Muslim girl from a good family,

with the full consent of the Nizam. The Residency building was commenced at his initiative in 1803, and was completed five years later.

In 1799, the Nizam took part in the fourth Mysore War and his troops were led by Mir Alam, one of his courtiers who had been in the pay of the British Government at Calcutta for several years. The war led to the death of Tipu Sultan and the destruction of his state, which was partly dismembered, the core area being handed over to the Maharaja of Mysore, whose family had been displaced by Hyder Ali a few decades earlier. Within a few months, the Nizam signed away his independence by the Treaty of 1800.

The British now controlled almost the whole of South India, having destroyed Tipu Sultan and bought off the Nizam. The Nawab of Arcot and the new Maharaja of Mysore were their creatures. Only the Maratha chiefs remained to be disposed of.

The Treaty of Perpetual and General Defensive Alliance between the East India Company and the Nizam was negotiated by the Resident, James Achilles Kirkpatrick, under instructions from the Governor-General in 1800. This was the culmination of a number of treaties entered into by the Nizam between 1765 and 1798, according to which the British gradually acquired a stranglehold over the Nizam's external and internal affairs.

The Subsidiary Force in Secunderabad set up by the previous treaties was raised to eight batallions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry. For the maintenance of this force, the Nizam had to cede the territories in Rayalaseema which he had acquired by the Treaties of Srirangapatnam (1792) and Mysore (1799) viz., the districts of Cuddapah and Bellary.

The treaty marks the surrender by the Nizam of his status as an independent ruler and the State becoming, 'the premier state in subordinate alliance with the British Government.' Although the first article spoke of the, 'peace, union and friendship of the two states being perpetual,' the second article made it clear that the British Government had taken the Nizam's government under its protection, and would defend it against any unprovoked attack. The Nizam undertook, 'neither to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiations with any other power without giving previous notice, and consulting the Company's Government.' He also agreed,'never to commit any act of hostility against any power whatever, and to settle all disputes in accordance with the desires of the Company's Government.'

Perhaps the only provision in the treaty which recognized specifically the autonomy of the Nizam was that in which the Company's government declared, 'that they have no manner of concern with any of His Highness's children, relations, subjects or servants with respect to whom His Highness is absolute.' The force of this provision is considerably reduced, however, when it is read in conjunction with Article 6 of the Treaty of 1798 which provides for the dismissal of the Frenchmen in the Nizam's service, and the prohibition of the employment and residence in the State of any Europeans what so ever without the knowledge and consent of the Company's Government.

As a result of the treaties of 1798 and 1800, the Nizam entirely surrendered his external independence. He also recognized by implication the fact that he did not exercise complete authority over his territories. From a buffer state, the Nizam's dominions had become a protectorate.[4]

According to a widely-held British view, the Nizam was, 'straw-stuffed and held upright,' by the Company, except for a very brief period when the Marathas held down the State. Having neither racial nor religious cohesion, the State was kept alive by one man—the Nizam. It was saved from disintegration by the coming of the British.[5]

There is a good deal of evidence to support this view. Unlike the Nizam, the Marathas were genuinely independent. At the Battle of Kharda in 1795, the Nizam's troops fled. The Marathas won the fight as cheaply as the British had won Plassey in 1757. Although it had a territory as large as France, the Nizam's dominions enjoyed only a fictitious independence. After 1795, the next battle fought by the Nizam's army on its own was in December 1948 against Indian troops, where it put up an equally poor fight. Hyderabad officers and men served in the British-Indian Army in the two world wars, but the Hyderabad Army itself had very little to show in the way of success on the battlefield.

A strong element of medievalism pervaded the culture of Hyderabad, because of the origin of the ruling class and the social hierarchy which moulded the political institutions in the State. Tribe, rather than class, was the original basis of classifying persons in the social hierarchy. Tribe among the Muslims, and caste among the Hindus, nurtured the human qualities of the family and the individual.

A family could rise in the social structure, but it was difficult for it to do so unless some member of it acquired a strong patron or achieved upward mobility through administrative acumen, accompanied by a modicum of good luck. The principle of nobility which dominated the thinking of the State's rulers and subjects was brought to the Deccan from Central Asia. The Central Asian institution of nobility differed considerably from that of Europe as well as that of India.

These Central Asian institutions underwent many changes in the Indian context in North India and in the Deccan. The Mughal nobility was identified in terms of rank, expressed in terms of the number of horses which the official was expected to maintain, ranging from a few hundred to several thousand.

The mansabs or salaries which were fixed for these officials were often paid by an assignment of the revenue on a piece of land, which was called a jagir or estate. In return for this assignment of land, the jagirdar was expected to maintain troops which had to be supplied to the ruler whenever required for the suppression of a rebellion.

In northern India, in keeping with the Central Asian tradition, the land throughout the kingdom was considered to be the property of the sovereign. 'The royal grants consist only of pension either in land or money which the king gives, augments, retrenches or takes away at pleasure.' This was unlike the system in Europe, where there was a hereditary claim to a particular territory on the part of a Duke, Earl, or Marquis.

In the Deccan, however, the jagirdari system underwent further changes, because the Mughal Empire came to the region when it was already in decline in the north. The most important difference was in the position of the ruling family of Hyderabad. The Nizam's family did not belong to the ruling Mughal stock; they were not Begs or Mirzas. Hence they could not claim kingship. Nevertheless, many of the customs of the Mughal ruling family began to be adopted by the Nizams. In addition to being Viceroy of the Deccan, the Nizam was also a jagirdar, who controlled large private estates, known as the Sarf-i-Khas territory.[6]

Most of the Asaf Jahi rulers upto 1857 were appointed to the viceroyalty of the Deccan through Mughal firmans. The Mughal emissary who brought the auspicious firman from Delhi was welcomed with the ceremonial beating of drums and made the proclamation of the Nizam's appointment on a hillock near the Hussainsagar lake, which consequently

is still known as Naubat Pahad. The practice however, had to cease when the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar was deposed soon after the Revolt of 1857. The Nizam, Nasir-ud-Daula and his son, Afzal-ul-Daula continued to issue coins in the name of the Mughals and to read the Qutba in the name of the Mughals till 1858, when the Government of India pointed out that coinage should not be issued in the name of a non-existent emperor.

The suba of Aurangabad was set up, with Daulatabad as its capital in 1634, during the reign of Shah Jehan. The addition of the eastern territories was made only in 1687, after the fall of Golconda. Nizam-ul-Mulk introduced to the eastern Deccan the administrative practices he had learnt from Aurangzeb. Even while they were being introduced, these practices underwent modification due to the peculiar circumstances of the place and time. The Mughal system of land grants was to allot jagirs to noblemen who were subject to transfer every three or four years. The merit of the practice was that it made the jagirdars completely dependent upon royal favour.

The jagirdars of Hyderabad had in theory no proprietary rights and were entitled only to the revenue accruing from the land. In practice, however, the grant became hereditary. These jagirs (including the Nizam's Sarf-i-Khas occupied forty per cent of the total of Hyderabad State at the time of the Police Action, i.e. about 33,000 square miles out of a total State territory of 82,700 square miles. The jagir areas included 37.2 per cent of the villages and about one-third of the total population of eighteen million, in the event of jagir abolition in 1949.

Seventeen of the major jagirs at the time of Hyderabad State coming to an end had been declared by the Nizam to be exempt from the jurisdiction of Khalsa or Diwani administration. These included three Paigah jagirs, five Samasthans and nine ilaqas and estates of premier nobles.

The original jagirdars were the followers of Asaf Jah I who had accompanied him from Malwa as his personal followers. Among them were military commanders, who were granted jagirs on military tenure and received the title of Jamedar. The Nizam also granted a number of jagirs for the carrying on of the administrative work in the Department of Revenue and Finance. These included the Kayastha family which was given the charge of Daftar-i-Mal (the Revenue Office) and entrusted with the management of the eastern subas of the Deccan. At the same time the Maratha Brahmin family of Raja Rai Rayan were given the charge of four western subas of the Deccan. Moreover, a large number of indigenous

chieftains who held sanads or grants from earlier rulers, some of them confirmed by the Mughals, were recognized as rulers on payment of tribute and were allowed to exercise semi-independent powers within their estates.

The most important of the jagirdars, apart from the Nizam himself, was the Paigah family. This family owed its origin to Abul Khair Khan, whose father came to Hyderabad from Malwa, and who held high office since the time of the second Nizam, Nawab Nizam Ali Khan.

The term Paigah has been interpreted differently as meaning, 'the place where the foot of the ruler is kept,' or 'stable'. The Paigah family were expected to provide cavalry and were the bodyguards of the Nizam. Large jagirs were given to them for maintaining troops to protect the person of the Nizam. This closeness eventually led to intermarriage, and their holding the highest status in the dominions next to the Nizam's family. In the late nineteenth century, the Paigah family estates were divided, by Salar Jang I as Prime Minister, into three branches, the Asman Jahi, the Khurshid Jahi and the Viqar-ul-Umra Paigahs.

Within their own jurisdiction, each branch had full control of revenue and judicial functions and operated its own departments of education, public works, health, and survey and settlement. They were exempted from paying any rent or tax. They were however expected to provide troops for the Nizams, although this service had not been carried out in practice for a long time.

The five Samasthans which were exempted from Diwani jurisdiction were Gadwal, Wanaparti, Jatprole, Amarchinta and Palvancha. There were nine other Samasthans which were required to pay taxes to the Nizam's government. These had come into being prior to the Mughal rule in the Deccan, and had been allowed to continue under the Mughals and Asaf Jahi rulers.

The high sounding title of Umra-e-Uzzam (premier nobles) was given to only four families, the Salar Jang, the Chandu Lal (Kishen Pershad), the Khane Khanan, and the Fakhrul Mulk families. These family estates were also referred to as ilaqas, and were exempted from paying tax or revenue. Next in rank to these four families came the five estates of the Malwala family, the Diwani family (Rai Rayan), the state of Kalyani, and the Suraya Jang and Mehdi Jang families.

The other jagirs were much smaller units. Most of these jagirdars were holders of one village only, and their administration was of a rudimentary order. They did not provide welfare activities. These jagirs were not exempted from paying taxes, and many of them were conditional upon some service being rendered. They accounted for 3,122 villages covering an area of 11,619 square miles.

Jagirs were scattered all over the Hyderabad State, whose map resembled a patchwork quilt. The same jagirdar would have villages lying hundreds of miles apart from one another . To obtain redress for grievances, a ryot may have to travel long distances, and even then not obtain proper redress. The jagir administration did not affect the primary relationship between the tenant-cultivator and the owner of the land. It was concerned only with the relationship between the State, the revenue collector and the land owner. The jagirdar thus constituted an intermediary between the Nizam's government on the one hand and the land owner on the other.

The system made possible a large number of feudal exactions such as nazars and gifts, and the enjoyment of unpaid, or partly paid for, labour and supplies. In those jagirs where revenue was not paid, the exactions were even more than in the ordinary jagirs. The nation-building activities of the government did not extend to the jagir areas in any substantial manner.

The title 'Asaf Jahi' was proudly borne by those families who came to Hyderabad with the first Nizam and had the right of access to the ruler by virtue of this hereditary claim. Not all of them belonged to the Umra-e-Uzzam but all of them were jagirdars of greater of lesser rank.

The culture of the jagirdar class was an important factor which provided continuity to the Nizam's rule. As a class, they were not given to hard work, as the obligation of providing troops to the ruler had become a dead letter long before the last Nizam came to the gaddi. The jagirs, and mansabs which had been granted in exchange for certain military services to be rendered became an anachronism, as they became a kind of sinecure in the family, which had long since ceased to perform the duties prescribed when the original jagir was given.[7]

The political-administrative system of the State functioned with a traditional harmony based on the hierarchical principle with the Nizam at the top. He was surrounded by the Paigahs and the Umra-e-Uzzam, who had access to the ruler, by virtue of their hereditary position as jagirdars

and the titles which had been passed on from generation to generation since the founding of the State.[8]

Most of the Mughal traditions which were brought to Hyderabad by the first Nizam were sanctified and continued unchanged in the lotus-eating atmosphere which survived in Hyderabad State into the middle of the twentieth century. Innovation of any kind was frowned upon. Institutions created to change the structure of traditional Hyderabad themselves became encrusted with tradition and tended to lose their capacity for innovation soon after the individual who gave rise to the new institution was removed from the scene. The viceroyalty of the Deccan, which had acquired an autonomy arising out of the weakness of the Mughal state, became itself an embodiment of each new succeeding generation, as a favour rather than a right, gave way to an atmosphere where nobility carried with it rights and privileges, such as appointment to superior posts in government departments, while a person of higher intelligence and greater qualifications was consigned to a lower post, from which he could hardly hope to emerge in the course of his entire career.

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Within three years of the signing of the Treaty of 1800, under which the second Nizam became a subordinate ally of the British in India, Nizam Ali Khan died, and was succeeded by his son, Sikandar Jah.

The reigns of the next three Nizams, Sikandar Jah (1803–1829), his son, Nasir-ud-Daula (1829–1857) and grandson, Afzal-ud-Daula (1857–1868), coincided with a period of British dominance and intervention. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Treaty of 1800 which gave the Nizam almost complete control over his own internal administration, the British did not hesitate to intervene in all major matters relating to the State, including the succession of Nizams, the appointment of Diwans, and the maintenance of armed forces by the Nizam out of his own finances. This intervention was achieved through the giving of oral 'advice' which could be resisted only at the peril of the survival of the State itself. Although it was seldom necessary to administer a direct threat of destruction, a hint conveyed through a messenger was usually sufficient to bring a recalcitrant ruler or Diwan to heel.

No less a person than Sir Charles Metcalfe, Resident at Hyderabad from 1820 to 1830, pointed out in a Minute (extracts from which have been quoted in the second volume of Bilgrami and Wilmott's *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of the Nizam's Dominions*) that the third Nizam, Sikandar Jah was offered the gaddi under British protection, even before his father's death, on the clear understanding that he retained in power Aristo Jah, the Minister appointed by his father, who was in the pay of the British Government. On the death of Aristo Jah in 1804 the British insisted on his appointing as Diwan, Mir Alam, who had been the paid agent of the British, and had led the Nizam's Army at the Battle of Srirangapatnam in 1799, when Tipu Sultan was killed. In 1808, Mir Alam died; and then the British reluctantly agreed to Sikandar Jah's appointing his own choice, Munir-ul-Mulk, as Diwan, provided the real power lay with the Peshkar, Chandu Lal. When Munir-ul-Mulk died in 1832, Chandu Lal was treated as Diwan by the British, though he was never actually appointed to the post by the Nizam.

Sikandar Jah in fact was anti-British to the end. There was a party in his court consisting of Raja Rao Rambha Nimbalkar, Noor-ul-Umra and Raja Mahipat Ram, which was opposed to British influence. At one time Sikandar Jah, who, 'swore by the head of M. Raymond,' had wanted to appoint Mahipat Ram, another Raymond admirer, as Diwan, but the British would have none of it. Sikandar Jah was not even allowed to choose his own successor. Perhaps to spite the British, he sought to have his brother, Akbar Jah, placed on the masnad in preference to his own sons. But when he died in 1829, the succession of his son, Nasir-ud-Daula was quite peaceful. Meanwhile in 1815, the British had intervened to appoint a Commission of Inquiry and imprison for life another brother of Sikandar Jah, Mubariz-ud-Daula, who was implicated in a Wahabi conspiracy against the British.

The British were able to keep the Nizam in check because the Subsidiary Force, which had been created ostensibly for the protection of the Nizam, had been used to maintain British nominees in power. Not satisfied with this force, the Resident in 1812, Henry Russell started building up a force, at first called the Russell Brigade, and later the Nizam's Contingent, which was commanded by British officers but paid for entirely by the Nizam. Chandu Lal's appointment as Diwan with British support thus became the means of foisting this expensive hobby of Russell on the State exchequer. 'As one appointment followed another,

and fresh posts were created for new applicants, the proverbial expression current in Hyderabad was "Poor Nizzy pays for all".'

In 1811 a commercial firm, Palmer & Co, was established in Hyderabad by William Palmer, son of General Palmer, to open up the State for economic exploitation. In 1816 the firm was permitted by the Governor-General in Council to lend money to the Nizam, thus ensuring regular payments to the Russell Brigade. The Company was reimbursed by Minister Chandu Lal, by cash payments or by assignment of land. Districts were leased out to the highest bidder. Thus the entire revenue system of the State was mortgaged to the British interests in the State, as represented by the Residency and Palmer & Co. All this was made possible because the firm was managed by an unscrupulous man, Sir William Rumbold who was closely connected by marriage with the Governor-General, Lord Warren Hastings.

In 1820, Sir Charles Metcalfe became Resident at Hyderabad. He soon realized the extent to which the economy of the State was being drained by the British connection. He wanted the government to repay the loans taken by the Nizam from the firm, and recover the amount in stages from the Nizam. He was supported by the Home Government in England, but it was only after the departure of Hastings for home in 1823 that the debts of Palmer & Co. were settled, in return for which the Nizam waived the peshkash of seven lakh rupees per annum for the northern circars. Within a year, Palmer & Co. became bankrupt for want of funds to meet ordinary demands.

Maharaja Chandu Lal had come to Hyderabad from the Punjab and started life in a humble way as a stamp vendor, and *naqalnavis* or copyist. This financial acumen and his social graces enabled him to achieve the status of a sahukar (moneylender) and later rise to the official position of Peshkar which was something like a Minister of Finance reporting to the Diwan. Once in a position of power, Chandu Lal retained the position by playing a role utterly subservient to the British Residency.

Legend has it that Chandu Lal once spied from the top of his palace a man sitting on a donkey with his face to the tail of the animal. He sent for the man and asked him why he was travelling in this unorthodox manner. The man replied that he had been appointed Talukdar (Collector, or Chief Administrator) of a district and was taking this precaution to see whether any one else had been appointed to the same post by the Diwan.

He was afraid that the Diwan might have accepted a large bribe from a second applicant and appointed him to the post as well.

The British oscillated between two contradictory policies towards the Nizam's administration. By insisting on Maharaja Chandu Lal being retained in power and on the continuance of the Hyderabad Contingent, they were putting a heavy burden on the State's finances. However, occasional attempts were made to pressurize the Nizam to set right affairs, especially by reforming the revenue administration. Thus in 1821, Sir Charles Metcalfe persuaded the Government of India to introduce a general settlement of the land revenue for a period of five years on the principle of a village settlement, carried out on the basis of a careful scrutiny of past assessments, and collections by British officers.

The new system restored confidence among the ryots. Many villages which had been deserted were again occupied. But Metcalfe's successor, William Byum Martin criticized the settlement effected by the British officers appointed by Metcalfe. In 1829, the European Revenue superintendents were removed from the districts at the request of the new ruler, Nasir-ud-Daula, evidently at the instance of Chandu Lal. Thus the policy of non-interference in the affairs of Hyderabad followed by Governor-General Lord William Bentinck (1818–1835) led to a serious deterioration in the administration of the State.

The problem of balancing income with expenditure was a chronic one which faced all the Diwans from the time of Chandu Lal onwards. After the withdrawal of Metcalfe's system between 1832 and 1839, Chandulal made grants of land so recklessly that in later years sanads issued during his time were not accepted as proof of title unless corroborated by further evidence. In spite of a severe warning administered to the Nizam by the Board of Directors of the East India Company (probably at the instance of Metcalfe, who was acting Governor-General), Chandu Lal took no steps to increase the revenue or to reduce the expenditure of the State. He was forced to resign in 1843 when the payments of the Hyderabad Contingent fell into arrears and his appeal for a loan of one crore rupees evoked no response either from the British Government or from the Nizam personally.

Chandu Lal is still remembered in Hyderabad legend for his promises to pay tomorrow–(Chandu Lal *ka kal*)–a tomorrow that never came. After Chandu Lal's resignation in 1843, the Nizam changed his Diwan and Peshkar several times. It appears that he could hardly believe that the

British would allow him to appoint a Prime Minister of his choice. Chandu Lal's immediate successor for a short time was his nephew, Ram Baksh. Thereafter the post was kept vacant for three years and the Nizam put in his own money to the extent of two crores, but the State finances did not improve.

Nawab Siraj-ul-Mulk worked as Diwan from 1846 to 1849 and again from 1851 till his death in 1853. He made a sincere effort to reform the administration by appointing men of ability and experience to hold charge of the districts, to release lands from army jamedars and to pay fixed salaries to the taluqdars instead of commissions. However, such efforts did not receive the support of the British Government because of the attitude of Lord Dalhousie. It was only after the transfer of Berar to the British in 1853 that they permitted the Residency at Hyderabad to support the reform of the Nizam's administration.

The Resident at the time, General Stuart Fraser (1838–1852), was highly supportive of the efforts of Siraj-ul-Mulk to reform the administration. However, Fraser did not receive any support from Lord Dalhousie. In fact he was severely criticized by that statesman for having exceeded his functions by trying to improve the Nizam's government. He ultimately resigned in disgust, and was replaced by Colonel John Low, who was posted to Hyderabad for the specific purpose of getting the Nizam's government to sign away the province of Berar on which Dalhousie had his eye for a long time. Three years later, Low played a similar role in removing the last ruler of Oudh, Nawab Wajid Ali Shah.

Dalhousie told Fraser that the British had no moral or political obligation to take the government of his country into their own hands, merely because he mismanages his own affairs, and quoted a letter from the Diwan reporting, 'professed inability to pay will probably lead, more or less remotely to important consequences... .' This was a clear indication of his intention to intervene in the affairs of the State. The transfer of Berar took place four years later, in spite of the Nizam's counter-claims.

In 1849, the Hyderabad Contingent was the cause of the Nizam's government being in debt to the British Government to the extent of Rs 5,40,000. The Nizam's government had put in a counter-claim against the Government of India in 1852 on account of excise duties (taxes on

liquor) due to them from British army stations. Although this claim was later admitted, the arrears were never paid.

Meanwhile, the current cost of the Contingent fell into arrears. After General Fraser had been replaced by Colonel Low, the stage was set for the impending action in regard to Berar. In spite of British pressure, the Nizam refused to countenance Dalhousie's proposal for the assignment of territory in perpetuity. The Assistant Resident, Major Cuthbert Davidson, sent a note to the Diwan, warning him as a friend that troops were being moved from Poona unless the treaty was signed, and that the military would occupy the capital city of Hyderabad. The Nizam then capitulated, but as he still declined to accept a permanent cession, Colonel Low was forced to alter the language of the treaty to provide for a temporary transfer of territory.

The treaty signed in 1853 provided for the payment to the Nizam's government of any surplus over the expenditure on the administration of Berar, and for the furnishing of accounts by the British Government. The objects of the expenditure were the maintenance of the Contingent at a strength of 7,000 men; the liquidation of the debt amounting to Rs 48,00,000 Hali Sicca (Hyderabad currency); and the payment of the cost of administration.

Soon after the treaty was signed, the cost of the Contingent was drastically cut down within a year from Rs 40,00,000 to Rs 24,00,000, because the British Government was now paying for it out of the revenue of the assigned districts. Had a similar reduction been undertaken five years earlier, the whole of the debt (on account of which the assignment was necessary) would have been wiped out. Davidson admitted that the British, 'had no just claim,' on the Nizam for the debt of forty-three lakh rupees.

Dalhousie saw Berar as part of his overall strategy for the maintenance of internal and external security and the furtherance of economic progress. In addition he was being pressurized by the President of the Board of Control of the East India Company to open up, 'the great cotton districts of Berar,' to the western coast. Behind Sir Charles Wood's (President, Board of Control of the East India Company) anxiety was the pressure of the Manchester school of economists (Bright, Cobden, Phillimore and others) who demanded expenditure on vast public works like canals, roads and railway lines, and were firmly opposed to expenditure on the warlike 'forward policy'

of the Tories, under which the Government of India spent money on expanding its frontiers in the northwest.[9]

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Once the British Government had achieved its object of obtaining Berar (which, contrary to the terms of the treaty, they persisted in regarding as a lease in perpetuity), their policy towards the reform of the Nizam's administration totally changed. Soon after the signature of the treaty, Nawab Siraj-ul-Mulk died. He was succeeded by his nephew, Mir Turab Ali Khan, Salar Jang who, although only twenty-four years of age in 1853, set himself the task of reforming the administration, in the face of the opposition of vested interests in the court. He was fortunate in the good relations he enjoyed with his British friends in the Residency and outside.

Salar Jang's talents lay primarily in the field of finance. He had a pragmatic bent of mind, and quickly realized that the financial crisis which faced the State could be tackled only with the support of the banking community. He took steps to obtain loans from the bankers with the guarantee of the Nizam. The credit of the government gradually improved. Salaries were paid regularly. As a result of the goodwill thus generated, a cut of one-third was effected in the salaries of the armies. The system of coinage was reformed, and the State debt reduced.

Before the young Salar Jang could turn his attention to the restructuring of the State administration, he faced a serious challenge in the form of the Revolt of 1857. In Hyderabad, as in parts of northern India, the revolt took the form of a mutiny which affected both the Subsidiary Force at Secunderabad and the Hyderabad Contingent at Bolaram. The inspiration for the revolt came from orthodox elements, the so-called Wahhabis, who were actually the followers of Shah Waliullah, an eighteenth century thinker, and were determined that British rule in India should come to an end.

Although the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar had become the figure-head of the revolt in Delhi, and the Nizam's dynasty was traditionally loyal to the Mughals, both Salar Jang and the ruler, Nasir-ud-Daula, firmly resisted the attempts of orthodox elements to bring the Nizam's State into alliance with the revolt. Just after the fall of Delhi to the

mutineers, the Nizam died at the age of sixty-five on 19 May 1857. Shortly before his death he had his son brought to him by Salar Jang and advised him to remain faithful to the alliance with the British. The fifth Nizam, Afzal-ud-Daula, was thirty-one years of age, and was thus a few years older than Salar Jang. He seemed to have resented the fact that his father treated Salar Jang as more mature than his own son. Relations between the new ruler and Salar Jang were never very cordial after this. Several attempts made in the next decade to remove the latter from the post of Diwan failed, because of the British insistence on the continuance as Diwan of their loyal supporter. As a result, the Nizam withdrew more and more into his shell.

On 17 July 1857, five hundred Rohillas led by Maulvi Allauddin and Jamedar Turrebaz Khan attacked the Residency and were repulsed by the armed forces of the Resident. Turrebaz Khan was sentenced to transportation to the Andaman Islands. Maulvi Allauddin apparently escaped punishment, because the criminal law was still administered by his peers, the maulvis.

The Revolt of 1857 in North India had repercussions in the Deccan. An important leader, Tantia Tope, entered the Hyderabad territory and received support from some district officials, who were arrested and punished at the instance of the Resident. On 15 March 1859, a Pathan from Rampur named Jahangir Khan attacked the Resident, Major Davidson. Ironically the attack took place just after Davidson had presented a formal letter to the Nizam, congratulating him on the peaceful conditions in his dominions. The Resident was at the time walking arm-in-arm with Salar Jang. Although the attack was unsuccessful, it was clear that there was strong opposition to the Nizam's and Salar Jang's policy of opposing the revolt.

As late as March 1862, the Resident brought to the notice of Salar Jang the fact that about five hundred rebels, led by one Rama Rao, Raghunath, or Rao Sahib, had fled southwards from Ujjain. The leader had subsequently entered the Nizam's dominions from Sholapur, travelled to Hyderabad, and received the support of sahukars, from Hyderabad. Davidson complained to Salar Jang about the inactivity of the Kotwal or Chief of city police. He was not satisfied with the Minister's defence of the latter, but felt that he was under great obligation to the 'Sahoocars', who were the, 'chief support of Salar Jang's administration

in all pecuniary matters.' It would therefore have been too much to expect Salar Jang to take action against them.

The State administration was organized by Salar Jang on the model of the British Indian administration, which he was able to personally study in the districts returned to the State under the Treaty of 1860. The financial and administrative reforms were carried forward by a major alteration in revenue and economic policy. The gross land revenue more than doubled between 1853 and 1881. The percentage of collection on demand in the Nizam's dominions was 98.85 per cent, while in the Bombay Presidency it was 97.52 per cent, although survey and settlement had been completed in Bombay and not in Hyderabad. In his administrative reforms Salar Jang received the full support of the British Residents, especially Sir George Yule, Sir Richard Temple, and C.B. Saunders, all of whom had rich experience of administration in British India.

Salar Jang completely restructured the judiciary, and introduced educational institutions which for the first time brought the modern educational system to the State. An Oriental College, Darul Uloom was opened in 1854, one of its objects being to produce young men for the service of the State. A number of schools were started as well as a Civil Engineering college under the Public Works Department, and a Medical college which was run by the Residency surgeon.

Salar Jang's services to the British in the revolt were so substantial that they could never be forgotten. Not only did he receive personal titles and honours, he also received political support when the Nizam was on the point of dismissing him from the Diwanship on a number of occasions. He survived two attempts on his life, and several intrigues intended to precipitate his resignation or force his dismissal. During the crisis of January to March 1867, the Nizam was pressing for his resignation on the one hand, and Queen Victoria was about to confer the high honour of Knight Commander of the Star of India (KCSI) on the other. However, Salar Jang managed to remain in office due to strong British support.[10]

It is difficult to find an objective assessment of the atmosphere in the court of Hyderabad. The Urdu accounts available, written by loyal subjects of the Nizam, are coloured by an undue reverence for the ruler, and a consequent inability to be truly objective. The British accounts are less inhibited, since they were written for official consumption, or for readers

at 'home' in Britain. Thus Sir Richard Temple, a distinguished British official who served as Resident at Hyderabad for a short period in the 1860s, recorded a shrewd and frank analysis of the fifth Nizam, Nawab Afzal-ud-Daula.

He described Afzal-ud-Daula as, 'a Mohammadan of the best Mogul blood, and born of a stock which had sent forth men of courage, capacity and perseverance...' However, 'he had never learnt even the rudiments of government, had received but a slight education, and was not actually competent for conducting any important business.' In keeping with his Central Asian ancestry, he had, 'a tall and massive figure, a handsome countenance, and the dark blue eyes characteristic of his race.' Although as a young man he had been trained in, 'manly sports and pursuits...he had long led a secluded life in his palace and garden, associating chiefly with humble dependants.' His health had suffered due to, 'his own imprudence.' Moreover, 'soothsayers or astrologers had power over his impressionable mind. If there was any idea in politics on which his thoughts fixed themselves it was this, that whatever thing had novelty must be evil, and that any so called reforms which the British Resident might suggest should be regarded with circumspection... .'

What Temple omitted to mention was that this state of affairs was largely a result of the thraldom to which the british Residency had reduced the Nizams by excluding them from all major decision-making, and foisting on them a series of Diwans whom they tolerated only because of their British connection.

In 1869, only a year after Salar Jang survived the second threat on his life, the fifth Nizam, Afzal-ud-Daula, died after an illness of a few days. Since his successor, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan was only two years old, a Regency was created consisting of Sir Salar Jang and the Amir-i-Kabir, the head of the Paigah family. The Resident, C.B. Saunders paid tribute to the, 'eminent ability, singular rectitude of purpose and numerous high qualities of Salar Jang. I have seen no other example of the Asiatic mind where subtlety of intellect blends so happily with honesty of heart and public integrity as in him.'[11]

Within a few short years of the expression of these warm sentiments, the British had changed their opinion of Salar Jang, and regarded him as a threat to the stability of British rule in India. The change took place due to Salar Jang's insistence on the return to the Nizam's government of the

sequestered province of Berar, and the continued efforts he made to obtain its return. These efforts were supported by arguments, legalistic in nature, and couched in increasingly strong language. The Maharaja of Mysore who had been deposed by the British in 1850, was at the same time trying to obtain the return of his kingdom. The agents of the Maharaja seem to have come across Salar Jang's agents in London, and the two worked together to obtain the return of their lost territories. The Mysore Maharaja succeeded, but Salar Jang failed, because the British were afraid of strengthening 'a Mohammadan state'.

Salar Jang also clashed with the British on a number of other issues including the education of the young Nizam, the building up of an armed force, the financing of the Nizam's State Railway and the building up of a sphere of influence in South Arabia. The Prince of Wales' visit to India in 1857, enabled Salar Jang to establish direct contacts with the heir to the throne of England, the future Edward VII and to try and use his influence with the Queen to get back Berar.

During Salar Jang's triumphal tour of England in 1876, he obtained many honours, but no concrete support for his demand that Berar be returned to him. In fact, Viceroy Lytton and the Secretary of State, Salisbury in their personal correspondence were referring to Salar Jang as, 'the most dangerous man in India,' and were talking of his removal as,' a consummation devoutly to be wished. 'At the Delhi Durbar in 1877, just after his return from England, Salar Jang accepted the supremacy of Her Majesty, the Empress of India over His Highness the Nizam, 'according to existing treaties.' His insistence on referring to the treaties was annoying to the British Viceroy and officials, because they wanted the Queen's supremacy to be recognized unconditionally.

The British finally decided to take drastic action after Salar Jang's refusal to accept as Co-Regent the younger brother of the Amir-i-Kabir, when the latter died in April 1875. Viceroy Lytton ordered Resident Meade to take all necessary steps to ensure Salar Jang's compliance with the Government's decision, threatening meanwhile his arrest and deportation to Madras. Faced with the alternative, Salar Jang gave in and accepted the appointment of a Co-Regent.

After this dramatic episode, Salar Jang lay low and accepted the British position of supremacy, concentrating on the restructuring of the administration, which however could not fructify before his untimely

death in 1883. He had not completely given up the claim on Berar and accepted the negative judgement of the British only under protest. He hoped that Berar would be restored to the Nizam at some future date. Salar Jang died suddenly at the age of fifty-three in February 1883, leaving a gap which could never be filled.

Within a year of Salar Jang's death, his elder son, Mir Laiq Ali Khan, was appointed Diwan by Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, when the latter was invested with full powers by the Viceroy, Lord Ripon, in February 1884. However, the friendship between the young prince and his minister did not long survive the intrigues of the court. In March 1887, the Diwan left the city without seeing the Nizam and resigned on grounds of ill-health in mid-April.[12]

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Throughout the nineteenth century, the British played a game with the Indian states. They were allowed to exist without the reality of independence, guaranteeing their boundaries, but giving them no internal autonomy, using the argument of good government to intervene in the states, but refraining from pressurizing them to improve the system itself.

The British Resident in the Indian states has been described by a French observer as, 'a servant who directs his nominal master, haughty, polite, impertinent and ironical.' The Residents were described as 'spies' whose reports were accepted by the government in preference to the views of the states, which did not get a hearing. K.M. Panikkar commented that, 'All those who have direct experience of Indian states know that the whisper of the Residency is the thunder of the state, and that there is no matter on which the Resident does not feel qualified to give advice.'

The British desire for legitimacy was expressed in the extravagant ceremonial trappings of authority which they adopted to impress the Indian mind. The British salute table for India by the early twentieth century gave the King Emperor a 101-gun salute, and the Viceroy a thirty-one-gun salute. Some 113 princes got salutes from twenty-one to nine guns, and the remaining princes no salutes at all.

British influence on the Indian states was not necessarily intended to ensure good government. It was primarily to ensure the continuance of British rule in India and of British influence in the state. Only after these criteria were taken care of was some importance given to efficient and honest management of a state within the parameters already laid down. Much depended on the commitment and competence of the official holding the post of Resident at the time.

The Revolt of 1857 forced the British to consider the Indian states as a permanent fixture in India. They were now regarded more and more as a bulwark against popular revolt. In the years after the revolt, there was an upsurge of anti-Muslim feeling among the British rulers of India. With the foundation of the Indian National Congress, this policy changed to the support of a separate Muslim identity to counter the newly rising nationalist forces. Hyderabad State was, however, always looked upon with a certain suspicion, as the British suspected that the State was capable of asserting its identity, and even of allying itself with the Ottoman Empire, the only powerful Muslim power at the time.

The death of the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar in exile at Burma, gave the Tories under Benjamin Disraeli an opportunity to declare Queen Victoria as Empress of India. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy who initiated the process which culminated in the Delhi Durbar of January 1877, explained his motives, stating that his object in, 'organising with so much elaboration the great Assemblage recently held at Delhi was not merely scenic display or theatrical pomp,' but was to prepare the way for the British Empire's, 'more complete consolidation. It seemed to me that, by all means not involving any infraction of the recognised rights of Native Princes, the subordinate position of their States should be more distinctly defined than heretofore, and that the resources of those States should, if possible, be gradually brought into closer and more systematic co-operation with the Supreme Government of the Empire to which they belong.'[13]

In spite of the attitude of benign despotism with which the Government of India treated the states, there was an occasional challenge to British power from this quarter. The Nizam's government always regarded their treaties as a bulwark against the British Government and later the Indian Government in the first half of the twentieth century. Salar Jang made the treaties the basis for his request for the restoration of Berar,

which had been taken away from the Nizam under duress in 1853. He did not, however, press the matter after the British Government made it clear that the restoration of Berar could only be considered along with revision of existing treaties, and that too after the Nizam attained majority.

The attitude of the British Raj to the Indian states changed from time to time, partly as a result of the change in regime in Great Britain, and partly due to the personality of the statesman holding the post of Viceroy. However, there was also a great deal of continuity of policy owing to the dominant position of the Indian Civil Service, which had been described by one Viceroy as, 'the world's most powerful trade union'. The Political Department of the Government of India was manned by civil servants and former military officers who were specially chosen for their knowledge of Indian state traditions, and their ability to combine the iron hand with the velvet glove.

Two of the strongest Viceroys of India were Lord Dalhousie (1848–1856), whose policies led almost directly to the Revolt of 1857, and Lord Curzon (1899–1905). Both left the impress of their personalities on the Indian scene in a formative period of Indian history. Hyderabad State suffered at the hands of both. Dalhousie took away Berar from the Nizam, and when Curzon was Viceroy, the sixth Nizam was forced to lease it in perpetuity to the British. However, many Indians felt that Berar was better off under British rule than it would have been under the last Nizam.

Continuing the policy of imperial splendour initiated by Lord Lytton in 1876, Lord Curzon held a spectacular Durbar in 1903 in Delhi to celebrate the coronation of King Edward VII. He took the opportunity of projecting the power and glory of the British Empire for the benefit of the Indian princes, but he objected to their being treated as members of ruling families. He made every effort to limit their travel abroad and tried to discipline them. According to S.R. Ashton in his *British Policy Towards the Indian States 1905–1939*, Lord Curzon regarded them for the most part, 'as a set of unruly and ignorant and rather undisciplined school boys.'[14]

Curzon argued that the rulers had a duty of active and vigorous cooperation in the discharge of their onerous responsibilities. He sought to make them realize their responsibilities to their own people. Looking at the problems of the country from a long-term perspective of fifty years

later, he tried to prepare the princes for the future, and pressurized them to adopt the highest standard of administration.

However, Curzon's policies underwent considerable change under his successor, Lord Minto, Viceroy from 1905 to 1910, who was guided largely by Sir Harcourt Butler, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India between 1908 and 1910. They introduced a policy of non-interference, born out of the conviction that British rule in India was facing a threat as great as the revolt. This policy could not be uniformly followed, as India was increasingly becoming a single entity as a result of the new policies of the British, intended to ensure a common system of transportation, communication, public works and education.

By the turn of the century, the princes were increasingly resentful of the interference by the British Government in their territories through communication and transportation networks, fiscal and economic policies, and structural reorganization. They rejected or attenuated measures such as railways, that would have helped modernize their states, in order to resist imperial encroachment on their authority.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the British Government wrested a major concession from the Indian states. They set up the Imperial Service Troops, which were paid for by the Indian states, but controlled by the Government of India.

'As the 20th century dawned, it became clear that Indian states could have exercised considerable influence because of the British need to use them as a counter-balance to the rising nationalist movement.' After the First World War, the Chamber of Princes was set up with this very object in view. Some of the nationalist leaders were also willing to make concessions to the Indian states, since they hoped that the princes might provide financial patronage and active members to their organization. The 'historical prestige' of the princes could have raised the legitimacy either of the national movement or of the British power in India.[15]

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When the Asaf Jahi regime emerged from the viceroyalty of the Deccan, there was no tinge of divinity in its titles, as it was a subordinate of the Mughal Empire. But through a gradual process of change, the Mughal traditions of the divinity of the emperor began to affect the Nizam's court.

The principle was that there was hierarchy which was clear and undisputed. First, there was God or Allah, then came the Nizam, and finally came the Amir-i-Paigah. The Nizam's supremacy over his sons and the Paigah chiefs was such that they could not leave his dominion without his written permission even for an hour or two. The printed inscription on the letter-head indicated to be addressed to the Nizam contained the following message:

Bad uz Asthan Bosi, ba paish gahe Hazrath Peer-o-Murshid,
Jehan Panahi, Zile Subhani, Ala Hazrath, Khadar-i-Khudrath,
Huz oor Purnoor, Bandagane Ali,
Mutha Ali Mudda Zilla, Hul Ali Khalladall ahu Mulkahu
Va Sultanathahu Moadubana, Urz Hai Kay...[16]

(After Kissing the Threshold of Your Throne,
To the Great and Holy Protector of the World,
Shadow of God, Mighty Holder of Destinies,
Full of Light, Most Elevated among Creatures, the Exalted,
May God's Shadow Never Grow Less,
May God Protect Your Kingdom and Your Sultanate,
Most Respectfully I beg to submit...)

The atmosphere of a princely Indian court in the late nineteenth century was reminiscent of the medieval splendour of the royal capitals in the great days of the Mughal Empire, along with echoes from the earlier Hindu kingdoms of India as well as the Islamic traditions coming from Central Asia, Iran and the Arab world.

Aga Mirza Beg, later Nawab Sarvar-ul-Mulk, came from Delhi to Hyderabad to seek his fortune in the 1860s. The arduous journey of a thousand miles from Delhi using different forms of transport including bullock carts, horses and boats had left him penniless and exhausted. Although he carried letters of introduction from an uncle in Delhi, he was able to get access to the Diwan, the first Salar Jang, only by promising to pay a head-Chobdar fifty rupees, a substantial sum in those days. Taking the letter, the latter disappeared for some hours. Mirza Beg then promised ten rupees to another Chobdar to bring down the head-Chobdar. The latter finally came and said, 'The Nawab Sahib read your letter and ordered your presence at 1'o clock.' At the appointed time, he had to pass through several rooms before he entered the room where Nawab Salar Jang was sitting with great dignity on a masnad. He was fair complexioned

and was wearing a jamawar sherwani. There were a lot of papers lying before him on the masnad, and he was holding some papers and a pencil in his hand.

At the time of his presentation, the 'Vagera' called out, 'Salute with reverence and with proper order.' Aga Mirza Beg immediately bowed and salaamed Salar Jang in the Hindustani fashion. The Vagera took hold of his hand, and brought him close to the masnad. He then placed a nazar of five rupees on the masnad. After reading the letter brought by Beg, Salar Jang enquired how long he had been in Hyderabad, and asked why he had delayed so long in coming to him, saying that no one was prevented from seeing him. He asked about his welfare, and invited him to call again without hesitation. The conversation continued for a quarter of an hour. Finally he left the palace satisfied, after taking a little scent brought by a servant. But he was upset when he learnt that a second interview with Salar Jang had not been fixed. Finally, he was able to arrange a second interview on Wednesday at eight in the morning by paying fifty rupees as bakshish.

Aga Mirza Beg's description of the Salar Jang Devdi or palace during the first Salar Jang's time brings the picture even more vividly before us. He was reminded of the Andalusian story of Gil Blas. 'From the small hours in the morning to midnight, the hum and bustle in the palace beggars description. Apart from the guards who were posted on the wide court yard, throughout the night and day, the servants and officials of various departments came in their respective conveyances, such as palanquins, horses, and elephants, together with the escorts of retainers of the visiting noblemen. These were posted and parked outside.'

The general Treasury and the office of the Accountant-General was located on the ground floor of the main building. The hall opposite was reserved for, 'Chobdars, peons and other menials.' In this hall were the staircases which led to the apartments of various dimensions occupied by officials for whom hours had been fixed to meet the Minister. These, 'were subject to the discipline of Fakir Mohamed.' Those of higher rank sat in the *Aina Khana* or Hall of Mirrors. Secretaries and heads of departments sat in the gallery. Members of the nobility like Raorambha, Raja Shiv Raj and the Sadr-ul-Mahms met the Minister by appointment. When learned men belonging to various faiths met the Minister he used to leave the masnad and for some of them he went forward a few steps while receiving them. The Diwan had to put up with a number of cranks and

troublesome supplicants for financial support or a position. According to Server-ul-Mulk Bahadur in *My Life*, one person who had been in expectation of a post for a long time presented his request for a position in the form of verse which included the following couplet:

Don't enquire what I eat and drink;
I sit in the palanquin and drink the atmosphere.[17]

The account we have given was that of the palace of one of the most efficient Diwans who administered an Indian state in the nineteenth century. The atmosphere in the palace of the ruler was doubtless more relaxed, but also more venal.

The ruler of the Indian state and his family were always surrounded by people. Attendants were everywhere, anticipating every wish of the ruling family, guiding them in matters of etiquette and carrying out their orders. The Maharana of Udaipur, Fateh Singh, according to a political officer who knew him intimately, had no private life for forty years. Four of his Sardars slept around his bed and two others kept awake by rotation to every two hours. When he was dining with his Maharani in dim candle light, there were a hundred maidservants standing around, saying: 'May the Maharana and the Maharani live for ever. God bless them.' Mir Osman Ali Khan in his later years was almost always accompanied by his unmarried daughter Shahzadi Pasha. If no one else was around, there was a court jester or juggler to tell jokes, turn cartwheels, or perform tricks for his entertainment.

It was natural in these circumstances for the ruling family to be closer to their attendants than to their nobles or officials. A kind of intimacy developed between the ruling family and their companions, who were of humble origin, and were close to the culture of poverty in the city and the surrounding villages. The Nizam's last private secretary reports that the ruler often discussed with his guards and sentries their private affairs, the arrangements made for their marriages, and sometimes talked to them about religion and politics as well.[18]

From an early age the ruling family was exposed to the crudity of everyday life as seen by the humblest of their subjects. It is said that Osman Ali Khan and his sons were capable of using the choicest abuses in Urdu when the need arose.

Rulers could also live a life of utter austerity without feeling uncomfortable. The nobility and his personal staff were often better dressed than

the ruler. When he appeared in public, the ruler had to be very careful, because he was always surrounded by spies from the Residency and top nobility. He also had his spies in the Residency and the palaces of important nobles and the Diwan. In order to ensure that a message was reliably given to another dignitary, a Vakil was appointed to carry such oral messages.[19]

The most important event in an Indian court was the Darbar. This word could refer either to the court of the ruler itself, or to the Levees held at the court.

The British in India had taken over the traditional Indian Darbar and made it an instrument for maintaining their supremacy over the Indian states. Any deviation from the traditions of the medieval courts was frowned upon not only by the rulers themselves, but also by the Political Department of the Government of India, which had become very sensitive to the status of the Residency officials and the Viceroy, the personal representative of the British monarch, who was also the King-Emperor, or Queen-Empress of India. Thus the British became, willingly or unwillingly, an instrument for the continuance of a political system and way of life which had in many ways become anachronistic, even in nineteenth century India, and more so in the twentieth.

Lord Lytton in 1877, Lord Curzon in 1903, and Lord Hardinge in 1911 held major Darbars to celebrate Queen Victoria's assumption of the title of Empress of India, the accession of King Edward VII to the imperial title, and the visit of King George V and Queen Mary to India.

The gun salute at a darbar was determined by the level of autonomy in a state. The Viceroy had a gun salute of 101 while the highest gun salute allowed to an Indian ruler was thirty-one, the highest allowed to any Indian state. As we have seen, the Nizam had a very impressive set of titles, most of which derived from the Mughal connection, but they went beyond the legitimate claims of a viceroyalty of the Mughals by asserting that the Nizam's was the supreme government and was next only to God.

The Chobdar was a very important functionary, although he was a member of the subordinate staff. Throughout the darbar he was busy shouting the names of the visitors as they were received by the ruler. At the same time he would shout instructions to the ruler himself, in case the latter made a mistake on some point of etiquette. For instance, he could

tell the ruler to return the salaam a the visitor. It was considered very impolite to ignore a salaam. Several other points of protocol which had been observed for generations were strictly enforced in the court of Hyderabad. These traditions were remembered and communicated to the new rulers by faithful servants and officials who treasured the accounts of past events which had come down from their ancestors. The etiquette was different in the Diwan-i-Aam or Hall of Public Audience and the Diwan-i-Khas or Hall of Private Audience.

In 1920, when for the first time, a person from outside Hyderabad was appointed to the highest post in the State, there was a strong feeling that the traditional etiquette to be observed at ceremonial occasions would be adversely affected unless the dignity of the old nobility was preserved. Sir Ali Imam himself suggested to the Nizam that at the traditional darbar, he should take precedence after the Peshkar, Maharaja Kishen Pershad, 'to avoid unnecessary humiliation to the old nobility.' The Nizam agreed to his proposal; however he directed that Sir Ali Imam should present *ittar* (scent) and paan to the Resident.

A considerable amount of discussion went into the taking of decisions in matter of protocol. When the matter was reported to the Resident, the latter asked for instructions from the Government of India, pointing out that this practice would also be followed during the Prince of Wales' visit in 1921. The Political Department of the Government of India noted that when the Viceroy visited Gwalior, *ittar* and paan were presented by Sardar Phalke, who had a hereditary right to do so, although he was not the principal officer. At Baroda however the minister presented *ittar* and paan. Presumably the Government of India decided to accept the proposal of the Nizam's government.[20]

Inter-marriages between Indian ruling families often took place under British rule. This was one way in which the traditional isolation of the Indian ruling families broke down. Hyderabad however, was an exception. Although many Muslim princes would have welcomed a matrimonial alliance with the Nizam's family, the Nizam's daughters had been married traditionally to young men of the Paigah family. This family belonged to the Sunni sect, and from the second Nizam's time they had been personal bodyguards of the Nizam. During the reigns of the last two rulers, the daughters of the Nizam did not marry, and the sons usually married within the State, a major exception being the Turkish marriages of the Prince of Berar and his brother Moazam Jah in 1931.

Four legally registered nikahs were permitted by Muslim law. It was the Nizam who decided who in the family would marry whom. The Shias were also allowed mutayi or contractual marriages of limited duration. There was no limit to the number of informal connections which could be entered into by the members of the ruling family.

A few of the southern princely families like the Nawab of Machchlipatnam and Bainganpally did marry members of the Nizam's family. But they migrated to Hyderabad and became parts of the Nizam's establishment. The reason for this exclusiveness of the Nizam's family traditions was twofold. It was considered beneath the dignity of the Nizam to allow a marriage with the princes of lesser states. The second Nizam had taken umbrage when Tipu Sultan wanted him to give his daughter to his son. The second, unstated, reason for the reluctance to allow marriages with outsiders was that the Nizam's dominating position over his family, including his sons-in-law, would be endangered by marriages into other ruling families. As a consequence of this restriction, many of the girls in the Nizam's family remained unmarried, including Osman Ali Khan's eldest daughter Shahzadi Pasha, whose mother was the same as that of prince Azam Jah and prince Moazam Jah.

Except for his first wife, Dulhan Pasha, who lived in a separate house in Eden Gardens, the Nizam's wives lived in the zenana, where his mistresses also lived. The Nizam's mother lived in a separate house in a different part of the city.

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The seventh Nizam inherited from his ancestors not only a state but also a body of doctrines and a set of traditions which provided the framework in which the State machinery was expected to function. The Asaf Jahi dynasty regarded itself as the successor to the Mughal viceroyalty of the Deccan, and guarded carefully the traditions which it had received from the Mughals. Mughal rule in the Deccan was not based on any religious origins, and the titles of the early Asaf Jahi rulers indicated a sense of subordination to the Mughal Empire.

It was only gradually, after the end of the shadowy Mughal rule from the Red Fort at Delhi, that the court of the Nizam of Hyderabad began to be considered as the successor to the Mughal Empire of Delhi. The large-scale migration of individuals and families from Delhi and other

parts of northern India tended to increase the importance of the Nizam's dominions and made it the cynosure of those who looked back nostalgically to the Mughal past. The court of the Nizam under the last two rulers began to take over the role of the Mughals in India. This role consisted not only of providing employment to job-seekers from the north trained in the Mughal traditions—both Muslim and Hindu—but also of maintaining the traditions of poetry, music, the fine arts and handicrafts by providing patronage which only an Indian court could give.

However the court was able to maintain its traditional glory only by ignoring the inequities and contradictions which had been perpetuated in the economic system over a period of nearly two centuries. The jagirdari system with all its refinements, was a burden on the peasantry, who were exploited by the middlemen who fattened on them, thus freeing the jagirdar for a life of leisure and occasional participation in the court intrigues.

The culture of the court and the state was steeped in feudal traditions. The reforms of the first Salar Jang had a limited impact, but there had been a regression in the State's administration since the 1880s. Hyderabad was once again a traditional court, maintaining medieval traditions under the benign protection of British rule in India. Thus Mir Osman Ali Khan came to the gaddi of Hyderabad in 1911 on the death of a legendary ruler, the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MAKING OF THE SEVENTH NIZAM

Nahin mumkin ke choothe, dekh Osman
Muhabbat ho gayi mulk-i-Dakhan se

(It is not possible, O Osman,
For you to give up your love of the Deccan)

– Mir Osman Ali Khan

Tum iftikhar-i-Dakhan
Ho Tajdar-i-Dakhan
Tumhen ho Hind mein mumtaz shahryar-i-Dakhan

(You are the pride of the Deccan, the King of the Deccan;
Among the rulers of India, the only one that counts
Is the King of the Deccan)

– Mir Osman Ali Khan

The birth of Mir Osman Ali Khan is shrouded in mystery. According to the official version, he was born at Purani Haveli in the old city of Hyderabad on Tuesday, 6 April 1886 (30th Jamadi-us-sani 1303 Hijri). Muslim custom in India requires a formal or nikah marriage to be performed by a Qazi. However, the court of Hyderabad permitted members of the ruling family to keep a number of concubines, who were attached to the harem of the ruler or the nobleman concerned. The father of the seventh Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, was only sixteen years of age when he met his future partner, Amat-uz-Zehra Begum, in the zenana. His tutors, Captain Claude Clerk and Maulvi Anwarullah Shah were in favour of a marriage, but Sir Salar Jang was opposed to a nikah marriage with any lady residing in the zenana.

Shortly before Salar Jang's death in February 1883, there was a correspondence between Salar Jang I and the Government of India about the desirability of a marriage for the young Nizam. Mahboob had expressed a desire to be married before his eighteenth birthday, as custom forbade him to do so for one year after the birthday. The alternatives discussed included the comparative advantages of a marriage to a girl

from another ruling family as against one to the daughter of a Hyderabad nobleman with its internal political repercussions. Another possibility was to arrange a simple nikah marriage to a girl of no social importance. In this case the girl would stay with the Nizam's mother at Chow Mahalla Palace, while the young ruler would be with his tutors at Purani Haveli. The Government of India was concerned about the possible danger to Mahboob's educational progress, and to his proposed trip around the world, a proposal which later had to be dropped because of the untimely death of Salar Jang. They were also concerned about the possibility of an unwanted pregnancy, since the Nizam had already been initiated into the delights of the zenana.[1]

Mahboob eventually decided not to go in for a marriage at all, as his family tradition did not require it. According to H.R. Lynton and Mohini Rajan in *The Days of the Beloved*, the heir to Asaf Jahi masnad were generally not sons of royal wives, and, 'a legal fiction had grown up which imputed legitimacy to all children of the Nizam, whatever the status of the mother.'[2]

The young lady who became the mother of the seventh Nizam was in fact Amat-uz-Zehra Begum. The authors further say : 'Nawab Osman Ali Khan was his second child, his first had already died before Osman was born.'

The gap of three years between the commencement of the liaison and the birth of Osman Ali Khan is thus explained by the existence of an older child who died before Osman's birth.

The seventh Nizam himself asserted that he was not the product of a nikah marriage. He wrote a letter to this effect to Lieutenant-Colonel Terence Keyes, the Resident at Hyderabad in 1932:

> His late Highness did not perform Nikah with the mothers of his sons ....Nikah was not thought necessary for legitimacy in our family provided that the father accepts the issues to be his own offspring during his lifetime. In fact, this practice was and is still in vogue in our family. Besides the canon of our religion is based on this principle, which is not known to you.[3]

From the name Amat-uz-Zehra it is clear that Osman's mother was a Shia. This is widely known, and, cited as a major cause of his favouring the Shia faith in later life. The question arises as to who the lady was. According to the seventh Nizam's son-in-law, Kazim Nawaz Jang, she was the granddaughter of Nawab Salar Jang I through his mutayi wife,

Preetamji. This version is lent support by the account of Hosh Bilgrami, the Peshi Secretary to Mir Osman Ali Khan, who says that the latter often referred to Preetamji as his mother's wet nurse, or *munh boli nani.*

It is possible that Osman did not wish to admit that his grandmother was born of a mutayi marriage between Salar Jang and a Hindu woman. The fact that he gave his daughter in marriage to Kazim Nawaz Jang, a great-grandson of the first Salar Jang, lends credibility to this connection with the Salar Jang family. The mutayi form of marriage is recognized as a temporary marriage among the Shias. Sir Salar Jang had only one regular marriage, to Fakhrul Mulk's sister. Two daughters were born of this marriage. Both his sons, Mir Laiq Ali Khan, Salar Jang II, and Sadat Ali Khan, were children born of mutayi wives.[4]

In 1887, Mahboob Ali Khan, the sixth Nizam, was seriously ill with cholera. The Diwan at the time, Mir Laiq Ali Khan, Salar Jang II, had Mir Osman Ali Khan, then only a year old, recognized as his successor by the Government of India, in the event of Mahboob's demise. This was confirmed by Lord Curzon during his visit to Hyderabad in 1902.

In 1892, when Osman was eight years old, and his father was again seriously ill, the Government of India directed the Resident to draw up a scheme for the boy's education. In the same year the boy commenced the study of the Quran under three eminent maulvis, who were appointed to supervize his religious instruction.

However, the British Government was not satisfied with this. The Resident advised Mahboob to follow essentially the same system used for his own education. The Nizam's Secretary, Nawab Server-ul-Mulk, objected to the Resident's scheme of appointing an Englishman as superintendent of the Sahibzada's education. He suggested that a group of elderly gentlemen-in-waiting should be appointed to look after his education, health, personal comforts and exercise, in consultation with one of the ruler's own physicians. The Resident expressed complete disapproval of this scheme, pointing out that four elderly men would not be suitable companions for a young boy of nine, who would be, 'perplexed by the varying counsels and prohibitions which these worthies were likely to impose upon him.'

The Government of India was however unwilling to press its views with the Nizam. Their motto was, 'better a spoilt and uneducated heir apparent than a discontented Nizam.' It was only after Lord Elgin had a personal talk with Mir Mahboob Ali Khan that the Nizam took a decision

to appoint a tutor, and it was only in November 1895 that Syed Hussain Bilgrami started work as tutor to the Sahibzada. By this time the boy was nine years old.

Bilgrami was at the same time the Director of Public Instruction in the Nizam's government. He drew up a scheme for the education of the prince, utilizing English textbooks. Nawab Afsar-ud-Daula, Commander-in-Chief of the Hyderabad State forces, was appointed to look after his shooting lessons and physical exercise. The course of instruction included the Urdu and Persian languages, riding, tent-pegging, cricket and other exercises.

The young Osman left his book of Persian poems with reluctance to attend his military training classes. He was not by nature a sportsman, but what little he did on the field, he did with competence. In the Central Asian tradition, a young man had to cut in two a sheep or goat with its vitals removed, suspended between an upright pole and a rectangular bar at forty-five degrees.[5]

On the whole, Mir Osman Ali Khan came to the masnad under more favourable circumstances than did his father. Mir Mahboob Ali Khan never really knew his father, who had died when the former was only two years of age. Mahboob was already a ruler, and hence was treated with great reverence by all around him. This created in him an undue sense of self-importance from early childhood. Osman Ali Khan, on the other hand, grew up during the lifetime of his father, who could give him the necessary parental control and guidance. During this period the relations between the Nizam's government and the paramount power were cordial, and there were no major points of tension. It would therefore have been expected that Mir Osman Ali Khan would receive the best possible education, a combination of the eastern and western traditions, to produce a harmonious personality.

However, as we have seen, the question of his education was a subject of disagreement between the Nizam and the British. The latter did not want to press the Nizam unduly about the education of his son. Although Mahboob Ali Khan had himself been educated by an English tutor, he agreed only reluctantly to the appointment of an Englishman, who was a nominee of the British, to be in charge of Osman's education.

Four years after Bilgrami's appointment, in the year 1899 when the prince was thirteen, Mr (later Sir) Bryan Egerton, who had served for many years in the Rajput states, and had supervised the education of the Maharaja of Bikaner, was appointed superintendent of the young prince's education on the recommendation of the Viceroy. The establishment was moved from Gaokhana (one of the palaces in Purani Haveli) to King Kothi, where he lived with Egerton and pursued his studies in Arabic, Persian, Urdu and English.

The Indian tutors or *ataliqs* were placed under the control of Egerton, who was in overall charge of the King Kothi establishment. Osman continued to be instructed in literature by Syed Hussain Bilgrami. In religion his teacher was Anwarullah Khan, Nawab Fazilat Jang. Fazilat Jang was a strict Sunni, and Osman Ali Khan was brought up in that faith, but his mother's Shia faith overcame this early training. Another of his *ataliqs*, Nawab Tahwar Jang, was instrumental in confirming his Shia faith.

In 1905, the Resident, Sir David Barr, remarked that, 'the Nizam is very austere in his treatment of his son.' The boy was given very little money to spend. Although he resented this position at that time, he turned it to his own advantage later. In an interview with the Resident many years later, Osman recalled having resented his father's restrictions when he was a boy, but in retrospect felt that he had benefited from them. He expressed the view that if young boys were allowed liberty without licence because of their high status, they would suffer the consequences in later life.[6]

Two stories about Osman's upbringing throw light on his relations with his father. There is a hillock near Hyderabad called Moula Ali on the top of which is a shrine which is supposed to have an imprint of the palm of Hazrat Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet. Osman once accompanied his father to this shrine. The boy spotted a multicoloured parrot which caught his fancy. Mahboob asked his attendants to buy it for Osman by paying a suitable sum to the owner. But the parrot belonged to a small boy who refused to part with it. A rich landlord gave hundred rupees to the boy's parents and took away the parrot from him. Thus Osman got the parrot. However, on his return from the shrine, Mahboob heard the cries of the child, and when he found out what had happened he had the parrot returned to the boy, saying, 'Let my son cry instead. He should grow up like any other child.'

Another oft-told story is that the young Osman dropped an ashrafi, and stooped to pick it up. His father, Mahboob Ali Khan noticed this, and considered it a bad sign. He felt that a King should never pick up money, or even have it picked up for him. The child of a Nizam must not behave like an ordinary person.[7]

In contrast, Mahboob had refused to accept a ring which had fallen from his hand, and was respectfully submitted to him by a servant. There are many other stories about Mahboob's generosity and his refusal to interfere even when he was told that an object of great value had been stolen from him. He is said to have replied that in such cases he had gifted the object to the supposed thief.

Clearly the attitude of the two rulers to money and other objects of value was very different. Osman's attitude was originally a reaction to Mahboob's excessive generosity and indifference to financial affairs. He was obviously more influenced by his mother's shrewd business sense than by his father's generosity. However, a trait that began as a virtue was eventually to become a vice.

In 1903 the young prince was present along with his father at the Delhi Darbar convened by Lord Curzon. At this time the Government of India suggested to the Nizam's government that the prince should be sent for training to Mayo College at Ajmer, a school designed for the training of young ruling chiefs. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, further desired that the Sahibzada should join the Imperial Cadet Corps for his military training. However, the chief nobles of the State did not approve of the proposal and the sixth Nizam agreed with them.

The main ground for rejecting the proposal was that Osman Ali Khan was seventeen, and was thought to be too old to be sent outside the State. In fact, Mahboob Ali Khan was concerned about arranging the young man's marriage at an early date to protect him from temptation.[8]

The consequences of this rejection of Curzon's proposal were to be great for the future of Osman Ali Khan, for the State of Hyderabad and of the Indian states generally. Had the seventh Nizam been exposed at an early age to a public school education, and to members of princely families from other parts of India of his own age, he might have regarded the rest of India, and especially other Indian states, with a less supercilious eye. Because of the lack of such an experience, he was unable to see himself except as the centre of the universe, which he regarded as

revolving around him. The traditions of his family, transmitted from generation to generation, had inculcated in him a sense of his own importance which never left him. Although he acquired a fair knowledge of administrative techniques and was able to use the State machinery to achieve his goals as a ruler, his understanding of India, of the British, and of the world at large was always coloured by his conviction that he had been born to rule.

Mir Osman Ali Khan's childhood was less disturbed than that of his father, who had grown up under the shadow of a conflict between the Nizam's government and the British government which had adversely affected his upbringing. Mir Mahboob Ali Khan had lost his father when he was still an infant, and had been brought up by his mother and grandmother. The most powerful figure in the State was the Regent, Sir Salar Jang I. By 1869, when the two-year-old Mahboob was placed on the masnad, Salar Jang had already completed sixteen years as Diwan, and was emerging as one of the most respected Indian statesmen. During Mahboob's childhood, his training and education had become a bone of contention between Salar Jang and the British. Salar Jang had carefully guarded the young Nizam against the influence of the Residency, and brought in as tutor to the young ruler successively two young Englishmen who had been handpicked by him.

Although Mahboob was thus exposed to the ways of an English gentleman at an early age, the stronger influence was that of the court atmosphere of adulation and self-indulgence which surrounded him. The combination of great wealth, an effete court, and an atmosphere of flattery, along with the early removal of his mentor, Salar Jang I from the scene when he was only seventeen years of age, led to the decline of his intellectual powers as he became increasingly involved in a life of pleasure. His greatest goal in life became the maintenance of his personal dignity in relation to the British and his own people. There is no doubt that he was a hero to his subjects, who were still medieval in their attitudes. Many legends were told of his prowess as a horseman and hunter. He was also praised for his generosity and his capacity to become one with the common people by disguising himself as a person of humble origin. However, as we will see later, the prodigality of Mahboob led the State into financial difficulties, and

this appears to have influenced Osman Ali Khan to eventually become more careful with the State funds as well as with his own money.

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The resignation of Mir Laiq Ali Khan, Salar Jang II, from the post of Diwan of the Nizam's dominions in 1887 marked the end of an era—the period of the dominance of the Salar Jang family in the affairs of the State. From 1887 to 1901, members of the Paigah family held the high post of Diwan, but they lacked the competence to run the affairs of the State effectively. The two Paigah Diwans were not trained for the highest post in the administration, as Laiq Ali Khan had been. They were elderly persons, closely related to the Nizam, who were more concerned with the prestige and power of the appointment than with any contribution to be made to the development of the State, or the improvement of its administration.

Nawab Bashir-ud-Daula, Asman Jah who became Diwan in 1887 had served as the Judicial Minister under the first Salar Jang. However, his administration was weak and his assistant, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain, took advantage of his incompetence to assert himself in all major matters.

The weakness of Asman Jah's administration was compounded by the fact that there was no other institution to take the place of the Diwani which had, under the two Salar Jangs, emerged as the major focus of power. The Nizam, Mahboob Ali Khan was almost entirely in the hands of his personal secretary, Server Jang, another import from northern India, who was notorious for nepotism and financial laxity. Although Mahboob had a streak of greatness in him which endeared him to the people, he did not have the administrative abilities required to manage the State of Hyderabad after the reforms of Salar Jang had given it a certain prestige and status in the country and the Empire.

Towards the end of Asman Jah's Diwanship, the Nizam expressed his desire to acquire one of the most valuable diamonds in the world which had been discovered in the Kimberley mines of South Africa. He paid a deposit of twenty-three lakh rupees just to have a look at it. When the gem was shown to him, by the dealer, a Mr Jacob, he decided to keep it, but was dissuaded from doing so by the Resident. The latter felt its purchase by the Nizam would create a bad impression as the State was facing a famine and was in a financial crisis. It appears that, although the diamond was returned to Jacob, the latter did not refund the deposit of Rs 23,00,000.

Finally, a Commission was appointed by the British Government to look into the matter, and the ruler was asked to give evidence before it. The public was deeply disturbed that the Nizam had to give evidence for six days and face humiliation as he had to answer questions put to him by the opposing counsel.

If the Jacob diamond case showed the Nizam in a poor light, the lakh bribery case did not enhance his reputation. His Peshi Secretary, Nawab Server Jang was accused of having received a bribe of one lakh rupees on 14 November 1892 in order to influence the Nizam in favour of the Diwan, Nawab Asman Jah. The scandalous affair was brought to light in a series of articles in the Bangalore *Evening Mail*. The Diwan and Nawab Server Jang both admitted that the money had changed hands through the good office of Nawab Mehdi Ali Khan (Mohsin-ul-Mulk). The Diwan claimed that the amount was paid to help Server Jang in his financial difficulties and not to influence the Nizam.

The most surprising part of the story, to those unused to the ways of the Hyderabad court, was that both the Nizam and the Resident knew that the money had changed hands, but chose to ignore the matter till the Resident received a letter of complaint from Nawab Mehdi Hasan.

Instead of helping to consolidate his position, this episode weakened the Diwan further, and he lost his position a year later. Late in 1892, Resident T.J.C. Chichele Plowden inquired into the allegations against Mehdi Ali Khan and the latter was banished from the State. No action was taken against Server Jang, who had admitted taking the money.

On 30 March 1893, a Member of Parliament, Seymour Keay, who had close links with Hyderabad, raised a question in Parliament regarding the conduct of Plowden, and alleged that the Resident had supported Server Jang in the lakh bribery case. Keay followed up this Parliament question with two letters to the Secretary of State for India.

In October 1894, Kenneth James Loch McKenzie, the officiating Resident at Hyderabad wrote to the Foreign Secretary that, 'Besides himself, Sarwar Jang has at this moment twenty-nine of his relatives or connections in offices of sorts and places of more or less importance; and that, including himself, nineteen out of the twenty-nine drew per mensem Rs 11,575 from the State or thereabouts. I am not yet accurately informed as to the emoluments of the remaining eleven. Sarwar Jang's personal emoluments are said to be Rs 3,600 per mensem, Rs 2,600 from the

Diwani, and Rs 1000 from Khurshid Jah. Quite an Eastern family romance; as Sarwar Jang originally, I believe, started as a humble schoolmaster on Rs 20 a month. He has numerous connections and friends about him still unprovided for, in the position of 'Umedwaries' or hopefuls and as I understand from Dunlop, he takes craftily every opportunity of displacing Hyderabadies and putting these men in ... . '

McKenzie felt that Server Jang was, 'a thorn in the flesh of the Minister.' By this time the Diwan or Minister was not Asman Jah but Viqar-ul-Umra. Server-ul-Mulk had already contributed to the downfall of Asman Jah, due to the lakh bribery case.[9]

On 15 November 1895, the Viceroy and the Nizam met at Hyderabad. The Resident, Plowden, made an indictment of Server Jang, pointing out that he had continually interfered in the business of the State, including the High Court, in order to get his close relatives appointed to high positions, and to prevent Afsar Jang's appointment as commandant of the Imperial Service Troops. He was himself administering the Salar Jang Estate, contrary to the advice of Resident McKenzie. The note by Plowden evidently formed the basis for the Viceroy's interview with the Nizam, but nothing came out of this exercise.

Over two years later, on 31 January 1897, Plowden again called on the Nizam. After Plowden left, His Highness commanded the Minister that :

- There should be a seventy-lakh limit to the payment to His Highness in the annual budget.
- Colonel John Clerk should be asked to suggest a suitable person for appointment as Superintendent of Education of Mir Osman Ali Khan.
- Server Jang was ordered to leave Hyderabad for Delhi, never to return, and the office of the Peshi Secretary was to be abolished.

It had taken over three-and-a-half years after the lakh bribery case became public for the Government of India to force the Nizam to take decisive action against Server Jang, and to begin the process of setting right the State's finances. In the next year, 1898, the Government of India deputed a competent Accountant-General called Crawley to look into the finances of the Nizam's government. His report was highly damaging to the Nizam, arguing as it did that his personal expenditure was a major

cause of the financial crisis. The Nizam, however, blamed his Prime Minister Nawab Viqar-ul-Umra, and got a handpicked committee of noblemen to put forth the view that the State actually owed money to the Nizam.

Thus during the post-Salar Jang period, the British Residency had failed to become an alternative focus of power. The longest-serving Residents, J.G.Cordery (1883–1888) and Plowden (1891–1900) did not command respect. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, who acted as Resident between 1889 and 1891, made a sincere effort to help the Nizam to tackle the State's financial problems by having an assessment of the financial position done in England. However, this attempt did not have any substantial effect, as the Nizam was too pre-occupied, and British officials were unwilling to intervene decisively to force a reform of the administration, perhaps because they hoped for a collapse of the Nizam's government as a result of which the entire State would fall into their hands.[10]

The beginnings of constitutionalism can be discerned in Hyderabad State during the reign of Mir Mahboob Ali Khan. The change from the efficient administration of the first two Salar Jangs to the ineffectual rule of Nawab Asman Jah led to an attempt by civil servants who had worked under the Salar Jangs to direct the affairs of the State from behind the scenes. This was not too difficult to achieve, as Asman Jah, like other members of the nobility, was unfamiliar with administrative methods and saw the State's problems in terms of personalities rather than issues. After the Jacob diamond case and the lakh bribery case of 1892, the Nizam had the *Qanuncha Mubarak* or Auspicious Code drafted, prescribing the powers and duties of all officials. The *Qanuncha* abolished the Council of State. It was replaced by a Cabinet Council with the Diwan as President, Viqar-ul-Umra as Vice-President, and Kishen Pershad and three ministers as members.

The new Council of State was a thinly disguised attempt to clip the wings of Diwan Asman Jah, who was under the influence of his secretary, Nawab Mushtaq Hussain, a North Indian official. Stress was laid in the *Qanuncha* on the need for relieving the Prime Minister of some of his responsibilities, and strengthening the subordinate ministers, who had practically no work to do. Moreover, the State subjects, as against outsiders, were to be provided greater opportunities of carrying on the administration as, 'only they could have the greatest sympathy for the country.'

The beginnings of the legislative system are seen at this time in the formation of a Legislative Council in 1893 with the Prime Minister as President, the Assistant Minister as Vice-President, eleven official members and six non-official members. Of the latter, two were elected by the jagirdars and landowners, two seats were reserved for first-grade pleaders of the High Court, and the other two were nominated from the residents of the State, of whom one had to be from the Paigah territory.

In 1900, the financial decline and the famine situation had become so serious that the Nizam's government was forced to take a loan of two crores by hypothecating a part of the Berar surplus.

The administrative and financial decline of the Nizam's dominion during the late 1880s was blamed by the Nizam on his Diwans. But both the Ministers, Asman Jah and Viqar-ul-Umra, were appointed by the Nizam, and both were his brothers-in-law. Moreover, the power exercised by his Secretary, Server Jang was a clear indication of the Nizam's weakness as a ruler. It was only at the Resident's insistence that the Nizam decided to dismiss and banish Server Jang from the State in January 1897.[11]

In fact, there were two completely different theories of politics which clashed during the reign of Mahboob Ali Khan. The nineteenth century Western idea, based on the State as a trust on behalf of the people, was sought to be put forth in Fitzpatrick's investigation and Crawley's report. Much has been said of Mir Mahboob Ali Khan's generosity in giving money from his own resources for the poor, especially after the floods of 1908; but this generosity has to be seen in the context of the Crawley Report, which points out the mismanagement of the State's finances, and ascribes it to the excessive expenditure on the palace. Mahboob's generosity to the poor must also be seen in the context of the generous amounts paid to other less deserving beneficiaries of the Nizam's largesse.

The appointment of Maharaja Kishen Pershad as the Diwan in 1901 marked a turning point in the Nizam's relations with the British. The latter were able to take advantage of the weak bargaining power of the Nizam following the famine of 1899, the financial difficulties which followed, and the diminished stature of the Nizam in the eyes of the public, to demand concessions which they could not otherwise have obtained.

Osman Ali Khan was sixteen years old when his father faced a great humiliation. Mir Mahboob Ali Khan was pressurized by Lord Curzon to

sign away the province of Berar on a permanent lease. He must have felt that his old mentor, Salar Jang I was turning in his grave. The Treaty of 1902, providing for the permanent cession of Berar, was also accompanied by a financial crisis of a magnitude which would have been unimaginable in the time of the first Salar Jang. The Nizam was forced to accept a British official with a veto power on all important expenditure.

Lord Curzon visited Hyderabad and obtained the signature of the Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan on the document in which he consented to the administration of Berar along with the Central Provinces. In other words, he gave up his claim to Berar in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the Hyderabad Contingent, which had been the cause of the cession of Berar to the British in 1853, was to be disbanded and merged in the Imperial Service Troops. Curzon took full advantage of the situation and insisted on the appointment as Financial Adviser of a British civil servant, Casson Walker. Curzon even hinted that he would veto the confirmation of Maharaja Kishen Pershad as Diwan if the Nizam did not agree to Walker's appointment. Casson Walker was later made Assistant Minister of Finance.

Maharaja Kishen Pershad continued as Diwan till a year after the death of the sixth Nizam in 1911. He did not build up a coterie around him, and made it a point to support the Nizam in all major matters. His submissive attitude was no doubt the explanation for his survival in office for eleven years, a long period by Hyderabad standards.

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The city of Hyderabad by the mid-nineteenth century had become the symbol of the Nizam's dominions, in the same way that the three Presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras had come to represent the power of the British.

As the port cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras grew into major provincial capitals, railway junctions and centres of education and industry, the old political and trading cities of India, which had earlier supported a large number of military and civil employees, began to decline, especially as they lost their political, strategic and economic significance. Some of them like Poona, acquired new importance as centres of British military activity, and provided educational facilities which attracted élite migrants from the districts.

Delhi ceased to be of importance as the Mughal court declined in power. The British ruled India from Calcutta from 1757 till 1917 when the capital moved back to Delhi. Unlike Delhi, Hyderabad continued to be the capital of a major dynasty. The manufacture of luxury goods for the court élite was not confined to the city, but spread over the entire Deccan with cities like Bidar, Aurangabad and Nirmal contributing to the production process. Two main factors played a vital role in the continued growth of Hyderabad, albeit at a slow pace. First, the establishment of a British cantonment at Secunderabad, and second, the highly centralized administration of the State, even after the reforms of Salar Jang in the 1860s and afterwards. It was this second factor which enabled Hyderabad to expand in the nineteenth century. The twentieth century saw a different kind of growth, due to the arrival of migrants from other parts of India, and the rise of industry on a major scale.

The city of Hyderabad grew out of the fortress city of Golconda. The new city of Hyderabad with its centre at Charminar was founded in 1591. The historian Ferishta has recorded that on an auspicious day, 'when the Moon was in the constellation of Leo and Jupiter in its own mansion, Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah took a decision to construct a new city which he desired should be, unequalled in the world and a replica of paradise itself.' The city was divided into four sections, divided by four roads radiating from the famous Charminar (four minarets), a monument which thus became the hub of the city.

The building of the city of Hyderabad was the starting point of a new stage of commercial and political growth. Significantly, one of the major roads radiating from the Charminar was the one which led to Machhlipatnam, the major port of the Qutb Shahi rulers, thus emphasizing the importance to Golconda of its coastal region. The map of Golconda was similar to the present map of Andhra Pradesh. The city was called Bhagyanagar, after the Telugu dancing girl and courtesan, Bhagmati, who had become the mistress of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah.[12]

The walled city continued to grow around Charminar, till the Golconda fort and the entire kingdom fell to Aurangzeb, the Mughal emperor, in 1687. The city was walled to protect it from marauders, but the capital of the Deccan under Mughal and early Asaf Jah rule continued to be at Aurangabad. In 1763, the second Nizam shifted his capital to Hyderabad, realizing its strategic importance for the control of the Deccan. In 1803, the British Residency was constructed across the Musi River from the

walled city. The Nizam obviously did not want the British to enter the walled city except on formal occasions.

The military cantonment of Secunderabad was built up by the British as a centre for their armed forces. A suburb of Secunderabad, Thirumalagiri, later corrupted to Trimulgherry, housed a large number of troops and camp followers from the Tamil areas of the Madras Presidency.

The floods of 1908 hit the walled city very badly. The high water mark is still visible in old buildings like the Badshahi Ashurkhana. After this catastrophe, the future ruler, Osman Ali Khan, established his residence at King Kothi, which was located in the Chaderghat area, between the Musi River and Secunderabad. It was not till the post-independence period, in the 1950s and after, that the Naya Shahar or new city around King Kothi (which had ceased being called Chaderghat) began to merge with Secunderabad. Since then, a new metropolitan Hyderabad has emerged, far outstripping its old boundaries, including even the old Golconda fort.[13]

The Nizams had a large number of palaces, in varying degrees of grandeur, and in different parts of the city, representing the posh areas and the architectural styles which were popular with the élite when they were constructed.

The oldest palaces of the Nizams were in the Golconda fort itself (Nau Mahal). Then came Zeba Bagh, which was located in the Karwan area, connecting Golconda with the walled city. There were several palaces in the walled city, including Purani Haveli, the Chow Mahalla, and others.

Qutb Shahi architecture continued to dominate the walled city, with the Mecca Masjid being completed after the fall of Golconda. Some new structures were constructed in the Qutb Shahi style even in the late nineteenth century.

After the completion of the Residency in 1803, several new buildings were constructed both by Europeans and native residents, influenced by Georgian architecture. These, added to the earlier French-designed buildings, gave parts of the old city, and most of the new city and Secunderabad, a distinctly European appearance. However, the heart of the old city was largely Qutb Shahi, Rajput or Mughal in style, especially around the Charminar and the Etabar Chowk.

Apart from the artistry of its architecture and the character it exuded, the old city of Hyderabad was also known for its dirt and smells. But for the native of the city as well as the outsider, the city had a charm of its own, derived from its traditional way of life built around the court, and ceremonials like the Langar, an annual elephant procession, which was carried over from Qutb Shahi times.

The railway line from Wadi near Gulbarga on the Bombay-Madras line had been connected with Secunderabad during the 1860s and opened for traffic on 8 October 1874. The Nizam, Afzal-ud-Doula had great reservations about permitting such an innovation, not because of its financial implications, but, owing to its political and social consequences. He felt it would,'upset all orthodox notions,' and that British influence would increase in the State. Finally, he accepted the proposal on the strict understanding that if any of his family or servants or dependents left the Nizam's territory without his permission, such an 'absconder' would be restored to him and the Resident assured the Nizam's government that it would afford advice and assistance while the renegades were still in the Nizam's territory.

Fortunately for the Nizam, the coming of the railways apparently did not fulfil his fears, perhaps because there was at that time no major railway station at Hyderabad. The British cantonment at Secunderabad was the major railhead for the area.

Apart from the railway system, the Nizam's government initiated or permitted the introduction of the telephone, the gramophone, the bicycle and the motor car. These in turn led to the gradual introduction of new engineering techniques in areas like road building and telegraph lines.

The Nizam's government had always exercised the right to mint its own coins. The Mint was now established on modern lines, and the coinage system was standardized. Paper currency was also introduced and the postal system modernized.[14]

While the majority of the population belonging to all social classes maintained their traditional values, a small minority began to imitate the Western ways of dressing, eating and drinking. They preferred to speak English even among themselves, although they knew Urdu, which was the language of the State. This phenomenon was encouraged by the introduction of English-medium schools, like the Madrasa-i-Aliya

(school for nobles, founded in 1873), and the Mahboobia Girls' School, as well as the Nizam's College, which was affiliated to Madras University.

Thus, Hyderabad was a mixture of both the Oriental and Western culture which included traditional Indian technology and modern innovations like railways, motor cars and the telephone. Several Europeans who lived in Hyderabad for some length of time found the mixture of East and West, of tradition and modernity, highly attractive, and considered themselves to be Mulkis, or permanent residents of the State. They retained their identity as Europeans, and yet adapted themselves to the culture of Hyderabad, which was described as Mughlai, a somewhat decadent version of Mughal culture. The court etiquette of Hyderabad retained much of the rigidity and elegance of the Mughal court, but this was combined with a more relaxed social and cultural life. As the Persian language gave way to Urdu, Hyderabad became one of the last outposts for the survival of the composite Hindu-Muslim culture.

The court dress had changed from the medieval angarkha, a flowing garment which extended to the ankles, to the more modern sherwani. This was worn with churidar-payjamas, a special turban known as *dastar*, and a belt known as *bakloos*. The tradition was still followed of greeting one's superior with a low bow, and a gesture with the hand as if placing the dust of a superior on one's head. The basic attitudes of the ruling class had not changed in spite of Western education which had introduced an element of uniformity and a veneer of egalitarianism. Apart from the English-medium schools, there were Urdu-medium schools as well, like the Madrasa-i-Asafia (the Asaf Jahi school), and the Madrasa-i-Aizza (school of friends.)

By 1881, there were three colleges in the State, the newly established Nizam College at Hyderabad, the Aurangabad College, and the Darul Uloom or Oriental College in the old city of Hyderabad, which prepared students for the Panjab Oriental Titles examination. All three were State institutions.

In 1884, two old schools were amalgamated and the Mahboob College was set up in Secunderabad, to commemorate the installation of Mahboob Ali Pasha as Nizam. Education in Marathi, Telugu and Kannada was furthered mainly by private activity and not given much encouragement by the State. Medical education, technical education in civil engineering, and women's education were not neglected in the city of Hyderabad, and had their indirect impact on the entire State.

These innovations did not have such a widespread effect as may be imagined. To a large extent, it was the upper middle class and part of the lower middle class which gained from the new educational facilities and training institutions. The majority of the jagirdar class and even the nobility were so steeped in ignorance that they had no desire to educate their sons, let alone their daughters. Some of this class were barely literate, and almost entirely innocent of education. The Jagirdars' College was started in the seventh Nizam's time in order to encourage the jagirdars to educate their children, but it fulfilled the purpose only partially.

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Nevertheless, Hyderabad played an important role in the intellectual life of the country during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The founding of the Hyderabad State in 1724 represented an attempt to maintain the continuity of Mughal power in southern India, and the State continued to be throughout its history, a refuge for learned individuals and families who were familiar with the Persian or Urdu languages and sought employment or advancement in the Deccan. Lucknow and Hyderabad were the two centres of Mughal culture. Of the two, Lucknow retained more of the original ethos of Delhi, while Hyderabad was located much further away in an area where other languages—Marathi, Telugu and Kannada—played an important part.

Along with the secular aspects of culture like music, dance, food, dress, entertainment, poetry, games, customs, and ceremonies, a new religious philosophy came to Hyderabad from North India. The Sufi tradition had always played an important part in the faith of the common role man, both in the north and in the Deccan. But as the power of the court declined, the influence of religious teachers and thinkers increased. Moreover, the traditional Sufi faith was not enough to satisfy the educated citizen and the common man in the cities. They had begun to feel a sense of frustration and unease. The centre of their world had collapsed with the end of the Mughal court and the court of Awadh at the time of the Revolt. A few of the Muslims, who regarded themselves as participants in the power of the state, began to feel that the Nizam's dominions rightfully belonged to them. Both Muslims and Hindus who were steeped in the Mughal culture of the north migrated to Hyderabad for employment. The State soon emerged as a major centre of Mughal culture and tradition,

with Bhopal and Rampur playing subsidiary roles in maintaining Mughal courtly traditions.

After the death of Aurangzeb and the evident decline of Mughal power and influence in India, a new Muslim philosophy arose under the inspiration of Shah Waliullah (1703–1764). This remarkable man, a Naqshbandi Shaikh educated in Mecca and Medina, argued that Islam had been adversely influenced and weakened by Hindu customs and beliefs, and the only solution lay in further intensifying Islamic reform. He urged the need for applying *Ijtihad*, or creative reasoning, to bring ordinary educated Muslims into the process and prevent Islam from being totally dependent on local mullahs. 'He was probably the first Islamic thinker to articulate that religious thought had to interact with changing social conditions.'

Waliullah was the contemporary of Abdul Wahhab (1703–1787) an Arab reformer who also sought to rid Islam of its later accretions and superstitions. Because of the influence of Wahhab in the Arab world the British in India identified the followers of Waliullah as Wahhabis, although there were differences in the two ideologies. Waliullah, unlike Wahhab, was a Sufi, and thus a product of the Persian and Indian traditions, as well as of the Arab.

The ideas of Waliullah had an influence on the Revolt of 1857 and on earlier revolts in Hyderabad. A few years earlier in 1839 an all-India conspiracy was discovered. Mubarizud-Daula, brother of the Nizam Sikandar Jah, was imprisoned for life in Golconda fort after being found guilty by a British court of inquiry for participating in this conspiracy.

The late nineteenth century saw major changes Islam in Indian. First, there was an attempt by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to modernize Islam by introducing concepts of rationality and Western scientific ideas in order to face the challenge of Christianity and the onslaught of modern science. Although several disciples of Sir Syed known as Naturees worked as officials in Hyderabad under Sir Salar Jang I (1853–1883) and later, they were not particularly interested in propagating their version of Islam in the Deccan.

They included Mahdi Ali Khan (Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk), Chiragh Ali (Nawab Azam Yar Jang) and Mushtaq Hussain (Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk). A more influential figure in Hyderabad was Jamaluddin Afghani, a native of Hamdan in Persia who stayed in Hyderabad for some time in 1879. Afghani claimed to be a Sunni from Afghanistan although he was born of Shia parents in Iran. He played a role in the politics of Turkey,

Egypt, Iran and Afghanistan, arguing everywhere that Islam could be reconciled with science, and each believer had the right and responsibility to interpret the Quran and Sunna for himself. Afghani, who has been described as 'the modern progenitor of Islamic reform', and his disciples went on to offer a blueprint of an Islamic state suitable for the present day and age.

The Indian Muslim poet, Dr Sir Muhammad Iqbal was born and lived in the Punjab and died in Lahore in 1938. Educated as he was in Germany, he was at ease both in Islamic and Western philosophy. He tried in his poetic work to reconstruct a philosophy for Islam and especially for Indian Islam. Iqbal visualized Pakistan as a homeland for the Indian Muslims, but died nine years before the idea reached fruition. His thinking greatly influenced the younger generation of Muslims in Hyderabad in the 1920s and 1930s.[15]

During the reign of the sixth and seventh Nizams there was a continued influx of important Urdu poets and writers to Hyderabad from northern India. In the sixth Nizam's time, Altaf Hussain Hali, Nazam Tabatabai, Mirza Khan Dagh, Shibli Nomani, and Fasahat Jang Jaleel came to Hyderabad. The former was the tutor in poetry of the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, and the latter taught poetry to the seventh Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan.

Fasahat Jang Jaleel was designated the poet laureate of both the sixth and seventh Nizams. During Osman's time, Shibli came again to Hyderabad. Among other writers who came to Hyderabad were Sulaiman Nadwi and Hafeez Jalandhari.

Mir Osman Ali Khan gave large sums of money to prominent poets like Iqbal and Hali who did not make Hyderabad their headquarters but visited only once or twice. The novelist, Mirza Hadi Ruswa of Lucknow, the author of *Umrao Jan Ada*, and the essayist and journalist, Zafar Ali Khan of Lahore were received with honour and given appointments in government departments both by Mahboob Ali Khan and Osman Ali Khan.

Another major figure who worked in Hyderabad was Abdul Haleem Sharar, poet, dramatist, novelist, biographer, historian and journalist. He was first employed in the 1890s by Nawab Viqar-ul-Umra to train his son in Urdu. The boy was studying at Eton College in England. Sharar worked for some time in Hyderabad in a government post, and spent three years in England. He was later employed to write a history of Islam at the instance of Mir Osman Ali Khan.

Employment in Hyderabad State was profitable but insecure. Four important migrants from the north, Abdul Haleem Sharar, Zafar Ali Khan, Safiullah and Aziz Mirza were banished from Hyderabad in 1909 at the instance of the Residency, which was convinced that they were involved in a conspiracy against the British interest in India. However, at least three of the four were allowed to come back at various times and for different reasons.

The only one of the four conspirators who was known as an administrator was Aziz who held the post of Subedar and Secretary, and whose family stayed on in Hyderabad after him. He is also known as a writer of Urdu prose.

The steady stream of literary figures from North India continued well into the Thirties. Hafeez Jalandhari was the author of an important four-volume history of Islam in Urdu verse. It was modelled on *Shahnama*, the great work by the Persian poet Firdausi. Hafeez came to Hyderabad to seek financial help from the Nizam's government, after completing two volumes and finding himself in financial difficulties. The Nizam's government decided in February 1937 to give him Rs 300 per month for three years. The third and fourth volumes of the work were completed with the support of the Nizam's government, for which the Finance Member, Sir Akbar Hydari received plaudits from Sir Feroze Khan Noon, Indian High Commissioner in London, and Sir Abdul Quadir, Member of the Secretary of State's Council for India. Hafeez Jalandhari later became the poet laureate of Pakistan and wrote the national anthem of that country.[16]

In the early years of the seventh Nizam's rule a new phenomenon emerged. A professional class of administrators arose, largely but not entirely non-Mulki in origin. Prominent among them were the Bilgrami family and their relatives, descendants of the brothers, Syed Hussain and Syed Ali Bilgrami who came from Bilgram in U.P. They had intermarried with other Shia families in Hyderabad and established a reputation for private learning and competence in administration.

The family of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had a long association with Hyderabad. Sir Syed himself visited Hyderabad first during the time of Salar Jang I. Later he came again in 1891 with some of his disciples including the poet, Hali. A public meeting was held at Bashir Bagh under the chairmanship of Nawab Viqar-ul-Umra at which Hali read his Urdu poetry, and Shibli his Persian poetry. Sir Syed's son, Syed Mahmood, was appointed a judge of the Hyderabad High Court and his grandson,

Sir Ross Masood was Director of Public Instruction of Hyderabad, and served a term as Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University, before his premature death. Among the families which came to Hyderabad from U.P. under the influence of Sir Syed and his group, was the Sherwani family, which gave Osmania University its first Vice-Chancellor as well as the historian, Haroon Khan Sherwani.[17]

From South India, Hyderabad received at least two families of Navayatis. They were originally traders but later became learned figures and contributed to scholarly activity in Hyderabad. These included one family which had such distinguished litterateurs as Muhammad Hamidullah, and Nasiruddin Hashmi. Another Navayati family was that of the poet and writer, Aziz Jang Villa, whose son acquired prominence as Nawab Deen Yar Jang, rising to be Kotwal and later Director-General of Police.

Muhammad Azam, who served as Principal of the City College, Vice-Chancellor of Osmania University and Minister of Education also came from Madras. He married a lady from a Shia family of U.P., and made Hyderabad his permanent home. He was known as a liberal, and a supporter of progressive ideas.[18]

Among the all-India figures who made Hyderabad their base for several years were Abdul Haq and Abul Ala Maududi. Abdul Haq was born in U.P. in 1890 and made a great contribution to the growth and propagation of the Urdu language through the Anjuman Taraqqi-i- Urdu. (Association for the Propogation of Urdu).He was invited to Hyderabad to serve as Inspector of Schools and was later Professor of Urdu of Osmania University and Chairman of the Translation Bureau. He migrated to Pakistan from Delhi at the time of partition, and lived to be over ninety. He was called Baba-i-Urdu, or the father of Urdu, in recognition of his contribution to the language.

Abul Ala Maududi was born in Aurangabad in 1903 and lived in Hyderabad till the 1930s, when he accepted an invitation from Dr Muhammad Iqbal to live and work in Pathankot in the Punjab. There he played a prominent role in building up a fundamentalist Islamic ideology which later developed into the Jamaat-i-Islami, an organization intended to produce a cadre of sincere and disciplined Muslims, capable of bringing about the victory of Islam in India. He, 'faced modern life armed with the Sharia.' Like Abdul Wahhab he attacked orthodox ulema for confusing the fundamentals of Islam by attaching their own rules to the injunctions

of the Sharia. He advocated Ijtihad, but only in accordance with the spirit of the Sharia's commandments.[19]

The coming into Hyderabad of a large number of educated families from other parts of the country naturally created a sense of grievance among the local population, who felt that they were unfairly excluded from the loaves and fishes of office. This resentment had already begun during the second Salar Jang's tenure as Diwan (1884–1887). The change of the official language from Persian to Urdu gave an advantage to North Indian migrants, especially to Muslims and Kayasths fluent in that language. Old residents of Hyderabad called themselves Mulki(sons of the soil). But as more and more outsiders educated their children in Hyderabad, intermarriages took place and it was difficult to distinguish a Mulki from a non-Mulki.

It was not entirely true that Mulkis were excluded from employment. The sixth Nizam once declined to approve the employment of the Urdu poet, Fani Badayuni as a Headmaster, because he felt that lower posts which fetched a salary of Rs 250 to Rs 400 per month should be reserved for local people who would otherwise feel discontented. But Maharaja Kishen Pershad pressed for the appointment, and the ruler relented. He warned however that such a request should not be made in future.

Among the Mulki poets and writers who were benefited by the largesse of the last two Nizams towards Urdu literature were Nawab Aziz Jang and Shamsullah Quadri. The latter was not only a well-known poet, but also an archaeologist, whose work in that area was known to Sir Akbar Hydari, a powerful official who later rose to be Finance Member and President of the Nizam's Council.

The non-Mulki poets, writers, scholars and journalists who were patronized by the Nizam's generosity were however handicapped by the presence of British officials both of the Residency and the Nizam's government. The Residency kept a watch on their political activities while Finance Department officials tried to control the generosity of the Nizam's officials who were prone to loosen the purse strings a little too generously.

The Mulkis regarded British officials in Hyderabad as even more alien than the non-Mulkis. Both Mulkis and non-Mulkis questioned their lack of consideration for Indian culture and traditions. Casson Walker, who was Financial Advisor to the Nizam's government under the sixth Nizam was castigated in a satiric poem published in a Lahore paper in

1909. The poem was first published in part under the pseudonym Abu Niwas in September, 1906; the author Zafar Ali Khan was then employed in Hyderabad. In 1909 he was banished from Hyderabad, it was only then that the complete version appeared in a Lahore newspaper. The poem reflects the reaction of a sensitive Indian poet towards Walker's behaviour and attitudes. It makes fun of senior Hyderabadis who were unable to assert themselves against the strong personality of Casson Walker. The Prime Minister Maharaja Kishen Pershad, the Education Minister Fakhrul Mulk, as well as Sir Akbar Hydari and Faridoon Jang are mentioned specifically as being unable to rein in Walker's powers.

The poem began as follows :

Na Bengali *se ghabra na* Madrasi *ki parwa kar*
Magar sijde men jhat gir pad nazar aye agar Walker

(Do not bother about a Bengali, take no notice of a Madrasi.
But fall flat on the ground the moment you see Walker)

The poet went on to claim that Walker had outraged the modesty of the Nizam's State:

Padi phirti hai nange sar Nizam-ul-Mulk *ki daulat*
Ek Anglo-Indian *ke hath se chadar utar* Walker

(Nizam-ul-Mulk's regime wanders about with head uncovered
her chadar [headcloth] having been removed by an Anglo- Indian)

Referring to the distinguished official, Aziz Mirza, the poet said that with all his knowledge and cleverness, he could not raise his head before Walker :

Aziz Mirza *sahib ba een tadbir ba een danish*
Utha sakte nahin tere age apna sar Walker.

Finally, the poet expressed the hope that Nizam-ul-Mulk will assert himself and take the power in his hand so that the very next day Walker could appear in London:

Nizam ul-Mulk *le agar kam kuwwat se*
To aay doosre hi roz London *me nazar* Walker.

A study of Casson Walker's notings on the files regarding the dues to Abdul Haleem Sharar does not support the harsh assessment of the

Punjabi journalist. Sharar was one of the four persons banished from Hyderabad in 1909. In a note written in 1903 Casson Walker commented critically on the work done by Sharar. Sharar had been assigned the writing of a book on the Crusades and Jerusalem. He pointed out that only half the book had been written in five years. There was no evidence that the book was required for official purposes. Many books were available on the Crusades. The burden of his salary had been on the exchequer for ten years. Walker, while suggesting the termination of Sharar's services, suggested that he should be given a gratuity amounting to Rs 3,320, giving him credit for some work he did in the Finance Department for twelve months, as well as a gratuity amounting to one month's salary for ten years, for which he was not, strictly speaking, eligible under the rules.

We may allow Zafar Ali Khan his poetic licence. Although his attack on Walker was exaggerated, he expressed the sentiments of many in Hyderabad—both Mulkis and non-Mulkis—who felt severely restricted by the British-imposed regulations on Hyderabad State.[20]

Aghorenath Chattopadhyaya was a remarkable figure who played a role in the intellectual life of Hyderabad. He was a student at Oxford University when the first Salar Jang visited England in 1876, and persuaded him to come and settle in the Nizam's dominions.

Aghorenath was a dominating figure at the Nizam College in Hyderabad where he lectured in a stentorian voice in English on scientific subjects. He was also something of a radical. In 1884, soon after Salar Jang's death he was banished from Hyderabad for one year because of his strong protest against the extension of the Nizam's State Railway to northern Telengana through an agreement with a British company. Had his views prevailed, the State would have been saved a large expenditure and avoided a major financial scandal involving the British firm and a Hyderabad official, Abdul Haq Diler Jang.

During his absence from Hyderabad his family was looked after by his close friend, Mulla Abdul Qaiyum, who had started a branch of the Indian National Congress in Hyderabad. Aghorenath's contribution to the growth of an intellectual ferment and a radical presence in Hyderabad requires further study.

In 1888, the Nizam sanctioned an annual grant for residents of his State, to assist their going abroad for higher studies. The education of women also received attention. One of the first recipients of this scholar-

ship was an Anglo-Indian, Edith Boardman, who took an advanced degree in medicine and surgery and returned in 1890 to join the State Medical Service. Another scholarship holder in Europe was Sarojini Naidu, the poetess, and daughter of Aghorenath Chattopadhyaya. Her eldest brother, Virendranath left India in 1902 and never returned from Europe. He took an active part in the Communist movement in Europe, and was based in Berlin for many years. In 1905, the Nizam endowed the Victoria Zenana Hospital for women.[21]

Thus Hyderabad was both physically and intellectually a different place at the beginning of the twentieth century to what it had been even half a century earlier. Elements of modernity had entered and created a new dimension to the social scene. However, beneath the veneer of Westernization, there was a strong current of traditional life which continued to dominate urban society.

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Although he was not the child of a nikah marriage himself, the future Nizam entered into a marriage in his twentieth year. Mir Osman Ali Khan's betrothal took place on 10 January 1905 and the marriage was celebrated on 16 April 1906 with pomp and splendour. The bride was Azamunnisa Begum, daughter of Jehangir Jang, a noble of high status distantly related to the ruling family. The young prince was to reside in Eden Garden, adjacent to King Kothi.

Osman Ali Khan's old tutor, Egerton, stayed on in Hyderabad for twenty years, twelve as Osman's tutor, and eight as his guardian. Soon after his marriage, the young prince started going on regular tours in the districts with Egerton. He visited Medak, Bidar, Aurangabad, Warangal and Gulbarga, among other places in the Nizam's dominions. He was also trained in practical administration. Assistant Secretaries of various departments came to him on working days for a couple of hours. In March 1911 Egerton wrote to the Nizam that :

> The Sahibzada Sahib's work at present consists chiefly in his going through settled revenue files and civil and criminal cases and writing his opinion on them: this is subsequently corrected by the Madadgaar (Assistant) of the Department concerned. [22]

He also visited Bombay, Calcutta and Ajmer Sharif, while still a minor.

While the young Osman thus acquired some fluency in English and a working knowledge of the administration of his own State, he was not given the opportunity to look at the problem of the Indian states in general or of India as a whole. He left Hyderabad only on short visits and was not exposed to the friendship of public men or the comradeship of other Indian rulers. No doubt this early isolation led him to grow up convinced that he and his State were the hub of the universe.

Mahboob perhaps realized that he had been unduly extravagant and had to suffer the consequences of his own mistakes. He must have hoped that his son would grow up differently and set right the State's finances. This perhaps explains the strictness with which Mahboob brought up his son in regard to financial matters. However, Mahboob himself was very lax with money and the young man evidently felt that he should not follow his father's example. He saved money, and in the process gradually acquired the reputation of being a miser.

The circumstances in which Mahboob Ali Pasha died have been debated for a long time among persons knowledgeable about old Hyderabad. It is widely believed that the mother of Nawab Salabat Jah, to whom he was married by a nikah ceremony, was pressing him to remove Mir Osman Ali Khan from the succession, and to nominate her son in his place. Mir Osman Ali Khan himself wrote to the Resident that it was, 'a matter of common knowledge amongst all the citizens of Hyderabad that just a few years before my late lamented father's demise, the relations between him and myself were somewhat estranged.'

He further asserted that there was an intrigue against his succession to the position of Nizam by Maharaja Kishen Pershad among others. This intrigue was upset by the sudden death of Mir Mahboob Ali Khan. Even after his death however, the acting Kotwal or Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad, Sultan Yavar Jang was alleged to have sent reports to the Diwan that the Nizam used to drink heavily and go in for all kinds of debauchery.[23]

Salabat Jah was born in 1898 and was thus only twelve years of age when his father died. Even if Mahboob had acceded to the request of his nikah wife and declared Salabat Jah as his successor prior to his death, this declaration would have had to be approved by the British Government in accordance with the custom prevailing as far back as the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is by no means certain that the British would have acceded to the Nizam's request to change the succession from

Osman Ali Khan to Salabat Jah. The succession of Mir Osman Ali Khan to the gaddi had been approved by the Government of India when Salar Jang II was Diwan in 1887. It was confirmed in 1902, during the visit of Lord Curzon to Hyderabad. Osman Ali Khan was declared the successor to Mahboob Ali Khan immediately after the latter's death on 29 August 1911. Salabat Jah was too young to rule in his own right. If he had been declared the successor, there would have had to be a Regency, which would have greatly increased British power in the State.

Mahboob Ali Khan, the sixth Nizam of Hyderabad and the 'beloved' of his subjects (the word Mahboob literally means beloved) went into a coma late in August 1911 from which he emerged only for a brief moment before his death on 29 August. Although the monarch had been uneasy, for a few days nobody had an inkling about any threat to his life. He had left Purani Haveli in an angry mood for Falaknuma Palace, and had been, 'drinking more heavily than usual, eating very little, brooding by himself.' Early in the morning on the third day of Ramzan, it was reported to the Diwan, Kishen Pershad that the ruler was sinking. The heir to the gaddi, Mir Osman Ali Khan came to the ruler's bedside just after eleven. He hesitated to enter but allowed himself to be led to the dying man. Mahboob Ali Khan, 'opened his eyes wide for one last look around and closed them forever.

'Shaken as if by an earthquake, Osman fled; brought back to the room, he flung his *dastar* to the floor and threw himself on his father's feet. But he was too racked by emotion to remain there more than momentarily, and he quickly left Falaknuma. Before Osman's car had re-entered the King Kothi gates, the shivering had started. He hurried to his room with barely time to throw himself on his bed before convulsive shudders took possession of him.' The paroxysm passed only in the late afternoon and, 'he returned to Chow Mahalla for the last salaam. By tradition he was debarred from attending the funeral.'

In accordance with an ancient tradition, the city gates were closed and barred before noon on 29 August in order to prevent outside interference in the decision on a successor to the Nizam. The announcement of the successor was also an official confirmation of the death of the ruler. The proclamation had been signed by the Diwan, but because of his responsibility for law and order, the Minister for Police, Nawab Shahab Jang, mounted his horse and led a solemn procession to Charminar. There he removed his turban, placed a white handkerchief on his head and called out loudly:

'The state belongs to God and the grace and the power to Mir Osman Ali Khan Asaf Jah VII !' A roll of drums followed the announcement. A similar proclamation was made by Shahab Jang at each of the twelve gates of the city, after which the gates were opened.[24]

The decision that Mir Osman Ali Khan would be proclaimed the Nizam without any delay was taken by the Diwan, Maharaja Kishen Pershad, the Police Minister, Nawab Shahab Jang and the Kotwal, Sultan Yavar Jang. The private secretary to the late ruler, Faridoon Jang and his chief clerk, Abdul Aziz, were also present. There seems to have been a fear that the British would intervene on behalf of Salabat Jah, and exercise power through a Regency, although they had previously recognized Osman as the rightful heir.[25]

Although Osman Ali Khan was deeply moved at the death of his father, he had never been close to him. He was clearly more attached to his mother than to his father. His mother was originally a poor woman, who had been brought up as a Shia, but she was highly ambitious. Her son visited her almost every day during his lifetime and mourned her sincerely when she died. He visited her grave regularly and was deeply devoted to her memory. Soon after her death, he built in her memory an enormous mourning hall, according to the Shia custom, which was known as Azakhana Zehra. Although officially a Sunni, he openly patronized the Shia faith, especially in the years immediately following his mother's death.

On 1 September 1911 the seventh Nizam was formally installed by the Resident, Sir Alexander Pinhey. He was accompanied by senior officers of the Secunderabad garrison with their staff officers, besides his own staff. He was met in the centre of the Khilwat, which had been especially constructed for such functions, by the seventh Nizam. After the usual exchange of greetings, as the Resident reported to the Government of India, he took Osman Ali Khan's left hand in his right and,

> conducted him to his seat under a canopy at the top of the room. When all were seated, I addressed the Durbar in a short speech, recognising and confirming His Highness on the masnad of Hyderabad in the name of the Government of India, and conveying to him the congratulations of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General and of the British officers present.[26]

The young Osman had inherited from his father a love of magnificence and for the display of wealth. At his *masnad nashini* at the Khilwat Palace on 8 September 1911 he rode in procession and put on his formal dress for the Darbar at the Baradari House. It consisted of a muslin cloth *dastar* with, 'a golden crest, wrapped in front with a jewelled ornament set in gold, a brocade Sherwani designed in vertical stripes, jewelled armlets round the arms and jewelled bracelets on the wrists, a string of pearls, bedecked with glittering diamonds, in the neck.' This dress was made for him by the tailoring firm, John Burton & Co., of Secunderabad.

A cock was sacrificed and eighteen prisoners were released to celebrate the occasion. An elephant with full decorations, a gold serpent, eighteen gold mohurs, 525 silver rupees and ten goats were set aside for giving as alms. All nobles, officials and ministers who were privileged to attend the Darbar presented nazars. After the Darbar was over the Nizam changed his dress and mounted the royal elephant, occupying the front seat in a canopied howdah. Nobles of the Paigah family surrounded the royal elephant. Other elephants followed carrying the sons of the new ruler and trophies from the treasury, insignias of Mughal honours and banners of the ruling family. After traversing the city the procession ended at Roshan Bagh at one o'clock. The salute of the regular army and the Maisram irregular forces was taken in the afternoon.[27]

As we have seen earlier, the Diwan, Maharaja Kishen Pershad, was a party to the declaration of Mir Osman Ali Khan as the ruler on the death of his father, although the actual announcement was made by Shahab Jang, the Police Minister. The secrecy with which the declaration was made evidently provoked some individuals in the State to try and have Mir Osman Ali Khan removed from the gaddi by making allegations against him to the Government of India. The young ruler suspected that the then Kotwal, or Chief of Police, Sultan Yavar Jang, was behind this conspiracy. Without consulting the British Government he quickly replaced Sultan Yavar Jang by Lal Khan, a man of humble origin who had been loyal to him and given him support during his father's time. The British objected to the appointment of Lal Khan, arguing that the Kotwal should be appointed with their prior knowledge and that of the Diwan. The young Nizam argued, however, that the Kotwal was always appointed by the Nizam and reported to him directly, and not through the Diwan.

By July 1912 Resident Pinhey was convinced that the new Kotwal was 'a liar and forger,' and sent messages demanding that he be dismissed. The Nizam sent prevaricating messages through Faridoonji, whereupon the Resident threatened to report the case officially to the government and have the Kotwal deported. By the end of July, the Nizam produced two documents, purporting to be petitions to the Viceroy accusing the Nizam of various misdemeanours, and signed by a large number of high officials, headed by the former Diwan, Kishen Pershad. Although some of the signatures in the mahzars were found to be correct by a handwriting expert brought in from Calcutta, other signatures were forgeries.

The Government of India had thus built up a body of practice which went beyond the letter of the treaties, and which gave them a handle to intervene even in comparatively minor matters. In Hyderabad, as in many Indian states, the Resident gave advice through oral messages which were never formally recorded. A network of spies operated on behalf of the Residency, closely watching the affairs of the Nizam's government. The Nizam's officials also had their spies, who watched the affairs at the Residency.

However, when he found that the Nizam was determined to pursue a particular course of action, Pinhey refrained from interfering in the major decisions of the Nizam. At his suggestion, the Government of India acquiesced in Mir Osman Ali Khan's decision to accept the resignation which was offered by Maharaja Kishen Pershad.[28]

The accusation against Maharaja Kishen Pershad of having entered into an intrigue to prevent Mir Osman Ali Khan from succeeding to the gaddi was preposterous. He had been brought up in a tradition of complete loyalty to the ruler and subservience to his wishes. The only possible circumstance in which he could have been involved in such a conspiracy would have been at the instance of Mahboob Ali Pasha himself. It is unbelievable that the sixth Nizam could have been involved in such an intrigue against his own son.

From the evidence so far available, it would appear that Lal Khan had the documents forged. Possibly a few signatures were obtained on a blank sheet of paper under some pretext or other, before the petition was inscribed on the document, and later other signatures must have been forged.

It became clear early during the seventh Nizam's reign that he was capable of handling the affairs of State himself, and was not willing to allow the British to advise him in day-to-day matters. Unlike his father,

who had retained both his tutors, Claude Clerk and Server-ul-Mulk, in positions of power during the early part of his rule, Osman did not agree to the proposal to appoint Egerton, his former tutor, as general advisor to the Nizam.

It was equally clear that Osman was capable of being influenced by flatterers and sycophants like Lal Khan. Evidently Osman Ali Khan changed his mind about Kishen Pershad later. Had he been still of the view that Kishen Pershad had been behind the conspiracy to deny him the gaddi, he would hardly have appointed him President of his Executive Council in 1926 and continued with him for a period of twelve years.

Mir Osman Ali Khan had come to the masnad of Hyderabad with all the traditional pomp and splendour which characterized the reign of his ancestors. This tendency dominated his official life till about the age of thirty. After that he began to neglect his personal appearance, although the etiquette of the court continued to be strictly enforced.

Although the British had laid restrictions on the Nizam's freedom of action in external and internal matters, the Nizam at the height of his glory enjoyed far more power over his subjects than did the King of England over his. Like the Mughal emperors, he granted titles to his subjects. The highest title given was Jah. This was reserved for members of the ruling family and subsequently for the successors of the ruler. Second, in order of precedence, came the title of Mulk. Then came the titles of Daula and Jang. Originally these titles carried with them the right to command an armed force which was measured in terms of the number of horses. Later these titles were accompanied by the grant of land in the form of jagirs, or a cash stipend known as mansab. Thus emerged the class of jagirdars and mansabdars. During the last Nizam's rule many officials received the titles without any corresponding grant of land or money. The titles thus became the equivalent of the knighthoods and other honours given by the British ruler to his or her subjects on the recommendation of the government in power.

Mir Osman Ali Khan's first wife, Azamunnisa Begum, was commonly referred to as Dulhan Pasha Begum. By her he had three children, Mir Himayat Ali Khan, Azam Jah was born in February 1907. Another son Mir Shajaat Ali Khan, Moazam Jah was born in December the same year. The third child was a daughter, Shahzadi Pasha, who remained unmarried. She was her father's constant companion for much of his life.

Osman Ali Khan's second wife was the daughter of Nawab Nazir Jang who was his Army Secretary. His third wife was a niece of the Aga Khan, known as Gowher Begum. The fourth was the daughter of Nawab Khurshid Jah, a leading Paigah noble.

In addition to his four official wives and their children, the Nizam's household consisted in 1955 of forty-two Begums, thirty-three living children (from the fifty he had had), forty-six grandchildren, sixteen daughters-in-law married to eight of his sons, forty-four Khanazads, twenty-five line-boys (sic) and about 1,000 servants. Over these members of his family the Nizam exercised, 'the rights of a Roman paterfamilias. His rights are as inalienable as their allegiance. They are his family; they are also part of his estate.'

Of the forty-two women who were in the zenana or harem of Mir Osman Ali Khan, the last and most favoured was a Hindu lady of great charm known as Leila Begum. By her he had seven children, five sons and two daughters. Leila Begum was a singer who was noticed by the Nizam during one of his tours in the State. He was struck by her exquisite beauty and asked for her for his harem. The girl and her family, we are told, regarded it as an honour to accept.

Another category of women in the zenana came to the notice of the Nizam through word of mouth. Senior maidservants would inform women members of the courtiers' households and the courtiers would pass on the information tactfully to the Nizam. The latter then had the choice of inviting the candidate for an interview or sending one of the senior womenfolk to have a look at the girl before inviting her to join his harem.

The third way in which a woman could enter the harem would be as a gift from the ruler's mother who would choose the best looking girl from among the Khanazads. These Khanazads were more than family servants. Every jagirdar family had them. They were attached to the family for generations and the young girls were usually available to the young men of the family when the latter reached puberty. The custom in the Nizam's family was slightly different. The Nizam accepted a girl from a Khanazad family as a birthday gift from his mother, which he could not refuse out of respect for his mother.

The Nizam's harem was his private preserve and was not to be passed on from father to son. Women in the harem were required to be faithful to the man who kept, fed and sheltered them, and sometimes fathered

children by them. The harem was guarded only by maidservants, and not by eunuchs, nor by other male servants.[29]

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A characteristic of Osman Ali Khan's policy during this early period was to maintain the strength of the Nizamate by cultivating close and friendly relations with the Residency. He requested the Government of India to permit him to honour the Resident, Sir Alexander Pinhey with the title of Hashmatul Mulk. However, this proposal did not meet with the approval of the Government of India.

Pinhey seems to have been instrumental in the appointment as Diwan of Yousuf Ali Khan, Salar Jang III, the scion of a family that had held the post of Diwan for so long that even their palace was commonly referred to as Diwan Devdi. This appointment was made conditional on the appointment of the veteran Syed Hussain Bilgrami as his private secretary. As Bilgrami had served the State from about the 1860s and had known the grandfathers of both the ruler and the Diwan at close quarters it was expected that public affairs would move smoothly, and the youth and inexperience of the Diwan would not prove to be a handicap. Bilgrami's appointment replaced the appointment of Sir Bryan Egerton as Adviser.

However, the third Salar Jang did not really enjoy the confidence of his master at any time. His appointment was conditional on the veteran Syed Hussain Bilgrami being made his private secretary. At the banquet held to felicitate the young Diwan on his appointment, the Resident, Sir Alexander Pinhey spoke eloquently on the occasion : 'Salar Jung! what a name to conjure with in Hyderabad!' A couple of years later, however, his successor, S.M. Fraser wrote that, 'there is no doubt the Nizam has grown bitterly jealous of his popularity and goes out of his way to treat him as a boy... .' Salar Jang's friendship with Pinhey was also resented by the Nizam. Although confirmed as Diwan, Salar Jang resigned the office in 1914. When he did so, Pinhey made no attempt to persuade Osman Ali Khan to retain him in office, and suggested that the post should not be filled unless a suitable person was found.

The Nizam clearly disliked the young Salar Jang; and tolerated him only because the British liked him. When his relations with Salar Jang deteriorated, the British did not press for his retention. His resignation

made hardly any difference to the method of work, as the Nizam took the final decision in any case on most matters of State.[30]

The early years of the seventh Nizam were characterized by a period of strict financial discipline, in contrast to the somewhat lax administration of the sixth Nizam, whose disinterest and unconcern in financial matters was notorious. The reforms were largely promoted and guided by Sir Reginald Glancy. Glancy was Financial Adviser of the State for many years and devoted his attention not only to the straightening out of government finances but also attempted, with the full support of the Nizam, to set right the, 'problem of heavy indebtedness of the Hyderabad nobility as a class, owing to their habit of loose living and undue extravagancy.' Among these nobles was Maharaja Kishen Pershad, the former Diwan as well as the great Paigah nobles.

At the same time the revenue administration was greatly improved under the guidance of A. J. Dunlop who was Director-General of Revenue from 1910 to 1914. He was succeeded by G.E.C. Wakefield, who had a sound knowledge of Indian languages and the revenue system. He was able to weed out many dishonest officers from the Nizam's service, and tightened up the administration. A similar role was played in the Police Department by the Inspector-General of the District Police of Hyderabad State, A.C. Hankin.

In 1914, on the eve of the First World War, the British were afraid that the entry of Turkey on the side of the Germans would cause a major setback to their cause throughout the Middle East. The British Resident at Hyderabad on the eve of Turkish entry into the war persuaded Mir Osman Ali Khan to issue an appeal supporting the British action against Turkey, and urging the Muslims of India and elsewhere in the world to support the British cause, notwithstanding the Turkish Caliphate. He complied with this request rather reluctantly.

The appeal or Manifesto, as it came to be called,was drafted by Syed Hussain Bilgrami who had long since retired from all official positions. Bilgrami's second wife, the former Edith Boardman, pointed out that, 'the Manifesto was worded in a way that appealed to the best sentiments of Muhammadans and succeeded in calming them completely.' She considered this, 'the most signal service rendered by Syed Hussain Bilgrami no less to H.E.H. the Nizam than to the British Empire.'[31]

The Manifesto took the form of a letter from the Nizam to the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge dated 4 November 1914. In the letter the Nizam stated that, 'As a true Mohammadan, who has the welfare and prosperity of his community at heart, and who takes a just pride in the glorious traditions of the Mohammadan Nation, I cannot but view with profound grief the unwise, short-sighted and futile course adopted by the Turkish Government in joining Germany, as one of her allies in the war now raging in Europe.'

In spite of the 'perplexity as well as distress' which the conflict 'must and will cause' to 'the minds of many of the Mohommadens in India... true to the tradition of my house, as a faithful ally of the British Government, I regard it not only as a duty but as a privilege to place all the influence at my command towards assisting the British Government.' He therefore appealed to Indian Muslims to remain, 'staunch in their fidelity to British rule.'

As a result of this appeal, the Nizam was, in the minds of the Indian and Middle Eastern public, pitted against the Turkish Caliphate, and was thus given an international importance which neither he nor his predecessors had enjoyed. From a subordinate of the Mughal Empire and later of the British Government of India, Mir Osman Ali Khan had become a leader of the Muslims, although in an undefined manner.

The British in India were not entirely comfortable with the new role in which the Nizam had been cast, as a result of their initiative, in their time of difficulty. There was in fact a clear contradiction between the role adopted by the Nizam as a leader of the Muslim world, and the traditional restrictions which had been imposed on his ancestors, and which they had accepted throughout the nineteenth century.

The last Nizam's tendency to see himself as larger than life—a prospective king and independent ruler with the title of His Majesty—thus dates back to the British utilization of their position in the Nizam's court to suit their own diplomatic, military and strategic objectives, before Turkey entered the war in 1914.

All over British India and the Muslim world, Muslims paid attention to this appeal on behalf of the Nizam. It started a train of thought among many Muslims which made them feel that the glory of Islam could be revived. It generated, 'fresh aspirations and ambitions to be attached to the Ruler of Hyderabad State, for the regeneration of their community, after the general depression that had set in amongst the Muslims of India

with the complete disappearance of the last Mughal Emperor from the political stage in 1858. With Osman Ali Khan's new position as the leader of the Muslims of India, and the role that Osmania University was to play in the development and promotion of their community life, the Indian Muslims had already started to see signs of improvement in their spiritual and moral life, and hopes were cherished by them that their religion was being gradually regenerated. Consequently, some of them felt that it was their duty to show their appreciation and gratitude to the Nizam, by offering him the title of Muhibul-Millat-wad-Din or the Restorer of the Nation and the Faith.'

Among the influential Muslims in India who supported the claim of the Nizam to be declared as King of Hyderabad (on the analogy of the Grand Shareef of Mecca being made King of Hedjaz) was Sir Fazalbhoy Carrimbhoy, the Bombay business magnate. The remarks of the Resident when the title of the Exalted Highness was conferred on the Nizam are significant in his regard. The Resident remarked: 'The true son of Islam ... with far seeing realisation of the true interests of his coreligionists... boldly stood forth as the leader and spokesman of Mahomedan India.'

However, in regard to the suggestions in the vernacular press that the Nizam should be styled King of Hyderabad, the British Resident at Hyderabad, Sir Stuart Fraser, firmly held that such proposals should not be entertained as there could be no 'His Majesty' among the feudatory Indian princes. As the idea of the Nizam being given the title of King continued to be pressed, the British even regretted that the title of His Exalted Highness had been conferred on the Nizam. Lord Willingdon, the Viceroy in 1933, in a private letter to the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, remarked 'I have formed a very definite opinion against it (about the possibility of the title of King for the Nizam). It was pointed out that the title of His Exalted Highness...aroused the most bitter jealousy and discontent among the other princes. The Secretary of State who took that decision, Edwin Montagu, once wrote that if he had previously realised what would be the extent of the depth of this feeling, he would never have agreed to recommend it to His Majesty.'[32]

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For the next five years, from 1914 to 1919, Mir Osman Ali Khan worked without a Diwan. Thus he had a free hand in reconstructing the administrative

machinery and moulding State policies. He was also able to make a substantial contribution to the British war effort the good there by earning will of the Imperial power.

The armed forces of the Nizam,which, during the nineteenth century had deteriorated, had been brought back to some semblance of efficiency by its inclusion in the Imperial Service Troops. Two of these Imperial Service Regiments, the Deccan Horse and Hyderabad Lancers, served in the war under General Arthur Watson. The Nizam spent 2.8 million rupees on re-equipping the Deccan Horse, gave twenty million rupees as an outright gift to the British Government, invested sixteen million in war loans and bonds, paid for the maintenance of the two regiments abroad, provided ammunition and vehicles on a no-profit basis, and finally loaned silver worth five million rupees to the Government of India, 'to ease the deteriorating economic situation in British India,' towards the end of the war.

As a reward for the expenditure of nearly sixty million rupees the Nizam's gun salute was raised from fourteen to twenty-one. He was also made an Honorary Lieutenant-General of the British Army and as we have seen, was given the title of 'His Exalted Highness'. In 1912 when he was made a Knight Grand Commander of the Star of India (GCSI), Osman Ali Khan had to share the title with the Aga Khan and lesser states. Now, however, the Nizam had clearly emerged as superior in status to all other Indian rulers, none of whom could boast of a twenty-one gun salute or be referred to by the British Government of India as 'Our Faithful Ally'.[33]

The young Nizam was at the height of his power and prestige during the First World War. Throughout the war, he had administered the State himself without the assistance of a Diwan or Prime Minister. His chief assistant was Faridoonji, later Nawab Faridoon Jang and Faridoon-ul-Mulk, who maintained an even tenor of relation with the Residency.

It was during the direct rule of Mir Osman Ali Khan that many new innovations in administration were introduced. The Musi floods of 1908 had led to the realization that the river had to be, 'tamed by the construction of a dam upstream and strong embankments at vulnerable points along its length through the city.' The dams provided two major reservoirs, the Osmansagar and Himayatsagar, which still provide water supply to the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.

The project had been initiated at the instance of M.Visvesvaraya, a brilliant engineer from the Bombay service who later became Chief Engineer and Diwan of Mysore. Not satisfied with providing a plan for

water supply to the city and controlling the floods, he made suggestions for improving the urban surroundings of the 'old' and the 'new' cities of Hyderabad. The two banks of the Musi river were to be shorn of the unsightly slums and lined with a set of impressive buildings, three of which still stand as a monument to the vision of the distinguished engineer, and the ruler who enabled him to carry it out. The City Improvement Board, which was set up at this time, laid out gardens, built markets, widened streets, and provided for underground sewerage in the walled city. During subsequent visits to Hyderabad, Visvesvaraya made suggestions for further improvements including inner and outer ring roads, and parks all around Hussainsagar lake, which separates Hyderabad from Secunderabad. However these proposals were implemented only to a limited extent.

The State's development took shape in other directions as well. Electric power was provided by a 1,000 k.w. thermal station. An industrial laboratory was opened and a new Department of Agriculture started functioning with government sponsored cooperative and agricultural credit societies and agricultural credit banks. The State revenue had mounted by the end of the war to five crore rupees.[34]

During the early years of his reign the young ruler acquired a first-hand knowledge of conditions in the districts by making frequent tours. These visits became the occasion for officials vying with one another to bring to the Nizam crowds of rural people, both rich and poor, who were expected to pay for the privilege of entry into the august presence of the Nizam by offering a nazar. The gift consisted of gold ashrafis or specially minted coins, and sometimes actual sums of money.

This new trend evidently found favour with the Nizam, because rumours soon began to spread that the best way to get the Nizam to visit a part of his dominions was to offer him a substantial sum as a sort of guaranteed nazrana. Officials who had worked under the sixth Nizam were aghast, but were helpless and unable to stem the rot, while corruption spread from the top down.The Residency was carefully watching the situation, but the Government of India was unwilling to take action against the ruler who had been so helpful and generous to them during the crucial period of the First World War.

Even before the war ended, the Nizam returned from a trip to Bombay, Delhi and Aligarh, where he had been led to believe that the British were likely to lose the war. Taking advantage of the absence of

the Resident and the senior revenue official, Wakefield, Osman Ali Khan replaced all his three senior British officials by undesirable Indian substitutes. The Resident had the decision reversed soon after his return. Nevertheless the British had received a rude shock, and in spite of the high dignities conferred on him, it was considered necessary to administer a severe warning to the seventh Nizam in 1918, indicating that he would have to be removed from the masnad if he did not mend his ways.

After the end of the war, the Government of India continued to be faced with the dilemma as to how to respond to the Nizam's increasingly wayward behaviour. They were conscious that they owed him a debt of gratitude for having come to their rescue with men, money and materials during the First World War, as well as with his moral support in connection with the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the Germans. So far as they were concerned, he had been quite adequately rewarded by conferring upon him the titles of 'Our Faithful Ally' and 'His Exalted Highness'. However the Nizam saw these benefits only as a gesture of goodwill, which would ultimately result in an independent status for himself.

The warning that had been issued to the Nizam was only a precursor of a more fundamental change. It was considered necessary to introduce a form of government which would end the concentration of power in the hands of the ruler, which the Government of India was convinced, was the real cause of the difficulties they faced.[35]

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Mohammed Ali Jinnah's first visit to Hyderabad was in connection with a court case in April 1919. He was invited to deliver an address at a public meeting on 'The India of Tomorrow'. A police officer of the Nizam's government, Venkatrama Reddy, communicated to Jinnah in a personal interview the order that he should not address the meeting. Jinnah insisted that the written orders of the Nizam's government be shown to him, but the police officer declined to do so. Instead he requested Jinnah to avoid speaking on any political subjects.

Jinnah's speech was in fact fairly innocuous. The burden of his message was that the states and British India were closely linked, and the states possessed various advantages over British India. There were no black acts and Defence of India Acts in the states. Both the rulers and the bureaucracy were Indians and identified themselves with Indian interests,

unlike the British bureaucracy which crushed the, 'finer feelings and legitimate aspirations of the people.' The rulers and people of the states were urged to identify themselves with the country's problems in its hour of dire peril, following the example of the Maharaja of Bikaner.

The speech was reported by the Police Criminal Investigation Department to the Member and the Nizam. It roused the ire of the Nizam. Under his personal instructions, the Political Member, Nawab Nizamat Jung wrote to Jinnah after his return to Bombay on 18 April 1919, requesting him,'not to visit any part of H.E.H's Dominions on any account whatsoever, professional or otherwise,' without prior permission of H.E.H. In his reply Jinnah denied having given an assurance that he would completely avoid political topics but only that he would not speak on,'self government and cognate political questions.' He felt sure that if the entire text of the speech was placed before an enlightened ruler like the Nizam, the latter would have no objection to it.

The somewhat conciliatory letter did not, however, cause the Nizam to revise his opinion. The letters written by Nizamat Jung were being drafted by Hormuz Jung under the specific orders of the Nizam, and Nizamat Jang did not interfere in the matter. On 25 April, Nizamat Jung wrote to Jinnah again, reiterating that H.E.H. was satisfied that he did insist on making a political speech, unless an order was served on him to bar him from doing so. The Minister accused Jinnah of committing a 'blunder,' and deliberately offering,'a gratituous insult to H.E.H. by refusing to obey his order.' He particularly resented a political speech made to,'a crowd of school boys, young students and illiterate persons,' which was calculated to have a harmful effect. The Nizam refused to rescind his orders.

Jinnah now boldly and unequivocally asserted his point of view. Holding that, 'only under the Hyderabad regime my word would have been questioned,' he objected to the, 'impertinent tone and language of the letter,' which he felt sure could not have been sanctioned by H.E.H. He went on to suggest that the message should have been communicated to the organizers of the meeting rather than to himself. He commented sarcastically: 'Evidently, H.E.H's subjects are not acquainted with their Ruler's enlightened views as to the undesirability of holding any public meeting in his dominions on a political matter of any sort and thus suggesting to the minds of his loyal and law-abiding people any ideas of agitation or public demonstration from which they have happily kept

themselves aloof, otherwise, I feel sure they would have never dreamt of convening this meeting and above all requesting me to address them.'

Thus a thinly-veiled hostility characterized the attitude of the Nizam's government at this time to the distinguished Bombay advocate. It is interesting to find that eleven years later in the very same file in which these strictures were communicated to Jinnah, the orders of the Nizam barring Jinnah's visit to the Nizam's dominions were withdrawn.

This volte-face was evidently initiated by the Nizam himself. The new policy was justified by saying that circumstances had changed since the order had been passed.[36]

It is not difficult to guess the reason for the changed attitude to Jinnah. In 1919 Jinnah was a nationalist and a rising figure in the Indian National Congress. A year later he left the Congress along with M.R. Jayakar, predicting that Mahatma Gandhi's importation of religion into politics would be disastrous for the Indian polity. By 1930 Jinnah was found to be the leader of the school of thought among Indian Muslims who regarded themselves as the vanguard of a separate identity, and eventually claimed separate nationality.

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One of the major achievements of the first seven years of Osman's reign was the setting up of the first university in India to use an Indian language as its medium of instruction. The establishment of Osmania University which was named after the seventh Nizam, was the product of a series of attempts over a period of nearly half a century to set up in Hyderabad an institution of higher learning which would be worthy of the premier princely state of India.

In March 1856 the first Salar Jang laid the foundations of the Darul Uloom, which imparted education through the Persian language and prepared its students for degrees such as Munshi Fazil of the University of Punjab. During the second Salar Jang's time the official language was changed to Urdu and the idea of a separate Nizam or Deccan University arose in 1884. It received an impetus from the separate visits to Hyderabad of an English writer and traveller, Wilfred Scawen Blunt and of Jamaluddin Afghani, a scholar and thinker from the Middle East who was one of the founders of the Pan-Islamic movement. Each of them separately proposed a university which would revive the glories of Islamic

learning and become a centre for training professionals among the Muslims of the subcontinent. Thus it would give both secular and religious instruction.[37]

As to the medium of instruction of the proposed university, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who visited the Nilgiris at the invitation of the Nizam to discuss the proposal, was in favour of an English-medium university but he agreed that local languages could be given a trial. Jamaluddin Afghani on the other hand was strongly in favour of the local language as the medium of instruction.[38]

When the scheme began to take concrete shape, it was influenced more by the practicalities of the situation than by ideological considerations. The proposal was revived at the convocation of Nizam College in 1894 by the then Diwan, Viqar-ul-Umra. In 1906 the Darul Uloom lost its affiliation to Punjab University and the then Education Minister suggested that it should be brought under the Education Department of the State, and the latter should be authorized to conduct examinations and give degrees. The proposal was accepted by the Diwan and the then ruler Mahboob Ali Khan.

At the Hyderabad Educational Conference in 1913, a proposal for a separate Urdu-medium university received the support of a number of scholars including the Vice-Principal of the Nizam College, Professor Abdul Rahman, the Director of Public Instruction, Alma Latifi and Syed Ross Masood. Akbar Hydari chaired the open session of the Conference. In the course of his presidential remarks he stressed the need for studying science, technology and the arts through the medium of Urdu. A resolution was passed at the conference proposing a separate university, and Hydari pursued the matter with the Education Ministry. The reasons he gave for Urdu as the medium were that it was the most widespread language in India, was the official language of the State, and an Aryan language related directly to other languages of the State.

An *arzdasht* (petition) was submitted to the Nizam by the Education Minister on 24 April 1917. The firman setting up the university was issued only two days later. The administration was directly under the Nizam and he had no Diwan at the time. The petition stressed the use of Urdu as the medium of instruction, as well as the integration of modern science and traditional knowledge. English was to be a compulsory second language to maintain a window to the world outside. Four months later on 14 August 1917 a translation bureau was set up under the direction of Mohammad Abdul Haq,

who later came to be known as Baba-i-Urdu or Father of Urdu. The university granted intermediate certificates from 1919, B.A. degrees from 1921 and M.A. degrees from 1923.

While setting up the Osmania University, however, inadequate attention was paid to the employment potential of graduates of the university. Only a couple of years after the inauguration of the new university, recruitment to the Hyderabad Civil Service was given up. The civil service had been inaugurated in 1884 during the Diwanship of the second Salar Jang. It was conceived as a way of enabling qualified Hyderabadi graduates of the Nizam College to enter government service. It was also meant to limit the recruitment of non-Mulkis to the government. The first civil service class had functioned from 1884 to 1891, when further recruitment was discontinued.

The service had been revived in 1913, on the basis of a note by Sir George Casson Walker of 1907. Casson Walker had urged the following advantages in favour of civil service recruitment :

- providing a Hyderabadi element in administration;
- inducement for higher qualifications;
- preventing recruitment by influence;
- discouraging Umeedwars (temporary appointments) and;
- infusing new and better blood in the Revenue Department.

The Hyderabad Civil Service functioned from 1913 to 1920, when fresh recruitment was stopped. [39]

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Contemporaries have often commented that Mir Osman Ali Khan had a personality very different from those of his ancestors. He did not have the same attitude of reverence for the past which characterized his father and some of the noblemen of his period, especially Maharaja Kishen Pershad. He did not maintain to the same extent the courtly traditions which characterized the reign of his father. In some respects, he had the qualities not so much of a ruler who had succeeded to the throne of a two-hundred-

year-old dynasty, as that of a self-made man who had come to occupy a position of great power through his own efforts and achievements.

Some of the Indian rulers used to dress in magnificent costumes and wore costly jewellery on their clothes as well as their headdress. Mir Osman Ali Khan at his *masnad-nashini* was dressed in a fantastic sherwani decorated with diamonds and rubies. In later years however, he never wore this dress even at formal occasions.

In his early years as ruler, Osman Ali Khan dressed in style, kept up a smart appearance, drank the choicest wines, and enjoyed ballroom dancing. However, alcohol did not suit him, and he was given to losing his temper on slight provocation. He was advised by Umrahs and officials around him that he should give up liquor and take opium in small quantities everyday. This would enable him to live long and also control his propensity to anger.

While the daily dose of opium did achieve the intended objective, it eventually had an unexpected side effect, which brought the ruler considerable unpopularity. Opium in his case did not weaken his powers of reasoning or capacity for work. It helped to control his temper, but apparently also made him indifferent to his own appearance and unwilling to spend money on himself. His teeth continually decayed. He suffered from pyorrhea, but had no time to go to a dentist. He had his hair cut once every three weeks when the Resident came on a visit. Hosh Bilgrami reported (obviously an exaggeration), that he wore the same sherwani for seventeen years, and one red fez cap for his entire life. When the Diwan, Sir Mirza Ismail brought a Persian visitor, Aga Jamaluddin Qazrooni, to see the Nizam in 1946 at the Azakhana Zehra, and said in Persian '*Een Shah-i-Dekhan ast*,' (This is the King of the Deccan), the startled visitor could only comment, '*Panah-ba-Khuda* !' (God save us!).[40]

The traditional court etiquette observed during Salar Jang's time had continued during the lifetime of the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan. During the seventh Nizam's reign these courtly traditions were maintained not so much by the ruler, Mir Osman Ali Khan, but by great nobles such as the three branches of the Paigah family, the Fakhr-ul-Mulk family, and most of all by Maharaja Kishen Pershad.

One of the great attractions of India for visitors from Europe and other parts of the world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the thrill of shooting a tiger. The entire operation had been refined to the point where it could be mounted at a few days' notice, once the visit of a

dignitary was decided upon. Among the great figures who visited Hyderabad on an expedition which included the inevitable tiger hunt were the Crown Prince of Russia and Archduke Ferdinand of Austria. Carrying on this tradition, the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan used to arrange tiger shoots for British dignitaries who visited Osman Ali Khan.[41]

The Residency often observed that the Nizam spoke freely to his servants and courtiers even on matters which would be expected to be kept secret. The spies of the Residency in King Kothi would report these remarks, and thus the Residency would often have the advantage of knowing the Nizam's mind on important matters of State.

Mir Osman Ali Khan spoke in a sharp and staccato manner. He was not kind or graceful towards visiting dignitaries, and made no small talk to make a person feel at ease. He would come straight to the point and transact the business at hand without preliminaries. He had strong likes and dislikes. However, he did display a sense of humour, and appreciated a joke, provided it was directed against someone or something he disliked. He spoke English adequately, but not well and was more at home in Urdu, and preferred to speak that language if the visitor knew it.

Those who met him frequently and had business dealings with him say that he was like an uncut diamond, externally rough and even crude, but kind at heart. On one occasion when he was driving to meet the Resident at Bolarum, he was passing through Secunderabad. He realized that he had fixed a certain time to try on a suit which he had ordered from John Burton & Co. Private Ltd., Tailors and Outfitters of Secunderabad. John Burton saw a fleet of cars proceeding towards Bolarum. Before the war memorial the cars stopped. One car turned around and drove up to John Burton's shop. The Nizam stepped out of the car and said, 'Mr Burton, please don't wait for me as I am going to see the Resident and I do not know how long I would be engaged with him. I would let you know the next time I would come.' John Burton was touched by the courtesy shown by the ruler and remarked that several of his other clients did not show him such courtesy.

One of his characteristics was an innate courtesy for people of other faiths and the respect he showed towards their beliefs. He regularly attended the Christmas eve service at the All Saints Church, a Catholic church in Hyderabad. He gave donations to churches, and presented a painting of the Virgin Mary to another church in Hyderabad.

It is possible that Osman would have been a very different type of person had he not been surrounded by an atmosphere of flattery and sycophancy early in his life. When he first became ruler, he was uneasy about the exaggerated respect shown to him, and tried to ban the practice followed by some of his subjects of placing their head on his feet at formal interviews. This followed an incident which had distressed him.

A leading advocate, Naoshir Chinoy, wrote after the Nizam's death: 'It seems that when H.E.H ascended the Gaddi, Nawab Sir Afsar-ul-Mulk and Sir Faridoon-ul-Mulk after offering "nazar" to H.E.H. placed their heads on the feet of H.E.H. Once it happened that my father, the late Nawab Sohrab Nawaz Jung, had to offer his "nazar". My father asked Sir Faridoon-ul-Mulk whether every one had to follow suit since my father could not bend his knees owing to gout and other diseases. Faridoon-ul-Mulk replied that it was not necessary but when Sir Faridoon-ul-Mulk himself, after offering "nazar", put his head on H.E.H.'s feet, my father, when his turn came, after offering "nazar" tried to do the same, and as he could not bend his knees he fell down, and could not get up. H.E.H. shouted, "Sohrab Nawaz Jung has fallen, lift him up." The next day a firman appeared to the effect that "in our religion Sijda (meaning obeisance) should be done to Allah alone and therefore this sort of thing should not be done in future."'

Another episode, which took place while there was a ban on subjects salaaming the ruler, indicates that the medievalism of his subjects played some part in confirming Osman's acceptance of his supposed semi-divine nature. A Parsee priest, Khurshedji Naoshirwanji Dastoor, was standing near Moazam Jahi Market, just before Osman was passing by in his car. He was asked by a police constable why he was standing there, and he said he wanted to salaam His Exalted Highness, who was expected to pass by. The constable asked him not to do so, as the Nizam had prohibited the practice, but he insisted on doing so. He was taken to the Abid Road police station and when the officer-in-charge knew why he had been brought there, he apologized and asked him to go. However the Dastoor was not satisfied. He asked a Maulvi, a Pandit and a Christian priest to give him passages from the Quran, the Vedas and the Bible to justify paying respects to one's sovereign. When he had collected the quotations from the various scriptures he went to see the Nizam, presented his nazar and the extracts from the Zoroastrian, Muslim, Hindu, and Christian scriptures, and told him the story of his being dragged to the police station because he had salaamed the ruler. The Nizam was deeply touched by the

priest's devotion and wanted to tell the Commissioner of Police the story. As the latter was not available, he published an article in the paper the next day in praise of the Parsee community which read in part as follows:

> Khurshed Naoshirwan Dastoor Sahib whom we know, came to Nazri Bagh on the Idul Fitr day. And on many an occasion, when our motor car passes by, he had been standing on the road to offer salutation to us. And this act of his had a deep impression on us to the effect that undoubtedly, the community to which he belongs is also among our well-wishers.
>
> Next, in the days gone by, the respected and honoured members of this community and brotherhood, who happened to be here were very well known to us. And whatever loyal services they rendered are undoubtedly worthy of praise, and the memory of those loyal services has not yet been obliterated from our thoughts. Some of them happened to be Government Officers and some non-official subjects and citizens.[42]

The practice of subjects of the Nizam placing their heads on his feet gradually fell into disuse, but not the attitude of reverence, mingled with awe and wonder towards the ruler.

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As Mir Osman Ali Khan entered his thirty-fourth year in 1919, he could look back on the first eight years of his reign with satisfaction, tinged with a mixture of sadness. He had been alienated from his father during the last years of the latter's reign, due to certain traits in his personality which did not fit in with the open-hearted generosity which characterized Mahboob Ali Khan. Added to this was the conflict over the gaddi of Hyderabad, arising out of the demand of Salabat Jah's mother, a nikah wife of the sixth Nizam, that her son should be the seventh Nizam.

Osman Ali Khan saw the world from the limited perspective of Hyderabad, some of whose history had been communicated to him by his tutors. He was not a learned man, and did not read widely in the languages he knew—Urdu, Persian and English. Although he was shrewd enough to see that British power in India was not likely to last for more than a

few decades, he could not see any other power emerging in India to fill the vacuum.

His understanding of the outside world was also deeply coloured by his early experiences when he had to face an attack on his position as *Walihad* or heir to the masnad of Hyderabad—an attack which questioned his legitimacy, and probably even the fact of his being the son of the sixth Nizam. Perhaps the future course of his life was determined more by the psychological trauma that he went through at an early age than by any other factor in his childhood. The challenge to his right to the Hyderabad masnad evidently remained with him and moulded his personality for the rest of his life.

His succession had however taken place peacefully and without open controversy. Later, the young Osman had shown a streak of vindictiveness through his involvement in the case against Kishen Pershad and others who were accused of having denied his claim to the masnad. He had also shown his inability to brook a rival when he failed to work harmoniously with his next Diwan, Salar Jang III, a young man who would have made a mark as an administrator if he had been encouraged.

Nevertheless, the seventh Nizam in 1919 presided over a State which had many achievements to its credit. Its finances were on the mend after the crisis which had struck at the turn of the century,when a loan had to be taken from the Government of India. The foundations had been laid for the building up of the capital city as an urban centre with pretensions to metropolitan status. Irrigation schemes had been taken up with a view to exploit the water resources of the State and improve agricultural production. The State was apparently on the verge of becoming one of the well-administered Indian states, in the class of Baroda and Mysore, which had stolen a march over British India in some respects. Mir Osman Ali Khan evidently had in him the makings of a good administrator, as he could deal directly with such major issues as the establishment of a new Urdu-medium university, and the starting of a department of Archaeology in the State for the first time.

But the next few years were to witness a sharp decline in the public image of the State and of its ruler. It would emerge from the crisis only after the decisive British intervention of 1926, when a team of British officials, nominees of the Government of India, was to be imposed on the Nizam against his will. The personality of the Nizam was to play a major role in this crisis.

CHAPTER THREE

THE TURKISH CONNECTION

Salateen-e-Salaf sub hogai nazar-i-ajal Osman
Musalmanon ka teri Saltanat se hai nishan baqi

(All the rulers of the past are dead, O Osman,
Because of your kingdom, the power of the Muslims survives)
– Mir Osman Ali Khan

Shadi Aqd-i-Raisana mubarak bashad
Rishta ba dualat-i-Turkana mubarak bashad

(May the royal marriage be auspicious,
May the connection with the Turkish empire be auspicious)
–Mir Osman Ali Khan

The last years of Asaf Jahi Hyderabad saw the blossoming of a culture which laid great emphasis on the cultivation of social graces and the writing and appreciation of poetry. Hyderabad had inherited the mantle of the Mughal court of Delhi which had patronized some of the greatest Urdu poets, among whom were: Dagh, Ameer Minai, Zauq and Ghalib. Both Ghalib and Zauq became the poetic mentors of the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, who was a true poet in his own right and will always have a legitimate place among the major practitioners of the ghazal form. His poetics are marked by a genuine note of tone and temper, a far cry from the artificiality of much of the royal verse of others, including that of Mir Osman Ali Khan.

This was an age when anybody who had any pretensions to distinction tried his hand at writing poetry, either composing it himself or having it written by 'hired' poets, who were quite willing to oblige their patrons for favours. Many great poets from Hyderabad and elsewhere sought the patronage of the ruler and nobility of the State.

Writing poetry was the 'done' thing for the ruler of a princely state and members of the royal family. The sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan was an accomplished poet, who used the pen name (takhallus) "Asaf".

A major figure in the literary life of Hyderabad, both as a poet and as a patron of letters, was Maharaja Kishen Pershad, whose life and career spanned the last years of Mir Mahboob Ali Khan's reign, and a good part of that of the last Nizam, Osman Ali Khan. Several of Osman's sons were poets, the second son, Prince Moazam Jah Shajee being a good poet by any standard.

For a number of years a fresh ghazal of Osman Ali Khan's appeared every morning in a local Urdu daily. The ghazal was printed on the front page and at the end appeared the opinion of the ruler's master (ustad) in poetry, Nawab Fasahat Jang Jaleel. The opinion was invariably laudatory.[1]

Osman Ali Khan's poetry consisted mainly of ghazals, but also a great many *hamds* (poems in praise of God) *naats* (poems in honour of the Prophet), *manqabat* (poems eulogizing the fourth Caliph, held in high regard by Shias), and *salaams* (poems in honour of the martyrs of Karbala.) The poetry is traditional, both in theme and form. Much of it consists of exercises in versification, and lacks genuineness. Osman also frequently used his poetry to express the notion that he was the last true representative of Muslim glory in India, and even the world. This idea finds expression in the last couplet of a ghazal called *maqta* , in which the poet uses his pen-name.

One poem of his became a kind of national anthem in the State. It was sung from the Deccan Radio, Hyderabad, at the beginning and the end of the day's programmes and also in school assemblies. The *matla* (the first couplet of the poem) reads:

Ta abad Khaliq-i-Alam yeh riasat rakhe.
Tujh ko Osman *ba sad ajlal salamat rakhe.*

(May God preserve this state till eternity.
And may God keep Osman in all his grandeur.)

Most of Osman's poetry is likely to die out of public memory because of its artificial nature. However a few couplets may gain currency and some measure of critical acclaim, as sometimes happens even in the case of ordinary poets. In any case, the poems in which he glorified his own regime will be remembered as an example of kingly vanity.

He penned the following lines which were published in many newspapers:

Salateen-i-Salaf sub hogai nazar-i-ajal Osman
Musalmanon ka teri Saltanat se hai nishan baqi

(All the rulers of the past are dead, Osman
The name of the Muslims is kept alive only because of your State)

However, a dismissed soldier of the Nizam's Army is supposed to have replied as follows:

Salateen-i-Salaf sub hogai nazar-i-ajal Osman
Musalmanon se hai teri Saltanat ka nishan baqi

(All the rulers of the past are dead, Osman
Your State is surviving only because of the Muslims)

This view summed up rather well the ideas entertained by a newly emerging force in the State, the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen, in the late Twenties and early Thirties.

Although Islam does not recognize the institution of kingship, Islamic countries have almost invariably been ruled by kings. Over many centuries, a great mystique had been built up around the institution of kingship in Islam. In India, the political power invariably dominated the religious authority. While respect was shown to the Qazis and learned men who interpreted Muslim law, they were not allowed to decide on affairs of state. During the medieval period, a ruler of Delhi was approached by religious divines asking him to enforce the law of the Shariat. He declined to do so, saying that he could not enforce his authority in India by enforcing the religious law of a single community.

Osman Ali Khan was no exception to this general trend. While not averse to using Islam as an instrument of policy, he considered himself the heir to the tradition of kingship which had evolved during Mughal rule. As we have seen earlier, Osman deviated from the policy of his predecessors, and especially of the founder of the dynasty, by asserting his claim to the title of King and by planning for the day when he would become independent. We will now examine the sequence of events which

gave rise to these ambitions, and the interaction between the ambitious ruler and the British overlords of India during the period from the end of the First World War till the Turkish marriages of his sons in 1932.

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As the First World War came to an end the British found themselves under increasing pressure from India to accede to the demand for devolution of power. This demand was a result of the severe trauma which the British Empire had suffered as a result of the war. Unlike the position during the Second World War, India by and large supported the war effort. Indian troops fought side by side with the British in the trenches of France and gave a good account of themselves. The Maharaja of Bikaner served as a member of the British War Cabinet and commanded the respect of his colleagues. While the extremist leader, Bal Gangadhar Tilak was in jail, the more moderate leaders like Gopal Krishna Gokhale in India and M.K.Gandhi in South Africa even supported the war effort.

British officials in India were quite opposed to Indian self-rule. However, it was not possible for the British to ignore the increasing demand for self-government. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 introduced a small measure of self-government in British Indian provinces. At the same time, a Chamber of Princes was set up in order to serve as a check on the radical tendencies of the British Indian provinces.

The Secretary for State for India was Edwin S. Montagu, a liberal in every sense of the word, who had joined Lloyd George's government in July 1917 on condition that he should go to the India Office. On 20 August 1917 came the famous announcement that the aim of British policy was the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India. This announcement was followed by a visit to India of several months by Montagu during 1917–18. His book, *An Indian diary* reveals his strong sense of disappointment at the failure of the Indian bureaucracy to adapt itself to the changing times, and agree to a substantial devolution of power to the Indian people.

Arising out of Montagu's visit, the Government of India Act of 1919 was passed. This act embodied the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and

inaugurated in British India a new system of dyarchy. According to this system, some subjects in the provincial government such as education, health and local governments were handled by Indian members responsible to the legislature while others such as police, law and order and revenue would continue to be handled by British members of the Council. Both the categories of members would report to the Governor who was both an executive and constitutional head of State.

The British hoped that at least some of the princes would move with the times and introduce some form of constitutional government, but they did not wish to hurry the process unduly. The Chamber of Princes had merely an advisory function, but nevertheless gave an opportunity to rulers to play a role in Commonwealth and Indian affairs. The Nizam of Hyderabad did not participate in the Chamber, as he felt that his dignity would be affected by involving himself in such a body with princes of a much lower status.

Montagu felt, during his visit to India, that the Nizam was being given undue importance. He admitted that the Nizam was, 'enormously important to us because he has kept Mohammedans of India straight and we have used him by means of his wily old ministers and our Resident for this purpose.'

But he also pointed out that, 'We have made all the princes very sick by segregating him as "His Exalted Highness." '[2]

Part of the Urdu language press, not satisfied with the title of 'His Exalted Highness' and 'Our Faithful Ally' conferred on him, wanted him to be styled King of Hyderabad. The Resident, Fraser, held that such a proposal should not be entertained, as there could be no 'His Majesty' among the Indian princes.

The First World War had been a traumatic event for orthodox Muslims in India and in the Orient generally. The Ottoman Empire, which ruled the entire Middle East from Lebanon to Egypt, as well as the Arabian Peninsula, entered the war on the side of Germany. The ruler of Turkey was not only the most powerful Muslim ruler in the world, he was also regarded as the successor to the Prophet himself. In 1914, when Turkey was about to enter the war, the British Resident had, as we know, been able to persuade Osman to make an appeal to the Muslim world to support the British cause in the First World War, in spite of the Turkish entry on the German side.

Mir Osman Ali Khan's personal rule during the war had led to both favourable and unfavourable reactions. On the positive side were the steps taken to tighten up the administrative machinery, to introduce innovations in the fields of irrigation, city planning and other areas of development. The Osmania University had been inaugurated in 1918. It had roused the interest of Urdu speakers all over the country, and had given hope to middle class youth from all over the State that they would be able to qualify for gainful employment. Moreover, the British had been recipients of large contributions towards the war effort, and received considerable benefit from the Nizam's appeal to the Muslims of India to support the British cause in the war.

On the negative side, however, were the complaints being received against the Nizam for his pecuniary demands on his subjects on the one hand, and the increasing ambition he displayed for the increase of his power and prestige on the other.

His personal rule had led to serious doubts about the future government of the State. Although he had shown himself to be generally a firm and efficient administrator, he was prone to being misled by undesirable advisers. Before the war ended, the Nizam returned from a trip to Bombay, Delhi and Aligarh, where he was led to believe that the British were likely to lose the war. Taking advantage of the absence of the Resident and G.E.C. Wakefield, the senior revenue official, the young ruler replaced all his three senior British officials by Indian substitutes who were considered highly undesirable by the Residency. The Resident was able to have the decision reversed soon after his return. However, the British had received a rude shock and were determined to introduce a constitutional system of government which would put definite limits on the powers of the Nizam.

Thus in spite of the high dignities conferred on him, the British felt it necessary to administer a severe warning to the seventh Nizam in 1918, indicating that he would have to be removed from power if he did not mend his ways. [3]

The result of the agonizing reappraisal which the British had done of the Nizam's government was the promulgation of a new constitution which visualized instead of a Diwan or Prime Minister, an Executive Council headed by a President or Sadr-i-Azam, whose powers were clearly demarcated, as were those of the members of Council. Constitutional reforms

were on the anvil in India. Even if popular participation was not visualized, some limits on the power of the Nizam were felt to be politic. A Cabinet Council was set up with the Sadr-i-Azam as the President, the Revenue Member as Vice-President and other ministers as members. There was also to be a Legislative Council consisting of the Chief Justice, Judge of the High Court, Inspector-General of Revenue, Director of Public Instruction, Inspector-General of Police and Finance Secretary. The Minister for the Department whose rules were being framed would preside.

The laudable objectives of the new scheme included the stabilization of expenditure, the liquidation of debts, the reform of irrigation and communication, the gradual disbandment of irregular troops and mansabs, the introduction of an annual budget and accounts, and the appointment of a Comptroller-General on loan from the Government of India. The new Constitution gave to the people of Hyderabad the hope that they would be governed under the rule of law rather than in the arbitrary manner they had been ruled for the past few years. The powers of the Council and of individual ministers were strictly laid down. The Nizam's powers were supreme, but could be exercised only in a constitutional manner.[4]

The first President of the Council was the distinguished barrister, Sir Ali Imam. He was a member of the Shia sect who belonged to Patna, and was one of an expanding class of élite Indians who had been educated in the Western tradition while retaining their sensitivity to the problems of the country. He had made his mark in the High Courts of Patna and the Federal Court, and had impressed British officialdom, who had chosen him for the high post of Law Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. His appointment as the President of the Nizam's Executive Council was the result of a recommendation by the Government of India, which hoped that the new regime in Hyderabad would receive a great push with the appointment of such a distinguished incumbent to the post of Sadr-i-Azam or President of the Council.

While inaugurating the Executive Council on 17 November 1919, Mir Osman Ali Khan indicated the tasks on which the Council was to devote its attention as, 'development of education, expansion of economic resources, growth of commerce and industries, advance in sanitation and hygiene, and improvement in communication.'

On his part Sir Ali Imam was quite willing to use his legal capacity and influence to obtain for the Nizam a higher status as a ruler and to try

for the retrocession of Berar. In 1921, when he happened to be in London after a visit to the League of Nations where he had represented the Indian states, he entertained Lord Reading at the Claridge's Hotel in London before the latter came out to India as Viceroy.

Sir Ali Imam's stay in Hyderabad unfortunately lasted only two years. During this short period he made an impact on the State's administration by introducing a major reform, the separation of the judiciary from the executive. He also appointed a Reform Committee consisting of himself and Rai Balmukund, a Judge of the High Court. This committee initiated a study of important reforms, which, however, failed to see the light of day because of opposition within the Nizam's government.

Another scheme which was pushed by Sir Ali Imam was the proposal to reclaim and colonize the uncultivable land in the State. This scheme floundered as a result of malpractice which began to vitiate it as the scheme moved to the implementation stage. Moreover it was alleged that the scheme was meant to bring Muslim colonists from North India and thus increase the proportion of Muslims in the State.

According to Sir Nizamat Jang, who was a Member of the Council at that time, Sir Ali Imam's resignation was brought on by his taking umbrage at a comparatively minor incident in which a member of the Council had caused him offence. He insisted that the member be removed from office or he would resign. He could not be persuaded to change his stand. In spite of his impulsive nature he would have done much valuable work for Hyderabad—'cleansing and constructive' as Nizamat Jang put it.

Sir Ali Imam drafted the Nizam's application for the return of Berar. Although it was rejected, he continued to enjoy the confidence of the Nizam in so far as the Berar issue was concerned. The seventh Nizam was determined to obtain the return of his territory which had been taken away in 1833 under duress from his ancestor.[5]

In the early Twenties the Nizam's administration was once again at a low ebb. The brilliant administrator Sir Ali Imam had failed to make the adjustment to the conditions prevailing in the Hyderabad Court, although he had succeeded in effecting a separation of the judiciary from the executive. Though the Reform Committee set up by him did not lead to any actual reform, it began a series of Hyderabad political conferences. Because of government displeasure, most of these had to be held outside

Hyderabad and came under the increasing influence of public men in Maharashtra.

For a couple of years two comparatively obscure men, Faridoon-ul-Mulk and Nawab Wali-ud-Daula were appointed successively as President, of the Nizam's Executive Council. Faridoon-ul-Mulk served from 1922 to 1923 and Wali-ud-Daula from 1923 to 1925.

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In 1922 the Sheriff of Mecca was elevated to the kingship of Hedjaz (which later became Saudi Arabia under King Ibn Saud and his descendants). This event, which followed the abolition of the Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk, was intended by the British to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Turkish power from Arabia. It could also be interpreted as an attempt to create a spiritual centre of Islam in place of the Caliphate. However, the Nizam of Hyderabad asked why the British should not sponsor him in a similar way as a monarch who would function under their aegis as other kings in the Middle East were doing. He felt he had an advantage over the impoverished rulers of the Middle East, as he enjoyed enormous wealth, and presided over a prosperous kingdom. In fact, among his officials were a couple of ruling princes from Southern Arabia—Shehr and Makulla.

The end of the First World War, witnessed the Khilafat movement, led by Mahatma Gandhi and the Ali brothers, for the preservation of the Caliphate and the Turkish Empire, which was in danger of being completely dismantled as a result of its defeat along with Germany in the war. The agitation was an occasion for the coming together of Hindus and Muslims in a manner unknown in the past, at least since the Revolt of 1857. The campaign, however, received a setback when the Caliphate was suddenly abolished by Kemal Ataturk in March 1924.

Ataturk's original intention appears to have been to separate the Caliphate from the rulership of Turkey, but the ex-Caliph did not cooperate with this intention, and therefore had to be removed from Turkey altogether.

The reaction to the abolition of the Caliphate among Muslims in India was one of shock and surprise. The more moderate Muslim leadership proposed to send a delegation to Turkey to ascertain the reasons for the action taken by the Turkish Government. There was another group in the

Khilafat movement led by the Ali brothers which wanted to take a strong stand demanding the restoration of the former ruler of Turkey, Abdul Majid, as Caliph. Neither of these groups was keen to accept the claim of the Sultan of Hedjaz to the Caliphate.

The reaction of Hyderabad State to the abolition of the Caliphate was surprisingly low-key. In March 1924, the Nizam told the Resident at Hyderabad that people took little interest either in the abolition of the Caliphate by the Angora Assembly or in King Hussain's assumption of the office. The Nizam was not personally sympathetic to the ex-Caliph. As regards the future, he said it was difficult to say what might happen. He did not think that any one was likely to advise him to recognize King Hussain as the new Caliph.

In an interview with the Resident 'one of the most thoughtful men in Hyderabad' (probably Syed Hussain Bilgrami) told the Resident that, 'While every Muhammadan must regard the abolition of the Khilafat with a certain grief, yet, except in its earlier days, the Khilafat had been mainly a temporal affair.' He saw no reason for believing that present events would 'lead the people to turn more to the spiritual aspect of the question.' He felt Hyderabad was more likely to follow than to lead in such a matter.

The Resident's learned informant deplored as 'unseemly' the efforts being made by the Ali brothers to induce the Turks to restore Abdul Majid to the Caliphate. He referred to the possibility of several Caliphs being in existence at the same time, as had happened once when different Caliphs ruled in Baghdad, at Cairo and in Spain. Although he did not think it likely that His Exalted Highness would be invited to become Caliph outside his dominions, he mentioned that some Muslim leaders of British India had approached His Exalted Highness with the suggestion that he should accept office as Sheikh-ul-Islam for India. 'The Nizam had referred the suggestion to the Sadarus Sudur as the Head of the Ecclesiastical Department through the Executive Council who had advised his Exalted Highness against accepting the offer pointing out that there was no guarantee that those who made it might not be the first to dispute his religious authority.'

A few weeks later, the Nizam took a decision to sanction a pension of 300 pounds per annum to the ex-Caliph and asked the Resident to obtain the approval of the Government of India to the proposal. The Government of India wanted to know whether the decision was due to the Nizam's desire to revive the Caliphate or continue it in some other form, or whether

it was merely an act of charity to a defeated and fallen monarch. It is more likely to have been the latter than the former. However, there is sufficient evidence to show that the caliphate issue directly and indirectly fanned the latent ambitions of Mir Osman Ali Khan, and made it possible for him to assert his claim to the title of King and his implicit claim to the succession of the caliphate. In 1933, thanks to the mediatory role of Maulana Shaukat Ali and Sir Akbar Hydari, the marriage took place at Nice in France between the two sons of Mir Osman Ali Khan with the daughter and the niece of the former Khalifa, Sultan Abdul Majid. [6]

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There was a conscious attempt by the Nizam's government to build up a sense of loyalty to the Nizam's State on the part of all its citizens, both Hindu and Muslim. Nevertheless, the evolution of political ideas in Hyderabad usually followed the trends in the neighbouring states derived from all-India movements. As early as the 1890s, the great nationalist leader from Maharashtra, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, took up the cause of the Home Rule League Movement which introduced into Indian nationalism, a strong component of Hindu ideology. The identification of the country with the concept of Mother India was a characteristic of the national movement both in Maharashtra and Bengal. In Bengal the Goddess Kali was worshipped as the supreme mother, and the identification of Kali with Mother India had a tremendous psychological effect on the common people in Bengal. Similarly, in Maharashtra the symbolism of the elephant-God, Ganapati, was utilized by Tilak for celebrating the festival of Vinayak Chaturthi, and building up nationalism as a counter to British rule. This movement from Maharashtra had an effect on the western part of Hyderabad State where the language spoken was Marathi.

At the same time however, a very different movement was also emerging from the northern part of India—the Arya Samaj movement. It began as a reform movement within Hinduism to purify the latter of its later accretions such as idol worship. The Arya Samaj wanted to reintroduce the Vedic form of the Hindu faith in its purest form and was thus opposed to idols and rituals which were considered to be the result of superstition which had crept into the Hinduism. Both the Arya Samaj ideology and the Sanatana Dharma ideologies had supporters among prominent intellectuals of Hyderabad. The main concern of both the groups was the welfare of Hindu society and its reform.

The first impact of the Indian National Congress on Hyderabad was seen during the reign of Mir Mahboob Ali Khan. Men like Aghorenath Chattopadhyaya, Keshav Rao Koratkar and Maulvi Abdul Qaiyum were the moving spirits at the time. However the institution was not formalized and died out in about 1906 with Maulvi Abdul Qaiyum. All these men combined government service with an interest in social work. Hence, they were unable to become true instruments for political change. However, they raised public consciousness and thus paved the way for later political movements.[7]

During the 1890s, Hyderabad had felt the influence both of the Arya Samaj and its reformist ideas as well as the Ganesh Utsav which, following the example of Tilak, was celebrated in Hyderabad in 1895. Krishnadeva Raya library was founded in Hyderabad in 1901 and a Marathi library in the same year, which was located in the Residency Bazars; Raja Narendar library was started in Warangal in 1904. The first Telugu-medium school was started in the Residency Bazars in 1904 and the first Telugu newspaper was started in Mahboobnagar in 1912.

In spite of this early start, there was a very slow growth of cultural consciousness in the Marathi, Kannada and Telugu-speaking regions of Hyderabad State. The dominant position of the Urdu language, which was spoken by perhaps one-fifth of the population of the State, was paralleled by the neglect of Telugu which was spoken by over fifty per cent of the population as their mother tongue, as well as of Marathi and Kannada.

As early as 1908 in Hyderabad there was a beginning of a radical movement with the emergence of a progressive and pontentially revolutionary leader called Pandit Taranath. Born in January 1891 in Mangalore, he had his early education in that town before joining Nizam College. After two years of studies in that college, he joined the Medical College at Hyderabad but left it when his claim for a foreign scholarship was overlooked.

Around 1910, he joined the education service of the Nizam as a teacher at Bidar. This appointment was apparently at the instance of the Director of Public Instruction, Alma Latifi and he was asked to introduce science teaching in the High school classes. Around 1916 he joined a government school as a teacher but left government service in late 1919 and founded the Hamdard High School at Raichur in March 1920. This school continued to flourish in Hyderabad State and developed into a college.

Pandit Taranath evidently maintained his links with the students at the Medical College in Hyderabad. In October 1920, a student of Taranath named Raja Bahadur was arrested for writing a mischievous article in *The Hindu,* making allegations against the Nizam. This article entitled "The Indian Dyer" was suspected to have been written by Taranath in the name of Raja Bahadur. The Hyderabad Government banned *The Hindu,* arrested Raja Bahadur and externed Pandit Taranath from the State. The latter promptly crossed the border to Bellary district in British India and opened the Premayataha Ashram in Tungabhadra in 1921.

Meanwhile Taranath had come into personal contact with Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Shaukat Ali, who were passing through Raichur on the way to Madras in connection with the Khilafat agitation. He accompanied Shaukat Ali to Madras where he stayed for a week. There he established contacts with the great revolutionary, B.S. Ayer and collaborated with him to do research on the Indian Renaissance and its relation to the freedom movement.

Taranath played an important role in the intellectual life of the Kannada-speaking parts of Hyderabad State. He started a magazine *Prema* in English and Kannada and was a follower of Swami Vivekananda's ideas. He was also a supporter of the Khilafat movement and Hindu-Muslim unity. The Muslim masses in Hyderabad showed confidence in him. A practitioner of Ayurveda, Naturopathy, yoga, and an artist, Taranath was also a writer who introduced a new spirit and style in Kannada literature. Although *The Hindu* article led to the banning of the newspaper and the exile of Taranath, it had its own effect. The Nizam, after the publication of the article, was forced to limit the practice of accepting *nazarana* due to British pressure.[8]

On 11 and 12 November 1921, the Nizam's State Social Reform Conference was held at Hyderabad under the chairmanship of Maharishi Karve. Proceedings of the conference were conducted in English, Urdu or Marathi. Most of the leading social and political leaders of the State were Maharashtrians. Madapati Hanumantha Rao wrote in his autobiography that an advocate, Allampalli Venkat Rama Rao, wanted to move a resolution in Telugu, his mother tongue, and was hooted down by the audience especially the Maharashtrian section.

That very night a meeting was held by the Telugu members who were deeply hurt by the fact that a resolution could not be moved in Telugu at

a conference in the capital city of the Nizam's State, which had a majority of Telugu speaking population. As a result, the Andhra Jana Sangh was formed, originally with eleven persons including Madapati Hanumantha Rao, Burgula Ramakrishna Rao, M. Narsing Rao and A. Veerabhadra Rao. The first formal conference was held at Hyderabad on 14 February 1922, only three months later with a membership of one hundred. Its original goal was the social and cultural upliftment of the people of Telengana who spoke the Telugu language and called themselves Andhras thus identifying themselves with the culture of the northern part of Madras Presidency and the original roots of this culture in the Satavahana dynasty of the third century BC to the third century AD. At the February 1922 meeting, the name of the organization was changed to the Nizam's Rashtra Andhra Jana Sangham at the instance of M. Hanumantha Rao, who was the guiding spirit of the movement and was chosen its secretary. The new name was evidently meant to counter the possible criticism of extra territorial loyalties and links. Nevertheless, the name did cause suspicion and Nawab Ali Yavar Jang once asked the organizers why they did not change its name to the Telengana Jana Sangh.

The Nizam Rashtra Andhra Jana Sangham was a federative association which had a regular managing committee of fifteen members with Raja Rajgopal Reddy Barrister, as President and Madapati Hanumantha Rao as Secretary. Soon a number of sister associations sprang up all over Telengana and they were brought into a federation under a central body, the Andhra Jana Kendra Sangham. At its meeting held on 27 April, the aims and objectives were expanded to read as follows:

- To establish libraries and reading rooms;
- To help and encourage students;
- To accord respect to scholars;
- To collect manuscripts and to conduct research;
- To spread knowledge through handbills, booklets and public speeches.
- To propagate Telugu;
- To encourage fine arts and physical culture; and

- To help the helpless.

The Sangham had to face serious obstacles in fulfilling its goals because of the limited understanding of government laws. For example, the police patel of a village in Warangal District and the Collector of Nalgonda challenged the opening of libraries by the Sangham without the prior sanction of the government. When an appeal was made to the Home Secretary to the government, he held that government permission was entirely unnecessary for opening a library.

Conditions in the districts were primitive. Merchants were required to supply commodities freely to government officials (or at least at concessional rates). This system was challenged by the Sangham. It also endeavoured to put a stop to the practice of forced labour known as begar. The Sangham translated into Telugu the Nizam's firman banning this practice and thus conveyed it to all sufferers. As we have seen earlier, the Sangham's attempts to open new schools in villages and to hold educational and library conferences were obstructed by the authorities.[9]

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We have seen that in the year 1920, Mahatma Gandhi mobilized Hindus and Muslims jointly to begin an agitation to persuade the British authorities not to take harsh steps against the Caliphate in Turkey which had been on the German side in the First World War and was in the process of losing its Arab dependencies. The Khilafat agitation as it was called in India was the occasion for a great upsurge of national consciousness based on Hindu-Muslim unity and the joint programme for the propagation of hand-spun cloth known as khadi and the installation of charkhas in order to encourage spinning in each household. One of the components of this movement was the demand for a national system of education and rejection of the British-imposed system of education which was prevalent in the country.

Many prominent Arya Samajists took part in this movement. Among them were: Lala Lajpat Rai and Swami Shraddhanand, both Punjabis. Many students left the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh and joined the National College started by Maulana Mohammad Ali. Among the Hyderabad students who did so were: Mir Akbar Ali Khan, Syed Mohammad Ansari, Badrul Hasan and Jaffar Hasan. Jaisoorya, the

son of Sarojini Naidu, the prominent leader of the Indian National Congress who belonged to Hyderabad gave up his studies at the Grant Medical College at Bombay in 1921. Later he studied in Germany where he qualified as a doctor and took an active part in political events in Hyderabad State.

The Khilafat agitation brought together Hindu and Muslim leaders including the orthodox on both sides. On 23 April 1920, a mammoth meeting was held in the Vivek Vardhini grounds to celebrate the Youm-e-Imtihan (Day of Trial). Maulvi Syed Jamat Ali Shah of Sialkot was in the Chair and when he had to leave suddenly in the midst of the meeting, Pandit Keshav Rao Koratkar was asked to occupy the Chair. On the spot a contribution of Rs 12,000 was made for carrying on the Khilafat agitation. Dr Mohammed Hussain Effendi donated his motor car and half his property for carrying on the Khilafat agitation.

Apart from Keshav Rao Koratkar, this meeting was addressed by other leaders like Vaman Naik and Raghavendra Rao Sharma. Thus Hyderabad was greatly affected by the crescendo of the Khilafat agitation. A hartal and a unity day was observed in the city on 5 May 1920. On 17 May 1920, a public meeting was held which was attended by more than 15,000 people who heard speeches by leaders belonging to both the Hindu and Muslim communities like Keshav Rao Koratkar and Maulana Abdul Hai.

As the Khilafat movement gathered strength, the Nizam and the President of its Council, Sir Ali Imam came under increasing fire from British Indian newspapers, many of which strongly supported the movement.

However, in a letter to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, the Nizam pointed out his personal sympathy for the ruler of Turkey: 'He was a bitter foe, but is a fallen one now and, with the Khilafat resolutions Mohammedans in India remained content with pleading for the Turks and did not degenerate into threats against your Excellency and your Government. I would not hesitate for a moment to add my voice to the appeal for lessening the severity in the terms of peace.' In fact the Nizam pleaded with the Viceroy to prevail upon the British Government to alter the terms of peace and make them less stringent against the Caliphate. However, on 26 June 1920 the Viceroy made it clear that he had done all, he could to alter the terms of the settlement in the peace treaty to favour the Caliph more than before. Thus the difference of opinion between the Nizam and the Khilafat movement was confined to the methods adopted by the Satyagrahis, not to the substance of their demands. The Nizam thought

the movement was dominated by 'Hindu extremists' who were leading Muslims to create an atmosphere of unrest. He considered the term passive resistance to be a euphemism for a more violent resistance against British and indeed all authority.[10]

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Public opinion in Hyderabad State was not entirely quiescent during the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements. Vaman Naik, a prominent advocate, had entertained persons who participated in the Non-Cooperation movement and extended hospitality to them. The government was watching him carefully but the President of the Executive Council decided in April 1921 that, 'for reasons of expediency the matter may be allowed to stand over.' Perturbed by these developments, the Nizam issued a firman on 14 September 1921, forbidding the holding of political meetings in the State and the entry of British Indian political leaders. It also insisted that the agenda of any meeting that was to be held in any part of the State be approved by the Chief Secretary in advance.[11]

Seeing the strength of the Swadeshi movement grow day by day, the government imposed stringent rules restricting the establishment of private schools and *akhadas* (gymnasiums) as a result of which the number of private schools which stood at 4,053 in 1942, periodicals like the *Kesari*, the *Swarajya*, the *Hitavada*, published from British India, were banned in the State.

From 1921 onwards the diversion of political activity to areas outside the State was made necessary by the reactionary trend which overtook the Nizam's government after the comparatively liberal rule of Sir Ali Imam. The Andhra Jana Sangh was founded in November 1921 but confined itself to social reform activities on a strictly non-political basis during the Twenties and Thirties under the guidance of moderate leaders like Madapati Hanumantha Rao, Burgula Ramakrishna Rao, and M. Narsing Rao. Burgula Ramakrishna Rao and M. Narsing Rao were also involved in the activities of the liberal and leftist organizations which sprung up during the Thirties. Thus by the mid-Twenties the political leadership thrown up by the Khilafat movement was dispersed.

The new developments were triggered off by the holding of the Indian National Congress Session at Kakinada (Cocanada) during Christmas week, 1923. Many national leaders including the Ali Brothers, Sarojini Naidu,

C.R Das, and Vallabhbhai Patel passed through Hyderabad on their way to Kakinada and made speeches at railway stations. The first Hyderabad Political Conference had to be held in Kakinada as permission for such a conference had been refused within the State. Nevertheless, the conference placed on record its devoted loyalty and fidelity to His Exalted Highness the Nizam. He was reminded of the firman issued in 1920 announcing liberal and far reaching reforms including the expansion of the legislative council. Vaman Naik moved a resolution referring to the Bal Mukand reforms, and urged follow up action on his report. A Gulbarga pleader, Abdul Kareem, the only Muslim present at the conference, opposed the resolution and even the holding of the meeting outside the State which was calculated to incur the displeasure of the ruler. As a result of his objection, the word 'promised' in the resolution was replaced by the word 'announced' and the plea for 'Responsible Government' was dropped from the proposal.

Among the other points discussed were a request to the Nizam to remove the restriction on political meetings and the ban on newspapers. The Berar issue was also discussed. The President of the conference was Madhav Rao Aney, a pleader from Berar.

Baba Sahib Paranjpe from Berar also pleaded at Kakinada for the Nizam to reform his system of government to make it attractive to Beraris. At the second conference held at Bombay in November 1926, the President, Y.M. Kale from Berar, expressed the view that the young Nizam's zeal for Islamic culture and the Muslim religion was combined with a 'systematic and well planned effacement of all that is Hindu.' He also attacked the system of nazaranas which had become a scandal in the State, and made a strong plea for Hindu-Muslim unity, pointing out that several noblemen (jagirdars), had been deprived of their properties by the ruler. The Muslim nobility, he said, being larger in number had suffered more.[12]

Kale pointed out however that most Muslim leaders had failed to show sympathy to the suffering humanity in Hyderabad and instead some, 'short sighted people have even gone to the length of charging the Hindus of engineering agitation against the Nizam because he is a Muslim. Nothing can be farther from the truth. We have as much reverence for a Muslim ruler as we have for the Hindu Rajas but when religious intolerence is taken to its farthest limit, it is the common interest of both Hindus and Muslims alike to try sincerely to remedy the evil. The utterances at the "Nizam conference" at Lahore and its recent echo from

Allahabad together with the writings of some Muslim papers are no wonder to the present communal atmosphere, and we might look to the day when our Muslim brothers treat Hindu interests with as much concern as their own and vice-versa. There are honourable exceptions to this and nobody should take this as a general indictment of Muslim leaders. We request Hindus and Muslims alike to help the subjects of Hyderabad in their present struggle.'

The Hindu Mahasabha leader, N.C. Kelkar, presided over the third Hyderabad Political Conference at Poona in 1928. He made a scathing attack on the Nizam's government for refusing permission for such a conference in Hyderabad which had, 'to wander about like orphans and come outside the state limits to hold sessions.' For this he blamed the British Government equally which he said, was the suzerain power.

He further said:'They have the least hesitation to interfere in the administration of states when it suits their interest. I am sure that today there is such a heap of correspondence in the Residency about the maladministration in states that four asses would not be able to bear its burden, not to mention as to how many asses prepared it (laughter). But the result of all this is nothing. However, when required, details of any case shall come out all right from the heap of correspondence. They will only show it to the Ruler to frighten him for their own self-interest.'[13]

The immediate post-war period had seen a remarkable flowering of national sentiment based on a joint approach on the part of Hindu and Muslim leaders during the Khilafat movement. Within a few years however, we find an emerging communal divide among Hindu and Muslim leaders. Keshav Rao Koratkar was now identified as an Arya Samaj leader. He and Vaman Naik, an Advocate and Judge of the High Court, were working for the preservation of Hindu identity in the Nizam's dominions. On the other hand the promiment Muslims who had joined with them to work for the national cause had ceased to be active in State politics.

The reasons for the change in atmosphere by the late Twenties needs to be explained. First the Khilafat movement had lost its meaning when Ataturk abolished the Caliphate and the claim of the King of Hedjaz to the Caliphate did not receive wide acceptance. Hindu-Muslim unity in North India was a thing of the past and had given way to an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, if not open hostility.

Second, since the Nizam's government had completely reversed the liberal policy of Sir Ali Imam of introducing reforms, the Hyderabad State Political Conferences had to be held outside the State, first at Kakinada and then in Bombay. They went into the hands of Marathi-speaking politicians, some of whom were influenced by the rightist Hindu Mahasabha ideology. Some political leaders like the Marathi-speaking Raghavendra Rao were exiled for life. Thus there was a vacuum in State politics. Finally, the Nizam had begun to see himself as a major force on the Indian scene. His government was evidently financially assisting North Indian newspapers which projected the Nizam as a leader of the Indian Muslims and a future king. Muslim businessmen and politicians as well as literary men regarded the Nizam's State as a source of financial support and a future refuge in what they felt would be an increasingly Hindu-dominated India.

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The introduction of the new constitution, the *Qanuncha Mubarak* of 1919, should have reduced the tension in the relations between the British and the Nizam. However, things did not settle down in the State capital as they were expected to.

The Resident at the time of the introduction of the new constitution, Sir Stuart Fraser, had pressurized the Nizam directly and through Lord Chelmsford about the importance of appointing a minister, and their relations were hence a little strained. Sir Ali Imam, the Sadr-i-Azam, reported that the Nizam's penchant for accepting nazars had declined for about a year. At his birthday in the spring of 1922, nazars amounting in value to between one and eight lakh of rupees were received, according to rumour.

In March 1923, a *jarida* (circular) was issued from the Nizam's Education Department saying that the Nizam had invited the students of middle school to meet him at the public gardens. A form was attached to the circular including the class, the name of the student and his parent or guardian with rank or occupation and monthly income, the student's age, school fees paid, what amount the student will have the honour of presenting, name of teachers, present pay, what amount they will have the honour of presenting, and remarks.

On 12 March, the Resident, Charles Lennox Russell asked for an interview, but the Nizam prevaricated. He sent him sixteen letters through Fraser, but declined to meet him. There were several interviews between the Resident and the Sadr-i-Azam, Sir Ali Imam, and other officials. After prolonged negotiations the Nizam ordered the withdrawal of the Education Department circular, but still refused to meet the Resident. He said there had been great public resentment when nazars were stopped in 1921.

On 17 March 1923, the Resident argued that the Nizam should place a clear ban on nazars. He said in England benevolences were given to the king. King Charles had misused it, and was beheaded. The Nizam replied that this analogy did not hold good, as Europe was more or less democratic, and monarchy was constitutional. Here (in Hyderabad) the case was different; people themselves offered nazars, and they were willing to sacrifice their lives, let alone money, for a benign and just ruler. The Asaf Jahi dynasty was famous for this attribute. There was proverbial harmony and mutual confidence between the ruler and his people. The first Salar Jang he said, had collected money at the accession of Mahboob and it was not recorded whether the amount went to the Salar Jang estate or the State treasury. The Aga Khan was collecting large amounts in nazars which went abroad. Restricting nazars to certain classes of people was unfair as they resent interference in this time-honoured custom. He claimed that at the Resident's request he had put the whole system on a well organized and unimpeachable basis to avoid abuse.

On 18 March 1923, the Nizam put forth a fresh scheme of nazars to be paid to the District Treasury. The Resident felt that it would reduce but not eliminate peculation entirely. On 26 March, the Resident said that the high principles laid down in the Nizam's speech at Warangal in 1921 had not been followed as seen by the events of 1921. An inquiry was instituted and discontinued lest the scandal should undermine government's authority.

There were rumours regarding the sale of appointments for Rs 25,000 to Rs 30,000 for the post of Taluqdar or District Officer. The Nizam said that he reserved the right to accept any amount offered. When the Resident pressed the point, the Nizam claimed that he accepted nazars openly, but that they had never exceeded twenty to thirty ashrafis in the last three years. The Nizam said that he did not appoint anybody without the approval of the Council. Thus, he implied, there was no question of bribery or of the sale of offices. However, when he was asked about the removal of the three notorious officials, Nawab Sirdar Ali Khan,

Rahim Yar Jang and Fasil Ali Khan, the ruler declined to remove them. He admitted that their guilt had been recognized in 1921, but nothing had been proved against them in the current year. However he agreed to have a discussion with the Resident every two months.

The *jarida* was issued on 20 March 1923 and the Resident met the Nizam on 26 March to avoid the impression that it was he who dictated the *jarida.*

There had been reports of collections by all Heads of Departments of amounts fixed by the Nizam ranging from Rs 5,000 to Rs 60,000 per district. A petition had been received from the inhabitants of Osmanabad district stating that although land assessment was twenty lakh rupees per year an additional Rs 1.5 lakhs were collected and only Rs 60,000 paid to the Nizam. On 23 March the Nizam explained the Osmanabad nazarana and the conversion of 'so much cash' into British Government currency. All this nazarana he said, had been collected by the Taluqdar on behalf of the Nizam.

The Resident summarized his achievements by saying that the circular regarding nazar from students had been revoked. The Nizam claimed that the circular was issued without his consent or knowledge. A *jarida* had been issued restricting ryots and people in districts from offering nazar. The ruler had also repudiated the sale of offices, and agreed to prohibit interference on behalf of individuals. The agreement had been concluded with cordiality and frankness on both sides. The Nizam would be more accessible in future. Fraser however regretted that the three notorious assistants were still in office and no limit had been placed on nazars.

After the resignation of Sir Ali Imam took effect in September 1922 he was succeeded as Sadr-i-Azam by Nawab Faridoon-ul-Mulk, an old courtier who had served as Private Secretary to the Nizam for several years. He confirmed to the Resident that the practice of accepting nazars continued. Contrary to the Nizam's impression that the offering of nazars was popular with the people, Faridoon-ul-Mulk felt that the popular feeling against the practice was intense, and that soon there would be an uproar. He felt that the Nizam had a mania for collecting nazars and that matters would reach a crisis in six months. The Resident told Faridoon-ul-Mulk that opium eaters often live to an advanced age and that misers do not become insane. Faridoon-ul-Mulk said that he was himself heading for a nervous breakdown, such as Nizamat Jang had had during the Prince of Wales' visit.

In September 1923 Faridoon-ul-Mulk had a stroke and submitted his resignation but he was not relieved for some time. Since the Viceroy was to visit Hyderabad, he was relieved by another stopgap arrangement. Nawab Wali-ud-Daula acted as Sadr-i-Azam for a period of two years from 1923 to 1925.[14]

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In 1923 the Nizam received a report on the education of the two Sahibzadas from their senior tutor, W.G. Prendergast. This gentleman, a retired British official, was living with the two boys at Eden Bagh near King Kothi, along with several other elderly and respectable gentlemen who were designated as *ataliqs* or preceptors. The Indian tutors gave lessons on religious and cognate subjects, the whole system being organized on the lines of the seventh Nizam's education under Sir Bryan Egerton as tutor.

Prendergast told the Nizam that the Viceroy, Lord Reading could scarcely believe that the princes had been through forty-six books, including classics on the French Revolution and a wide range of English literature. The explanation was that Prendergast had read aloud a number of books to the boys, which they had presumably absorbed, at least partially.

Three years later, Prendergast submitted to the Nizam a comprehensive report on nine years' education of the two boys. He reported that they had thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the English language and literature. Their outside readings included the speeches of the Prince of Wales and under the rubric of current affairs they had been acquainted with ancient and modern European history as well as with Indian history. In geography a stress had been laid on the British Empire and the Nizam's dominions. They had taken up nature study, arithmetic, manuscript reading, political economy and physical training. They could ride, shoot, cycle and play tennis well.

Their conduct, according to their mentor, was exemplary. He said: 'They cheerfully take punishment and never sulk... . They thoroughly understand and appreciate that "manners maketh a man" and "noblesse oblige" '. They observed, 'lofty principles of reverence, self respect, truthfulness, clean living and clear thinking... . I think I may justly claim for both princes a well informed and well trained intellect, a keen and alert mentality, a healthy and well developed body; in a word mens sana in

corpore sano, and the simple manly and moral character which constitute the finished product of a liberal education.'

On the basis of, 'ten years close, continuous and critical observation, virtually day and night', Prendergast asserted that, 'the Princes possess the mental, moral, intellectual, and physical equipment essential to success in the exalted position they occupy as the sons of the Ruler of the Premier state in the Indian Empire.'

Prendergast paid humble tribute to the Nizam, saying that, 'whatever success has attended my efforts is directly due to the unfailing powerful support extended to me by Your Exalted Highness, the strict parental supervision over, and the intense personal interest you have manifested in the princes' education and welfare, every day ever since they commenced work with me in January 1917, nine years ago.'

The Viceroy, Lord Reading, was evidently taken in by this fulsome flattery of the Nizam. He expressed his gratification to the ruler, and hoped that the two boys would, 'grow up to be worthy sons of the House to which they belong, and be a credit to the prestige of the family and state.' He said that he would like to meet them in England if they visit that country. He praised the Nizam for his 'commendable solicitude' for their education, and the tutor's reports indicated an 'excellent grounding' in many important subjects.

The British officials' private opinion of the princes' achievements was by no means as favourable as that expressed by Prendergast. A few weeks earlier the Resident, Sir William Barton had reported to the Government of India that an authentic letter had been found from Azam Jah demanding Rs 15,000 from a government engineer. He had reported to the Government of India that the two boys are 'practically immured' in a palace separate from the Nizam under the control of Muslim *ataliqs* and Prendergast, who was well educated but had no qualification for bringing up the boys. They were developing dissolute habits and following, 'the classic example of their father in endeavouring to raise money. The son need not be as the father if given a chance although people feared it would be so. An increase of one lakh in the civil list for the sons ("the budget could well bear it and no one would grudge it") would be desirable if the money were spent for the boys or reached them.'[15]

Speaking about the two younger brothers of the Nizam, Salabat Jah and Basalat Jah, Barton reported that, 'the brothers are treated even worse

than the sons.' They were, 'pleasant, wellbehaved lads,' but always looked 'half-starved and depressed.' They were not even allowed to play tennis. The eldest brother was a great favourite of his father, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, who had purchased property in his name in Bombay. The full price was not paid before Mahboob's death. Instead of paying the balance, the seventh Nizam, according to the Resident's information, had compelled the Trustees to transfer the property to the Nizam. 'The boy should have got 4 lakh rupees paid by his father originally. He wants to leave the state and continue his education in England. If His Excellency originates it, something can be done for him (a matter of some delicacy).'[16]

In January 1923, the Viceroy received a telegram from Nawab Sikandar Nawaz Jang that his sister and mother had been taken away by the Nizam to King Kothi on the pretext of showing them a *tamasha*. The two ladies had then been confined to the palace. The Nawab alleged that the Nizam wanted to marry the young lady, Mazharunnisa Begum, who was twenty-four years old. She was the youngest daughter of Nawab Khurshid-ul-Mulk, the grand-daughter in the line of the fifth Nizam, Afzal-ud-Doula, and a niece of the sixth Nizam, Mahboob Ali Khan.

In a letter explaining the incident Osman Ali Khan informed the Resident that he had been engaged to the young lady nine years before. Due to some reasons the nikah was not possible, but now he had married her. Her status would now be second in the harem that is, next to Dulhan Pasha. The Nizam wanted to give a party to his friends. The Resident, Charles Lennox Russell expressed the view that it would be undesirable for the Government of India to intervene in such a matter.[17]

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Mir Osman Ali Khan was a man of restless energy who worked from early morning till late at night. He had no hobbies except keeping a strict eye on the administration and managing his Crown property as economically as possible. He went out of King Kothi only to investigate conditions in the State. He dictated copiously, except on Fridays, which he observed strictly, except in emergencies.[18]

The young ruler now began to lay the foundations of his claim for the restoration of Berar and for the ultimate assertion of the independence of Hyderabad.

The cotton-rich province of Berar had become a part of British India under very peculiar circumstances in 1853. The great Diwan and Regent of the Nizam, Salar Jang I, made heroic efforts to recover the province by making a series of applications to the Government of India. He built up his contacts in London through the discreet disbursal of money and the assiduous cultivation of men and women of influence including the Queen of England and the Prince of Wales. But he was ultimately unable to achieve his goal of getting back Berar. The sixth Nizam, Mahboob Ali Pasha was pressurized by Lord Curzon to lease Berar to the British in perpetuity, thus permanently waiving his right to its return. At the same time the Hyderabad Contingent, the armed force for the payment of the arrears of which, the Nizam was forced to cede Berar, was abolished. The British had successfully shifted their argument in favour of the retention of Berar from the need to pay the Contingent to the simple proposition that they could not give up Berar because the people of Berar were contented under British rule.

However, in 1923 Mahboob's son, Osman, made a last attempt to secure the actual retrocession of Berar. In preparing this application, he did not hesitate to impugn the British Government's decision on the ground that the debt of forty-three lakh rupees alleged to be due by the Nizam's government to the Government of India was not actually due. In support of this claim the Nizam's government cited the views of Colonel Cuthbert Davidson, the Resident at Hyderabad during the Revolt of 1857, expressed in a letter to the Government of India. Thus Mir Osman Ali Khan was following in the footsteps of Salar Jang I who had questioned the British Government's bona fides in regard to the Berar issue.

A second point on which the seventh Nizam's application differed from the earlier set of applications for the restoration of Berar was his claim to complete equality with the British except in regard to dealings with external powers. This claim was no doubt, in accord with the letter of the Treaties of 1778 and 1800, under which the Nizam had merely passed to the English East India Company, the control over his foreign affairs. In return for the protection of the Company, the Nizam's ancestor, Nizam Ali Khan, had obtained an assurance that the Company had, 'no manner of concern with any of His Highness' children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom His Highness is absolute.'

The seventh Nizam's application for the return of Berar had been drafted by Hasan Imam, the brother of Sir Ali Imam who, although he

had ceased to be Sadr-i-Azam of the Nizam's Executive Council late in 1922, continued to enjoy the Nizam's confidence so far as the Berar issue was concerned. Sir Nizamat Jang, the then Political Member of the Nizam's Council, felt that the letter should not include the, 'lengthy chain of lawyer's arguments,' regarding the return of Berar, which, 'did not sound overpolite.' He therefore advised the Nizam that, 'the greater part of it might, with advantage, be sent in the form of a legal note enclosed in a friendly letter to the Viceroy.' Sir Ali Imam felt that this would cause the demand to lose its force. 'The Nizam hesitated for a while, but the "prestige" of Sir Ali carried the day—with what consequences we know. The publication of that letter in newspapers was senseless bravado.' [19]

On 8 March 1924 the Nizam gave a dinner in celebration of the first Asaf Jah's declaration of independence. He gave a long speech, justifying his ancestor's actions. Little enthusiasm was evoked among nobles and other leading subjects.

A few days later, on 28 March 1924, he wrote to leading princes of India and to Mahatma Gandhi, asking for support on the Berar question. The letter was not sent through his regular advisers. This was only three or four months after the Kakinada Congress session at which Maulana Mohammad Ali was the President. The public of Hyderabad had shown great enthusiasm in welcoming the Ali brothers, Sarojini Naidu and other leaders. Five hundred Hyderabad State subjects had attended the Kakinada Session.[20]

The application of 25 October 1923 elicited a reply from Lord Reading dated 11 March 1925. Another letter was sent on 20 September 1925 and a reply was sent on 27 March 1926. In his applications, the seventh Nizam put forth the view that the Berar question was only a controversy between, 'two independent Governments having mutual relations with each other', and that the Nizam was therefore on par with the British on this question.

Lord Reading, although a former Chief Justice of England, was in no mood to look at the problem in a legalistic manner. Even if he had been so inclined, the opinion of generations of Britons who looked upon their rule in India as a kind of divine dispensation, would have stood in his way. The British Imperial tradition was nurtured on the feeling that territory once gained should not be given up, whatever be the rights and wrongs of the particular case.

The British reply to the Nizam has often been quoted as the classic statement of the role of British paramountcy in the Indian states. The Viceroy made it clear, with the full concurrence of the Home Government in England, that paramountcy could not be defined; it went far beyond the treaties, which had been signed in the early nineteenth century, when conditions were different from what they became later. While admitting that the Berar issue lay technically within the purview of the Nizam's government, Lord Reading asserted that it also concerned the welfare of the people of Berar, and the British view on this point was supported by the Indian press and public opinion as well as the people of Berar. He also assured the Indian princes that the British power and the Indian Army were still the guarantors of the territorial integrity and freedom from attack of the Indian states. 'The sovereignty of the British Government is supreme everywhere in India, and no ruler of an Indian state can justifiably claim to negotiate with the British Government on an equal footing,' declared the Viceroy bluntly, and added, to make the position abundantly clear that, 'the varying degrees of internal sovereignty which the Rulers enjoy, are all subject to the due exercise by the Paramount Power of (its) responsibility (to protect) the imperial interests.'[21]

This outspoken and uncompromising rejection of the Nizam's appeal for the return of Berar, coupled with a strong assertion of the right of the British power to exercise practically unlimited authority over the states, came as a shock not only to the Nizam but to the Indian states generally. If the Nizam, the 'faithful ally' of the British who had been declared as 'His Exalted Highness' could be told unceremoniously that his position was no stronger than that of the other states, how weak their position must be, they argued. The strong sense of unease they felt led to a renewed dialogue with the Government of India leading to the appointment of the Indian States Commission headed by Sir Harcourt Butler, which submitted its report in 1929, but failed to satisfy the State's demand. Meanwhile the Nizam faced another threat to his dignity.

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The Indian Political Service had a saying, 'Lean and keen men for the Frontier, fat and good-natured men for the states.' This saying was recalled when Sir William Barton, a tough wiry Frontier man was appointed Resident at Hyderabad in 1924, replacing Sir Charles Lennox Russell.

Barton was shocked to find out about the Nizam's well-known penchant for accepting substantial offerings in the form of gold ashrafis from the subordinates and demanding sums of one or two lakh rupees from the Samasthans which he was planning to visit. He put his foot down and finally persuaded the Viceroy, Lord Reading to intervene decisively after administering a severe rebuke to the Nizam for his mismanagement of the finances. Henceforth the key posts of Director-General of Revenue and Director-General of Police would be filled not just by British officials, but by British officials deputed officially by the Government of India. Moreover, a position in the Executive Council of the Nizam, the equivalent of the Cabinet today, was reserved for a senior British official. Thus the British entrenched themselves in the very top echelon of the Nizam's government. During the next twenty-one years, they were to take full advantage of the key positions to which they had access.[22]

Though the actual decision in this regard was taken by Lord Reading, the task of announcing the change fell on his successor, Lord Irwin, as Reading felt he had already gained enough illwill from the Nizam by his reply to the Berar letter. Sir Richard Chevenix Trench of the Indian Political Service was appointed Revenue Member of the Nizam's Executive Council. Theodore Tasker of the Madras cadre of the ICS was appointed Director-General of Revenue and Malcolm Armstrong of the Indian Police was appointed Director-General of Police.

The appointment of senior officials from the British service to the Nizam's government had not been done for the first time. As we have seen earlier, Casson Walker's appointment as Financial Adviser and later Assistant Minister of Finance was instrumental in tightening up the administrative machinery and reducing wasteful expenditure. He was succeeded in his influential position by A.H. Hydari who had first come to the State as Accountant-General and later rose to be Finance Member and President of the Nizam's Council. The British had found, however, that officials appointed by the Nizam, however efficient and well meaning, could be overawed into submission or simply sidelined. The Government of India officials were expected to bear a very heavy burden, as the Nizam was in the habit of interfering in day-to-day matters, and was often influenced to make undesirable appointments to key positions, which brought down the level of administration.

Closely connected with the decision to appoint British officials to the Nizam's government was the decision to place restriction on the Nizam's practice of accepting nazars from his subjects. On 21 December 1926 the

Nizam issued a firman with the concurrence of the Resident and in order to fulfil the following general principles :

- the abolition of existing abuses;
- the confining of the practice of nazars to the well-established custom of his ancestors;
- that if in future the Nizam disregarded the British advice they would be compelled to advice the complete abandonment of the practice.

The firman itself contained a list of the customary nazars approved for acceptance, an affirmation that no other nazars would be taken and a list of the abuses that had occurred in the past. For example, the Nizam referred in the firman to exactions made from the peasantry and others on the occasion of his birthday, Ids and his visits to districts, and prohibited them in the future. The last para of clause 10 said that no nazars would be presented except on occasions set forth in the firman, that is on the birthday of the ruler, two Ids every year, the birthday of Azam Jah and Moazam Jah and Darbars held on extraordinary occasions like the birth of a son to the ruler and the marriages of his children. Only nobles, relatives, holders of Samasthans, members of Council, Secretaries, Nazims, Heads of Departments, the Chief Justice and Justices, respectable jagirdars, Sahukars, Vakils etc. would attend these Darbars and would be notified in due time. No nazar would exceed fifteen ashrafis and most officers would pay one ashrafi and four rupees only. Officers drawing salaries of Rs 500 or more would be given an opportunity to present nazars at the annual birthday Darbar.

In spite of this detailed firman issued at the insistence of the British Government, the question of nazars continued to dog the footsteps of Sir William Barton and of the Nizam's government for the next several months. The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, an Indian ruler of considerable influence, visited Hyderabad and advised the Nizam that he was being treated by the Resident in a cavalier manner and should protest before matters got out of hand. He told the Nizam that he had once had an obnoxious Agent removed after a personal interview with the Viceroy, and thereafter had had no trouble. He even offered to help the Nizam to get Barton transferred. Spurred to action by this encouragement, the normally cautious Nizam wrote to the Government of India, taking strong objection to what he considered Barton's undue interference in the

internal affairs of Hyderabad, and expressed the wish to deal with the Government of India directly, instead of through the Resident.

The Nizam was really concerned about the possibility of interference by the new Director-General of Revenue, Sir Theodore Tasker, and the new Revenue Member, Sir Richard Chevenix Trench. He refused to have his relative Nawab Tilawat Jang removed from the Council, although the Resident considered him to be a most undesirable person. In March 1927 Barton had to defer his home leave to handle the crisis as his substitute, Leslie Crump, would not be able to handle it. Barton strongly refuted the Nizam's contention that the city police had always been under the Nizam. He wanted it to be under the Revenue and Police Member of the Council. He told the government that the restriction on the Nizam's powers were essential in view of the way in which he had utilized his position.

In addition to the old question of nazars there was now a problem about *khasas* (plates of food traditionally sent to the ruler) and paandans (plates of betel-leaf), or cash amounts expected by the Nizam in lieu thereof, from nobles or officials on the occasion of weddings in their families. Barton also pointed out that a number of firmans had been issued by the Nizam which has taken away or limited the powers of the Council or Sadr-i-Azam, as laid down in the constitution of 1919. These firmans were constantly being produced, and the Council was reluctant to overrule them. He saw the real problem as the weakness of the Council which had generally been supine when the Nizam wanted his way. The Viceroy's adviser, Thompson, agreed with this assessment. In regard to the appointment of Moinuddin, an undesirable person, he felt that it was primarily a question of the Council not objecting to an action of the Nizam against which they were entitled to protest.

There was an exchange of correspondence between the Viceroy and the Nizam. After listing the ways in which the Nizam had earned his disapproval, the Viceroy wrote that the matter had only been raised because it had become a 'scandal'. He continued that he felt the Nizam was in danger of not appreciating, 'the grave damage that in the eyes of your subjects and the world at large these petty transactions are inflicting upon the position of a great potentate. If my dear friend, I could lead you to see these things as they appear to others, I feel sure that I should earn the gratitude not only of your subjects and your fellow princes but in the end even of Your Exalted Highness and of those who are nearest to you.'

Not sure whether this argument would drive the point home, the Viceroy further asserted that, 'His Majesty's Government and the Government of India are both determined that reform at Hyderabad should be real... 'While we have protected Your Exalted Highness from publicity so far, if we did publish a full statement of the reasons why advice was given, public opinion both here and in England would demand strong action... . Under the Resolution of 1920 Your Exalted Highness has a right to a Commission of Inquiry, but I hope Your Exalted Highness will not put me to the necessity of considering these possibilities... .'

This was not only a strong rebuke, but a threat as well. Characteristically, Mir Osman Ali Khan thought discretion to be the better part of valour, and wrote back that, 'as the Government of India now insist on their advice being acted upon, he will simply carry out their wishes...' He hoped he would be given the opportunity to, 'remove any misconception' at some later date. He thanked the government for showing favour to him as their,' Faithful Ally,' as well as,'the further kindness with which the words "Great Potentate" have been applied to me in their present communication which greatly add to my dignity.' He said that he hardly deserved this honour because whatever his personal position or actions may be, 'I am after all only a human being and as such not infallible. For no man is absolutely faultless; otherwise he would be superhuman.'

Ending the correspondence, the Viceroy wrote to the Nizam on 18 May 1927 in a *kharita* that he was glad to learn that the Nizam accepted the advice, 'without reservation', and expressed the view that if given a fair trial, the reforms would be entirely beneficial.[23]

The administration at this time had reached such a low ebb that the new appointments were welcomed by the population at large, including representative Hindus, who felt that Lord Irwin was dealing firmly with the situation. While observing the necessary formalities, the Government of India made it clear to the Nizam that he should not interfere in day-to-day administration. A firman was issued making the new appointments, and another to the effect that all complaints would he heard through departmental heads and not directly as was done before.

Writing in an all-India magazine, K.G. Abhyankar welcomed the introduction of a strong European element in the service of the State as it would counter 'moral deterioration' and 'high communal tension and estrangement prevailing then' caused by 'chronic misrule' and the

dominance of the 'Aligarh influence.' A plea was made however for the appointment of competent and talented Hindus from outside the State for appointment to the judiciary, as well as reforms of the police and education department.

He pointed out that only one out of seven High Court judges was a Hindu and was thus conversant with the personal law of the Hindu subjects (nearly ninety per cent of the population) by whom a major proportion of the cases were filed and felt that the new dispensation would help to improve general efficiency. A long run improvement would require thorough reform of the judiciary, of police and education which was characterized by incompetence and neglect of the interests of Hindus. The *Siasat*, an Urdu newspaper of Lahore, lampooned the the Nizam's poem praising his own rule. The Nizam had written :

In this reign comfort is abundant
Peace, mercy and blessings of God are prevailing
Scattered leaves of heart have gathered together
Praise be to God, this is the reign of Osman.

This was amended by the *Siasat* to read as follows :

In this reign bribery is abundant
Vicissitude, misery and curse of God are prevailing
Everyone is being reduced to poverty because of Nazars
There are perturbance, poverty and indigence
No one is heard without presenting Nazar
Justice has become dear and oppression cheap
praise be to God, this is the reign of Osman.[24]

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The appointment of Maharaja Kishen Pershad as Sadr-i-Azam or President of the Nizam's Executive Council was announced along with the appointment of the British officials to the Nizam's service. He was known as a representative of the old school of nobility of Hyderabad. He had held the post of Diwan when the seventh Nizam came to the gaddi in 1911 but was removed from the post a year later when he fell into disfavour. He remained in the wilderness for fourteen years before he made a comeback in 1926. He continued as President till 1937. His survival in office was

due to a combination of traditional respect for the authority of his master, a remarkable devotion to the tradition of the State, and unwillingness to disturb the status quo unless absolutely necessary.

Kishen Pershad was a Khatri of Punjabi origin whose distant ancestor, Maharaja Chandu Lal, had risen from a humble position to the *de facto* Diwanship of Hyderabad. Chandu Lal's grandson, Maharaja Narender Bahadur, was a contemporary of the first Salar Jang. He served as Peshkar during Salar Jang's lifetime and later as senior administrator for a year. His exit from the political scene took place in 1884 when the Viceroy Lord Ripon was present at the installation of the young Salar Jang II as Diwan. The change was at the instance of the seventeen-year-old Mahboob Ali Khan, the sixth Nizam.

Kishen Pershad had three Hindu wives and four Muslim ones. He was equally at home in the Hindu and Muslim traditions, made piligrimages to the holy places of both the communities and was familiar with the scriptures of both.

The re-emergence of Kishen Pershad as Sadr-i-Azam in 1926 was an indication of the continuity of traditions and the principle of nobility in Hyderabad. The fact that he was a Hindu was an additional advantage, an apparent reversal of pro-Muslim tendencies of the ruler. This impression was further strengthened by the appointment of the Nizam's Council of Sir Akbar Hydari as Finance Member of, a secular-minded Muslim who came from a distinguished Bohra family of Bombay. He was a grandson of Badruddin Tyabji, one of the early Presidents of the Indian National Congress.

One of the major instruments for maintaining control in the Indian state has always been the police. It is not generally known that the police administration of Hyderabad was divided until the Police Action, into two categories–the district police under the Director-General, and the city police under a Kotwal.

The foundations of the modern police force in the districts was laid by H.C.Hankin, who was known as the father of Hyderabad police. He was succeeded by S.T. Hollins who paid attention to the improvement of the salary, uniform, housing and service facilities of the district police. Like his predecessor Hankin, Hollins became a legendary figure in the districts. However neither Hankin nor Hollins had access to jagirs, Samasthans and Sarf-i-Khas territories which constituted one-third of the State. Their influence in these areas was therefore indirect.

The investigation of crimes received great importance in the traditional set up of Hyderabad State. It was said that any crime that occurred, such as a theft or murder, would be so promptly tackled that the offender would be arrested in a matter of twelve hours. This was an indication of the efficient system of spying which prevailed in Hyderabad. The efficiency did not however extend to crimes committed by the landlords, moneylenders and other powerful vested interests against the poor. In other words, the police system was oriented to the maintenance of law and order and to the control of criminal activity of a particular type and not to the enforcement of justice in the wider sense.

The Kotwal or Chief of city police occupied a position of great trust in the traditional Indian state, especially in those states following the Mughal administrative pattern, like Hyderabad. The chief of the city police was always considered a confidant of the Nizam, as one of his main assignments was to keep a watch on the affairs of the palace including the numerous ladies of the harem, the Khanazads and servants of all categories. The Kotwal of Hyderabad during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was usually a Muslim. An important exception was Raja Bahadur Venkatarama Reddy.

Venkatarama Reddy had joined service in 1906 as a Fourth Grade Police Amin on sixty rupees per month, plus a horse allowance of twenty rupees at the age of seventeen or eighteen. He came to the notice of Hankin because of his hard work and ceaseless devotion to duty. He benefited from the guidance of senior police officers who had served along with his uncle, William Wahab (who, despite his name, belonged to the Reddy community), the nephew of Raja Rameshwar Rao of Wanparti. He was promoted to the post of Mohtamim or Superintendent of Police, Gulbarga in 1312 Fasli. He distinguished himself by his dynamism and courage. His knowledge of Urdu helped him to ingratiate himself with the higher nobility and the élite. At the same time his acquaintance with his mother tongue, Telugu, enabled him to handle the common people with tact and sympathy. While at Gulbarga he came into contact with Imadat Jang who was the Sessions Judge, Gulbarga and who was later appointed Kotwal of Hyderabad by Mir Osman Ali Khan, in succession to Lal Khan.

Imadat Jang needed a trustworthy man to reform the city police under the Kotwal and asked for Venkatarama Reddy as his first assistant. For six years Venkatarama Reddy worked relentlessly during and outside the office hours and, succeeded in removing the defects in the functioning of

the city police. In 1329 Fasli, Imadat Jang passed away. Venkatarama Reddy had not met the ruler, although his office and house were very close to the main palace gate. He never expected that a Hindu would be made Kotwal. He was summoned to the presence of the Nizam, who looked him up and down four or five times and sent him away. Immediately after that he was appointed as officiating Kotwal, 'until further orders'.

Venkatarama Reddy began going to the Nizam whenever called for, and gradually became so indispensable that he saw the ruler several times a day. He became particularly adept at bandobast or making arrangements for the visits of dignitaries. Reddy made a particularly good impression on the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VIII) who visited Hyderabad in 1921. He also handled Mahatma Gandhi's visit to Hyderabad with great tact. Sir Richard Chevenix Trench had restrained Gandhiji from visiting a khadi exhibition in Hyderabad. The latter was indignant, and decided to cancel all his programmes and leave Hyderabad. Venkatarama Reddy met Gandhiji personally and pacified him so that he went through the rest of his programme on schedule.

On Bahman 27, 1339 Fasli, the Nizam conferred the title of Raja Bahadur on Venkatarama Reddy. In 1330 Fasli (1931) he received the Order of the British Empire. He retired from service in 1343 Fasli (1934). Thus his service overlapped with the new regime after the British intervention of 1926 for as much as eight years. He won great appreciation from Sir Akbar Hydari, perhaps the most powerful figure of the new regime.

Venkatarama Reddy used his position as a respected public servant to build up voluntary organizations and to help his own poor relatives and others who came from the same village, or with whom he had some old connection. He was a good speaker in Urdu and had a lot of worldly wisdom and experience. Although he had not read learned books, he encouraged the education of women, and contributed to the building up of the Reddy Hostel in Hyderabad which also built up a large collection of eleven thousand books. In spite of its name, it accepted students of all castes, and did not limit it self to the Reddy community.[25]

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Meanwhile the Nizam's two sons were causing him serious concern. On 2 April 1927, Barton wrote (on the basis of secret reports) that the Nizam

'wept' when discussing his sons with the senior Begum. He was fearful that the Government may not recognize them after his death. However, he put a bold front with the Government of India and criticized the Resident for having taken rumours for facts in regard to the alleged demand for money by the heir apparent. The Viceroy however stood his ground and pointed out in his reply to the Nizam (dated 12 April 1927) that the Resident had proof of what he told the Nizam about his son. The details could not be divulged as the facts had been revealed in confidence, but the Viceroy was convinced that the evidence was conclusive.

The Nizam had two half-brothers, Salabat Jah and Basalat Jah, who had been born of nikah marriages. In 1928 the elder of the two, Salabat Jah, was ill. The Residency reported that the Nizam was 'waiting for his death' so that the Nepean Trust property would then revert to the Nizam. Both the brothers were living in small houses without amenities. Salabat Jah was due Rs 2,000 per month in British Indian currency from March 1929, but the Nizam was willing to pay only half, as the construction of a house for him was pending. Salabat Jah was keen to study at an English university, and the Residency was trying to have his hope fulfilled. Basalat Jah on the other hand was being proposed for a government post in the State.

The Nizam was obviously not as solicitous about the welfare, education and employment of his brothers as he was of his two sons. Although they were older than his sons, the marriages of the brothers were to be arranged only after the marriages of the sons. Nevertheless , he was good enough to send cavalry horses to perform the mount and dismount ceremony at the residence of the brothers. Unfortunately, there was not enough place for the ceremony to be performed properly in their house.[26]

In February 1928, the Nizam agreed to give an allowance of Rs 300 per month to Basalat Jah, but he explained that the amount had been exhausted during his visits to Madras and Calcutta, where he purchased souvenirs which were being debited to his brothers' meagre allowances. Basalat Jah was therefore entirely dependent on his mother's allowance of Rs 500 per month. Moreover, the Nizam did not send Basalat Jah the souvenirs purchased on his account. The Residency feared that this pattern would continue and the allowance would not be paid to his brother as promised.[27]

The Nizam kept his two older sons also on a very tight leash. On the one hand they were being groomed to hold highly dignified positions as Heads of State, and on the other, they were starved of funds and were

consequently unable to maintain the dignity of their positions. Their personal staff was often not paid for months together and this put the young princes in a very embarrassing position. Traditionally the children of the ruler had been maintained from the Sarf-i-Khas or private estate of the Nizam. Since this source was not giving them adequate income, the Resident, Barton began to feel that it would be more appropriate if they were paid from the State funds. No doubt this would put an additional burden on the State but it was a small price to pay, he argued, for the training of the future ruler and his brother. The Nizam was, however, strongly opposed to the proposal. He pointed out that the Sarf-i-Khas was the traditional funding source for the heir to the gaddi of Hyderabad. He argued that there was no justification for burdening the exchequer with it. The real reason for his objection was however that he would be unable to exercise control over the princes. As the Resident put it, he would be unable to exercise his 'petty tyrannies' over them.

At the time he was opposing the sanction of an allowance from the State funds for his two sons, the Nizam was also proposing that the elder prince be made the President of the Council. Evidently considering the prince too immature, the idea was opposed by Barton and turned down by the Government of India. Barton's successor, Sir Terence Keyes also opposed the proposal and suggested other measures for training the princes.

The Government of India had its way, and in spite of the Nizam's opposition, an amount of Rs 20,000 per month for the elder prince and Rs 15,000 for the younger prince were allotted from the civil list. Apart from the civil list, an amount of Rs 2,500 per month was paid to Azam Jah as his salary as Commander-in-Chief and Rs 2,000 per month was paid to Moazam Jah as Chairman, City Improvement Board.

Within a few years, however, the boys had gone to the other extreme. In October 1935 a meeting had to be called, which was attended by the Resident, Akbar Hydari, Finance Member of the Nizam's Council, and two other members, Theodore Tasker and Mahdi Yar Jang, to discuss the liquidation of debts run up by the two boys.

The Nizam was a traditional Indian father who wanted his sons to marry in the traditional way at an early age and thus enter the stage of a householder. He did not however expect his sons to be monogamous or to remain faithful to their wives.

On 22 January 1930, Barton told the Government of India that the Nizam wanted his heir apparent and his younger brother to marry the daughters of one of their mother's relatives, a course for which the two boys were not willing. The Nizam wrote to his two sons, 'You will remember my advice that the earlier you get married and settled down the better... further the marriages of your two uncles have been arranged to take place this year. They have placed the matter entirely in my hands and I am preparing to make the necessary arrangements. I want you to get married in the first place to some one within our own family. Afterwards you can marry as many outsiders as you like, but the elephant which carries the standard at the head of the procession should be the pick of the train.

'What you want is a wife who will be obedient to you and capable of managing properly the domestic arrangements—not the kind of girls so common now-a-days who know English well but are not of good disposition but are filled with a spirit of freedom so strong as to be likely to lead to some disasters.'

The Nizam also requested the support of the Resident in persuading the heir apparent to give up what he considered an unsuitable marriage with the daughter of Sir Kishen Pershad. The Nizam thought that it would cast a slur on the Asaf Jahi family if the heir to the biggest Muhammadan state were to enter into an alliance with a Hindu family (although the girl herself was obviously a Muslim, the daughter of one of Kishen Pershad's Muslim wives). The Resident had apparently agreed with the Nizam that such a marriage would be indeed unsuitable.

At the same time the Nizam was afraid that the Princes might fall in love and contract unsuitable marriages in Europe. He therefore urged the Resident to advise the Princes to obey their father with regard to their marriage. On 28 January 1930, the Nizam issued a firman fixing the maintenance allowances to his sons at Rs 10,000 Hali Sicca for Azam Jah and Rs 7,000 for Moazzam Jah.

The Resident however was not impressed with the sincerity of the Nizam in the matter. He thought that the proposed marriage of the princes to Muslim girls was, 'a mere piece of trickery to neutralize the effect of the Nizam's agreement with the Viceroy regarding the training of the boys.'

The Sahibzadas themselves were opposed to the marriages, because they felt that the Nizam meant to use their future wives as weapons against them. They also felt that if they marry in good Hyderabad families their parents may create trouble in case the brides were not treated properly.[28]

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On 12 November 1931 the two princes were united in marriage to the daughter and niece of the last Caliph and former Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Majid Khan. Nawab Mir Himayat Ali Khan Azam Jah Bahadur, the heir apparent to the Hyderabad throne, married Princess Durreshahvar, and Mir Shujaat Ali Khan Moazzam Jah Bahadur married Princess Niloufer, a niece of the former Sultan. When, 'the young Princes left Hyderabad for a European tour no one for a moment imagined that they would return married, or that their marriage would form a link between two such illustrious Houses.' The wedding ceremony was held at Nice in Southern France and, 'was not attended with any of that oriental splendour which is supposed to be inseparable from Royal marriages. It was simple, with the dignified simplicity of Islam. Only some members of the ex-Sultan's family at Nice, some Turkish nobles and a few personal friends were present. The staff of the princes were in attendance.

'The Caliph himself performed the religious ceremony, and the register of marriages was signed by three witnesses representing Hyderabad, namely Sir Akbar Hydari, Sir Richard Chevenix Trench and Nawab Mehdi Yar Jang Bahadur.' The three dignitaries were members of the Nizam's Executive Council and delegates to the Round Table Conference.

The princes and their consorts sailed from Venice for India on 12 December 1931 and after a brief halt in Bombay took a train to Hyderabad. A reception committee was organized under the guidance of the Kotwal or Police Commissioner, Raja Bahadur Venkatarama Reddy, O.B.E. Persons of different communities contributed to the construction of a Shadi Khana or marriage hall as a permanent memorial to the occasion. Crowds of villagers flocked to the city and 'eager sightseers crowded every point of vantage.' The couples were greeted with thunderous cheers. Newspapers printed special illustrated editions and pictures of the wedding were sold on the streets.

At the State Banquet at the Chow Mahalla Palace on 4 January 1932, the Resident, Sir Terence Keyes, remarked: 'From the time when the Moghul Emperors began their great adventure of uniting under one rule the many warring races of this land, no ruling prince, or heir to a ruling prince, has ever sought his bride from a royal house beyond the seas.' He linked up the events with the announcement made two years earlier by the Nizam declaring his intention to enter an, 'All-India Federation at once, under due safeguards for the sovereignty of the States, of course. He was not only the first Ruler to make an announcement of this sort, but the first person of any importance with the courage and conviction to express his belief in the possibility of the States entering a Federation with the Provinces.'

Praising Sir Akbar Hydari's contribution to the Round Table Conference, as quoted in K. Krishnaswamy Mudiraj's *Pictorial Hyderabad* Vol.II, the Resident said :

> The Hyderabad delegation brought the prestige of the Nizam and his Dominions to a very high level; and made the whole Empire see that the title of Faithful Ally of the British Government was no empty formula.
>
> These alliances of a very different sort—the romantic alliances which have captured the imagination of so many in Europe and in India. There was no deep laid plan connecting these events; but at the same time they have all sprung from one origin—His Exalted Highness's deep-rooted desire to do his best for all that concerns him, for his family, for the people of his Dominions and for the Indian Empire as a whole. It happened, and I think that this is a happy augury, that all these plans came to a fruition at the same time. The Delegation returned bearing evidence of the worth of Hyderabad's contributions to the deliberation of the Empire, and, on New Year's eve, the Sahibzadas arrived with their charming brides.[29]

The Nizam decided in January 1932 on the two princes' return from Europe that they were to be appointed Vice-President and Extraordinary Member of the Council respectively. They were to be given salaries of Rs 5,000 and Rs 4,000 respectively and secretaries to assist in their work.

This was done in order to ensure their administrative training. On 5 January, the Council submitted an *arzdasht* asking whether the senior prince will replace the Vice-President, Nawab Wali-ud-Daula and whether he would preside in the absence of the President and vote. In a separate note, Sir Richard Chevenix Trench agreed with the resolution but added that 'the principle with which the Council has unanimously agreed,' may on further examination, 'present difficulties that render it desirable to explore other ways of giving effect to HEH's intention.'

The Nizam felt that it would not be in keeping with his sons' dignity to work under any minister except Maharaja Kishen Pershad. As a temporary measure, they would work in the Peshi office of the Nizam. Their salaries would be increased by Rs 5,000 per month for the heir apparent and Rs 3,000 per month for Moazam Jah.

While he was highly solicitous of the dignity of his sons, there were rumours that the Nizam was trying to locate his Turkish daughters-in-law separately from his sons, in hovels in Eden Bagh. Scores of shabby-looking girls, said to be the Nizam's daughters, were living there. If there was such a plan, it did not succeed, and the princes' wives stayed with their husbands in their Western-style bungalows.[30]

The Nizam now decided to put forth once more his claim to the title of King. This move was evidently carefully orchestrated, although it appeared to have been initiated by the Finance Member of the Nizam's Council, Sir Akbar Hydari, during his visit to London for one of the Round Table Conferences.

In December 1932, Hydari met the Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, and urged him to grant the Nizam the title of King of Hyderabad. Rather surprisingly, Hoare wrote to the Viceroy stating that he was inclined to support the proposal. The latter however firmly opposed the idea. Subsequently, in a letter written on 19 May 1933, Sir Terence Keyes wrote to the Government of India that the Nizam had under pressure repudiated Hydari's proposal, saying he was not authorized to press for the title of King. The Nizam should be given the title of King and be made Khalifa after the Khalifa's expulsion from Turkey. The proposal was revived at the time of the Turkish alliance by Marmaduke Pickthall, Shaukat Ali, and Akbar Hydari.

Keyes believed that the marriage of the Nizam's sons to Turkish princesses was a part of this scheme. In a book, *Whither Islam?*, British,

French, German and Dutch authorities also expressed the same view, attaching great importance to the alliance.

Keyes was opposed to the idea and pointed out that ninety-five per cent of the State's revenue was paid by Hindus and they were bitter at the high expenditure on Muslim institutions and personages and the close connection between the title of King and the Caliphate. He said there was a fear of revolt by Hindus and that it was dangerous to rely on Hydari's judgment. It was also unwise to offend other rulers. On Keyes' pressure the Nizam dropped the proposal.

On 25 August 1931, the Resident told the Nizam that the right to be consulted on the appointment of a member of the Nizam's Executive Council was justified, as for a hundred years the Nizam had consulted the British regarding the appointment of a Diwan. The power of the Diwan had been divided among the members of the Executive Council, hence the British should be consulted about all Council appointments. The Nizam accepted this position.[31]

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From 1919 to 1931 the fortunes of the seventh Nizam went through many vicissitudes. The period began with the inauguration of a new constitution amidst much fanfare. Actually the constitution had been forced on the Nizam by the Government of India which felt that there should be some kind of constitutional check on the autocratic behaviour of the Nizam, which was placing it in an embarrassing position vis-a-vis public opinion in India as a whole.

The Nizam however took the new constitutional set up as an opportunity to put forth his claims for the return of Berar, a cause which had been dear to his late father as well as the first Salar Jang. In 1923 he addressed the Government of India in a detailed and well-argued letter, requesting that the dispute over Berar be referred to arbitration, as the British Government and the Nizam's government were on an equal footing, except in regard to external affairs. Three years later Lord Reading sent him a reply which shattered his hopes in regard to the Berar issue, asserting firmly that paramountcy could not be defined, and was not limited by treaties.

In 1928 the Government of India appointed the Indian States Inquiry Committee, to investigate the claim of the states who wanted paramountcy

defined in clear terms once and for all, to prevent future encroachment on their powers. However, the Butler Committee belied their hopes, reasserting the position stated by Lord Reading's letter to the Nizam.

Meanwhile, under the British intervention of 1926, a senior British official was to be appointed to the Nizam's Executive Council as the nominee of the Government of India, along with two more British officials to head the key departments of revenue and police. This, together with the British assertion of a right to approve all appointments to the Nizam's Executive Council, placed severe restrictions on the Nizam's control of his own State's administration.

Although, at the beginning of the Thirties, the Nizam's family had caught the imagination of the fashionable world of the West, due to the Turkish marriages of his sons, his strength was more apparent than real. The British in India had effectively clipped the wings of the Nizam publicly by the reply to his letter on Berar, as well as by the insistence on having a say in all Council appointments. The Nizam could perhaps have countered the British pressures by keeping up a dialogue with the nationalist forces, but the idea would never have occurred to him, considering his strong antipathy to the Congress leadership. Perhaps inevitably, therefore, the next decade would find him playing more and more the Muslim card, utilizing the Muslims of the State to further his personal and dynastic interests.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TWILIGHT YEARS

Main hoon Hindu main hoon Mussalman
Har mazhab hai mera iman
Shad ka mazhab shad hi janey
Azadi Azad hi janey

(I am both Hindu and Mussalman
Every religion is my belief
Shad's religion is known to Shad alone
Only the liberated soul knows the nature of freedom)

–Maharaja Kishen Pershad 'Shad'.

Nizamu sarkaroda !
Najeela minchinoda
Yama badha pedtivi kodako
Nizamu sarkaroda

Pandina panta nantha
Tindi kaina unchakunda
Teesuka vellinavoo
Nizamu sarkaroda

Mannanu bhoomi leka
Undanu illu leka
Paradesha melthimi koduko
Nizamu sarkaroda

(O Ruler of the Nizam country !
You are worse than the Nazis
You have given us too much trouble
O Ruler of the Nizam country

Not a grain from the paddy fields
Is left for us to eat
You have taken it all away
O Ruler of the Nizam country

I survived without land
Without a house
I have left this country
O Ruler of the Nizam country) !

–Yadagiri

The Mughal traditions of Hyderabad State were carried on in the first half of the twentieth century by a number of distinguished noble families who had been recipients of the Nizam's goodwill and patronage for two centuries. These included the Paigah nobles, Nawab Fakhrul Mulk and his family, the Salar Jang and Chandu Lal families and some of the heads of Samasthans, like the Rajas of Gadwal, Jatprole and Wanaparti. The most prominent of these was the Hindu nobleman, Maharaja Kishen Pershad, who was, as we have seen, a direct descendant of Maharaja Chandu Lal. Although Kishen Pershad should have succeeded to the post of Peshkar when his uncle, Maharaja Narender Bahadur died after an illness of two days in 1888, it was three years after that that Mahboob decided to appoint him to the post. Along with the post he became the heir to all the properties, honours and allowances attaching to it. The post gave him frequent access to the ruler as well as the right to participate in State functions. He also acted as Minister-in-charge of Military Affairs. Ten years later, in 1901, he was appointed Diwan in place of Viqar-ul-Umra of the Paigah family who had lost the Nizam's confidence.

The Maharaja was an old-fashioned, conservative courtier who believed in complete loyalty to his ruler. He was the soul of courtesy to all whom he met, or with whom he had any dealings. He was a poet of no mean repute in Persian and Urdu and used Shad (meaning happy) as his pseudonym. Kishen Pershad was known as a patron of poets, writers and artists from different parts of India and even from Persia and Arabia.

Whenever he returned to his Devdi, he would give alms to the poor in gratitude to God for his safe return. It was an expression both of religious faith and compassion. Perhaps it was also an expression of vanity. During a visit to Ootacamund he was asked by the British authorities to desist from the practice. This injunction depressed him and he stayed at home for several days and soon decided to return to Hyderabad. 'How can I go out,' he asked his visitors, 'without throwing money to the poor ?'

The Maharaja was once approached by a beggar on a street in old Delhi. Kishen Pershad struck up a conversation, and soon realized that the ragged beggar was the son of the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar. He took him back to his hotel and handed over to the beggar the contents of his strong box, saying that the money had been kept for him.

He later remarked that he had been greatly blessed as he had been able to help a prince of the Mughal family. But his personal assistant, Nawab Mahdi Nawaz Jang, underwent deep anxiety after this act of generosity, because he did not have enough money to bring the Maharaja back to Hyderabad. It was fortunate that Mahdi did not have to trouble Kishen Pershad with his problem, as he met an acquaintance in Delhi who stood guarantee for a loan from a traditional bank.[1]

The appointment of Maharaja Kishen Pershad as Sadr-i-Azam in 1926 was significant as it followed a period when the Nizam had experimented first with a President from outside the State, Sir Ali Imam, and then with two of his loyal courtiers, Nawab Faridoon-ul-Mulk and Nawab Wali-ud-Daula. The former had proved to be too strong an administrator and did not fit into the traditional court atmosphere of the Nizam's dominions. His two successors were on the other hand too weak as administrators and could not keep the affairs of State under control. The British Government was dissatisfied with the state of affairs, and the appointment of Maharaja Kishen Pershad fitted in with their expectations. The appointment was also a popular one with the people of the State, both Hindu and Muslim who regarded Kishen Pershad as a survivor of the reign of the sixth Nizam, Mahboob Ali Pasha, as well as a symbol of the traditional harmony between Hindus and Muslims of Hyderabad.

During the period 1926 to 1937, Kishen Pershad functioned as Sadr-i-Azam while the brilliant financial administrator, Sir Akbar Hydari, occupied the important post of Finance Member of the Nizam's Executive Council.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the Twenties and Thirties in Hyderabad administration constituted the 'Hydari era'. He played a major role not only in the administrative reforms but also in the politics of the period. In 1937, after the Silver Jubilee celebrations of the seventh Nizam, he succeeded Kishen Pershad as Sadr-i-Azam. It is instructive to take a look at the major reforms of the Hydari era, which will enable us to see the administration of Hyderabad in a balanced light.

Akbar Hydari had entered the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, and had a promising career to look forward to there, when he was offered the Accountant-Generalship of Hyderabad State. He occupied that position for two years from 1905 and was then appointed Finance Secretary, a post he occupied till 1911. For nineteen years from 1911 to 1930 he worked as Secretary in charge of Education and other development departments, where he played a major role in the setting up of the Osmania University. In 1920, he retired and went back to Bombay. However, he returned about a year later on a promotion to ministerial rank as Finance Member of the Nizam's Executive Council, a post he held from 1921 to 1937.

In 1922 Hydari undertook a reform of the budget with a view to exhibit the financial condition in its true perspective. Each class of receipts and expenditure was shown in such a way so as to distinguish extraordinary from ordinary expenses, and capital from service items. The second reform was to earmark the different funded investments under separate reserves according to the sources from, or the objects for which they were constituted. The third and most important reform was the departmentalization of finances. At the beginning of each three-year period the finance department made a forecast of the revenue likely to accrue under normal conditions during that period. On the basis of this forecast, and in consultation with the other departments, the normal grant to each department was fixed by the Finance Department for each year of the triennial period.

If there was a general surplus at the conclusion of three years it was distributed among the various departments. The provision of buildings and equipment, expenditure on famine and redemption which did not follow the annual payment pattern was integrated into the three-year financial pattern. Thanks to this new pattern, Hyderabad State was able to weather a twenty-year period, which included the worst depression known in history, without any major financial upheaval. The departmentalization of finances gave considerable latitude to each government department to spend money within its budget allotment subject to general restrictions which may be found necessary and also to a rigid and really effective audit.

The new system avoided the rush of hurried and sometime unnecessary expenditure which spending departments indulged in when expenditure grants lapsed at the close of a financial year. It helped to finance a set programme with due care which proved to be economical. It enabled

the State to maintain financial stability and yet develop progressive activities in the State. A truly innovative system it contributed greatly to the high image which the Nizam's government enjoyed as a well-administered Indian state.

The large surpluses which accumulated as a result of the scheme of departmentalization of finances were utilized for works of public utility like roads and buildings, water works and drainage. Added to this, an increased network of railways contributed greatly to the prosperity of the State's people. In fact, the purchase of the railway by the State in 1930 was a great landmark in the general progress of Hyderabad.

Early in March 1930, the Nizam's government announced that they had agreed with the Nizam's Guaranteed Railway Company NGRC Ltd., in London for the acquisition of the Company's railway by government on 1 April 1930. This was forty-five months prior to the date agreed upon in the previous contract. The reason for advancing the purchase was that under the terms of agreement the redemption of the stock and debentures outstanding in January 1934 would have cost 6,875,000 pounds sterling. As against this the sum arrived at for the purchase from 1 April 1930 was 5,933,833 pounds sterling. In addition to this the dividend that would have gone to the NGSR company shareholders for the period 1 April 1930 to 31 December 1933 became the revenue of the government. Further the income tax that would have accrued to the British exchequer was also appropriated by the government. This substantial saving for the State finances was made possible by Hydari's careful handling of the State's resources over the previous decade. [2]

When Theodore Tasker came to Hyderabad as Director-General of Revenue in 1927, he found that the revenue administration was utterly demoralized. To give an indication of the problem he faced, he stated that he had to wind up a file regarding raising contributions to satisfy demands from the palace. Recruitment to the Hyderabad Civil Service was in abeyance since 1920, and members had been transferred from the revenue administration to the judicial side. After the British intervention, recruitment was again resumed in 1926 and Marmaduke Pickthall was placed in charge of the training.[3]

Tasker's first priority was to restore the morale of the Revenue Department by shifting the centre of gravity back to the districts, by removing unqualified staff and training new ones, recovering officers

from the judicial side, and regularizing the civil list, the authority of which was widely questioned.

Regular touring had stopped, and special orders from the Nizam had to be obtained to enable Tasker to tour in the districts. Tasker had sixteen districts under his control and had to travel long distances. It was three hundred miles to Aurangabad, the Subedari of Marathwada area.

The Director-General of Revenue worked under the Member of Council for Revenue and Police, who had great power. Commerce and Industry was included in his charge too. The Director-General of Revenue also dealt with forests, customs, *abkari* or excise, *atiyat* (land grants of jagir), Court of Wards, local funds or district boards and latterly town and country planning. He had also to maintain liaison with technical departments such as public works, commerce and industries, roads, water supply, archaeology, grain markets and tribes. He received the cooperation and support of able Hyderabadis in the government service whose ability had not been adequately utilized in the previous administrative set up.[4]

The financial system introduced by Hydari provided the framework in which the Government of Hyderabad not only enabled officials to make improvements in the revenue and police administrative system, but also in the nation-building departments like agriculture, cooperatives, medical and health Services, education and public works. In education for example, the number of schools had increased from 174 in 1910–11 to 1,016 in 1936–37. The strength in the schools went up from 21,755 in 1910–11 to 1,023,067 in 1920–21, and to 1,64,607 in 1936–37. The expenditure from State revenue had gone up from 5,89,503 in 1910–11 to 22,80,274 in 1920–21 and 46,28,445 in 1936–37.

The number of colleges remained at two from 1910–11 to 1920–21, but it went up to ten in 1930–31. The strength of colleges went up from 127 to 384 in the first decade and further to 1,206 in the next decade, ending 1930–31. In the same period the expenditure rose from 1,07,523 to 2,62,278 and 21,72,415. The annual expenditure on education went up from 9.69 lakhs in 1910–11 to 45.64 lakhs in 1920–21 and 86.74 lakhs in 1930–31. It further grew to 104.61 lakhs in 1936–37.

The expenditure on medical and public health went up from 8.12 lakhs in 1910–11 to 12.73 lakhs in 1920–21 and 29.85 lakhs in 1936–37.

In the fields of agriculture, cooperatives and veterinary departmental activities, the State of Hyderabad did not make any major impact. However,

in irrigation the Government of Hyderabad took up a number of major projects. The expenditure on the department averaged Rs 27,32,968 per year during the period 1911-12 till 1921-22 of which Rs 19,07,848 were spent on works. 56.8 per cent of the amount spent was devoted to original works. Important irrigation works completed during 1931-1941 were: Nizamsagar, Dindi, Palair, Wyra and Pendlipakala, Singabhoopalayam Baithpalli and Chandrasagar projects. The most important of these was the Nizamsagar Dam which was 12,800 feet in length and proposed to irrigate 2,75,000 acres. It was completed in 1931 at a cost of Rs 457.08 lakh. The next largest was the Dindi in Mahboobnagar district with a length of 5,100 feet with a proposed irrigation area of 40,000 acres, which was completed in 1942 at a cost of Rs 40.34 lakhs. [5]

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Although the winds of change were sweeping through the world at large and a new constitution had been introduced in the Nizam's dominions, the atmosphere in the State was still medieval. Reverence for the ruler was widespread. He was regarded as the kingpin of a political, administrative and social system which was as unchangeable as the stars in the heavens. The values that were inculcated in children were those handed down to their parents since Mughal times. The correct mode of dressing, walking and eating was strictly prescribed. Respect for one's elders and love for one's juniors was taught side by side with the Persian and Urdu alphabet. It was as important to treat one's elders with reverence as it was to write a beautiful hand with a reed pen, and just the right variation between the thicker and thinner parts of a letter in the Persian or Urdu alphabet.

Liberal ideas in Hyderabad were however not quite dead. Students from Hyderabad were going abroad and were imbibing new ideas through books and personal discussion. The seeds for the second upsurge of liberal ideas were thus sown in the late Twenties. Jawad Razvi, a participant in the Communist movement cites four sets of organizations which were formed to awaken the people of Hyderabad from their apathy and bring them into the mainstream of political and social consciousness. First, the Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Hyderabad was founded in London in 1928 by democratic-minded students of Hyderabad who had gone to England for higher studies and had been influenced by Victorian liberalism or Fabian Socialism. A periodical called the *Hyderabad Magazine* was published

in England. A branch of the organization was later set up at Hyderabad which included in its membership, among others, Nawab Ali Yavar Jung, B. Ramakrishna Rao, Padmaja Naidu, M. Narsing Rao, Baquer Ali Mirza and others.

Two years later, the Swadeshi League was started in Hyderabad in 1930 to propagate the boycott of foreign goods and to encourage the use of Swadeshi material and khadi. The President was Padmaja Naidu and the Secretary, Fazlur Rahman, a lecturer in Economics at the City College who lost his position because of this activity. The League became defunct after a year.

Third, as already mentioned, the Nizam's Subjects' League was founded in 1935, in order to promote the cause of Deccani nationalism, without distinction of caste, creed or sex, all striving for the best interests of the sovereign and the state. It also proposed to, 'secure and safeguard the fundamental rights and privileges of citizenship in Hyderabad and to strive for the establishment of a constitutional form of Government under the aegis of Asaf Jahi Dynasty.'

Finally, the Jamaat-i-Ittehad-o-Taraqqi (Association for Unity and Progress) was started by Mir Akbar Ali Khan, Mir Ahmed Ali, Mir Hasanuddin, Zahid Ali Kamil and a few liberal Congressmen of the State. This was a non-communal organization with liberal leadership who were satisfied with some sort of constitutional reforms and ultimately the establishment of a representative government under the aegis of the Asaf Jahi dynasty and the end of British paramountcy, which implied more power and greater independence to the Nizam.

These organizations had limited scope and popular appeal, and their activities were confined to a section of the Hindu and Muslim intelligentsia. They were supported by several pro-Congress Muslim families, such as the Amir Hasan family, the Ghulam Panjatan family and the Safrani family.

There were many individuals with strong nationalist convictions. Notable among them were Nawab Ahmed Ali Khan, Dr Lateef Sayeed, Dr Hashim Ameer Ali, Nawab Sardar Ali Khan and Sirajul Hasan Tirmizi, who was later the President of the State Congress. Thus many organizations carried on social reform activities on a non-political basis during the Twenties and Thirties under the guidance of moderate leaders like Madapati Hanumantha Rao, Burgula Ramakrishna Rao and M. Narsing Rao.

The latter were also involved in the activities of the liberal and leftist organizations which had sprung up during the Thirties.[6]

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Osmania University had been created as an institution of higher learning with Urdu as the medium of instruction. It now became an instrument for the transmission of traditional values and the composite culture of the Deccan and of North India, from which it drew many of its teachers.

The University taught not only the Arts and Sciences but also set up professional schools for the study of Law, Engineering and Medicine. It was an achievement to build up an institution with an Indian language as the medium of instruction in these technical fields. What was even more remarkable was that students whose mother tongue was Marathi, Kannada or Telugu were willing and able to study professional and technical courses through the medium of a language which was in many cases barely known to them when they started their school education. Urdu had become the official language of Hyderabad state only at the end of the nineteenth century and Urdu-medium schools had become widespread only during the reign of the last Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan.

The professionals who were trained at Osmania University were in no way inferior to those trained at other universities or at Nizam College in Hyderabad, which was affiliated to Madras University, and taught most subjects through the medium of English. It had a series of distinguished principals and teachers, many of them British. Osmania University also had very distinguished teachers, many of them chosen from outside the State. Although Urdu was the medium of instruction of the University, English was a compulsory language. Even today, it is difficult to distinguish a graduate of Osmania University from one of Nizam College simply by talking to them in English, as both know the language well.

When it came to the question of appointments in the government, which was the main employer for professionals, Osmania graduates suffered from a subtle discrimination in favour of graduates of Nizam College and Aligarh Muslim University, who had a greater pull with high officials and academics. The Translation Bureau, which was set up at Osmania University, undertook the translation of hundreds of textbooks from English to Urdu. This work was entrusted to leading scholars and persons of eminence residing in Delhi, Lucknow, Lahore and other places

where Urdu had reached an advanced level. Moreover North Indian men of letters like the Urdu writer, Maulvi Abul Haq and the Urdu poet, Josh Malihabadi were appointed to high positions in the Translation Bureau.

The Osmania Graduates' Association was founded, and developed into a pressure group which demanded more jobs for graduates of the University. A few Osmania graduates found employment in the Hyderabad Civil Service or in the subordinate revenue services and technical departments of the Nizam's government.

But all this was only a drop in the ocean. Now, yet another demand began to be made for the development of industry in the State. The holding of the All-India Industrial Exhibition by the Osmania Graduates' Association was a result of this interest. A couple of Osmania graduates opened a paanshop in the exhibition to highlight their difficulties in getting jobs. Pressure was brought to bear on the government for developing an industrial belt in the northern Telengana region which was rich in coal, and had great potential for industrial growth.

One of the unfortunate by-products of these trends was the increasing gulf between the rural and urban students and graduates of Osmania University. This gulf ultimately became a cause for long-term tension within the State. Unlike the Urdu-knowing and Westernized Muslims and Hindus of Hyderabad city, the rural-based students were almost entirely Hindu. Their mother tongue was Marathi, Kannada or Telugu. Some of them obtained admission in Osmania University and its affiliated colleges and learned enough Urdu to graduate successfully but did not feel at home in the language. They also resented the imposition of Islamic cultural values to which they had no attachment. Others of the same generation and often of the same families, studied in Madras, Poona, Benaras or other Indian centres of learning, and acquired little or no attachment to the dominant 'Urdu culture' of Hyderabad State.

In the technical and professional institutions like the medical, engineering and law colleges, there tended to be a preponderance of Hindu students. Several of them came from the Kayasth community which had an affinity to Islamic culture. However a number of them also belonged to Maharashtrian, Kannadiga and Telugu families, particularly from the middle class of Hyderabad city. Thus the professionals gradually began to acquire a largely Hindu complexion. In the government departments which administered medicine, engineering, and law, there was a sprinkling of Hindu officials, although not commensurate with their

representation in the profession. There was a particular feeling against the lack of access by Hindus to judgeships, as well as the occasional appointment of unqualified Muslims to such posts, probably because of nepotism.

As we have seen, one by-product of the setting up of the University and the Translation Bureau was the influx of a large number of non-Mulkis, mainly from northern India. The job of translation which was sometimes assigned to people living outside Hyderabad led to a heightening of resentment against outsiders. Osmania University graduates suffered from a disadvantage in relation to Nizam College, and to Aligarh MuslimUniversity, both of which contributed many officials to the Hyderabad Civil Service.

An attempt was made to develop a strong sense of regional-cultural identity among Mulki scholars, not only Muslim, but also Hindu. The acknowledged leader of this group was Dr Syed Mohiuddin Qadri Zore of the Urdu Department of Osmania University, who put forth the idea of a Deccani synthesis to which both Hindus and Muslims had contributed.

The question has been raised as to whether in the Deccan there was a true synthesis, or a mere co-existence of disparate cultures. Whatever the factual position, this concept of synthesis gained wide acceptance and acquired political overtones, with such prominent figures as Nizamat Jang and Salar Jang lending their support. Among those who formulated the concept were Padmaja Naidu, Abul Hasan Syed Ali, B. Ramakrishna Rao, S.B. Sharma (Bar-at-law) and Syed Abid Hasan. The Nizam's Subjects' League (or the Mulki League) was formally inaugurated in 1935 with printed materials and large public meetings.

The Mulki League advocated 'Deccani Nationalism' and argued that 'Hindustani is the common language of Hyderabad and India.' It deplored, 'communalism as an import from British India, an attempt to divert Hyderabadis,' from the foreigners. Because of lack of support by the government the Mulki sentiment though deep-rooted, could not failed to make a substantial impact on the public.

The movement was indicative of the emergence of a sense of nationalism, focused on the State of Hyderabad. The movement focused its attack on the British and the non-Mulki. In his book, *Whither Hyderabad*? Syed Abid Hasan quoted Macaulay as follows : 'Of all forms of tyranny the worst is that of a nation over a nation; heaviest of all yokes, is the yoke of the stranger.'

As far as special privileges for Muslims were concerned, the Mulki League skirted the question by leaving the matter to negotiation, and urging that electorates based on occupation should be set up. The Muslim masses were found to be in a deplorable plight, many members of the community being landless, and the percentage of the zamindars and agriculturists being insignificant. Since trade and professions like law, medicine and teaching were not strongholds of the Muslims, the 'historic' share of official government positions for Muslims was proposed to be continued. The general object was to see that no one community dominated any particular sector of society. The legislature was to be fully representative of the various interests in the State.

The League was firmly of the view that the executive should be made responsible to the legislature. It put forth the unusual argument that intervention from abroad cannot cease unless this is done. As Syed Abid Hasan, said in his book, *Whither Hyderabad*?:

> Today, as things stand our Executive is responsible neither to the Ruler nor to the people. If ever it is responsible at all, it is to a third party outside the dominions. This outrageous anomaly must end. The Executive must first become responsible to the Sovereign, who, we are sure, would of his own Royal will delegate his responsibility to the Legislature. The Executive must take orders and inspiration from our Sovereign, and not from any third party, however 'paramount'. That is what the League stands for. [7]

The views of the Mulki League represented a broad current of opinion which took a middle course between the extremist views of the Hindu and the Muslim communalists on the one hand, and the radical or Marxist view on the other. The broad middle current of opinion usually does not find vocal expression, but at this time some of the jagirdars gave a lead to the views of the emerging middle class, as well as their own opinions.

Most of the last Nizam's subjects accepted his rule as inevitable, criticized his frailties and praised his virtues. It could never occur to them to imagine a situation when the Nizam would not be ruling over them. The reverence for tradition and the love for the principle of hereditary royalty was too powerful to permit any change in the attitude of loyalty to the hereditary ruler of the Deccan. The views expressed by the Nizam's Subjects' League were voiced with increasing caution and less and

less fervour when it became known that the Nizam was strongly opposed to the idea of constitutional government, and had commented on the proposal in colourful, if not unprintable language.

The Nizam's government was also under pressure from the Residency to suppress anti-British views. The State Council proscribed the book *Whither Hyderabad*? because of the statement at the start of the book, which said: 'The essential in any settlement of the Hyderabad problem is to remember that the Resident cannot be trusted to advise for good.'

The attack on the Nizam was more subtle and therefore more effective, the Residency felt. They believed that the persons behind the book were Basheswarnath, a High Court Judge with a strong Congress connection, Sir Nizamat Jang, the former Political Member, and even Salar Jang. An old *Bombay Chronicle* employee was thought to have written the book.[8]

The pressure from the British along with the Nizam's firm opposition, was evidently successful in bringing the Mulki League's plans to an ignominious end. It lost the support of Salar Jang and Nizamat Jang.

It is significant that even the Majlis leader, Bahadur Yar Jang had expressed his willingness to be associated with the Mulki League. But he felt that the Muslims should organize themselves to increase their power in the State before coming to a settlement with the Hindus.

The association with the League of B. Ramakrishna Rao, the only Chief Minister of Hyderabad State after the Police Action, is significant, as it indicates that the Hyderabad State Congress would be willing to accept constitutional government under the aegis of the Nizam. The Hyderabad State Congress was founded in 1938. The top leaders were amenable to court influence and, 'spent time negotiating with the Hyderabad Government while district organisers pushed for action.'

The failure of the Mulki League is an indication not only of the weakness of urban-based intellectuals in a semi-feudal autocratic state, but also of survival well into the twentieth century, of an atmosphere reminiscent of Versailles under Louis XIV, when all power emanated from the ruler and a nod or a frown from the king was enough to create or destroy an incipient political movement. The political atmosphere however, changed considerably with the emergence of small town or rural-based leaders like Swami Ramanand Tirth in Marathwada and the Marxist-inspired Andhra Mahasabha (or Sangam as it was called in Telugu) in Telengana.

The emerging trends in Hyderabad State at this time were indicative of the widening gulf between Hindus and Muslims. At the same time a large body of opinion occupied the middle ground where they continued to revere the traditional values of Hyderabad State, with some admixture of liberal values derived from all over the country and Western influences.

One cannot help observing however, that this middle ground of opinion was greatly weakened by two important factors. First, the Nizam was firmly opposed to any political reforms which could even remotely be considered as a threat to the established order with himself as the all-powerful ruler. Second, British officials were strongly entrenched in his government and worked closely with the Nizam's own appointees in order to ensure that the status quo was maintained as far as possible. Generally they were committed to good government, but were opposed to self-government. They could not see anything good in the Indian National Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi. The one official who seemed to have some sympathy for the Gandhian or Congress view was Sir Akbar Hydari, but for the sake of survival he was forced to suppress his views and become a mouthpiece of the Nizam on the one hand and the British on the other.

It was unfortunate for Hyderabad and for the Nizam that the Mulki League's efforts were frustrated. Had Hyderabad joined the Indian Federation and had the ruler supported the Mulki League, some of the major Indian states may well have survived for another thirty years, under the leadership of Hyderabad.

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In the early Asaf Jahi period there was no communal feeling among Hindus and Muslims. In order to understand the emergence of the religious communities, as they are now known, we must delve into the changing social structure of the Deccan during the couple of centuries of Asaf Jahi rule.

Social change in modern India can be said to revolve around two or three basic parameters. The first is the tendency, pointed out by M.N. Srinivas and others, among social classes low down in the caste hierarchy to rise as they acquire economic and social power. Second, a tendency for social groupings to merge themselves in wider communities on the basis

of ethnic affinity, religious loyalty or linguistic preference. Third, those communities or groupings which are at the top of the political and administrative ladder tend to impose their value system on the society as a whole.

In Hyderabad State the ruling class in the time of the first two Nizams consisted of a largely military élite with its origins in Central Asia, northern India and Maharashtra. The fighting qualities displayed by Central Asian soldiers as well as by Rajputs, Sikhs, Arabs and others is reflected in the composition of the Nizam's Army.

The clerical duties were performed mainly by Kayasths or Maratha Brahmins. This division of function was reflected in the Nizam's administration. The Army continued to be in the hands of communities with a warlike tradition, while the revenue administration was divided between a Kayasth family of Mathurs, who ran the Daftar-i-Mal and a Maharashtrian Brahmin family, the Rai Rayans, who administered the western districts of Hyderabad State through the Daftar-i-Diwani.

The rise of communal feeling in Hyderabad State was a product of a combination of several factors. Intermarriage among different tribes which had settled in the Deccan led to the emergence of two broad categories—Shias and Sunnis—with minority groupings among Muslims like Bohras, Khojas, Mahdavis and Ahmadiyyas. Similarly among Hindus, various endogamous groupings of migrants from the north like Mathurs, Srivastavas and Saxenas began to emerge as one Kayasth community.

The power struggle in Hyderabad State was reflected in the competition for the control of essential services which represented the power base. In the unsettled conditions of the eighteenth century, the military role gave the greatest power to its practitioners. As conditions became more settled, the control of land gave maximum power. Thus the jagirdars, deshmukhs and village officials became major players in the power struggle. In the third stage, the bureaucracy was institutionalized by Salar Jang and power moved towards officials who controlled the State machinery like subedars, collectors, and secretaries to government, not to speak of the hierarchy of officials below them. In the fourth stage it came to be realized that ultimate political power would arise out of the electoral system. Thus strong competition arose to capture the political system by ensuring that the electorate was capable of being manipulated through separate electorates, indirect elections and other devices.

Given the feudal nature of Hyderabad State, it is not surprising that the first avowedly communal party to be established was led by a member of the petty feudal nobility. The jagirdars of Hyderabad as a class were given to extragavance with family prestige being their predominant concern. In spite of these defects however, they were endowed with good qualities like tolerance, mutual understanding and cooperation. They never suffered from a communal outlook and did not discriminate between one community and another. This was true not only of the big jagirdars like Salar Jang, Kishen Pershad, Kamal Yar Jung or Raja Sham Raj Rajwant Bahadur but even of smaller jagirdars who were influenced by the affluent jagirdars.

Bahadur Yar Jang was one of those small jagirdars whose ancestors were connected with the Nizam's irregular forces in which he also held the rank of Jemadar. His rank in the irregular army required him to respectfully salute the big Jemadars like Salar Jang or Kishen Pershad whenever he went to see them. Nevertheless, by the time the 1935 Act was passed, he had become a prominent political leader of Hyderbadi Muslims.

According to M. Narsing Rao's *Fifty years of Hyderabad* he had the backing of the entire Muslim press, owned and edited by those who, 'never tired of proclaiming the special place occupied by the Muslims in the Hyderabad state and their claim for political supremacy.'[9]

The rise of communal consciousness in Hyderabad is linked up with the declining influence of moderate leaders of the Andhra Mahasabha and the diversion of that organization to radical activity. It is only by the exercise of great tact that the conservative leadership of the Andhra Mahasabha had nurtured the organization in the face of strong opposition by the government. Now they had begun to lose control of the organization to the radical elements.

Hyderabad, like many other Indian states, began to experience communal tension in the 1930s. According to Ian Copland in his article, "Communalism in Princely India", the Diwan of Baroda, V.T.Krishnamachari told Jamnalal Bajaj in 1940 that, 'the greatest danger to avoid is introducing into the state(s) the communal animosities that have gathered around political organisations in British India.' [10]

This remark was based on the fact that no less than twelve states including Hyderabad saw incidents of communal riots in the Thirties. These included such major states as Kashmir, Jaipur and Travancore.

As we have seen earlier, the struggle for power in Hyderabad focused successively on the land, administrative positions, and on control of the political machinery. By the early Thirties, communal consciousness was fairly widespread, but it had not yet been transformed into communal hostility, much less into violence. One explanation for the rise of communal violence in the Indian states is that political movements in British India had already come to realize the possibility of mobilizing communal passions for maintaining political control over the masses. Second, the demand for Federation had made it clear that sooner or later the Indian states would be integrated with British India into a larger unit. Movements in British India naturally influenced the Indian states where the same language was spoken.

Moreover, the unwillingness of Mahatma Gandhi and the leadership of the Indian National Congress to allow its activities to be extended to the states created a vacuum which had to be filled. Finally, the real or imagined threat to a particular religious community and its right to practice a particular faith often became an issue and gave a handle to members of oppressed communities to assert themselves on a religious basis. Thus the dominant role of the ruling Dogras and influential Brahmins or Pandits in Kashmir made it possible for the majority Muslim community to oppose the rule of the Hindu Maharaja in Kashmir. Similarly, the demand for Muslim dominance in Hyderabad gave to the Arya Samaj an oppurtunity to assert itself as a movement for civil and political rights of the Hindus.

Hindu-Muslim relations in Hyderabad deteriorated sharply during the Thirties. Throughout the decade there was an increasing consciousness among the Hindus that they were not adequately represented in government service. Another major complaint was the religious policy of the Nizam's government. It was alleged with some basis that the Nizam's government encouraged the Tabligh movement mainly for the conversion of Harijans to Islam. It was also pointed out that the budget of the ecclesiastical department was unduly high, and that it was being utilized for the propagation of Islam.

Although the All-India Muslim League had not yet declared itself in favour of Pakistan, it was already identified as the mouthpiece of those who ultimately made the demand for Pakistan their sheet anchor. During the early 1930s, M.A. Jinnah had retired from Indian politics and settled down in London as a barrister. He attended the first Round Table Conference but did not take prominent part in it. During this time he served for a while as a constitutional adviser to the Nizam's government. However his services were not found to be very satisfactory and they were politely dispensed with by Sir Akbar Hydari with the concurrence of his colleagues, Nawab Mahdi Yar Jang and Sir Theodore Tasker.

Jinnah was requested to return to India in 1935 by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, a zamindar of Uttar Pradesh who was the Secretary of the All-India Muslim League. Thereafter Jinnah was its President and pursued with single-minded devotion the dual goal of obtaining for himself the position of sole spokesman of the Muslim community and the protection of Muslim interests in the country, as he saw them.

Bahadur Yar Jang began and ended his life as Muhammad Bahadur Khan, the third son of Muhammad Daulat Khan, a small jagirdar. The family had come to Hyderabad from Jaipur in the time of the third Nizam Sikandar Jah. It was a family of Pani Pathans which belonged to the Mahdevi sect of Islam. Bahadur Khan was forced to abandon his studies when he lost his father at the age of eighteen in 1923. His father had lived on a lavish scale and had accumulated debts. Bahadur Khan, showing remarkable will power as a young man, drastically cut down all expenditure and began to live frugally. Within eight years he managed to rid himself of the crippling debts and turned his attention to religious affairs.

In 1927, Bahadur Khan, then only twenty-two years of age, started the Majlis Tabligh-i-Islam which was intended to increase the number of Muslims in Hyderabad State. This movement received the open or tacit support of the Nizam and of government officials.

In 1930 when Bahadur Khan was addressing a gathering on the life of the Prophet Mohammad at the Zamarrud Mahal theatre in Hyderabad, the Nizam came in unannounced and sat down to listen. Bahadur Khan continued his discourse. Fixing his eyes on the ruler he proclaimed in a loud voice: 'Listen, you who are a slave of the Holy Prophet of Islam, pomp and throne adorns whose head. Come, listen. I will tell you what

the conception of a ruler was in the eyes of our Prophet.' He then described in moving terms and in a loud voice the Islamic conception of the ruler for the benefit of Osman Ali Khan. After the talk was over, the Nizam continued to sit there for a long time, 'as if in a trance' under the influence of the young man's oratory. A short while later the Nizam conferred through a firman the title of Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang on him.[11]

In 1931, he performed Haj and travelled all over the Middle East and Afghanistan with his wife. On his return to Hyderabad he delivered a series of public lectures on his experiences and commented on political developments in the Muslim countries of West Asia. He received widespread acclaim for these lectures, at one of which an influential Sufi leader, Khwaja Hasan Nizami described him as, 'truly an Ibn-i-Batuta of India.'

In 1933, some citizens of Hyderabad started the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen, a socio-religious organization intended to bring together Muslims of different sects. This event was largely a reaction to the activities of the Arya Samaj missionaries from northern and western India who had begun to spread their faith in Hyderabad. Bahadur Yar Jang continued the Tabligh movement for conversion to Islam and added to it the Tanzim movement for the reconstruction of Islam. He started declaring openly that: 'Islam is the religion of the ruler and if the Hindus embrace it, the ruler will be pleased, and they would get employment and he (ruler) desires that all the Hindu population should embrace Islam.' In support of his claim he used to show some letters, written by the Nizam and his appreciation of Tabligh activities.

It was alleged in a pamphlet that government officials were collaborating with him in Tabligh, and that poor Hindus (Harijans) were converted by temptations or threats. Even prisoners were converted in jail. Bahadur Yar Jang's activities continued unhampered for some time.

However there was a basic difference of opinion between Bahadur Yar Jang and the Nizam. As against the view of Bahadur Yar Jang, who held that power lay within the Muslim community and the ruler was allowed or permitted to rule by the Millat, the Nizam was firmly of the views that, power resided with himself as the ruler of the state, and not with the people, whatever be their religion.

There were thus two distinct world-views—one, that of the Nizam, who considered himself a candidate for the rulership of the Muslim world, and wanted to take advantage of the impending withdrawal of the British to assert this position. The second was that of Bahadur Yar Jang which reasserted the power of the Muslim community, and regarded the Nizam as an instrument in the hands of the community.

There was little or no basis for the presumption that the Muslims themselves were a ruling class. In fact, the Muslims were distributed over all strata of society, from the highest to the lowest. They were also a part of the feudal system that existed in Hyderabad. The lower revenue officers were almost invariably Hindus who spoke the local languages. The traditional Samasthans of Wanaparti, Gadwal and Jatprole were Hindus. The banking and trading community were almost entirely Hindu or Jain with a few Parsees and Muslims of the Bohra or Khoja communities. The revenue administration at the lower level was carried on in the local languages.

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In 1934, an All-Karnataka Sahitya Parishad was held at Raichur. It was proposed at the conference to set up a central federal body a for literary workers in Kannada at Hyderabad, but the proposal did not take practical shape.[12]

In 1937, the first session of the Nizam Karnataka Parishad was held at the Excelsior theatre in Hyderabad under the presidentship of P. Kishen Rao, a famous vakil from Raichur. The occasion for this meeting was the Silver Jubilee of the Nizam.[13]

It is clear that the political activities in the Karnataka region were at a very low level in spite of Pandit Taranath's catalytic role. On the other hand, political activities in the Marathi-speaking and Telugu-speaking areas grew more rapidly.

In the Marathwada region, the developments were linked with all-India trends, whereas in the Telengana region, the developments were more inward looking and geared to the slow pace of change in this backward area of the Nizam's dominions.

As we have seen earlier, during the early Twenties some political activity took place due to the appointment of the Reforms Committee

under Rai Balmukand of the Hyderabad High Court. However, the ending of the Khilafat movement and the refusal of the permission by the Nizam's government to hold political conference in Hyderabad forced the organizers to hold the conferences outside the state in British India. Many of these were held in the Marathi-speaking areas of Bombay Presidency. This led to Hyderabad's political ideology coming under the influence of Maharashtrian thinkers. Some of these were from the Vidharbha region of the state and were influenced by the political ideology of the Hindu Mahasabha.

Political activity in Hyderabad could not be entirely suppressed. The Hyderabad State Students' Conference was held at Aurangabad in 1925 under the presidentship of Barrister R.S. Naik who later became Chief Justice of Hyderabad High Court. One of the resolutions passed at the conference was that the regional language should be the medium of instruction up to matriculation. The resolution was a sequel to the decision of the Nizam's government to make Urdu the medium of instruction from class five onwards.

Although this resolution did not have any effect on government policy it helped to increase public consciousness, especially in the Marathi-speaking areas. During the 1920s a number of debates were held between orthodox Hindus and the reformist sect of Arya Samajists. In the Marathwada area such debates were held between Dharamveer Vaman Rao Naik, a staunch Sanatanist, and Justice Keshav Rao Koratkar, a great Arya Samajist. However, the public debates between the Sanatanist and the Arya Samajist were discontinued when the two protaganist realized that the debates were adversely affecting the unity of Hindus, especially in the light of increasing threats posed by the movement for conversion to Islam.

Vaman Rao Naik, and several other Maharashtrian social workers took up work in the educational, political and legal domains. They opposed the dowry system, outdated marriage customs among Hindus and even discussed the practice of untouchability though the discussions did not lead to any substantial results. Protests were raised against the poor representation of Hindus in government departments.

The Civil List for 1931 showed the dominating position occupied by Muslims in the state government cadres as follows:

Departments	Muslims	Hindus	Others	Total
• Secretaries	10	1	1	12
• Additional Secretaries	2	1	1	4
• Joint Secretaries	3	–	–	3
• Deputy Secretaries	9	3	–	12
• Assistant Secretaries	55	8	–	63
• Head of Departments	40	6	1	47
• Subedars	4	–	–	4
• Collectors	14	2	–	16
• Revenue Board	2	–	–	2
• Sub-Collectors	50	19	2	71
• Tahsildars	75	40	4	119
• High Court Judges	8	5	–	13
• Magistrates & Munsifs	147	33	–	180
• Police (D.S.P., A.S.P. and Circle Inspectors)	73	12	6	91
• Education Officers	237	65	27	329
• Supply Officers	25	7	1	33
Total	754	202	43	999
Percentage	75	20	5	100

The army and police also had a preponderent majority of Muslims showing 54,159 Muslims and 6,495 Hindus of various ranks. However, the rural economy consisting of land, commerce and banking was principally in the hands of Hindus. It was estimated that out of 1,000 persons who drew their income from the land only sixty were Muslims.[14]

The Arya Samaj movement in Hyderabad was given great impetus by Pandit Keshav Rao Koratkar, who and was elected President of the Arya Samaj, continuing in that capacity till 1932. Branches of the Samaj were established in many parts of the State and it set up several schools and libraries in Hyderabad. The *Satyarth Prakash* the holy book of the Arya Samaj was translated into Telugu in 1921. On Koratkar's death in 1932 he was succeeded as President by his son, Pandit Vinayak Rao Vidyalankar. Soon after this however, the state government's attitude towards the Arya Samaj changed, and many of its activities were obstructed.

The All-India Marathi Literary Conference had its annual session in Hyderabad in 1935. Balasaheb Khaparde was President and advocate Sripat Rao Palnitkar, later Chief Justice of the Hyderabad High Court, was President of the reception committee. The Hyderabad Peoples' Education Conference was held at the Prabhat theatre on the Kachiguda road under the presidentship of Kashinath Rao Vaidya. Two advocates, Laxman Rao Ganu and Govind Rao Gangakhedkar severely criticized the step-motherly attitude of the state governments towards the regional languages.

It was ironic that while the Andhra Jana Sangh had been holding regular conferences since the early Twenties, the first Maharashtra conference was held amidst difficulty in 1937 at Partur, a town in Maharaja Kishen Pershad's jagir. Among the demands of the conference one was for common civil rights to Hindus.

The politics of Marathwada was being increasingly influenced by all-India trends through the religious as well as the liberal movements active in the Bombay Presidency. This trend is seen clearly in the career of Swami Ramanand Tirth. Born in Chinmahalli village of Gulbarga district as Venkatesh Bhagwan Rao Khedjikar on 3 October 1903, he had his primary education at Gangapur village (the abode of Lord Dattatriya). Later he studied in a middle school at Kalyan and High school at Sholapur. When Mahatma Gandhi launched the Non-Cooperation Movement he terminated his studies and threw himself into it with enthusiasm. Later, he returned to his home region with a sense of commitment to the national movement.

Since Mahatma Gandhi had called for a boycott of the regular educational system, a number of national schools were started, some of

which later become universities. One of these was the Tilak Vidyapeeth. Ramanand Tirth stood first in the B.A. examination and also took his M.A. from there, and wrote a thesis on the 'Evolution of Democracy'.

In 1927 he joined N.M. Joshi to work as an activist with labour in Sholapur. Two years later he was appointed headmaster of the Hipparge School in a small hamlet in Osmanabad district in Marathwada. In 1931, he was initiated into sanyas and became Swami Ramanand Tirth, a follower of the north Indian saint Swami Ram Tirth with whose disciple he had come into close contact some time before.

In spite of his dual vocation as sanyasi and an educationist he was drawn into the national movement and also in the movement for the liberation of the people of Hyderabad State from the yoke of the Nizam. The reason for his involvement was his evident sincerity and the directness with he approached the problems of Hyderabad.

Unlike the traditional leaders of the State Congress, men who were lawyers, or held positions in the Nizam's judicial system, or enjoyed the patronage of officials and statesmen of the Nizam, Ramanand Tirth was inspired by the Non-Cooperation Movement as a young man in his early twenties. He had no family to support or vested interest to protect. He was deeply influenced by Govind Rao Nanal, a leader of Marathwada, who had played a constructive role in the movement against the Nizam's rule during the 1930s. Nanal was the only senior leader of the State who supported Ramanand Tirth in all his constructive as well as his political activities. [15]

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During the first sixteen years of the Andhra Jana Sangh from 1921 till 1937 the leading figures in the movement were moderate leaders like Madapati Hanumantha Rao, Suravaram Pratap Reddy, Burgula Ramakrishna Rao, M. Narsing Rao, and K.V. Ranga Reddy. Three of them came from the Deshmukh class which had held hereditary village offices in the Telengana area and still wielded considerable power and influence. Burgula Ramakrishna Rao and M. Narsing Rao were closely related and the former belonged to Shadnagar Taluqa of Mahboobnagar district and the latter to Chevadla Taluqa of Atraf Balda district (now Ranga Reddy district). As Deshmukhs or Deshpandyas their family was considered lower in status than that of jagirdars, many of whom were Muslims and lived in Hyderabad. They were however higher in status

in status than patwaris or village officers. In fact, they were often appointed by jagirdars as their agents for collecting dues from the village officers. This system was prevalent in the jagir areas till the abolition of the jagirdari system after the Police Action. However, in ryotwari areas there was direct collection of revenue and the Deshmukh and Deshpandyas lost their original position, although they still retained their vast lands, and thereby their influence in society.

Both B. Ramakrishna Rao and M. Narsing Rao were educated in Urdu in the village, and later came to Hyderabad for higher education. They both qualified as lawyers. B. Ramakrishna Rao built up a good practice, while Narsing Rao drifted into journalism. Both played an important role in the political movements of the 1930s and 1940s.

K.V. Ranga Reddy belonged to the vicinity of Hyderabad. The district has been named after him since 1978. He was a major landowner and came of a family of Deshmukhs or Deshpandyas. M. Hanumantha Rao, yet another leading figure of the Andhra Jana Sangh was the son of a village officer in Nandigama Taluk of Krishna district. He lost his father when he was only five years old. His mother migrated to Telengana, where her brothers were employed in Tahsil offices under the Nizam's government. Hanumantha Rao was brought up under the care of his maternal uncles, and after their death by his elder brother, an advocate. He moved to Warangal and passed the matriculation examination of Madras University in 1903.

Madapati Hanumantha Rao acquired proficiency in several languages including Telugu, Urdu, English, Sanskrit and Persian. He was drawn to social work and became one of a group of educated young men who discussed political events in India and decided to work for the propagation of Telugu language and literature among the people of Telengana, who had lost touch with developments in their own language outside the State. He took to the study of law and set up a practice at Hyderabad as a High Court advocate in 1917.

As a lawyer, he confined himself to cases which he felt had substance in them, and observed a high moral and ethical code. In politics, he was a moderate, and was described as Hyderabad's Gokhale.

The second stage of the Andhra movement began with the formal inauguration of the Andhra Mahasabha in March 1930 at Jogipet in Medak district under the chairmanship of Suravaram Pratap Reddy, the

editor of the *Golconda Patrika*. The second conference was held at Devarkonda under B. Ramakrishna Rao's presidentship in 1931. The enthusiasm of the organizers was dampened by the government's insistence on the security of Rs 2,000, which would be forfeited if any reference to politics was made. Among the social evils which were opposed at this conference were the heavy burden of taxes on the farmers, the system of forced labour with special reference to Adivasis and Harijans as well as the Devadasi system. Further sessions of the Andhra Mahasabha were held at Khammam in 1934, at Sircilla in Karimnagar district in 1935, at Shadnagar in 1936 and Nizamabad in 1937.

The fourth conference of the Andhra Mahasabha was held at Sircilla in Karimnagar district in December 1935. The state government permitted the conference to be held under humiliating conditions. 'Political matters should not be discussed; no outsider should speak in the Conference; and in the conduct of the proceedings, the President should follow the instructions and orders of the Collector. If any speech is made on any subject which is considered improper by the Collector, it should be immediately stopped.'

The conference was attended by 13,000 people from different parts of Telengana. It was presided over by Madapati Hanumantha Rao, and his wife Manikyamma presided over the ladies' session. The resolutions passed at this conference were connected with the reorganization of education, compulsory primary education, higher education for girls through the medium of the mother tongue, rights of jagir people, the denunciation of child marriages, improvement of the conditions of the ryots in Telengana, local self-government, uplift of depressed classes and the constitution of the Andhra Mahasabha.

The Sircilla conference saw for the first time an opposition to the leadership which had consistently pursued a policy of moderation and non-confrontation with the government. The younger generations, especially law graduates, objected to the views of bland phrases like 'all round development' used by senior leaders like B. Ramakrishna Rao, M. Hanumantha Rao, Suravaram Pratap Reddy and Mandumula Ramachandra Rao. Baddam Yella Reddy, later one of the foremost Communist leaders, organized the volunteer corps at the Sircilla conference. The burning issues at the conference were the demand for equal facilities to people of the jagir areas and the need for undertaking land revenue settlement in these areas. Second, there was opposition to the

high land revenue cess on wet cultivation of lands irrigated by wells. Resolutions on these points were adopted by the Sircilla conference.

The Andhra leaders had to move very cautiously as they received no encouragement from the Indian National Congress. In April 1935, the Congress Working Committee declared that it is the policy of the Congress not to interfere in any way in the affairs of the Indian states. In May 1935, at the Congress session at Bangalore, the President, Dr Rajendra Prasad stated that the method followed by the Congress in British India cannot be followed in the Indian states. A few months earlier Mahatma Gandhi had written to N.C. Kelkar, the right hand man of Tilak, that while Indian states were undoubtedly an integral part of the geographical Indian subcontinent, the Congress could not intervene in the affairs of the states due to 'our helplessness'. Drawing a parallel with Portuguese and French India he argued that, 'it is my conviction that any attempt on the part of the Congress to interfere can only damage the cause of the people of the states.'

In 1937, at the All-India Congress Committee session after the formation of Congress governments in British India, Mahatma Gandhi criticized the resolution on Mysore which he said was ultra vires of the resolution of non-interference which had never been repealed. He thus reiterated his opposition to interfering in the affairs of the state.

Officials of the Hyderabad State were not entirely unaware of the long term implications of the Andhra movement in Telengana. Even though the Andhra Mahasabha had scrupulously avoided discussing political matters, the Director of Government Publications once told M. Hanumantha Rao that the government had information that the movement intended, 'to integrate the Telugu speaking districts at this state with Telugu speaking districts of the Madras province.' Hanumantha Rao denied this vigorously and asserted that the Andhra movement had no such intention whatsoever.

The fifth session of the Andhra Mahasabha was held at Shadnagar, the jagir headquarters of Maharaja Kishen Pershad in December 1936 under the presidentship of K.V. Ranga Reddy. A number of resolutions were passed on educational reform, prohibition and other subjects discussed at the previous conference. The death of Vaman Naik a short while earlier had created a vacuum in the public life of Hyderabad along with that of Keshav Rao Koratkar. The leaders of the next generation were

M. Hanumantha Rao, Kashinath Rao Vaidya, G. Ramachari and K.V. Ranga Reddy.

In 1936, K.V.Ranga Reddy and Abdullah Pasha were elected to the Hyderabad Legislative Council for a two-year term. They introduced a number of draft bills in the Council relating to, 'the right of Hindu women to inheritance, rights of children born of inter-caste marriages, child marriage restraint, removal of untouchability, rights of jagir people, levy of dry rates for the wet cultivation under wells, and the establishment of Public Service Commission.'

The Nizam ordered the constitution of a committee to report, after ascertaining public opinion, on the question of restraint on child marriage and also to report about the levying of dry cess on wet lands under the wells. Till then he ordered that two-thirds of the wet cess on such lands may be remitted. Except these steps, all other draft bills introduced by Ranga Reddy were rejected.

By the mid-Thirties, the regional identities ceased to be an obstacle to joint action by different linguistic groups. The Andhra Jana Sangh leaders began to play an increasing significant role in state-wide politics. Kashinath Rao Vaidya presided over the Hyderabad Peoples' Educational Conference held at Hyderabad. In his presidential address he demanded compulsory primary education, stressed the importance of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction, pleaded for the removal of restrictions on private schools, and canvassed for the use of simple Hindustani in the Roman script.

Swami Ramanand Tirth took part in the conference with his followers and friends. In accordance with a decision taken at this conference, D.R.Bindu, R.G. Paranjpe, N.R. Joshi, Ramanand Tirth and two brothers connected with the Hipparga School met at Sholapur and took an oath to achieve independence for the people of Hyderabad State.[16]

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Neither in British India nor in the Indian states did newspapers have an easy time. The story of the struggle between journalists and bureaucrats would have to be taken back to the 1780s when the first English and Indian language newspapers emerged in Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and other places. Those of us who are familiar with the staid journals of the last days

of the British Raj and the early years after independence would be surprised to know of the struggles which the founders of newspapers like the *Statesman*, *Times of India* and *The Hindu* had to undergo due to their opposition to some official policy or other and the vindictiveness and suppression which they faced when they were hounded by the official representatives of the Raj.

The rulers of the Indian states had to face a double danger from the press, the critique of their policy by the all-India press in English, Urdu and other Indian languages on the one hand, and the local press in their own territories on the other. The fact that the newspapers were published in different languages added to the complications. The Government of India could manipulate or ignore even the English language press, confident of the superior power and prestige which it enjoyed. The larger Indian states like Mysore, Hyderabad and Baroda on the other hand had to deal not only with their own press but also with the all-India press. The Residency and the Government of India could sometimes play a role in reducing the sharpness of attacks on state governments, such as that of the Nizam.

The study of the press in Hyderabad can be understood only in the rise of public opinion, and the crystalization of political views in certain broad categories. The dominant position of the Urdu language among the intelligentsia of the State is evident from the fact that most of the newspapers, whatever their political colour, were published in that language.

By the late 1930s there were about twelve daily newspapers in Urdu, three dailies in Telugu and at least four weekly newspapers in Urdu published in Hyderabad. Several Urdu papers were sympathetic to the Majlis. *Ittehad* was the official organ of the Majlis and was edited by Kasim Razvi. Another, *Waqt*, was sympathetic to the Majlis and was edited by Abdur Rahman Rais. Another weekly newspaper, *Parcham* was also sympathetic to the Majlis; its editor was Fasihuddin Ahmed. A large number of newspapers were sympathetic to the government point of view although only two of them (*Nizam Gazette* edited by Viqar Ahmed and *Sahifa* edited by Akbar Ali) were known to be subsidized by the government. Most of the other papers which followed a government line did so presumably in order to obtain some favour or to earn the goodwill of government officials. These included *Rahbar-e-Deccan* edited by Ahmed Mohiuddin and later Manzoor Hasan; *Subh-e-Deccan* edited by

Ahmed Arif, *Musheer-e-Deccan* whose three successive editors were Baji Rao Aurangabadkar, M. Hanumantha Rao and Vasudev Rao, and *Sultanat* edited by Ahmedullah Quadri.

In 1935, an Urdu daily known as *Payam,* was started under the editorship of Qazi Abdul Ghaffar who had come from North India. A follower of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari, his views on political problems of Hyderabad were influenced by the larger nationalist interest of the country and thus a refreshing contrast to the general policy of the Urdu press. The Urdu weekly edited by M. Narsing Rao known as Rayyat was pleading for political change based on democratic principles. Like *Payam, Rayyat* vehemently opposed communal organizations and their ideologies. M. Narsing Rao, the editor of *Rayyat* was the brother-in law of B. Ramakrishna Rao who became the first Chief Minister of Hyderabad in 1950. Narsing Rao himself was a Minister for many years in the Cabinets of Hyderabad State and Andhra Pradesh.

In 1932 the Political Department asked the Director of Information and the Police Department to examine the anti-government policy of the *Nizam Vijay* and the *Golconda Patrika,* both Telugu papers. The Director of Information, Professor Qader Hussain Khan, after going through the issues of both papers for seven months, felt that the *Nizam Vijay* on the whole was 'sane and moderate' and 'draws attention to defects and abuses in the administration in a helpful and suggestive way, at the same time giving generous recognition of support to government measures.' On the other hand the *Golconda Patrika* was reported to be 'on occasions, malignant and vituperative and tried to excite ill-will between Hindus and Muslims.' The views expressed by the Director of Information about the *Golconda Patrika* show how even cautious and conservative persons like Madapati Hanumantha Rao, S. Pratap Reddy, B. Ramakrishna Rao and M. Narsing Rao were considered to be fire-eating radicals. Evidently supporters or members of the Hindu Mahasabha, the Hindu Political Association and the Social Service League like, Laxman Rao Pathak (editor and proprietor of *Nizam Vijay*) used to express his views with even greater moderation. The paper was patronized by Vaman Naik and Keshav Rao.

The English papers published in Hyderabad i.e., *The Hyderabad Bulletin* , *The Deccan Chronicle* and the *Daily News* followed a middle course between timidity and aggressiveness.

The policy of the Nizam's government was such that the local papers were allowed to criticize the affairs relating to the Government of India in a very frank manner. But any piece of writing lashed out at a Hyderabad official or the head of a department, was interpreted as either communal or political. [17]

The weekly paper *Marathwada* started by Anand Rao Weghmare was always aggressive in its criticism of Hyderabad Government's policy. When the Congress Ministry was established in Bombay the paper shifted its office to Sholapur. To avoid being confiscated by the Nizam's government, or its entry banned, it observed the weekly holiday on Friday. The paper was issued on Thursdays, and changed its name frequently. The Political Department was forced to issue a list of papers which were permitted to enter the State in order to counter this trick employed by newspaper proprietors. [18]

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During the period 1931 to 1937, the Nizam's dominions saw many administrative changes arising out of the British intervention of 1926, which enabled administrative reforms to be undertaken on a substantial scale. Much of the credit for these reforms must go to Sir Akbar Hydari whose financial and managerial talents were of a superior order. However, it is unlikely, that these reforms could have taken place without strong British support. The British officials were politically cautious and unwilling to permit nationalist ideas from permeating the Nizam's territories. However they were committed to the tightening of administrative machinery and the introduction of a more effective system of governance in the districts as well as in the urban areas.

The major issue in Indian politics during the 1930s was Federation. The three Round Table Conferences held in London from 1930 to 1932, formulated the issues and gave the states an opportunity to enter the Federation, nominating their own representatives to the Federal Assembly. The British intention was to use the states as a counter-balance to the Indian National Congress, whose future dominance over India they dreaded.

The Nizam at first allowed Hydari's policy of supporting the Federation to prevail, but later turned an opponent. The British did not pressurize the states to join the Federation, and continued to hope that the states

would act as a check on the Congress' increasing dominance in the India of the future. In fact, the British gave such a long rope to the states that they the latter hung themselves.

Almost unnoticed by the Nizam's government and the British a number of regional movements took shape in the State during the Thirties, focusing on the linguistic regions of Hyderabad, Karnataka, Telengana and Marathwada. An attempt by a group of Hyderabad-based urban intellectuals to build up a Mulki League became infructuous when it faced opposition both from the Nizam and the British, by the former for its political participation and the latter because of its anti-British stance.

The emergence of communal organizations both of Hindus and Muslims during the 1930s was originally a fallout of the events in British India. However, the covert encouragement given to the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen of Bahadur Yar Jang by the Nizam made the reaction by the Arya Samaj almost inevitable.

As the Hyderabad State was about to celebrate the Silver Jubilee of the seventh Nizam's accession in 1937, a discerning and farsighted person could point to certain trends which were not evident to the superficial observer. The communal divide was fast developing, due to the indirect encouragement given to the Majlis and its movement for Tabligh by the ruler. Moreover, the Majlis was gradually acquiring a hold over the lower middle class and the masses of the Muslim community which boded ill for the future of the State. Within a few years, the ruler himself would come to fear the power of the Majlis.

The Nizam's constitutional adviser, Sir Walter Monckton, expressed the view, after Hyderabad was absorbed in the Indian Union, that if only the Nawab of Bhopal had been in the position of the Nizam of Hyderabad, he could have worked out a formula whereby the states could have survived. It would be too simplistic to place the entire blame for the denouement on the Majlis' leadership. The Nizam felt, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, that he could stand up to the pressure of an independent India and retain his throne with British support.

CHAPTER FIVE

SILVER JUBILEE AND THE AIYANGAR REPORT

Mere Sarkar Ko yeh jashan-i-seemin mubarak ho.
(May my ruler's silver jubilee be auspicious)

— Part of a Ghazal sung by Akhtari Bai (Begum Akhtar) before Mir Osman Ali Khan at his Silver Jubilee celebration

Jannatain khak pe jis raat utar aai theen,
Badlian rahmat-i-yazdan ki jahan chhai theen

Ishrat O.aish ki jis jaga farawani thi,
Jis jagah jalwa figan rooh-i-jahan bani thi

Han waheen mere dil-i-zar ne yeh bhi dekha
Han meri chashm-i-gunahgaar ne yeh bhi dekha

Khoon-i-dahqan mein amarat ke safiney the rawaan
Har taraf adl ki jalti hui mayyat ka ahuvan

(That night, when the heavens had come down to earth

When angels covered the earth with silver clouds

Where luxuries and pleasure could be seen in plenty

Where even God was present

Yes, even there my broken heart could see
Yes, even my sinful eyes saw this

The boats of wealth were floating in the blood of peasants

Everywhere the smoke of the burnt corpses of justice)

— Makhdoom Mohiuddin's famous poem, originally entitled "Silver Jubilee". The title was later changed to "Dhuan" (Smoke).

The State and people of Hyderabad celebrated the Silver Jubilee of the Nizam's accession to the masnad on 13 February 1937. The function

should actually have been held a year earlier, as the accession of the Nizam took place in 1911. The celebrations had to be postponed because of the death of King George V of England early in 1936, and the abdication crisis of his eldest son, King Edward VIII, later the same year. The second son of the late King had ascended the British throne as King George VI and was also declared Emperor of India.

Mir Osman Ali Khan's reign had been marked by a series of achievements which seemed to augur well for the future. His was the largest Indian state, and had also provided a continuity with the Mughal past of India. The wealth of the ruler and the magnificence of his court had become a legend all over India and beyond. The ruler had been honoured with titles which raised him above all the other Indian princes. Within eleven years this glory was to fade : yet there was no hint of an impending doom at the Silver Jubilee celebration.

King George VI sent a message congratulating His Exalted Highness on the completion of twenty-five years of rule and wished him and his state happiness and prosperity. The London *Times* praised the leadership which the Nizam had given to other princely states in connection with the Federation. It praised the progress of the State administration and the constitutional reforms which gave it a moral claim to leadership, apart from the State's material achievements. The *Times* reported that the Nizam hardly ever rejected the recommendation of the Executive Council, whose President was a 'fine Hindu', Maharaja Kishen Pershad.

Out of deference to Maharaja Kishen Pershad, his retirement had been postponed to enable him to officiate at the formal celebrations which took place at the specially constructed Jubilee Hall in the Public Gardens. The Jubilee Hall and the entire Public Gardens were illuminated. By 9 p.m. on 13 February, all the guests arrived including the Nizam's two sons Azam Jah and Moazam Jah and his brother, Basalat Jah. The Nizam was received by Maharaja Kishen Pershad and members of the Executive Council and the Inspector-General of Police. A Guard of Honour was presented and the National Anthem was played. The ruler was then conducted to the throne.

Earlier the same day a Silver Jubilee parade was held at Fateh Maidan, the field of victory where the Emperor Aurangzeb had conducted his seige of Golconda in 1687. After thanks-giving at the mosque in the Public Gardens, the Nizam, accompanied by his eldest son, Azam Jah, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, motored to the parade,

where he watched the march past in the presence of a throng of courtiers, officials and subjects.

At 5 p.m. the same evening Prince Azam Jah presented an address on behalf of the Regular as well as Irregular Forces of the State at Bella Vista. He presented the Nizam with a golden casket and the Nizam gave the Prince a sword with a jewelled handle. Guns and swords were displayed on the walls of the Hall in profusion. Officers of the Regular Forces sat on one side in black uniforms, while officers of the Nazm-e-Jamait or the Irregular forces, sat on the other side in traditional attire.

The Nizam was received at Bella Vista by Prince Azam Jah along with the princess and Prince Basalat Jah. The Nizam extended his hand towards his three-year-old grandson, Mukarram Jah. Among the guests were Maharaja Kishen Pershad, Sir Akbar Hydari, Nawab Aqeel Jang, Nawab Mehdi Yar Jang, Raja Sham Raj Rajwant Bahadur, and judges of the High Court. A banquet was held at the Jubilee Hall, as well as a display of fireworks.

The two princesses, Durreshahvar and Niloufer, the wives of Princes Azam Jah and Moazam Jah respectively, took a prominent part in the celebrations. They inspected a rally of girl guides at the Ladies Club at Basheer Bagh at 4.45 p.m. Unlike most Hyderabad ladies of the time, they did not observe purdah.

Merchants, craftsmen and professionals vied with one another to present to their ruler, tokens of their affection and loyalty in the form of caskets, models of the Charminar and other valuable gifts. Together, these constituted such a large and valuable collection that it was proposed to open a separate museum to display them.

A special set of postage stamps was issued to commemorate the occasion. The Banjara Hills, a suburb on the outskirts of Hyderabad, was renamed Jubilee Hills. It was decided to locate a place on the Jubilee Hills to be occupied by Prince Azam Jah, the eldest son and heir apparent of the Nizam, who had been recently honoured with the title of Prince of Berar, on the analogy of the Prince of Wales.

In one of the meetings on the occasion of his Silver Jubilee, the Nizam declared that the Hindus and Muslims of his State were like his two eyes. He gave remission of land revenue to the ryots to the extent of 40 lakh rupees and declared: 'I will devote the rest of my life for serving my ryots

with affection and shall work for their prosperity. I shall be a servant of the people, created by God and shall consider this service as the highest title.' He assured his people of these intentions through the audience who attended the meeting.

After the celebrations ended, Maharaja Kishen Pershad retired and was replaced as President of the Nizam's Council by the erstwhile Finance Member, Sir Akbar Hydari. The Council of Ministers headed by Sir Akbar Hydari included Nawab Aqeel Jang as Minister in-charge of the Nizam's Army; Nawab Mehdi Yar Jang as Minister for Education and Political Affairs; Sir T. J. Tasker in-charge of Revenue and Police; Raja Sham Raj Rajwant Bahadur, in-charge of Finance, and Nawab Mirza Yar Jang as Law Minister.[1]

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The Government of India Act of 1935 was the result of a series of three Round Table Conferences held in London between 1930 and 1932 at which the opinion of Indian leaders from various communities and from political persuasions were sought. The main issues included the relationship between British India and the Indian states. Dyarchy was done away with at the state level in British India but was introduced at the Centre. All the subjects handled by the state government were to be administered by an elected ministry which would be responsible to the provincial legislature. However, at the Centre there was to be a Federal Government representing the British Indian provinces and the Indian states. This government would be responsible to the Federal Assembly. At the provincial level, elections to the assemblies were held in July 1936. The Congress swept the polls in Bombay, Madras, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa.

However, the federal provisions of the constitution were never brought into force. There were to be elections from British Indian provinces to the Federal Assembly. At the same time, the Indian states were to nominate their representatives to that assembly. Thus the Indian states would play a major role in the Federal Assembly. In spite of this they were unwilling to join the Federation. This was for two reasons. First the rulers of the states did not see any reason for surrendering their powers to politicians, the pressure for which was likely to mount with a Federal Assembly coming into being. The princes believed in the divine right of

kings and had no use for the democratic institutions which had been introduced in British India. They were encouraged in this view by officials of the Political Department of the Government of India, who did not wish to see the India of the native states going the same way as British India with political agitation and peoples' rights becoming the order of the day.

Second, the Indian states felt that the British would not actually withdraw from India. They thus hoped that there would be an indefinite delay in the transfer of power.

Hyderabad State received one benefit from the Government of India Act of 1935. The Nizam's sovereignty over the province of Berar was conceded. The Nizam was henceforth to be called the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar and the heir apparent of the Nizam was to be called the Prince of Berar. The Nizam was given the right to appoint an agent on his behalf in Berar. A sum of Rs 25,00,000 being paid annually to the Nizam as consideration in respect of Berar was to be continued. A retired High Court judge of Madras, Sir Mutha Venkata Subba Rao, was appointed the first agent of the Nizam in Berar.

Soon after the federal part of the Indian Constitution received the assent of the British Parliament, the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen turned itself into a political organization. The aims and objects in this organization were declared as follows:

- The Hyderabad Government should be a free and independent monarchy and shall always be ruled by a Muslim belonging to the Asaf Jahi dynasty.
- If Hyderabad State is to necessarily join the Indian Federation, it should do so only without detriment to its political rights, economic possibilities, privileges, and aspirations.
- If it became necessary to amend the present constitution for the development of the country as a whole, the Deccan Muslims would not accept any such change in the constitution which is likely to compromise the political supremacy of the Muslims in the State.
- In the Assembly and Local Self-Government institutions, the Muslims should have a statutory majority.
- Muslim seats in such bodies shall be filled up by candidates elected by the Reserved Constituencies.

- Urdu has already been recognized as the language of the people of India and as the official language of the Hyderabad State. Therefore, it should not only continue to be the official language of the State, but it should always be the medium of instruction from the primary to the university stage of education.

- Service or employment is not only a question of prestige historically as well as politically but it is also their economic problem. Therefore, in this respect there should be no question of recruitment being made on the basis of communal ratio. The Muslims shall never agree to lose their jobs.[2]

Notwithstanding these somewhat ominous trends, the political atmosphere in Hyderabad had been liberalized to some extent by mid-1937. The existence of popularly elected governments in the British Indian provinces created an atmosphere which influenced even the Indian states, in spite of their rigid and antedeluvian structure.

Kashinath Rao Vaidya, a prominent member of the Hyderabad Legislative Council, introduced a draft bill for the reform of the Legislative Council. Barrister Akbar Ali Khan issued a statement to the press in July 1937, pleading for a round table conference of the peoples' representatives in Hyderabad to discuss the State's political and economic problems. He also wanted a united front to work for a common ideal. Talks thus commenced between M. Hanumantha Rao, K.R.Vaidya, Bahadur Yar Jang and Akbar Ali Khan. These did not fructify as the Nizam's government announced the appointment of a Political Reforms Committee under the chairmanship of Aravamudu Aiyangar, which included both Vaidya and Akbar Ali Khan. The announcement of this committee was made by Sir Akbar Hydari, the new President of the Nizam's Executive Council, on 22 September 1937. The other members were G.M. Qureishi, of the Hyderabad Civil Service, and Professor Qadir Husain.

The Political Reforms Committee was evidently intended to take the wind out of the sails of the demand for responsible government which had received support as a result of the initiative of Vaidya and Akbar Ali Khan. The notifications spoke of the needs of the people, the conditions obtaining from the State, the 'due regard to the various interests' to be given, and the need to suggest alternative means of ensuring more and more fruitful cooperation between the people and the government.

In early December 1937, the sixth session of the Andhra Mahasabha was held, about two months after this announcement. At the insistence of the General Secretary of the Andhra Mahasabha, Mandumula Ramachandra Rao, the government withdrew its earlier insistence on the prior approval of resolution by the Collector. It was only after the General Secretary and other important members resigned their positions in the Congress that the application for permission was accepted and government informed the Andhra Mahasabha that, 'it would serve the government, purpose if a copy of the draft solution agreed to by the subjects committee was sent upto the Collector.'

On 12 November 1937, less than two months after Hydari's announcement of 22 September, a peoples' convention was held under the chairmanship of Abul Hasan Syed Ali. The invitations were issued by K.V. Ranga Reddy and G. Ramachari. Several public institutions and organizations attended the convention, which constituted a committee to prepare a scheme of political reforms to be presented to the government. This committee's terms of reference were:

- To prepare a comprehensive scheme with a view to reconstruct the Legislative Council and establish other political institutions conducive for the gradual attainment of responsible government under the aegis of the Asaf Jahi Dynasty and H.E.H. the Nizam keeping in view the present day conditions, needs and aspirations of the people.

- To prepare a comprehensive scheme to establish Gram Panchayats, local boards and district boards for the attainment of local self-government.

- In the matter of right of franchise, to offer suggestions, numbers and the constituencies.

- To make suggestions regarding the civil liberties generally and in particular regarding the freedom of speech and freedom of association.

A committee with twenty-three influential members of the convention was constituted to prepare a scheme of political reforms with a view to presenting the same to the government. This committee was to break up into three Special Committees to deal with the political reforms, local

self-government and the right of franchise and submit its draft scheme to the convention by 25 December 1937.

This committee coopted an additional twelve members and prepared a questionnaire to elicit the people's views, which was published in the newspapers and also sent to prominent persons, connected with different groups, communities and interests. The Adi Hindu League, the Indian Christian Association, the Women's Association, District Andhra Mahasabhas, Merchants' Association, Marwari Mandal, Maharashtra District Committees and an association of young men who declared themselves as the followers of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Adi Hindu League etc., expressed their views. Not only these institutions but institutions representing zamindars, doctors, advocates and traders, extended their cooperation by answering the questionnaire.

Thus the work of the convention progressed very satisfactorily upto a stage, what with the frequent meetings of the committee and the sub-committee. But differences began to arise between members of the convention on the question of allotting seats to Muslims in legislative bodies and local self-government institutions. Abul Hasan Syed Ali, Abdullah Pasha, Kaleemuddin Ansari and Mohammed Ahsan were insistent that fifty per cent of the seats should be allotted to the Muslims in each of these bodies. The Hindu members of the convention on the other hand, were prepared to go upto twenty per cent, conceding however, the right of Muslims to compete for the other eighty per cent seats. As no agreement could be reached in this matter, the above-mentioned Muslim members severed their connection with the convention.

Most of the Muslim members of the convention were pressurized to dissociate themselves from participation in further discussions. The only persons who resisted the pressure were Sirajul Hasan Tirmizi and Dr Lateef Sayeed. The latter however was too ill to work in the convention. Only Sirajul Hasan Tirmizi persisted in his course and stood firm.

Abul Hasan Syed Ali joined the Ittehadul-Muslimeen as its Secretary and Kaleemuddin Ansari and Mohammed Ahsan accepted the membership of its Working Committee. This greatly strengthened Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang's movement for the consolidation of Muslim hegemony in the State.

Finally, the convention prepared a scheme based on the political reforms introduced in British India under the Government of India Act,

1919. According to this scheme, the convention suggested a sort of dyarchy in the State. While declaring that the right of governance rested with the Nizam alone, it was suggested that out of the total number of ministers appointed by the Nizam, half should be from the elected representatives of the Legislative Assembly. The Council of Ministers should be responsible to the Nizam, for the work they do and for the advice they tender to the Nizam. But in the same way they should jointly be responsible to the Legislative Assembly in respect of all matters.

The Nizam was to have the right to appoint and dismiss the ministers. But if the majority of the members of the legislature passed a no-confidence motion against a minister, he could appeal to the Nizam. The Nizam would then examine this appeal and could remove one, or a few, or all the ministers.

The legislature was to have the right to enact legislation, to put questions, to speak on resolutions and to discuss the Budget. It was also to have the power to levy taxes, subject to certain rules and conditions, and also have certain powers regarding voting etc.

The Legislative Assembly was to have 130 members elected from General Constituencies, thirty members by the government and thirty-seven members elected by the Reserved Constituencies. According to the scheme of the convention, only those who had some property or means, and those who were educated, could use their right to vote.

This very simple and very carefully prepared scheme was submitted to the government as well as to the Aiyangar Committee appointed by it. But the government considered the scheme impractical and incapable of implementation.[3]

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Meanwhile the Ittehadul-Muslimeen reacted to the announcement by Sir Akbar Hydari in the Legislative Council of Hyderabad on 22 September 1937 by seeking to close ranks among the Muslims. It amended its constitution to say that,'the personality of the Ruler of the state and his throne is the symbol of the political power, and cultural heritage of the people belonging to his community. Therefore, the position of the Muslims in the Asafia State, i.e., Hyderabad State should remain unaltered. Further, in consideration of basic principles, as the foundation, no amendment or change in the political system or set up of the state should be made in a

manner which militates against the perpetual existence of the sovereignty of the ruler.'

The Majlis declared that its aims and objectives were :

- to oppose the British paramountcy;
- to fight for the independence of Hyderabad State;
- to prevent the formation of responsible government;
- to consolidate the political supremacy of the Muslims.

This reaction was compared by a shrewd observer, M. Narsing Rao, to the demand of the Muslim League which,'sowed the seeds of communalism, by demanding separate electorates for the Muslims,' but, 'ended up with the demand for a separate state for Muslims.' Similarly, 'the Ittehadul-Muslimeen, which started with the slogan of no change in the royal prerogatives of the Nizam in the state, started a more ambitious and stronger movement for the establishment of Muslim sovereignty.'

Although the Executive Council submitted to the Nizam its recommendations in the Reforms Committee Report in August 1938, the final notification on the reforms was not issued till July 1939. During this period of nearly one year, the Majlis was adamantly demanding first, that the reforms be shelved altogether and later denouncing the British Resident as, ' the foreigner who held the Nizam in tutelage.' While the ruler wanted to refer in the notification to Asaf Jah I, as the founder of the dynasty, Bahadur Yar Jang was insisting on a reference to, 'the largest Muslim state in India.'

On 14 June 1939, a black flag demonstration was held against Sir Akbar Hydari by the Majlis. The 'categorical demand' of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen on the reforms included:

- statutory majority for the Muslims;
- separate electorates;
- no scheme affecting traditional Muslim supremacy.

Rioting and bloodshed was threatened if its minimum demand as well as the declaration of a Muslim State was not conceded.

Even while the Majlis' agitation faced the state, the Nizam continued to see Bahadur Yar Jang. It was not known what transpired at these meetings. When the reforms were finally announced in July 1939 the Majlis opposed them with a black flag demonstration. It is possible that the Nizam encouraged these demonstrations during his private discussions with the Majlis leader. In September 1939, M.A. Jinnah visited Hyderabad for two weeks and had two long interviews with the Nizam. The next month the Majlis called off its threat of direct action. It was announced that the reforms would give the Muslims fifty-one per cent representation in the Legislative Council. This was a clear indication that the Nizam had accepted the view of the Majlis. It was a defeat for the Executive Council which did not want such a major concession to the Muslim party.

The Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen now opened branches in all district headquarters in Hyderabad city. It opened wings for treasury, theology, organization, information, development, students' hostels, publications, finance and volunteers. The last of these was the para-military wing modelled on the khaksars with a uniform of khaki shirts and pants and black fez. At the three-day annual conference in January 1940 twelve to fifteen thousand persons attended the sessions every day. The Majlis wanted the Nizam of Hyderabad to be called His Majesty or Jalalatul Mulk. The Majlis and its leader were increasingly assertive, and issued statements indicating a sense of bravado.

The Resident strongly suspected the hand of the Nizam in Bahadur Yar Jang's attack on the British, and especially on British officials in Hyderabad. The Nizam even sent the Viceroy a copy of Bahadur Yar Jang's presidental address. Many of Bahadur Yar Jang's speeches at this time focused on Hyderabad's claim to be independent as a reward for its service to the British during the war as well as its claim on Berar and the northern circars. The Nizam in turn was clearly trying to tell the British that Bahadur Yar Jang could not be taken lightly because he had the full support of the Muslims.

By early 1940 Bahadur Yar Jang had become even less cooperative and amenable to the Nizam's influence. In March he was unanimously elected President of the All-India States' Muslim League which had been founded in October 1939 after consulting Jinnah. In March 1941, speaking at Secunderabad on Pakistan Day, Bahadur Yar Jang declared that Hindus and Muslims have nothing in common, as their civilization and culture

The Seventh Nizam as heir apparent, c.1909.

The Seventh Nizam with his Prime Minister and personal staff at the time of the coronation, 18 September 1911.

State Banquet given by the Seventh Nizam for Lord Linlithgow in the Banquet Hall of the Chow Mohalla Palace complex, c.1938.

The meeting of the Executive Council (Bab-i-Hukumat) 1936. From L-R: Raja Sham Raj, Theodore Tasker, Akbar Hydari, Maharaja Kishen Pershad (President), Lutf-ud-Daula, Mahdi Yar Jang and Aqil Jang.

Nizam's Birthday Parade at Fateh Maidan Pavilion c.1937. Among those present are L-R: Habib Yar Jung of the Prince's Bodyguard, the Prince of Berar, Sir Akbar Hydari, Maharaja Kishen Pershad, and Salar Jang III.

The Nizam with two sons in brocade sherwanis.



The Nizam with his grandson Mukarram Jah.

The Prince of Berar meets tribals of Hyderabad State, c.1939.

Jinnah Calls on the Prince of Berar at Bella Vista, c.1946. From L-R: Col. Hamidullah, police officer, the Prince of Berar, Bashiruddin (ADC), M.A. Jinnah, police officer, the Nawab of Chhatari.

Jinnah with Majlis leaders, 1946. L-R: Abul Hasan Syed Ali (fifth from left), Bahadur Yar Jang, M.A. Jinnah, Rauf, Rahim, Raseed Turabi (Moustache and Irani cap).



Sarojini Naidu visits the Idara-i-Adabiyat-i-Urdu (Dr. Zore's house) c.1945
L-R: Raja Dharam Karan, Taqiuddin Zore's son, Sarojini Naidu, Mohiuddin Qadri Zore, Masooma Begum, Mohd. Qatil.
Back row: Nasiruddin Hashimi, Mahender Raj Saxena (Botanist), Zahiruddin Ahmed, Syed Mohammad.

Mir Laik Ali at Airport with industrialist Ahmed Nawaz Jang (Ahmed Allauddin) and his sons, Dost Mohammad Allauddin and Noor Mohammad Allauddin, c.1948.

The Nizam laying the foundation stone of the Catholic Church, Our Lady of Health, Saifabad, c.1951.

Airport scene at Hyderabad c.1948-49. From L-R: Mirza Humayun Ali Baig, Chief Engineer, Palaces, the Seventh Nizam, Nawab Zain Yar Jang, Major-General J.N. Chaudhury, V.P Menon.

Scene at Hyderabad House, Delhi. c.1950. From L-R: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru; President Dr Rajendra Prasad; the Seventh Nizam; Shahzadi Pasha; Lady Homi Mody (wife of the Governor of U.P.).

differed. In January 1941 the Majlis had issued a statement stating that every Muslim could claim a share in the State under the doctrine Anal Malik (I am the King). As a result, there was a minor split in the party, with some saying that the Nizam could not lose power except by Divine Will. But Bahadur Yar Jang's views carried the day.

The Nizam was shocked, and regarded the statement as *lese majeste.* He reprimanded Bahadur Yar Jang in April 1941 for his statements of January and March. Under his orders the Executive Council threatened to withdraw the *maash* or financial payment of any recipient who embarrasses the relations between the state government and the Government of India, its own people, or any other state. However, the very next month in May 1941, Bahadur Yar Jang ended a conference of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen with an emotional speech reiterating the views and arguments on sovereignty, Hindu-Muslim divergence and Pakistan, to which objection had been taken.

The Nizam was obviously deeply disturbed at the uncontrollable behaviour of Bahadur Yar Jang but he delayed his decisions till Jinnah was able to spend a fortnight in Hyderabad at the end of August 1941. At Jinnah's instance, a compromise was worked out, under which the wording of an apology was agreed upon, issued by Bahadur Yar Jang, and was accepted by an official firman by the ruler. The texts of the apology and firman were both released to the press, and there was a favourable reaction among Hindus.

Both the Nizam and Bahadur Yar Jang were in correspondence with Jinnah, who played a mediating role in regard to the apology. The apology was clearly meant for public consumption only. The Nizam, Bahadur Yar Jang and Jinnah were at this time in agreement on all fundamental issues. However, the Executive Council took a different stand to that of the Nizam. Unlike the Nizam, it was concerned not only about the reaction of Hindu public opinion to the Majlis-Nizam axis, but also about the future of the state polity itself. Even after the apology, Bahadur Yar Jang continued to address public meetings in different parts of the State in which, among other things, he asserted the sovereignty of the Nizam, rejected a democratic structure for Hyderabad State, and asserted that Hindus would not be allowed to dominate over Muslims. The Nizam also appeared to be playing a double game. He invited Bahadur Yar Jang, gave him a set of jewelled buttons, and issued a firman recognizing his loyalty.

The Executive Council was aghast, and the Resident called it, 'fickle and unpredictable behaviour.'[4]

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Hyderabad State was the largest of all the Indian states. Its area was 82,698 square miles which was greater than the combined areas of England and Scotland. As it was situated in the centre of India it was considered strategically very important.

The population of Hyderabad at the time according to the 1931 census was 1,44,36,148. This was an increase of, 19,64,378 or 15.8 per cent over the population of the State in 1921. According to the 1941 census, the population of Hyderabad State was 1,63,88,000. The Budget of Hyderabad State for the year 1936–1937 shows the income of the state as Rs. 9,43,00,000 (Hali)and the expenditure Rs 8,98,00,000 (Hali). The special feature of Sir Akbar Hydari's financial policy was that the State was having a surplus budget every year. There were only three sources of income:

- land revenue;
- export and import duties at six per cent *ad valorem*, known as krorgiri;
- excise and *abkari* duty on intoxicants and liquors like brandy and toddy etc.

There was no such thing as income tax or direct tax.

The Hyderabad State government provided fifty lakh rupees as privy purse to the Nizam and twenty-four lakh rupees to the princes. Besides this, a whole district was considered the Nizam's jagir. After giving away the expenses of the administration the remaining income of the whole district was taken by the Nizam.

In the 1936–37 Budget the expenditure showed a provision of Rs 1,04,00,000 for education, seventy-five lakhs for roads, thirty-five lakhs for medical and public health, sixty-six lakhs for police, twenty-five lakhs for administration of justice, eight lakhs for the army, forty-two lakhs for general administration, twenty-six lakhs for irrigation and thirty lakhs for famine relief, provided as a special fund.

According to M.Narsing Rao, the administration did have some good points. People were confident that justice would not be denied to them whether it was a law court or revenue court or Inam Commission, even if the government itself was a party. The decisions were strictly given according to the law and no discrimination was made on the basis of religion. Law and order was maintained, essential developmental activity was also taken up. However, the Nizam was against the very idea of joining the Federation because he knew fully well that joining the Federation would lead to gradual democratization of the government since eighty-five per cent of his subjects were Hindus. The Nizam did not relish the prospect of popular rule.

The finances and fiscal policy of Hyderabad State had undergone major changes during the period 1900–1956. During the third decade of the twentieth century, capital was diverted to investment in irrigation, power and industrial projects. Local finance was used to provide civic amenities in the urban areas of the State. Health and education received a better deal in the hands of successive finance members after 1920. The government also made a major impact on electricity and irrigation by taking up the city thermal unit and the Nizamsagar project. A major impact on the industrial sector was made by starting the Nizam Sugar Factory, Singareni Colleries, Sirsilk and Sirpur Paper Mills, Praga Tools, and Allwyn Metal Works. However, in the field of education there was an undue stress on higher education with little attention being paid to universal education, adult literacy and related problems.

The routine administration of revenue, police and judiciary were carried on at a fairly high level of competence by the time of the jubilee year of the Nizam. From 1926 onwards, the Revenue Member of the Nizam's Executive Council had been a British officer on loan from the Government of India—first Sir Richard Trench and later Sir Theodore Tasker, and R.M. Crofton. These officers had played a substantial part in maintaining the integrity and probity of the administrative system. They had prevented undue interference by the Nizam in the day-to-day administration, and the appointment of undesirable persons to high posts in the state. There were, however, two areas in which the contribution was less than adequate. First, they could not look into the details of administration at the lowest levels. At the most they could only investigate cases of corruption that were brought to their notice, and which required their serious attention. Second, their writ ran only in the Khalsa or Diwani

territory, which covered about two-thirds of the State. The administration of the jagirdari areas was at a very low ebb and it was difficult to discover any silver lining in the cloud. Even in the ryotwari areas, the vestiges of the earlier jagirdari system played a role in preventing reform, due to the survival of powerful vested interests.

In spite of the introduction of a more efficient system of revenue administration since 1926, conditions in the rural areas of the Nizam's dominions were grim. This is evident from the famine of 1935 in Raichur district and the way in which the state government handled it.

In 1953, the Madras Government had declared famine in the Bellary district of the Madras Presidency. The neighbouring Raichur district was also affected by famine, but the Hyderabad government refused to declare it as such. A non-official body, the Hyderabad Relief Association, appointed a committee with a view to finding out the actual conditions in the district. A committee consisting of Padmaja Naidu, Janardhan Rao Desai and Narsing Rao toured the famine hit areas of Raichur district and submitted a report to the government. While officials privately admitted that conditions were really those of famine, they were unwilling to say so officially, for fear of antagonizing the government, which was determined to declare that it was scarcity but not famine. In Kopbal jagir belonging to the Salar Jang estate (now a taluk in Raichur district of Karnataka State), famine conditions were prevailing, but the Padmaja Naidu Committee, which consisted of persons not belonging to the jagir area, was discouraged from entering Kopbal. Meanwhile, in the Mudgal village of Raichur district, an English officer, Captain Leonard Munn working in the well sinking department met the committee and pointed out the deplorable condition of the people of the village, a majority of whom were Muslims. Bullocks used for agricultural purposes were being sold for paltry sums of three or four rupees for the sake of meat.

Only after considerable pressure, the Nizam's government issued the Agricultural Debts Relief Act to give respite to the ryots. The act was notified by firman which suggested the appointing of a Debt Conciliation Board and also to control and regulate moneylenders and reduce the rate of interest. Through another firman, the alienation of agricultural lands was prohibited. This law was implemented in a few districts. A few years later, these rules and regulations were introduced in the Hyderabad Legislative Council and finally passed as acts.[5]

The last Director-General, Savidge gave figures of the achievements during the period 1926–1946 in a letter to Tasker in 1947: the number of Hyderabad Civil Service officers in the Revenue Department had increased from thirteen to seventy-two. Twenty-nine water supply and drainage schemes had been executed at a cost of Rs 88,90,570. The well sinking department dug 4,293 wells at the cost of Rs 55,72,683. Forest revenue had multiplied five times. Custom revenue had doubled too.

Although the Nizam resented the policy of intervention, this never affected his personal attitude to British officers such as Abdy Collins ICS, in the Commerce and Industries, and Colonel N. Walker IMS, in the Medical Department. They were loyal to Hyderabad and helped Akbar Hydari in a broadcast from All-India Radio in 1936, which he called "Modern Hyderabad".

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Communal riots in Hyderabad city were unknown till 1936, although there were a few Hindu-Muslim clashes in other parts of the State leading to some loss of life and property. These clashes arose out of, 'the action and reaction of the Ittehadul-Muslimeen organization and the Arya Samaj.' According to M. Narsing Rao's *Fifty Years of Hyderabad*, the President of the Nizam's Council, Maharaja Kishen Pershad and the city Police Commissioner, Raja Bahadur Venkatarama Reddy,

> the repositories of the special culture and traditions of Hyderabad handed down from generations, were there to prevent any damage to this unique friendly and social atmosphere that always pervaded the city. Both these gentlemen commanded the respect of both the communities, Hindus and Muslims, and were very popular among them.[6]

The relations between the Arya Samaj and the Nizam's government deteriorated after 1936, when the Arya Samaj workers commenced the work of preaching. In that year at Humnabad Maniknagar a clash occurred between some Muslims with Arya Samaj workers including Pandit Narenderji, known at that time as Narendra Saxena. In 1937 all meetings of any kind were prohibited by circular No. 53. The Arya Samaj protested by violating the order. In 1938 an order was promulgated that prior

permission should be sought before Havan Kund was put anywhere. This order was also defied by the Arya Samaj at Hyderabad.

It was also in 1938, after considerable pressure by the Arya Samaj and the moderate elements in Hyderabad like M. Narsing Rao, that the Nizam's government finally issued orders to all government servants not to join communal organization like the Majlis, the Arya Samaj, the karmayogis and the Sevadal. In the same year Bahadur Yar Jang and the Arya Samaj leader, Pandit Narenderji, were prohibited from delivering public lectures for a period of one year. Two years later, in 1940, the government banned military drill of the Khaksar Party under the Defence of Hyderabad Rules.

On 16 April 1938, a major communal riot took place at Dhoolpet. In spite of a distinguished advocate, Bhulabhai Desai defending the case, a number of Arya Samajists were sentenced. Another riot took place at Udgir during Dussehra in 1938. On 24 October 1938 the Arya Samaj commenced its satyagraha under the leadership of Devi Lal; he was arrested and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years. Before taking up satyagraha again an All-India Arya Samaj Conference was held at Sholapur under the presidentship of M.S. Aney on 25 December 1938 in order to mobilize public opinion against the Nizam's government. A Hyderabad Day was observed all over India.

In his presidential address Aney pointed out that Rs 12.5 lakhs were allotted in the Budget for head religion, out of a total of Rs 842 lakhs. It was contended that much of this amount was used to maintain Islamic religious institutions such as mosques and dargas. Other complaints were the use of Urdu as a medium of instruction instead of the mother tongue, and the gross over-representation of Muslims in government service.

The French Roman Catholic Bishop of Nagpur supported the view that the religious policy of the Nizam's government was working against the practice of the Hindu religion.

Mahatma Narayan Swamy entered Hyderabad on 31 January 1939, his ejection from the State again on 24 February 1939. As individuals were arrested with batches of satyagrahis, fresh dictators were appointed, and in all eight such batches under dictators offered satyagraha and were arrested.

Thus the Arya Samaj was fully engaged with the agitation for the right to propagate its faith as well as the rights of Hindus against the Muslim community which was regarded as dominating the State machinery.

The inspiration for this movement had come largely from outside Hyderabad. Copland in his article, "Communalism in Princely India" argued that:

> Most of the people involved in the agitation of 1938–39 were outsiders trucked and railed in from British India; that many of these came for a variety of personal reasons extraneous to the religious situation inside the state; and that the movement's domestic following was mainly drawn from the ranks of the urban proletariat of Hyderabad city, a class conditioned to violence and vulnerable to manipulation by community leaders.[7]

While it is true that the Arya Samaj satyagraha was largely undertaken by volunteers from outside Hyderabad and did not rouse much enthusiasm such element, it opened the eyes of the Nizam's subjects to the possibility of influencing the government and forcing it to accede to popular demands. The Arya Samaj leadership based in Lahore, Delhi and parts of Maharashtra was putting out considerable literature, sometimes exaggerating the damage caused to satyagrahis as well as the danger they faced from the Majlis and the Nizam's government. For example, the Nizam's government alleged that a daily wage labourer named Dasmayya who had sustained fatal injuries in a scuffle with a gang of Muslims was referred to in the literature as an Arya Samaj missionary, Ved Prakash.

The Arya Samaj on their part accused the Nizam's government of encouraging the Muslim missionary named Siddiq Deendar who was recruiting the converts to Islam by claiming to be a reincarnation of Chinna Basaveswar, a holy man of the Lingayat sect of the Karnataka region. The Nizam's government's reply was that they were in no way connected with the activities of Deendar.

The fact that the Nizam's government had condescended to argue with the Arya Samaj leadership on these points indicated clearly that they had lost ground during the agitation. They were finally forced to concede several of the fourteen demands of the Arya Samajists and the rest were either rejected or put off with vague assurances. The agitation was a shot in the arm for Sir Akbar Hydari who had been Sadr-i-Azam for less than a year.

One of the factors which played a part in reducing the public support for the Arya Samaj agitation was the advice given by Mahatma Gandhi to the Congressmen in the State not to participate in the agitation.[8]

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The prominent role played by the Arya Samaj movement in the Nizam's dominions in 1938–39 has tended to obscure the movement led by moderate leaders under the banner, first of the Hyderabad Peoples' Convention and later on the Hyderabad State Congress. We have already noted the flurry of activity in mid-1937 which gave rise to the Hyderabad Peoples' Convention and the committee appointed by it.

The Hyderabad Political Conference was held in January 1938 under the presidentship of Madapati Hanumantha Rao. On 3 July 1938 Hanumantha Rao wrote to the government urging the necessities of introducing responsible government in the State.

By mid-July a provisional government had been formed and about 1,200 primary members had been enrolled for Hyderabad State Congress. On 27 August 1938, satyagraha was offered at several different points in the State on the issue of the right to engage in political activities. The first dictator, Swami Ramanand Tirth, was arrested near the Sultan Bazar Clock tower along with Ravi Narayan Reddy and other colleagues. Altogether eighteen batches comprising four hundred satyagrahis offered satyagraha and were arrested. Meanwhile it was decided to hold a general body meeting for the election of the office bearers and the adoption of the constitution on 9 September 1938. However, one day earlier, on 8 September the Nizam's government banned the Congress even before it came into being.

Meanwhile M. Narsing Rao was negotiating with Bahadur Yar Jang on the basic question of a compromise solution to the outstanding issues between Hindu and Muslim leaders. The idea was to form a national organization open to all persons of the entire State and to attract the interest and harness the energy of the younger generation.

This movement had received an impetus from the sense of uneasiness which prevailed among the Hindus of Hyderabad after the Dhoolpet riots when there was considerable loss of life and property to both the communities. Among those killed were two nephews of Bahadur Yar Jang,

President of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen. On 7 April 1938, the two dead bodies of the nephews were taken out in a procession of 25,000 Muslims, armed to the teeth. This created a great panic among the Hindus, and probably led to the subsequent talks between M. Narsing Rao and Bahadur Yar Jang. The Hindus feared that they would not be protected by the Nizam's government and should therefore come to an agreement with the Muslim party.[9]

In October 1938 the singing of the national song, "Vandemataram" became an issue between the Hindu students of Osmania University on the one hand and the university authorities and the government of Hyderabad on the other. Osmania University was functioning almost as a branch of the state government. The President of the Nizam's Executive Council was the Chancellor, and the Education Member was the Vice-Chancellor. The man on the spot who administered the day-to-day affairs of the university was the pro-Vice-Chancellor. This hierarchical arrangement tended to discourage the emergence of a free academic atmosphere.

There were three major hostels, 'A', 'B', and Temporary, each of which had two prayer halls, one for Muslim students and the other for Hindu students. The warden of the 'B' Hostel ordered the Prarthana Mandir or Hindu prayer hall to be kept closed, after it was reported to him that "Vandemataram" was being sung by Hindu students there. When the college reopened after the Ramzan holidays on 28 November 1938, a notice was, 'circulated banning the singing of ''Vandemataram'' in the hostels of the University because, this song is thought to be of a political and controversial nature. It may hurt the feelings of the non-Hindu students and may adversely affect the mutual relations existing among the students residing in the hostels of this University.'

However, the next day many Hindu students incurred the wrath of the authorities by continuing to sing the proscribed national song. The names of several students were removed from the hostel and their attendance at college classes was suspended and scholarship and freeships granted to them were cancelled.

This harsh order, which was served on the students within a day of their return from vacation, created a stir in the city and initiated a confrontation between Hindu students and university authorities. Most of the Hindu students of the university went on strike. A deputation of students met the authorities and requested that the order be rescinded. The request was rejected, the authorities insisting that the students should join

the classes after submitting apologies before 10 December 1938 failing which their names would be struck off university rolls. After allowing a day's grace the names of 350 students from Osmania University College, seventy students from City College, Hyderabad, 310 students from Gulbarga College and High School and 120 students from Mahboobnagar high School were removed, from the respective institutions. Educational institutions were on strike in Aurangabad, Nanded, Bidar and Parbhani districts and it was spreading to the mofussils.

The members of the action committee of the Vandemataram strikers met the Chancellor of the university, Sir Akbar Hydari who said that he had great regard for Bankim Chandra Chatterjee whom he never considered to be anti-Muslim. He said the song "Vandemataram" could be sung at social functions but not on the university campus. The argument of the State government according to N. Ramesan's *The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad*, was that a song of recent origin could not be taken as an integral part of Hindu worship.

> If once this principle were to be admitted there is no saying where it would end as this would open the door to all kinds of extraneous controversial matters being imported into religious worship, whether by Muslims or by Hindus, in hostels of the University.[10]

The State authorities were hopeful that the students could be persuaded to tender an apology and the matter would then blow over. However, two factors worked against such a solution to the dispute. First, national leaders like Subhas Chandra Bose, Jawaharlal Nehru and Veer Savarkar sent letters to the students encouraging them in their struggle. Mahatma Gandhi also sent a message: 'You have every right to sing this national song in the Prayer Hall.' Second,the Vice-Chancellor of Nagpur University, Justice Kedar, welcomed the students, relaxing all restriction of rules of admission. There was a large exodus to Nagpur, and a smaller one to other universities. Sir Akbar Hydari wrote to the Chancellor of Nagpur University, Sir F.V. Wylie, but the latter declined to interfere in a matter of admission of students, because there was an elected ministry in office, and the subject of education had been transferred to them.[11]

Technically one could agree with the State authorities that the song was political in nature and of recent origin. The Hindu students however,

saw no distinction between their motherland and their religious faith. The controversy assumed importance because of the increasing demand of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen for conversion of Hyderabad into a Muslim state and the discouragement of Hindu religious and political institutions.

At least two Muslim teachers, Khalifa Abdul Hakim of the Philosophy department and Hussain Ali Khan of the English department encouraged Hindu students in their determination not to apologize.

The major fallout of the movement was the politicization of a generation of students, who considered the entire episode as an indication of arbitrary state power. Many of those who went from Hyderabad to Nagpur and other places were highly politicized. They formed the core cadre of the political movement like the State Congress, Arya Samaj and the Communist parties in the period of the Police Action.[12]

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In mid-1938, the Nizam began to be seriously concerned about the future of his second son, Moazam Jah. Not only was he living a rather dissolute life, but was also incurring debts out of all proportion to his quite substantial income. In the case of his elder son, Prince Azam Jah, the Nizam's anxiety was less, because he was to succeed the Nizam as ruler, and would have access to the substantial private estate of the Sarf-i-Khas which would accrue to him. With regard to the younger son, who was said to be the Nizam's favourite, the position was quite different. Apart from the difficulties he was likely to face due to his own improvidence, he was unlikely to receive from his older brother the same indulgence shown him by his father.

During the next few months till the end of 1938 a protracted correspondence took place between the Nizam, the Resident and the Government of India relating to the measures necessary to ensure that the young man did not bring disgrace to the ruling family of Hyderabad, and ignominy on himself. The Resident told the Government of India: 'I have never met a young man so completely devoid of what may be called financial sense.'

It was decided that a trust would be formed, with a trust fund of seventy-five lakh of rupees in British currency, to be invested at three-and-a-half per cent in government securities. During this lifetime, the seventh Nizam would be the sole trustee. On his demise, the trust would become *ipso facto* independent and would have no connection with his

successor. The prince would move to British India and stay there, but would make visits to Hyderabad.

Prince Moazam Jah would have no voice in the management of the trust and the trust would not comply with any unreasonable request from him. Princess Niloufer and subsequent wives if any would receive Rs 1,500 and Rs 1,000 per month respectively from the trust fund. The mehar for subsequent marriages would be between Rs 50,000 and Rs 1,00,000 only. Niloufer had already received a mehar of 15,000.

The Nizam made additional arrangements for the preservation of *sarapas*, or jewellery to be used on ceremonial occasions on the turban. Provision was also made for the purchase and the maintenance of houses for the prince's use at Delhi, Calcutta and Bangalore. An amount of Rs 3,00,000 was to be invested and the income used only for the maintenance of these buildings and establishments. After the Nizam's death, the trustees would consist of the Resident, the Finance Member of the Nizam's Council and the *Sadrul Maham* or Member in-charge of Sarf-i-Khas estate of the Nizam.

One would expect that the Nizam would now rest assured that his younger son would be well cared for after his death, but this was not the case. In October the same year, the Nizam told the Resident that he was concerned about the possibility of Moazam Jah incurring more debts in spite of these arrangements, and being declared bankrupt. If such a thing happened, the trustees would be authorized to settle directly with creditors and a special fund would be created for this purpose. The younger prince would cease to receive his income of Rs 15,000 per month from the civil list of Hyderabad as he would be living in British India. The Nizam therefore proposed to create an emergency fund of sixty lakh rupees so that an income of Rs 15,000 per month would accrue to the younger prince at three per cent interest. The Nizam proposed to instruct his trustees that the prince's habit of light-heartedly contracting debts may make him liable to attachment of property and imprisonment in the time of the next Nizam: thus this provision had been made to ensure his financial stability.[13]

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A Political Reforms Committee had been appointed under the chairmanship of Aravamudu Aiyangar to look into the question of changes in the

government and restructuring of the state legislature. The chairman was assisted by two members from each of the two major communities. The committee's report was to be implemented before the Jubilee year was out.

The announcement did not rouse enthusiasm in the public of Hyderabad. The Congressmen deplored the omission of responsible government even as a vague possibility in the terms of reference of the committee. Meanwhile, the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen complained that the Muslim members of the committee did not represent anyone but themselves. The Majlis was strongly opposed to the idea of responsible government, as they were committed to the dominance of the State by the Muslim community, which constituted about eleven per cent of the population.

Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Hyderabad Peoples' Convention came into being as the result of the earnest effort of public spirited persons to evolve a common stand on basic issues. All important interests were represented, including the professions of farmers, traders, landowners, doctors, lawyers and shopkeepers as well as the regional bodies of the Telugu and Marathi speaking areas, Harijans, Christians, Parsees and Marwaris. The convention failed to draw up a unified proposal because of the pressure brought by the government on the representatives of the Muslim community to withdraw from the proceedings.

It was reported that a recalcitrant member was threatened with the immediate confiscation of his property if he did not withdraw from the convention. Such a threat could only have come from the Nizam himself. There had been reports for years of the ruler taking over the property of prominent individuals on some pretext or other. The threat was therefore likely to be quite effective.

The representatives of the Parsee and Christian communities, both ladies, were asked to withdraw by the organizations sponsoring them which had probably been pressurized. They considered discretion to be the better part of valour.

The report of the Reforms Committee was submitted on 31 August 1938, through the Constitutional Affairs Department of the state government. It remained strictly within its terms of reference, and made no proposals for responsible government in the State. It did however recommend that the elected representatives in the Legislative Council should be elected neither on a territorial nor on a communal basis, but on the basis of economic and professional interests, through an organization

representing such interests. It wanted the Legislative Council to be reconstituted with a non-official majority.

On the question of the power of the Council over the Budget the report was not unanimous. The majority held that the Council should have the right only to discuss the Budget while a minority felt that the legislature should be given the right to pass or reject any demand for a grant.

The committee also recommended that the Hindu and Muslim elected members should be equal in number in the Council. One Christian and one Parsee member were to be elected to hold the balance between Hindus and Muslims.

The recommendations of the Reforms Committee were not acceptable either to the Congress or to the Majlis. The Congress was opposed to the treatment of Hindus and Muslims on the basis of parity, as Hindus constituted over eight cent of the State's population. The Majlis was also opposed to this concept. It was firmly of the opinion that the fifteen per cent Muslim population should have at least fifty-one per cent of the seats in the Legislative Council.

It was now obvious that the government headed by Sir Akbar Hydari was determined to prevent the State Congress from coming into being. By the judicious use of promises and threats they had induced Muslim members to withdraw from the Hyderabad Peoples' Convention. When the Congress leaders tried to re-establish links with the Muslim leadership after the riots of April 1938, they found the latter indifferent and unwilling to negotiate. Some of them argued that responsible government would be considered a serious blow to the future good of the State. A few Muslim friends were still keen to cooperate with the State Congress leadership but with the imposition of the ban by the state government, any attempt to involve them had to be given up.

In an important speech made in the Legislative Council in August 1938, Sir Akbar Hydari stated that the Nizam's government was not opposed to political reforms but would not encourage those who, 'ostensibly desired progress but who in their heart of hearts wanted the power to be transferred to a particular class or community.' He urged those pressing for independence or political progress to, 'eliminate from among their followers doubtful elements, and by their conduct to prove that they are the true representatives of the people and trustworthy and dependable.'

Thus the Nizam's government made it clear that they had, 'decided to treat even the concept of responsible government as being based on communal bias and to consider every organization working for the responsible government, as a communal organization.'

Seen in the context of this speech, the banning of the State Congress on grounds that it was a communal organization was by no means an act of impartiality. It was rather an indication that the government was going to play the game of the Majlis. If there was any communal organization in the State it was the Majlis, and the failure of the Nizam's government to treat it as such, while banning the State Congress as a communal body, was a clear indication of the gross injustice to the majority of the State's people and their representatives.

The Majlis insisted, as we have seen, that fifty-one per cent of the representatives in the Council should be Muslims. They were not satisfied with the Christian and Parsee representatives holding the balance between Hindu and Muslim representatives. The deadlock was solved by providing for the nomination of two representatives from the Sarf-i-Khas, who would presumably be Muslims and would thus give the Muslims a majority in the Legislative Assembly.[14]

Unfortunately, the reforms remained on paper, and were not implemented. Thus, there was no occasion for the new dispensation to be tested. The declaration of the Second World War in September 1939 had been the signal for the Government of India to shelve the proposals for a Federation between British India and the Indian states. The Nizam's government was not slow to get the message. The original announcement of September 1937 of the Political Reforms Committee had been made in the context of the acceptance of Federation by the Nizam's government. Heaving a sigh of relief, the Nizam's government shelved the reform proposals, on grounds that all efforts had to directed to the defeat of Fascism.

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Hyderabad's contribution to the British war effort in the Second World War was no less than it had been during the First World War. The Faithful Ally of His Majesty the King of England contributed material worth six million pounds sterling, financed two squadrons of the Royal Air Force and helped to raise a substantial cadre of air staff. Handsome

contributions were made in the form of donations to the Viceroy's War Fund, the King George Sailors' Fund, the purchase of ambulances for Red Cross as well as direct cash contribution to the war effort. Moreover facilities were provided for rest camps for troops, training facilities for air force staff, and coal was made available from the Singareni Colleries for the south industries in the south. Foodgrains were also provided. Tributes were paid to His Exalted Highness the Nizam by Prime Minister Winston Churchill for the generous help in men, money and materials. Hyderabad troops served in Malaya and the Middle East. The Royal Air Force had squadrons bearing Hyderabad's name, and the Royal Indian Navy had ships provided by the generosity of the State.[15]

An unexpected product of the Second World War was the ending of the short-lived rapprochement between the British in India and the Indian National Congress. For two years the Congress had run governments in several Indian states including United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) and three of Hyderabad's neighbours, the Central Provinces, Bombay Presidency and Madras Presidency. When the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow declared war on behalf of India without consulting the Congress, these ministries promptly resigned in protest. In 1942 the Congress announced the Quit India movement against the British Raj. On the other hand, the Indian Communist Party took a stand in favour of the British Government's war effort. This stand was taken because of Hitler's attack on Russia. The Communists of India were convinced that the Soviet Union was their most important shield and that the world Communist movement could not succeed without the strong support of the Soviet Communist Party. The example of China, where the Communist Party had enjoyed strong Soviet support, encouraged this view.

The Communist movement in India had been initiated by intellectuals inspired by the Russian Revolution. Many of the intellectuals who supported the movement were not themselves communists but were inspired by Marxist and Socialist ideas. Some of the greatest novelists, poets and writers in Urdu and Hindi, men like Premchand and Kishen Chander, formed part of the Progressive Movement, which was inspired by Marxist ideas. Among the Urdu poets and prose writers who took an active part in the movement were Sajjad Zaheer, Akhtar Hussain Raipuri and Sibte Hasan. When the journal *Payam* was started in Hyderabad in 1935, Sibte Hasan came to Hyderabad to work as an Assistant Editor under Qazi Abdul Ghaffar who had also migrated from North India. A Progressive Writers' Association was formally set up in Hyderabad in July 1943 but it had already functioned for about a year on an informal basis.

Soon a group of writers with revolutionary tendencies sprung up in Hyderabad which included: Makhdoom Mohiuddin, Raj Bahadur Gour and Abid Ali Khan. The liberal leadership of the State Congress was demoralized because of the policy of the Indian National Congress for non-intervention in the Indian states. The younger generation was searching for a new path. The propaganda of the Majlis to the effect that the Muslims were the real rulers of Hyderabad was rejected by many young Muslim intellectuals. The Communists and the Progressives argued that the main enemy was the feudal aristocracy, whether Hindu or Muslim, which was ruling the State.

At the same time the Andhra Mahasabha which had confined itself to cultural and social reform now began to be influenced by a new radical ferment against feudalism and was in favour of a peasant revolt in the Telengana region. In the Marathwada area the left nationalist group of Govind Dass Shroff, Waghmare and others gave new life and dimension to the Maharashtra Parishad. A few Communists like Habeebuddin and V.D. Deshpande also worked closely with nationalists.

In 1939, the Comrades' Association came into being consisting of young radicals who combined in themselves, 'Nigar's rationalism, Nehru's secular left appeal against imperialism, international progressive thought represented in socialism and anti-fascism, and above all by the great October Revolution of the Soviet Union'. The Comrades' Association became a front organization for the Communist Party, and put forth its political ideas. The party literature was circulated and propaganda carried on by the party cell. After the outbreak of war the All-India Students, Conference split into Communist and Congress factions. The Communist Party came into the open and started functioning legally with its head-quarters in Bombay. Party leaders were however prosecuted whenever they criticized the British Government, as Ravi Narayan Reddy and Raj Bahadur Gour did at a meeting on the Bengal famine. Makhdoom was imprisoned along with State Congress satyagrahis, Swami Ramanand Tirth and Achyuth Rao Deshpande.[16]

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Sir Akbar Hydari had weathered the storm of the Arya Samaj movement in 1938 and appeared to have successfully ensured his continuance in office by supporting the Majlis' claim for parity between Hindus and Muslims. In doing so he took the risk of endangering his friendship with

Mahatma Gandhi. He was unable to convince the Congress leaders, Sardar Patel and Acharya Kripalani that everybody had full freedom and full scope in Hyderabad State. He also supported the Majlis when it came to the Aiyangar Committee Report.

Hydari's ambitions, however received a particular jolt when he was unexpectedly offered membership of the Viceroy's Executive Council in 1941. He was obliged to accept. Within a couple of years however Sir Akbar died and was buried in the Bohra graveyard in Hyderabad.

Sir Akbar Hydari was replaced by the Nawab of Chhatari, a suave and docile zamindar from Uttar Pradesh who commanded the confidence of British officials. His tenure in Hyderabad would have been uneventful and smooth were it not for the strong personality of the ruler and the increasing clout of the Majlis in the affairs of State.

Throughout India the Congress suffered a setback, at least temporarily, during the Second World War. In Hyderabad the effect was even more pronounced. The weak and pusillanimous behaviour of the Congress leaders as well as Hydari and Chhatari gave the Majlis the upper hand in State politics. This trend was strengthened by the covert and sometimes overt support given to the Majlis by the Nizam.

In his book, *End of An Era*, K.M.Munshi has made a number of allegations against Sir Akbar Hydari. First, that his government was swearing by Hindu-Muslim unity in public but strengthened the Majlis, banned the State Congress and interfered with the religious freedom of the Hindus in an unprecedented fashion. The Arya Samaj satyagraha of 1939 was called off on the strength of a promise made by Hydari that the religious disabilities of the Hindus would be removed. The promise was not kept in its entirety.[17]

The author of a thesis on Hydari examined this contention and argued that Hydari became Prime Minister of the State, 'in 1937 at a most unfavourable period from any point of view.' Some in the Hindu community were opposed to his appointment because he succeeded Maharaja Kishen Pershad in that office. The Muslim Party of Hyderabad and the British Government were suspicious of him because of his role in the formulation of an All-India Federation during the Round Table Conferences in London between 1931 and 1932. Hydari himself was confident about performing his duties normally after assumption of office as Prime Minister, as was clear from his speeches and the letters addressed to his friends.

Hydari was aware of the need to win the support of the Majlis, which was for some time 'the King's party'. The Ittehadul-Muslimeen had been instrumental in the conversion of some Hindus to Islam. The Arya Samaj retaliated by the Shuddhi movement for reconversion to Hinduism of these or other converts to Islam. The Hindu Mahasabha which was active in the Marathwada area was also carrying on propaganda against the dominant Muslim Party. In this delicate situation Hydari was able to face the separate satyagrahas launched by the State Congress, the Arya Defence League and the Hyderabad Civil Liberties Association (later merged into the Hindu Mahasabha). Hydari's promotion and appointment of a communal-minded official, K.M.Ansari (later Nawab Moin Nawaz Jang) to the high post of Secretary of the Executive Council in succession to the liberal and urbane Mahdi Nawaz Jang was evidently done in order to win the support of the Majlis. The banning of the Hyderabad State Congress when even the Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha were not banned was evidently a serious blunder on the part of the Nizam and his Prime Minister, Sir Akbar Hydari.

In 1938 however, Hydari had also taken the step of ordering both, 'Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang and Pandit Narenderji, the Arya Samaj leader not to deliver any speeches without prior permission of the government. The government servants were prohibited from participating in the activities of Ittehadul-Muslimeen, Arya Defence League, Khaksars and other political organisations of the state.'

Sir Akbar Hydari developed an anti-Congress attitude at this time because of the tension generated by continued agitations in the State added to his own domestic worries. In a private letter to Sir Walter Monckton he complained that, 'the new India that is now emerging and may perhaps subsist for many years, until possible irretrievable damage has been done to Hyderabad, desired not cooperation but the destruction of the Muslim India state.' However, he retained his faith in the Federation, and hoped that the functioning of autonomous governments in Indian provinces would help to solve the existing difficulties.

The second allegation by K. M. Munshi was that Sir Akbar Hydari had assisted Muslims to acquire a predominant position in government departments where Hindus had a traditional strength, such as public works and accounts. However, there seems to be no evidence in support of this allegation. It would appear that persons belonging to the Muslim

community received training in accounts and secured appointments as a matter of course or by using influence. It would not be fair to blame Sir Akbar Hydari for this. Professor S. Keshav Iyengar, an Adviser of the Hyderabad Government, was of the view that Hydari was not against Hindus but on the other hand tried to help them in many cases.

The third allegation was that under Hydari, the Nizam's government had acquired fifty-one per cent interest in several Hindu concerns. Hyderabad government's policy was to retain the controlling interest in industries which were managed by private enterprise. In 1929, the Government of Hyderabad started an 'Industrial Trust Fund' for the industrial growth of the State with a capital of one crore rupees. There was severe competition among the industries located in Hyderabad and many of them sustained heavy losses. Industries owned by both Hindus and Muslims were taken over (and not only of Hindus) by the government for serious lapses on the part the of management.

Finally, Munshi alleged that Hydari helped Mir Laik Ali in floating the Hyderabad Construction Company and entrusting all government work to it. The appointment of Mir Laik Ali to this important position was evidently due to the patronage he commanded in the State with the Nizam and others and not with Hydari alone. The further allegation that the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen was financed by Laik Ali with funds from the Hyderabad Construction Company relates to the period after Hydari left Hyderabad. During his period the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen was quite well supplied with funds by several jagirdars and business magnates.

It was true that Sir Akbar Hydari was opposed to a team of observers from British India coming to study the conditions in Hyderabad State. This stand has however to be considered in the context of the position in pre-independent India when the rulers regarded themselves as supreme authorities and the British government supported this claim to some extent. The interference of any third party in the internal affairs of the state was regarded as a violation of their sovereignty. Sir Akbar Hydari was a bureaucrat who had worked under the British in India and later in life became an employee of the Nizam. In spite of his competence as a financial administrator he was not greatly liked because of his somewhat cold manner and short temper. He had many friends among the British but was a liberal Muslim and statesman with a flair for constructive work. His eldest son, Sir Akbar Hydari Jr., was a member of the Indian

Civil Service and rose to be the Governor of Assam. He was one of the confidants of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel during the critical period of the integration of the divergent states of Assam into the Indian Union.[18]

The period which began with the Silver Jubilee of the Nizam and ended with the resignation of Sir Akbar Hydari was a traumatic period for Hyderabad. Communal feelings grew because of the demand by the Majlis-Ittehadul-Muslimeen for a dominant role in the State's political system. The denial of civil liberties and the right to propagate the Arya Samaj faith led to the satyagraha of 1938. The Hyderabad State Congress, which could have played a moderating role on the Arya Samaj element, was practically smothered at birth by the ban imposed by the Nizam's government.

Sir Akbar Hydari succeeded Maharaja Kishen Pershad as the President of the Nizam's Executive Council in 1938. He now ceased to enjoy the immunity from public criticism which he had experienced earlier as the State's Finance Member. He attempted to introduce constitutional reforms and succeeded in having a Reforms Committee appointed for the purpose under the chairmanship of Aravamudu Aiyangar. Although its recommendations were highly favourable to the representation of Muslims in the State legislature, they were not acceptable to the Majlis' leadership. The Nizam at this time began to fall increasingly under the influence of the President of the All-India Muslim League, M.A. Jinnah, who also became close to Bahadur Yar Jang, the leader of the Majlis. Hydari who was a competent administrator and a supporter of Hindu-Muslim unity, found himself out of his depth in the new atmosphere. He was presented with a *fait accompli* in the form of an offer of appointment as Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council which he found impossible to refuse, knowing fully well that he had lost the confidence of the ruler.

Mir Osman Ali Khan was thus clearly taking a stand against the forces working for secular nationalism within the State. He did so not because he was opposed to secular values as such, but because the increasing power of the State Congress would have resulted in a diminishing of his own power by bringing into play democratic forces

which would have led to a constitutional rather than an absolute monarchy.

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A few years after the Silver Jubilee celebrations, the Telugu poet Dasarathi was jailed during the Telengana revolt against the Nizam's government. It is said that he wrote on the walls of the prison a poem which has since become a classic in the Telugu language. Extracts from the poem are given below:

Padatula maanalu dochi
Guda guda mani Hookah thragi
Jadiyaka koorchundinavu
Madi kattuka nilichinavu
Dagakoru batachoru

Kotinnara notiventa, Paataluga maataluga
Digipommani digipommani, Idemaata anestanu
Vaddante gaddeyeķki, Peddarikam chestava?

Ei kanula volene Hindu *Musalmanu*
Lirupakshamulu netramulu rendu nakanchu
Amita prema natinchi samata mantramu pathinchi
vanchinchinavuro O Nizamu niyanta

(Violating the chastity of women
Inhaling the hookah 'guda guda'
You are sitting relaxed without any fear
You are cheat and a thief

While the voices of one and a half crore people
Are asking you through words and songs
To get down from your seat
How can you rule against their will?

By mouthing the mantra that
Hindus and Muslims are your two eyes
You are cheating the people, O Nizam.)

CHAPTER SIX

THE CHHATARI ERA OR THE NIZAM-MAJLIS ALLIANCE

> Sir Ahmed, you are my chief. It is my duty to carry out your policy faithfully. There will be no cause for complaint on this score... We are all Ministers, but we are entrusted with the custody of a child who wishes to commit suicide. Our job is to prevent him from doing so*.

> It is not possible for any public worker to persevere in his aspirations for the real progress of this doomed land. If unfortunately he is bold enough to take a stand, he is either driven mad and dies in an asylum or is conveniently removed out of the picture as Nawab Bahadur was, and many more before him. The huge blunders committed as you believe by Nawab Bahadur were merely the games of the foolish CHILD, the responsibility of which Nawab Bahadur's shoulders were strong enough to bear ungrudgingly. And what was the reward ?**

In February 1941 the Nawab of Chhatari was offered the presidentship of the Nizam's Executive Council. A formal announcement of his appointment was made in July that year. Meanwhile, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Sir Akbar Hydari had been offered the post of Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. The Nizam had given his consent to the proposal, and Hydari thus had no option but to accept.[1]

Chhatari was a polished and mild-mannered zamindar from the United Provinces, a pro-British politician who had won the confidence of British officials and held high positions in his home state. His appointment as Sadr-i-Azam of the Nizam's Executive Council was made with the full support of the Government of India. The Nizam himself was apparently undecided whether to appoint the Nawab to the most important position in his government. Chhatari did not show undue anxiety to accept the appointment, especially when he learnt that the Muslim League leader,

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* Sir Theodore Tasker, Member of Council, in a letter to the Nawab of Chhatari soon after his taking charge as Sadr-i-Azam, September 1941.

** S.A. Bux, former private secretary to the late Bahadur Yar Jang, in a letter to M.A. Jinnah, 11 February 1946.

M.A. Jinnah was opposed to his appointment. Chhatari himself was willing to work wherever the British Government wanted him to go.

When Chhatari finally took office on 1 September 1941, it was with some trepidation. He had been warned about the palace intrigues and groupism in the Hyderabad court, which would affect his functioning. However, he was diplomatic enough to establish good relations even with those in Hyderabad of whom he did not approve. In normal times his tenure in Hyderabad would have been uneventful and smooth. However, the conflicts which beset the state political scene, together with the strong personality of the ruler and the increasing clout of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen in the affairs of State made his task a difficult one.

Throughout India the Congress party suffered a setback during the Second World War. In Hyderabad the effect was even more pronounced. The weak and pusillanimous behaviour of the Congress leaders, as well as of both Hydari and Chhatari, gave the Majlis the upper hand in State politics. This trend was further strengthened by the covert and sometimes overt support given to the Majlis by the Nizam.

At the annual conference of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen in September 1941, Bahadur Yar Jang praised the Nawab of Chhatari and made a speech putting forth the Majlis' demands in moderate language. From the circumstantial evidence, it appears that the appointment of Chhatari as Sadr-i-Azam was a joint decision of the Nizam, Bahadur Yar Jang and Jinnah. The three were working closely together at this point. The British, as already mentioned, had always favoured the appointment.

Chhatari's arrival in Hyderabad coincided with an increase in the power and influence of the Majlis and its leadership. However, Bahadur Yar Jang had to face frequent difficulties with the Nizam, due to his longstanding habit of making controversial statements on matters concerning Hyderabad . As early as 1932 he had faced the wrath of the British Residency due to an attack on the British policy of divide and rule in the Middle East and India. He got out of that situation by explaining that, 'My speeches are *ex tempore*. I do not remember what I say. I talked of the condition of Muslim countries and did not talk against the British Government. If you know of any words I have used please let me know.'[2]

The rise of the Majlis to prominence in Hyderabad during the Thirties and Forties had some parallels with the rise of the All-India Muslim League, which gained greatly in power and influence during the same

period in British India. At the All-India level the Muslim League was disillusioned with Congress rule in the states during the period 1937-39. The resignation of the Congress governments after the unilateral declaration of war on behalf of India by the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow was celebrated by the All-India Muslim League with a so-called 'Deliverance Day.' In Hyderabad State, the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen was in a stronger position than the Muslim League at the all-India level, because the Congress had been banned by the Nizam's government even before it was formally created. Moreover, the Nizam was supporting the Majlis almost openly.

The Nizam had encouraged Bahadur Yar Jang and allowed him to build up the Majlis as a powerful force in the State, first, in order to counter the powers of his own Executive Council. It is no wonder that one of the members of the Council referred to the Nizam as the permanent leader of the opposition to his own government. Second, during the war the Nizam used the threat of Muslim popular force to try and convince the British that they should concede his claim to be declared King, but he did not succeed in this attempt. Third, there was a convergence of interests between the Nizam and the Majlis. The Majlis wanted the Nizam to be declared King of the Deccan. The Nizam wanted this also. However, unlike the Majlis, he wanted to be king in his own right, and not as a symbol of the sovereignty of the Muslim population. He encouraged the Majlis in its endeavours, hoping that the majority of his subjects would continue to support him as ruler, even after he approved the declaration of Hyderabad as a Muslim state.

Apart from the convergence of interests between the Nizam and the Majlis, there was a parallel in the rise of the Majlis and the Muslim League, as well as a convergence of interests on the part of the two Muslim bodies. Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang was active in the All-India Muslim movement, and had he lived longer, he might have emerged as one of its most important leaders.

The relationship between the Indian National Congress and the embryonic State Congress was not dissimilar, but there was an important difference. The insistence of the Nizam's government on the isolation of the state's political movements from the all- India Congress leadership had led to the parallel growth of three regional movements in the Telengana, Marathwada and Hyderabad Karnatak areas during the Thirties. The state leadership did not get an opportunity to build up links with the all-India leadership till the early Forties, and by this time the all-India Congress leadership had already distanced itself from the political

movements in the Indian states, presumably on the ground that the problem of these states would be solved when power was transferred by the British at an all-India level.

Thus the Majlis enjoyed a distinct edge over the State Congress, of which it took full advantage during the war years. During this time the Congress was largely dormant, due to the lack of clear policy guidelines from the central leadership, and differences among the state leaders themselves. On the other hand the Majlis leadership was riding high, enjoying the support of the Nizam as well as the All-India Muslim League, and often the tacit acceptance, if not the active support, of the Government of India.[3]

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During his preliminary survey of conditions in the state, Chhatari found that the Peshi or private secretary of the Nizam, Nawab Kazim Yar Jang and the Cabinet Secretary, Nawab Moin Nawaz Jang, were the leaders of the Mulki group, while the Bilgrami family (although they had been in Hyderabad for three generations) were labelled as non-Mulkis. He discovered that officials in Hyderabad were not inferior to others in their abilities, but their capabilities were paralyzed due to intrigues. In manners and culture he found anyone in Hyderabad, whatever be his religion or status, to be superior compaered to his equivalent in British India. This, Chhatari felt, was due to the influence of the ancient civilization which had lasted there for centuries, while it had been largely submerged by outside influences elsewhere in India.

When Chhatari met Theodore Tasker, the British Revenue Member of Council, the latter told him, as we have already seen in the beginning of this chapter, that, 'we are entrusted with the custody of a child who wishes to commit suicide. Our job is to prevent him from doing so.' This remark only increased Chhatari's anxieties and added to his responsibilities.

Sir Stafford Cripps, a British Labour Party leader and a prominent member of Churchill's War Cabinet, was sent to India on a delicate mission of enlisting the support of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League in the war effort with the promise of independence after the war. Chhatari was one of the dignitaries invited to Delhi to meet Cripps and put forth the views of the Indian states in general, and of Hyderabad in particular. Chhatari wrote that he found Cripps to be a good judge of men, with a commitment to India's independence. However, his proposals

were put in such a way that each party felt that its demands had been accepted. The Mission thus left the states more confused about their future than they had been before its arrival.

Writing his memoirs many years later, Chhatari felt that the states had most unrealistic expectations. They thought that the situation before the British came would be restored. They never imagined that the flood of democracy would wipe them out. 'How could there be personal rule in the states when democracy had come to British India?' he asked rhetorically.

Although he had made a shrewd analysis of the situation, Chhatari still had a brief to present on behalf of the Nizam. Even before the Cripps Mission had been announced, the Nizam was pressing Chhatari, through Kazim Yar Jang, his Private Secretary, to prepare notes claiming the independence of Hyderabad and the title of King for the Nizam. The Nizam also wanted to mount a public agitation with the help of the Majlis leader, Bahadur Yar Jang. The Nizam gave the impression that he was being pressurized in this matter by the Majlis leaders, but Chhatari was told by the latter that the Nizam himself was insisting on these demands, and had asked the Majlis to press for them. Chhatari was opposed to taking advantage of the British weakness during the war. But the Nizam sent Bahadur Yar Jang and Abul Hasan Syed Ali, the top Majlis leaders, to be in Delhi during the discussions, evidently to keep a watch on Chhatari.[4]

At the Nizam's instructions, Chhatari raised with Cripps and the Government of India officials the question of the return of Berar and the northern circars, as well as an access to the sea, which he considered essential to the independence of Hyderabad after the British departure from India. The reply of the Political Secretary, Sir Kenneth Fitze, was that legally the Nizam's demands for the return of lost territories were justified, but he asked whether it was really possible to implement them? Would those people like to join Hyderabad? It was apparent to Chhatari that the British officials had changed their minds because of the situation created by the war.

During Cripp's stay in India, which lasted several weeks, he changed his mind completely on the question of the rights of the Indian states after the transfer of power from British to Indian hands. He had been instructed by the War Cabinet to give due importance to a possible claim by Hyderabad for an independent status and direct relations with the Crown. However, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow did not even accept at face value Cripps' statement that the British were leaving India, and asked for it in

writing. The Political Secretary in the Government of India was unwilling to admit Cripps' early stand that the states could claim independence in case of a transfer of power to Indian hands. Finally, Cripps came around to this view. While still maintaining that paramountcy would not be transferred to the new Indian government, he also advised the rulers to discuss the future set up with Indian political leaders.

Both the Nizam and the British Resident in Hyderabad were deeply disappointed at the tone of discussions during the Cripps Mission. The Resident was glad that the mission had failed. The old steel frame had not accepted the inevitable collapse of the Indian Empire after the war, and could not believe that Churchill had been a party to Cripps' proposals.

Chhatari's view was that the British Government was under pressure from the Americans to grant independence to India, and had therefore sent Cripps on a mission which Churchill himself did not expect would succeed. In March 1943, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's representative, William Phillips visited Hyderabad, at his own suggestion, and stayed with Chhatari. He told the latter that Roosevelt had advised Churchill to grant India independence. Chhatari noticed that Phillips had the temerity to refuse an invitation to tea at the Residency; this showed the way the wind was blowing.

While the Nizam strongly supported the British war effort with men, materials and money, this support was meant primarily for public consumption. In fact, Chhatari felt that the ruler hated the British. This hatred was not for patriotic reasons, but because of the undue restrictions placed by them on his powers and freedom. The Nizam thought the British would lose the war, and he wanted to wrest the maximum concessions possible in their hour of weakness. One of his main preoccupations during the war was to demand greater concessions from the British in the form of the title of King or His Majesty for himself and that of His Highness for his second son, his elder son having already received the title of His Highness the Prince of Berar in 1936.

At a personal level the Nizam sought to observe the letter of the protocol rather than the spirit. When the Prince of Wales had visited Hyderabad in 1921, the Nizam did not see him off. This was remembered by King George V years later when Sir William Barton told him that he had been Resident at Hyderabad. The King asked if he was the same prince who had been rude to his son. When the Duke of Gloucester, the younger brother of the reigning King, George VI, visited Hyderabad in June 1942,

the Nizam at first wanted him to stay at the Residency instead of at the Falaknuma Palace, on grounds that there was a danger of bombardment. Chhatari was unhappy about this stand of the Nizam. Fortunately the ruler changed his decision later. The visit of the Duke was a success, and he enjoyed his visit to Hyderabad. The Nizam even saw him off at the airport.

In the early part of the war the price line was kept by the Hyderabad Government. Gradually however, the stock of foodgrains was depleted and the price of rice and wheat showed an increase. In 1943 the State balance-sheet showed a deficit of Rs 36,00,000. The Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammed found himself unable to impose income tax due to the powerful vested interests. He levied taxes instead on the new profits of businessmen and industrialists. Industrial activity in the State had begun before the war and received an impetus from the war.[5]

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Mohammed Ali Jinnah had had a continuous connection with Hyderabad since the early Thirties. The story of his visits throws interesting light on the attitude of the Nizam's government to all-India movements, as well as on the changing role of Jinnah himself in Indian politics and in Hyderabad State. The Nizam at first kept a distance from Jinnah, who was then a nationalist leader. Later he depended on Jinnah for advice and for keeping a check on the Majlis leader, Bahadur Yar Jang. Still later the relationship cooled off at a personal level, but the Nizam continued to have links with Jinnah and the Muslim League. The last Sadr-i-Azam of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali, held a Pakistan passport. Many regarded Hyderabad as an independent Muslim state in south India, the corollary of Pakistan in the north.

Jinnah visited Hyderabad early in 1937 accompanied by his sister, Fatima Jinnah, after the Nizam's Silver Jubilee celebrations. During the visit, he came into close contact with the Majlis leader, Bahadur Yar Jang, who became one of his most ardent supporters. As we have seen earlier, Jinnah visited Hyderabad again in 1939 when the political reforms were being finalized, and in 1941, when Sir Akbar Hydari was about to be replaced by the Nawab of Chhatari. By this time the relations between Jinnah and Bahadur Yar Jang had become very close, and the Nizam was using Jinnah as a foil to the latter when it was necessary.

It is difficult to explain the close friendship that developed between the cold, aloof, highly Westernized, elderly barrister who knew no Urdu, and the young, enthusiastic religious thinker, with courtly manners, steeped in Islamic traditions, and a powerful orator in Urdu. What brought them together was evidently the political quest for the preservation of Muslim rights in what they regarded as an increasingly Hindu India.

It is doubtful if they shared a common conception of the ideal Muslim state. Bahadur Yar Jang wanted Islam to be the basis of political life. Jinnah on the other hand considered a secular society to be the basis of a healthy political system. This was a major issue on which he differed with Mahatma Gandhi during the Khilafat movement in 1919-21. When Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, he made a speech which indicated that his views had not fundamentally changed. He wanted Pakistan to treat Hindus and Sikhs on a par with Muslims. Citizenship rights were to be determined by democratic norms and the rule of law, and not by the law of the Shariat.

The political alliance between the Nizam, the Majlis and Jinnah had many ups and downs. On the eve of the Second World War, the Majlis received a considerable boost due to the banning of the Hyderabad State Congress.

During the next two years, the alliance between the Majlis and All-India Muslim League was cemented. Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang agreed to be President of the All-India States' Muslim League which was a sort of riposte of the Muslim League to the All-India States' People's Conference and Praja Mandal, which had been functioning under the direct or indirect support of the leaders of the Indian National Congress.

While the Majlis was riding high on Hyderabad's political stage with the support of the Nizam, the leadership of the Hyderabad State Congress had lost considerable support with the younger elements, especially those who had been influenced by radical ideas derived from the West. Already in the late Thirties there was an emerging gulf between the senior right-wing leadership of the Congress (many of whom came from the Andhra Mahasabha) on the one hand, and the more radical elements led by Swami Ramanand Tirth, on the other.

Tirth had resented Mahatma Gandhi's withdrawal of satyagraha, but had tried as far as possible not to deviate from the directives of the national leader. During the period 1939–40 there was some activity under the

banner of the Hyderabad State National Conference, a new name adopted to accommodate the views of the state government which had objected to the name Hyderabad State Congress. However, when the name was actually changed the State authorities let down the leadership and denied that they had agreed to recognize the body even under its new name. In March 1940, the Hyderabad State National Conference was dissolved with the concurrence of Mahatma Gandhi.

In November 1940 Gandhi launched individual satyagraha at an all-India level. Only those leaders who believed in non-violence as a creed were permitted to offer satyagraha. Four Hyderabadis were arrested at Aurangabad for offering satyagraha, but this event had practically no impact in Hyderabad State as a whole. By mid-1940 the British faced a critical war situation and there was a strong sentiment in the country in favour of the British. Even Mahatma Gandhi said that he did not want India to gain independence out of Britain's ruin.

There was a divergence of opinion among the radicals and moderates in the Andhra Mahasabha. The former were increasingly influenced by communist ideas, while the latter were more cautious, desiring to keep on the good side of the regime. In 1944 the Andhra Mahasabha was captured by the radicals and the moderates set up a nationalist Andhra Mahasabha at Bhongir.

Meanwhile relations between Hindus and Muslims deteriorated. In March 1940 unruly elements among the Muslims went on a rampage and burnt a market in Bidar to the ground, after a Hindu killed a Muslim in a petty quarrel. There was an outcry outside the State against the aggressive stance of the Bidar Muslims, and even Mahatma Gandhi wrote to the Sadr-i-Azam, Sir Akbar Hydari, complaining about the incident. The Resident also felt that there was a new militancy among the Muslims of Hyderabad. The Congress began to lose the initiative to the Hindu Mahasabha. A polarization between the two communities became evident as the situation became more tense.

In July 1942 Mahatma Gandhi asked Ramanand Tirth to prepare for a mass movement, but divisions within the Congress made it impossible. Tirth himself courted arrest and was imprisoned at Nampally in Hyderabad. He was the only leader to be imprisoned at the time. Students however protested, and prevented the 1942 movement in Hyderabad from being an utter failure.

The ban on the Communist Party of India was lifted when it announced its support for what to it had become a 'People's War' after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Ten thousand people attended the Bhongir session of the Andhra Mahasabha which reduced its membership fee from four annas to one anna, and increased its membership from 20,000 to about 90,000. The agrarian movement took root in Nalgonda district, which had most oppressive landlords and was nearer to the Communist Party headquarters at Vijayawada. The Resident admitted that the problems were genuine, but was more concerned that the leaders of the revolt were inciting breaches of the peace.

The situation was aggravated by a severe food shortage caused by the cutting off of Burmese rice on the one hand and poor crops and smuggling of food-grains to British India on the other. A food procurement scheme, strictly enforced by flying squads, added to the woes of the farmer. The Maharahstra Parishad took a stand opposing food procurement, and gained popularity among the middle peasantry by 1944. In the Telengana area, on the other hand, there was an open split between the moderates and the radicals. The radicals, who now controlled the official Andhra Mahasabha, welcomed the stern measures of the Nizam's government, as they helped the landless labourers, while the middle peasantry was against the grain levies.

Ramanand Tirth had made a serious attempt to bring together the opposing views of the radicals and moderates at the State level, as well as a common programme for the three linguistic regions of the States, but made little headway on either count. He proposed a joint controlling committee instead of a merger of the three regional organizations and suggested making fresh demands on the state government to lift the ban on the State Congress. He also tried to bring together the Communists and nationalists in the Andhra Mahasabha. But the fact of the matter was that the moderates had now come to feel that their interests in the state would not be adequately protected by the 'federal' or 'united' constitution. [6]

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By early 1943, Bahadur Yar Jang was becoming increasingly impatient at the ruler's indecisiveness in siding with the Majlis. Among the demands which the Nizam asked Chhatari to press with the Government of India were the grant of the title of Grand Commander of the Indian Empire

(GCIE) for the Prince of Berar and adequate guns for the Hyderabad Army. The Prince of Berar received the title of the Garter of the British Empire (GBE) at the New Year honours on 1 January 1943.

Bahadur Yar Jang denounced the Garter of the British Empire awarded to the Prince of Berar as, 'a fresh seal on Hyderabad's subordination.' The ruler demanded a public apology but Bahadur Yar Jang after consulting his working committee justified his action, saying that the Asaf Jahi flag was,'not a personal flag of the Asaf Jahi dynasty but...an Islamic flag and a symbol of a great Islamic state. If it was considered a personal flag he would not lay down his life for it.'

On 22 March 1943, the Nizam issued a firman prohibiting Bahadur Yar Jang from making any public speeches or statements in or outside Hyderabad State for one year. Chhatari received this firman through the Peshi Minister. The Nizam seemed to be pleading with Bahadur Yar Jang to treat the ruler's firman with due respect, and pointing out that Bahadur Yar Jang had exceeded his limits. He was asked to be careful about what he said. [7]

It was Mohammed Ali Jinnah who brought about a compromise between Bahadur Yar Jang and the Nizam, under which the former issued a public apology, and the latter accepted it by a firman. Both the apology and firman were primarily intended for public consumption of the Hindus. In fact, the Nizam and Bahadur Yar Jang had been working closely together, but when Bahadur Yar Jang went off at a tangent, the Nizam sought Jinnah's intervention. After publication of the apology and Jinnah's return to Bombay, the Nizam thanked Jinnah for his help in settling the differences with Bahadur Yar Jang. Bahadur Yar Jang was not happy about the wording of the Nizam's reply and told Jinnah that he wished that he had also been a part of the negotiations. He also corresponded with him about filling vacancies in the Nizam's Executive Council. Chhatari was evidently unaware that Jinnah had approved the wording of Bahadur Yar Jang's apology. [8]

In a second firman, the Nizam called Bahadur Yar Jang's declaration on the Asaf Jahi flag an act of impertinence as well as of gross ingratitude for the honours and privileges he and his forbears had enjoyed from the bearers of this flag.

Bahadur Yar Jang now asked for permission to renounce his jagir, mansab, titles, and privileges and offered them as nazar to the Nizam. Since he now regarded himself as a private citizen and no longer a jagirdar,

he stopped referring to the Nizam in the traditional fulsome phrases like *Bandegane Ali, Pir-o-Murshid*, etc., and addressed him simply as *Aap* (You).

However, the breach between the ruler and his subject was not as final as it appeared to be. When Bahadur Yar Jang (now Bahadur Khan, without his title) wanted permission to address the Muslim League and All-India States' Muslim League in Delhi, the Nizam, in consultation with Jinnah, replied that since he had resigned his honours, Bahadur Khan was free to speak outside the State, although for certain reasons the firman could not be modified. These 'reasons' were evidently the need to maintain an appearance of displeasure with Bahadur Khan for the sake of the British. The Resident felt that the Nizam's reply confirmed his basic untrustworthiness : 'He must have been mediating this plan of evading responsibility for some time...otherwise why this remarkable eagerness to show the limits of his powers over his subjects outside his state?...The Nizam has double-crossed everyone.'

The Residency's opinion was shrewd and basically correct. The deviousness of the intrigue did not endear the Nizam to Hyderabad's Muslims either. Many of them had become blind admirers of Bahadur Khan. After the Nizam stated in a firman that when the Majlis leader, 'stands on the public platform, he loses control of his tongue,' and debarred him from public speaking for a year, there were angry demonstrations by Muslims, a day-long hartal of Muslim shops, and violent statements in the press. In August 1943 when he was deported from Kashmir and debarred from addressing the Kashmir Muslim League Conference, he was greeted at Hyderabad on his return by a crowd of about 5,000. The train was decorated with flags and there were shouts of 'Allah-o-Akbar', 'Qaid-i-Millat Zindabad', 'Sher-i-Islam Zindabad'. Standing in an open car he thanked the crowds and denounced the arbitrary action of the Kashmir government. He was taken in procession to his house and many prominent personalities called on him, including some Marwaris and other Hindus. The Political Department commented on 14 April 1944 that, 'the real truth is that the Nizam is afraid of Bahadur Khan's influence and is always trying to propitiate him.'[9]

In order to circumvent the order prohibiting public talks, Bahadur Khan gave 'private talks' to limited audiences and left to Abul Hasan Syed Ali and to the editor of *Waqt*, Abdur Rahman Rais, the task of addressing Majlis meetings. They were even more fiery than their leader. In July 1943, the government prohibited the public or private entertainment

of more than fifty persons at a time without prior government permission.

Bahadur Khan was re-elected president of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen for one more year on 6 October 1943. Despite his sharply-worded speech threatening to defy the ban because it had been dictated to the Nizam by the British, the Nizam told the British Government that the wording of his speech implied regret for his earlier rudeness. The Nizam therefore proposed to return Bahadur Khan's jagir and title by July.

The fifteenth session of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen was held between 24 and 26 May 1944. Bahadur Khan declined to be president for the next year. The young firebrand leader had now reached a plateau so far as his career in Hyderabad was concerned. He could have secured a membership of the Nizam's Executive Council without any difficulty, but that would have meant accepting British hegemony over the Nizam's dominions, which was anathema to him, even for a transitional period. He could have staked his claim to a place of honour in the All-India Muslim League but that would have meant abandoning Hyderabad, where he was committed to making the Nizam an independent king. At the same time, his relations with the Nizam had deteriorated, as the latter still pinned his hopes on the British alliance as a means of attaining the status of King. Bahadur Khan had thus become a prisoner of his own ideology, and had reached a dead end in his career.

On 25 June 1944, Bahadur Khan attended a dinner at the house of Justice Hashim Ali Khan. He took one puff of a hookah, felt giddy and fell unconscious. He died at ten minutes past nine o'clock the same night. His widow said that he had been poisoned through the hookah, but no inquiry was conducted, as she declined to allow a post mortem.

The next morning the Nizam joined the crowds outside Bahadur Khan's house and tried to console the people. Condolence meetings were held. According to one version, Bahadur Khan had been seriously ill for a month, and had had a raging fever at Warangal. It is therefore possible that Bahadur Khan's death at the early age of thirty-eight was caused by a sudden and massive heart attack, of a type which has become more common in recent years. There was however a widespread feeling that the death was caused by foul play. The fact that a post mortem was not done added to the rumours, but even a post mortem might not have settled the issue, as there would have been accusations that it had been fixed in advance.

The Nawab of Chhatari visited the Nizam at King Kothi the same day. The ruler asked him what he thought about the demise of Bahadur Khan. Chhatari replied that the ruler had lost one of his major servants, but the ways of God are not devoid of wisdom. The Nizam said, 'his further rise would have led to unrest,' and continued to talk about the deceased leader. A few days later, on 30 June, the Resident also expressed the view that while he was personally sorry, the event would not adversely affect the future of the State. [10]

The removal from the scene of a dominant figure who had achieved incredible popularity at such an early age could not but have an effect on the organization which he led. His successor, Abul Hassan Syed Ali, started life as a moderate, turned into a strong supporter of Muslim nationalism as the secretary of the Majlis, and later again turned moderate. He was one of the sixteen representatives of Hyderabad in the first Indian Parliament in July 1950.[11]

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The administrative and financial reforms introduced by Hyderabad State during the period when Sir Akbar Hydari functioned as Finance Member of the Nizam's Executive Council provided the framework in which a new economic policy could be formulated. Not withstanding the backwardness of the Hyderabad State in the field of agriculture, there was one area in which it sought to make a great leap forward. This was the area of industry. While the agricultural sector was still trying to tackle the problems of depression during the early Thirties through the remission of land revenue, reductions in customs duties, famine relief works, the maintenance of proper records of rights, and the provision of debt relief, the Department of Industry and Commerce was taking steps to improve the quality of handlooms and indigenous handicrafts like the woollen carpets of Warangal, the inlaid metal works of Karimnagar and the traditional Bidari ornaments. During the late nineteenth century, the collieries at Singareni in Warangal District had been developed. Three new coalfields were established between 1916 and 1941. The state government took over the coalfields in 1944, and administered it through managing agents. Several textile mills were set up in the private sector between 1875 and 1934. In 1941 most of them were employing between one and 3,000 workers each. An Industrial Trust Fund (ITF) had been set up as early as 1929, and had taken over the Osmanshahi Textile Mills

when they were about to be closed by the managing agents in 1933. Between 1942 and 1945 the ITF bought shares in a machine tools factory, two chemical works, a tin works, a porcelain and enamel works, and a marble-quarrying company. It also started a number of new industries and ran the Deccan Airways.

Among the private entrepreneurs who benefited greatly from the support of the Industrial Trust Fund were Mir Laik Ali (originally a government official), Ahmed Alladin and Abdul Karim Babu Khan. Most of these had close links with the bureaucracy or the Majlis Ittehad ul-Muslimeen or with both.

There was a strong cooperative movement in Hyderabad State, which pinned its hopes for the solution of the State's economic problems on the introduction of cooperative farming, and even on state-managed collective farms. It was held, however, that industrialization had to precede radical changes in agriculture, because large-scale farming would require the mechanization of agriculture. This was an indication of the spread of Keynesian economic ideas by the early Forties as well as the optimism of well-meaning bureaucratic planners who ignored the fact that there was little chance of developing an economic surplus. The jagirdars constituted a privileged class who would never allow the introduction of an agricultural income tax. Since agriculture was still the mainstay of the economy, this kind of a tax was the only way in which the resources required for the kind of massive planning effort that was contemplated — the estimate amounted to 250 to 260 crores of rupees — could have been raised.[12]

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Mir Osman Ali Khan used to write regularly for the Urdu newspapers especially for the *Nizam Gazette*, a sort of court mouthpiece which published news of the palace as well as firmans, poetry and statements by the ruler. The Nizam also utilized the newspapers to convey messages and warnings to his subjects, whom he regarded not very differently from members of his household, to be praised, admonished or simply advised on their activities. For example, in February 1940, a note by Osman Ali Khan appeared in the newspapers saying that some persons imagined that their stipends which had been cancelled could be restored for the asking. This was aimed not at Zafar Ali Khan and Abdullah Khan Khasmandi,

but at Khwaja Hassan Nizami, who was reported to have taken the hint to heart.

In the same fortnight, four 'salaams' on Hazrat Ali, three in Persian and one in Urdu, appeared under the Nizam's name. There was also one in Urdu by Maharaja Kishen Pershad in the same metre. A note by the court poet was also published, pointing out how much better the Nizam's poem was.[13]

The Nizam's sons continued to be a cause of concern to him. On 28 June 1942 Osman Ali Khan wrote to the Resident Claude Henry Gidney about Moazam Jah, that, 'he leads his life under incongenial atmosphere or wasting his time in reciting poetry before an audience of undesirable people who flatter him by saying Jee Huzoor or mislead him in order to gain their own end. (I warned him more than once to get rid of them).'

On 5 November 1942, the Nizam wrote to the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow in a very frank and pessimistic letter that the brothers were extravagant. He also complained that they had borrowed large sums from private persons. Shopkeepers were sometimes asked to delay in sending bills to the Hyderabad Government for one year or more. He went on to make a most damaging admission : 'Neither of my sons has any real inclination for work no matter what the nature of the work might be. On the contrary, they have a hobby for occupations not quite in keeping with the dignity of their position; and it is only for the sake of mere show or fun that it is stated about them that they are fit for certain kinds of duty or that they possess the necessary ability for doing work of a particular nature. If these assertions were put to a practical test, their truth or falsehood would soon be proved. I hope Your Excellency will pardon my being so outspoken on the subject.'

Moazam Jah's appointment as Director of a cement company in Bombay, with the approval of the Resident and the Viceroy had proved a failure. He was unable to apply his mind and was likely to become an object of ridicule. The one-year appointment was over. He had used the Bombay trips for dissipation and shopping. He imagined he could do a lot of work, the Nizam felt, but his physique and health did not permit it—he was disturbed by small things and could not endure the hardship of any real business.

Comptrollers were 'worse than useless' whether European or Indian. Their advice was not acted upon and they were bypassed. Only a few days later on 20 November 1942, the Nizam wrote to Lord Linlithgow that his

elder son's debts of nine lakh rupees had been paid only two years ago due to his senseless extravagance. His private life was no better than Moazam Jah's, but no further liabilities had accumulated so far. He had given in writing his assurance not to repeat past mistakes, nor do anything derogatory to his great position. The Nizam had proof that he was keeping his promise. He had also acquired a religious frame of mind.

On 11 December 1942, the Viceroy wrote to the Nizam that he was glad to hear that the latter's elder son, His Highness the Prince of Berar was showing, 'a marked increase in the sense of obligation of his high position. I am deeply distressed to learn that Your Exalted Highness' younger son, Sahibzada Moazam Jah is still giving you anxiety by the extent of debts and his attempt to conceal them. Since he is no longer a youth (36) I hope he will abandon his bad habits and (to) show a sense of responsibility.'

On 16 December, the Nizam wrote to Linlithgow : 'Your letter will be shown to the boys. They must know what obligation or responsibility attach to their respective positions, or station they enjoy, not only in family connection, but also in the estimation of their country, since they are no longer boys but grown-up young men to see the difference between good and bad and also to earn by their good conduct the approbation of those who occupy high positions in the world.'

In January 1943, with reference to Moazam Jah's pressing desire to settle down outside Hyderabad, the Nizam wrote to him in his quaint English that the fact that, 'I am an outspoken man is known to everybody: therefore I say in plain language that this letter of yours has no value before my eyes. For you know very well what was the character or value of your previous undertakings or pledges given to me, both verbal or in writing. Therefore I am sorry to look upon this measure of yours in the same light.'[14]

In 1944, the elder prince, Azam Jah was receiving a monthly allowance, of Rs 25,000 and his younger brother was receiving Rs 20,000 per month from the civil list. These figures had been enhanced from the earlier figures of Rs 20,000 and Rs 15,000 per month fixed for the two brothers in 1930. Apart from the civil list, an amount of Rs 2,500 per month was paid to Azam Jah as his salary as Commander-in-Chief and Rs 2,000 per month was paid to Moazam Jah as Chairman of the Hyderabad City Improvement Board. Ironically, when the princes had first been granted amounts from the civil list in January 1930, the Nizam

had protested vigorously. But the Resident, Sir William Barton, had pointed out that the princes were being brought up under squalorly conditions because of the parsimony of the Nizam. They did not know how to handle money and behaved irresponsibly. The Nizam was therefore forced to accept Barton's proposal for their payment from State funds.

Within a few years the boys had gone to the other extreme. In October 1935 a meeting had to be called which was attended by the Resident, Finance Member of the Nizam's Council, Sir Akbar Hydari and two other members, Tasker and Mahdi Yar Jang, to discuss the liquidation of debts run up by the two boys.

By April 1944, the debts of the princes totalled Rs 16,76,870 five annas and nine pies. Much of the expenditure related to expenses on the maintenance of race horses, Rs 7.7 lakhs was due to Messrs. N.M. Gokaldas and Company, Rs 3.13 lakhs to J.H. Marshal for training charges and upkeep, Rs 2.88 lakhs to the Bhopal Stud Farm, and Rs 1.01 lakhs to G. Tarachand Bankers.[15]

Thus by the early Forties the two princes had become confirmed wastrels and spendthrifts. The Prince of Berar was described by the Foreign office as an 'Oaf'. The Maharaja of Kashmir said the prince caused him shame, 'flaunting his mistresses and generally behaving in most unbecoming ways.'

The British officials however felt that the Nizam was himself to blame for the way his sons had turned out. He had been jealous of his sons ever since they were children, they felt, and had tried to keep them under strict control it was pointed out that the Nizam received a civil list of rupees fifty lakhs per year under Lord Curzon's decision. The Nizam had agreed to an increase in his sons' allowance from State funds, they felt, because he knew of the debts, and wanted them to be met from State funds, so that his pocket was not affected.

The death of the Nizam's mother in 1944 was the occasion for an attempt at political rapprochement by the moderate leaders of the Congress with the ruler. While the Communists were able to capture the Andhra Mahasabha in 1944, and the Majlis was also building up its strength, the Congress seemed to have no cards in its hands. The leadership of the Indian National Congress was of the view that the Indian states would fall in line once the transfer of power took place in British India.

The radical leadership of the State Congress led by Ramanand Tirth attempted to follow the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi, but the moderate leaders were not quite willing to close the option of a settlement with the Nizam. They therefore took advantage of the Nizam's mother's death to make an attempt to mend relations with the ruler. A few of them, including M. Narsing Rao and G. Ramachari, joined the funeral procession, and thus caught his eye. Some negotiations followed, but this attempt at public relations did them little good. The negotiations came to naught as the Nizam was strongly opposed to any idea of responsible government.[16]

The death of his mother was no doubt a traumatic event for Mir Osman Ali Khan. He had visited her house daily during her lifetime, and visited her grave regularly after her death. At his own wish he was himself buried in the Judi Mosque, next to her grave, rather than in the Mecca Masjid, where his father and all his ancestors were buried. The reports of the British Residency to the Government of India indicate that his patronage of Shia institutions and ceremonies was accentuated after his mother's death. He constructed a hall, the Azakhana Zehra, as a gathering place for Shias during the mourning period in Muharram, naming it after his mother. In February 1944 the Nizam observed Muharram at Azakhana Zehra. The old Alams were brought out. There was much resentment by Sunnis, some of whom argued that only a Hanafi Sunni could occupy the masnad of Hyderabad and the Nizam was therefore forfeiting his gaddi.

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On 17 November 1944, the Political Adviser to the Government of India, F.V. Wylie, had received a report that the Nizam was ill, and took the opportunity of recording a note on the subject : 'What are we to do when the Nizam dies?' Answering his own question, he said the moment this happens the first necessary step may be to surround King Kothi with British troops and move its inhabitants elsewhere. The Prince of Berar was largely worthless, and he would succeed his father. The Political Department felt that the British must lay down conditions before recognizing the Prince of Berar as the Nizam after his father's death. It was pointed out that, 'one of the traditional duties of a political officer when the Ruler of an Indian state dies is to take precautions for the security of state property, particularly treasure and jewels.'

The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, asked cautiously, first, how ill the Nizam was; and second, what justification there was for seizure or protection of the Nizam's treasure. The reply in brief was that, 'the Nizam's excesses had weakened him; his creatures are stealing from him. There will be riots and all sorts of goings-on if we do not intervene and remove the hundreds and hundreds of women in the treasure rooms ,The Viceroy was evidently satisfied with this reply as he responded with the single word,Thank You.'[17]

The inquiries, which were initiated in November 1944, continued for several months thereafter. The main thrust of the debate was the steps that would be necessary to set right matters both in the Nizam's palace as well as in the State after the anticipated death of Mir Osman Ali Khan. There was a discussion of his personal fortune, and the extent to which it legitimately belonged to him. There was a further analysis of the state of affairs of the administration and the steps necessary to improve it. Lastly, there were proposals on the manner in which the Nizam's successor, the Prince of Berar, should be persuaded to accept the administrative and other reforms which the Political Department considered necessary to improve matters in Hyderabad.

Somewhat to the disappointment of the British officials, the Nizam recovered from his illness. Wylie recorded that the Nizam looked 'distressingly well' when last seen. He was handing over the post of Adviser to Conrad Corfield within a few weeks. The inquiry is of considerable interest because of the light it throws on the personal fortune of the Nizam, on the administration of the State and on the character of the regime in general.

The question of the magnitude of the Nizam's fortune was not a new one. It had been discussed at least from the year 1936 onwards. The British considered themselves responsible for ascertaining the wealth of the Nizam not only because of their position as the suzerain power in India, but also for very practical reasons. The Nizam frequently requested them to assist him in sorting out his financial affairs, and especially the problems he faced regarding the indebtedness of his sons. Another reason for their concern was that it had often been felt that a good deal of the personal wealth of the last Nizam had been acquired illegally through the receipt of nazars on a very large scale. Third, the wealth of the Nizam was reported to be scattered in many different forms in the palace itself and not much of it had been invested. This situation would naturally lead to

serious problems in case the Nizam suddenly died and there was no procedure laid down for disposing of his properties.

During the 1930s a former official of the Indian Civil Service, Sir F. Gauntlett, who was then engaged in financial dealings at the London Stock Exchange, made a proposal to the Nizam about the disposal of his treasure. The proposal gives some indication of the nature of the Nizam's wealth and the form in which it then existed, though not its quantity. He suggested that the gold bullion should be sold in London or New York, the silver bullion should be sold in New York, the gold coins in Bombay, and the rupees should be paid into a bank. In addition, he felt, the jewels and precious stones should be sold in London, Paris, New York or Amsterdam. The proceeds of his wealth should be sold and invested through the Imperial Bank of India in London. The stock exchange could be operated in New York through the National City Bank of New York. The interest from the amounts invested should be reinvested if it was not required.[18]

In 1936 the Nizam had laid down the principle that, 'just as the State of Hyderabad is a sacred trust held by its ruler, so Sarf-i-Khas is a sacred trust to be carefully guarded' for the maintenance of the Nizam's relatives and other dependants. Therefore, the Nizam planned to settle on his eldest son, Azam Jah, a share of his property, in order to enable him to receive a regular income of Rs 22,500 per month during his lifetime. Such an amount was already being received by him as a salary from the civil list, but that amount would have to be transferred to his three-year-old son, Mukarram Jah, as the heir apparent. Since the boy was to succeed his father in the rulership of the State, his dignity had to be maintained. The grandfather would also leave other amounts for the boy, and for other family members, from the Sarf-i-Khas.[19]

In July 1936 the then Resident, Duncan G. McKenzie, wrote to the Political Adviser to the Government of India that the Nizam's legitimate sources of income were from the following sources: Sarf-i-Khas lands; customs revenue from Hyderabad city and certain surrounding tracts; monies drawn from Diwani or State funds, corresponding to a civil list. The estimate of the first two items in 1899 was Rs 31,33,000, and that from the third item was fifty lakhs. In 1936 the income from Sarf-i-Khas was Rs 1,50,00,000 and from Customs Rs 17,50,000. A comparison was then made between the proportion of the Nizam's private income to the

total State revenue and the proportion which operated in the United Kingdom.

The Government of India officials estimated that in all probability, no ruler in history had possessed so large a private fortune. The Nizam could easily live on the interest of his income. Moreover, his 'private hoards' were, 'almost beyond computation.' He took two lakh rupees per annum in nazars and a good deal more in bribes. In 1934 he got Rs 15.20 lakhs from the death of his half-brother, Nawab Salabat Jah and three lakhs from the younger son of Khan-i-Khanan, to recognize him as heir to his father (in preference to grandsons by an older son who predeceased). In 1935 he took Rs 13.5 lakhs in bribes and nazars.

In 1927, Lord Irwin had circulated a note to all princes drawing up principles of the government and administration and urging moderation in the rulers' civil lists. However two years later, Sir William Barton, the then Resident had urged the Government of India to debit the cost of training and education of the Sahibzadas, Prince Azam Jah and Prince Moazam Jah, to the State budget as a means of ensuring their emancipation. The Nizam strongly opposed the proposal at the time because, as the Resident put it, he wanted to continue, 'the state of slavery in which they were then living.' By 1936 however, he had changed his views and wanted the Government of India to provide for the establishments of his sons, grandsons and other family members not only for the present but also after his death.

The Resident, McKenzie, pointed out that an amount of Rs 9,97,853 in Hali Sicca (Nizam's currency), equivalent to Rs 8,53,550 in Indian currency, was being debited to the State for the maintenance of Azam Jah, Moazam Jah, Mukarram Jah, Basalat Jah and the Turkish royal family in Europe. Moreover in previous years large amounts had been incurred on the personal expenses of the Nizam and his family as follows: Rs 9,41,598 (Indian. currency) from 1930–31 to 1933–34 on buildings and tours of the Nizam; Rs 80,57,973 (Hali Sicca) for expenses of the princes in connection with marriage and dowry, journeys to Europe, allowances, establishment, residences etc.; Rs 4,01,905 as expenses for Basalat Jah from 1930–31 to 1933–34; an amount of Rs 50,000 on the Haj expenses of Dulhan Pasha in 1936 and Rs 5,21,246 (Hali Sicca) on the Turkish royal family. The grand total thus came to Rs 1,12,02,611 (Hali Sicca) equivalent to Rs 96,82,559.9 annas, five pies in Indian currency.

The Viceroy's Political Adviser was firmly of the view that the 'posthumous arrangements for his (the Nizam's) sons at the cost of the state government cannot be tolerated.' He wanted the Resident's suggestion to be tried, although he was not sure if it would work. He was glad that Lord Willingdon had not accepted the Nizam's contention, contained in a letter to him after his retirement in England, that he had earlier agreed to a civil list appointment for Mukarram Jah. The Resident's suggestion was that the Viceroy should reopen the matter and say that the Nizam's family expenses are a legitimate charge on the Sarf-i-Khas. A good deal of recurring and non-recurring expenditure which was borne from state funds should have been met from Sarf-i-Khas. If the Nizam were to be recalcitrant, the state could pay the money and recover it from the Nizam's civil list amount of fifty lakh at the end of the year. This could have been done in 1929 but was not thought of at that time.[20]

Evidently the Government of India was able to impose some sort of discipline on the Nizam as a result of the dialogue which had been initiated in 1936. In 1938, as we have seen, the Nizam took steps to set up a trust to protect the interests of Prince Moazam Jah. However, in the early Forties there was a further increase in the indebtedness of the Nizam's two sons. In January 1944 the Resident spoke to the Nizam about the need of a trust for his family property, pointing out that the Nizam should make provision for other members of the family besides the Prince of Berar, who would inherit the Sarf-i-Khas. The Nizam said that he would defer the matter till the end of the war. He expressed the view however that it was a 'debt of honour' (sic) for the eldest prince to maintain the family of his father.

By 1945 the Nizam's financial affairs were not in a much better state that they had been in 1936 — hence the anxiety of the British officials to ensure that adequate permanent arrangements were made, in case of the Nizam's sudden demise. The Nizam had for some time been concerned about his second son, Moazam Jah who was not only more prodigal and improvident than his older brother, but was in greater danger of suffering hardship and privation, because when Azam Jah became the ruler the latter might not help his brother, but allow events to take their course.

After several such discussions, in April 1945 the Nizam expressed the desire to form a family trust, in addition to the trust formed for Moazam Jah, to provide for his many illegitimate children after his death.

The details of the proposal were outlined in a letter from Nizam to the Resident, Sir Arthur Lothian.

In August 1945, Lothian wrote to the Government of India that the Nizam was keen that after Azam Jah's death the Resident should be a trustee. He regarded Princess Durreshahvar as too strong a personality and did not want her to be a trustee. Lothian hoped the Government of India would agree to his request. He pointed out that the Nizam was, 'such a curious character that I believe it to be true that he would miss his British Resident very much although he spends much of his time trying to circumvent that officer.' He therefore felt that the Nizam's desire for continued direct relations with the crown, 'gives voice to his genuine feelings.'

Lothian's solicitousness about providing for the dependants of his family out of the accumulated capital at the ruler's disposal did not meet with any enthusiastic response from the Government of India. Wylie, the Political Adviser, was 'not enamoured of the trust idea'. A private trust would maintain the Nizam's descendants 'forever' which was not the government's intention. The idea of public trust for the management of the Nizam's whole property was also 'very dubious'. He felt that the treasure accumulated by the Nizam was the result of over taxation and gross mismanagement of parts of State machinery, 'in order to provide material for his (the Nizam's) jackdaw properties.' He continued, 'I would myself prefer that he was drawn to his father without making disposition of any sort whether for his family or generally.' If however, Lothian felt that he should pursue the matter, he could do so officially and the proposal would be considered.

In defence of his proposal, Lothian pointed out that, 'the trust in question should be formed out of his private fortune so that a question of his family maintenance falling on the State budget in perpetuity does not seem to arise.'[21]

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In a letter to Wylie written from Ooty on 10 May 1945, Lothian, the Resident, discussed the constitutional changes and other steps to be taken in Hyderabad on the death of the seventh Nizam. He wanted the initiative in selecting candidates for Members of Council to be transferred from the Nizam to the President. The Nizam should be required to accept recommendations by a two-thirds majority of the Council. The Peshi office of

the Nizam should be abolished or remodelled. The Sarf-i-Khas, Paigah and jagir estates should be incorporated in Diwani for administrative purposes, and reorganized on the lines of those portions of Sarf-i-Khas known as 'Diwani-Mufawiza'. The palace and separate city police should be combined with the district police in one common service.

A code should be introduced for the regulation of succession to jagirs and Inam lands, and the safeguarding and disposal of the Nizam's treasure. Lothian felt that the maximum the Nizam would have collected would be two crores per annum for every year of his rule. This came to seventy crore rupees or fifty hundred million pounds, which with interest added and the value of the jewellery he is reputed to have seized, would give a present valuation of round about hundred million pounds. In this valuation he did not include an estimate of his inherited State jewellery which was said to be fabulous. It was impossible to attempt any estimate of this jewellery. The Nizam must have saved much from his official civil list and a great deal more from the income of his private estate.

Lothian felt that part of the Nizam's fortune must have been acquired legitimately.Thus the proposal to declare all his property as trust was not justified. A half-way solution would be, after making provision for various trusts, and any necessary death and accession expenses, to try and induce the new ruler, as his 'Inaugural Boon' for his people to constitute the remainder as a public trust, 'to be administered by a Board of management somewhat on the lines of Carnegie, Rockefeller, or Nuffield Foundations, and devoted to projects of a public nature in the state, particularly in the Sarf-i-Khas lands, for the benefit of people, such as the development of medical, educational, communication and irrigation schemes.'

The additional items he proposed were the introduction of constitutional reforms, and judicial reforms, the increased delegation of powers to Council, the regulation of the presentation of nazars by rule, even for the Prince of Berar. As a *quid pro quo*, the British would have to give the Prince of Berar a larger civil list in exchange for the constitutional delegation of power.

Among the administrative steps which the Political Department wanted to impose on the Nizam's government were that the Nizam should be required to accept a recommendation made by a two-third majority of Council. He should not be able to play off non-official members against the others.

The post of the Nizam's Private or Peshi Secretary should eventually be abolished. In the meantime, it should be downgraded to State Secretary

under the control of the Council. The ruler should be accessible to Council members with the consent of the President. The Sarf-i-Khas, Paigah and jagir estates should be transferred to the State (Diwani) for administrative purposes. However forty per cent of the State was not under Diwani, ten per cent was Sarf-i-Khas and thirty per cent jagir. The opposition of the palace and jagirdars prevented the incorporation of these in the State except in regard to excise, drugs and police administration which had been partially taken over. Big estates retained individual powers, except for High Court control over judges and magistrates. There was no separation of judiciary and executive in most cases. Wartime regulations of food, cloth, moneylenders, debt conciliation, public health were not enforced in jagirs. The quality of administration was poor and corruption was rife.

The Sarf-i-Khas fetched the Nizam two crore rupees per annum. This was a rough estimate. Annual expenditure was sixty lakhs. If Sarf-i-Khas were to be taken over, the Nizam would be compensated at two crores. This takeover was highly desirable to prevent the Nizam dangling offers of posts in Sarf-i-Khas before officials as a post-retirement benefit. Except by compulsion the new ruler may not agree to reduce his claim to full compensation for the Sarf-i-Khas income.

The abolition of the palace police and the separation of city police from district police, and the fusion of all into one service was considered to be highly desirable. The three to four hundred strong palace CID was paid for from the city police budget. However, reports on zenana ladies and highly placed citizens and officials were wrong in principle and were moreover often inaccurate. The city police was not under the Director-General of Police, a British officer, because the Kotwal was reporting to the Nizam for three hours a day. This was a 'medieval use' of the city police.[22]

It is significant that as late as 1944, the British in India were planning not for the day they would have to leave the shores of India but for the day when the seventh Nizam would pass away and the improvements they could make in the administration after that event. Towards the end of the Second World War, they were planning the future of Hyderabad as if nothing was going to change. The Cripps Mission and the greatly increased power of the United States of America had left them unimpressed. Their concern for the future of the administration of the State was however praiseworthy. The negative feelings which the Residency used to create among some of the Indian rulers were not entirely divorced from the concern felt by men like Sir William Barton and Sir Arthur Lothian for

the welfare of the states, people, provided the official policies permitted them to express their concern.

The problems the British officials had outlined were to be solved only after an armed intervention by the post-independence Government of India, which retained the Nizam on the gaddi, but with almost no powers. The new regime was able to transform the situation on the lines visualized by the Political Department, and go beyond it to undertake major land reforms.

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The Nawab of Chhatari had been considered for the post of Sadr-i-Azam of the Nizam's Executive Council some years before he actually took office in late 1941. The British trusted him, but they found him weak in dealing with the Nizam. They were concerned more with the Nizam's increasing tendency to demand political concessions, especially the title of king for himself. The Nizam took advantage of the weakness of the Congress movement in the State to encourage the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen and its fiery leader, Bahadur Yar Jang to build himself up as a spokesman of the Muslim community. The British did not interfere in this endeavour, perhaps because they saw the Majlis as a lesser evil in comparison to the Congress.

The Majlis had emerged as a close ally of the All-India Muslim League; the two movements ran on parallel lines. Bahadur Yar Jang became President of the All-India States' Muslim League and thus began to emerge as a national Muslim leader. His arrogant stance in relation to the Nizam as well as the British was in contrast to his role as a humble follower of Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League. His sudden death in June 1944 gave a temporary respite to the Nizam and the President of his Council but one of his successors, Qasim Razvi, proved to be as difficult as Bahadur Yar Jang had been, but lacked Bahadur Yar Jang's political skills.

In his private affairs the Nizam was seriously hamstrung by the lack of responsible financial behaviour by his two sons. The administration of the Nizam's private estate was extremely lax, and there was no guarantee that his fabulous wealth would not be stolen if he suddenly died. However, the Nizam, contrary to all expectations, not only outlived the British Raj, but lived twenty years after independence.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ABORTIVE REFORMS AND DEEPENING CRISIS

> It was like looking at seventeenth-century England. Reason says that Charles I was impossible and yet he steals our sympathy by his dignity in adversity, by his good manners, his taste in art, his style. It was much the same with the nobles of Hyderabad. Their courtesy and good humour were unfailing; their clothes were enchanting. There was a special pleasure in talking to the ladies... It was distasteful in the extreme that the British should show to these people such contempt for past obligations and such callous disregard for the decencies of diplomacy. In Hyderabad, it is permissible to stab a man in the back but you must never be rude to him—a Muslim in Delhi had said to me. We did both.
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> — Philip Mason, *A Shaft of Sunlight,* p. 214

Nawab Mahdi Yar Jang, Member of the Nizam's Executive Council: in a conversation with Sir Walter Monckton ;

> Sir Walter, do you know the difference between the English constitution and that of the Nizam's Dominions? In the Nizam's Dominions, the ruler appoints the government, but the ruler is himself the Leader of the Opposition.

As the Second World War drew to a close, there was a mood of expectancy in India. It was felt that the old order was ending. Indian soldiers and officers who had taken part in the war were no longer overawed by the prestige of the British. They had seen the fighting capacities of the volunteer British armies in the field in the Middle East, North Africa and Italy as well as in Singapore, Malaya, Burma and North Eastern India. In 1946, a naval mutiny erupted in Bombay protesting against ill-treatment by British officers, and turning eventually into a full-fledged revolt against the British. The Indian National Army (INA)

leader, Subhas Chandra Bose who had been President of the Indian National Congress in 1938 and had later worked with the Germans and the Japanese during the war became a national hero overnight for his armed resistance to the British presence in India.

The trials of three Indian officers at the Red Fort in Delhi became a signal for popular support to the INA officers under trial, instead of serving as a rallying point for the British, as the latter had hoped.[1]

Some of the Indian princes had fought in the war, side by side with the British, but were not unaffected by the upsurge of patriotic feeling in India. While the people of British India wanted to overthrow British rule, these princes became passionately involved in the move to replace British rule by their own self-government in their states.

The new situation gave rise to three movements in princely states which would have been unthinkable a few years before—first, a desire to broadbase the administration and associate popular elements with it through internal reforms; second, the trend towards formation of regional unions of contiguous states intended to give small states the benefit of a more effective and modern administrative machinery. There was also a third trend, towards the formation of a larger union of states comprising the major Indian states. It was seen as a kind of confederation of India, intended to provide a check on the Congress which was fast emerging as the dominant force in British India.

It is interesting to speculate on the consequences these movements would have produced had there been a Conservative government in power in Britain when the war ended. Lord Linlithgow, who had been Viceroy of India from 1936 to 1943 was a supporter of a Federation, which would have given the Indian states considerable bargaining power in relation to the British Indian provinces. However, the Secretary of State for India in the late Thirties was Sir Samuel Hoare and supported the diehards in the India Office in London who did not want to give up control either in British India or in the states, and were able to delay the implementation of the Government of India Act for two years from 1935 to 1937. During the next two years Linlithgow made a sincere attempt to persuade the Indian states to opt for a Federation. In this endeavour he faced the opposition not only of the conservative rulers but also of his own Foreign and Political Departments which resisted the move towards a Federation, and did not wish to pressurize the rulers to grant self-government to their peoples. One of the few exceptions was F.V.Wylie, who at the time of

transfer of power, was Political Adviser to the Viceroy in Wavell's time and Governor of U.P. He wrote to Lord Mountbatten just before Indian independence supporting his policy of pressurizing the states to join the Indian Union.

By the end of the war, even a few of the old-fashioned officials of the Indian Political Service had begun to realize that in order to survive the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, the rulers would have to grant a measure of self-government to their people. If there had been a Conservative government in power in Britain, the long standing sympathy of the British ruling classes for the Indian ruling families, combined with the desire to divide and rule the Indian subcontinent, might have persuaded them to openly support the concept of a federation of Indian states, perhaps with a common defence to be provided. Such an idea was in fact being mooted by Sir William Barton, a former Resident at Hyderabad, during the years 1945 to 1947.

In mid-1945, after the war was over, the British Labour Party had come to power under the leadership of Prime Minister Clement Attlee. Although some of the senior leaders of the party shared the Conservatives' suspicions about and dislike of Indian nationalism, the party had adopted a resolution in favour of Indian independence, at the instance of a major trade union, towards the end of the war. Moreover the INA trials and the naval mutiny at Bombay were indicators that the days of British power in India were numbered. The post-war mood in Britain was also increasingly unfavourable to young Britons joining the Indian Civil Service and other services in India.

The wartime incarceration of Mahatma Gandhi and the top Congress leadership had strengthened the hands of M.A. Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League. Already during the Thirties and Forties, British officialdom in India had been sympathetic to the Muslim League. Jinnah now used the period to increase his influence in the Indian states by building up the All-India States' Muslim League and cultivating Muslim businessmen and industrialists all over the country including Hyderabad. He was also able to establish a working relationship with the Nawab of Bhopal, whose state occupied a strategic position in the heart of India and who enjoyed the highly influential position of Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes.

Towards the end of the war, the states' problem began to take a back seat, as against the Muslim problem, as the major obstacle to Indian independence. The British were not unaware of the direction in which events were moving, and seemed to be adapting themselves to it. This

was seen, for example, in the advice they gave to the Nizam's government to accept the dominant position for the Muslim minority demanded by Jinnah and the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen in the Hyderabad administration in 1941. The departure of Sir Akbar Hydari from the state soon after was also no doubt connected with the dominant position of Jinnah and the Majlis in the counsels of the Nizam.

Soon after its formation, the Labour Government sent to India a Cabinet Mission consisting of the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence and two other Cabinet Ministers, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander. They were to discuss the future set up of the country with Indian leaders after the British withdrawal. They arrived in New Delhi on 24 March 1946. At his interview with the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy Lord Wavell, the Nawab of Bhopal suggested the formation of a Privy Council of the States and British India on the lines contemplated in the Simon Commission Report of 1930. He rejected the constitutional setup visualized in the Government of India Act of 1935 and proposed instead a 'loose federation' at the Centre. He also opposed the transfer of paramountcy to an Indian government. The same afternoon the Cabinet Mission made it clear to the standing committee of the Chamber of Princes, including the rulers of Bhopal, Patiala, Gwalior, Bikaner, and Nawanagar that paramountcy would come to an end when British India became independent, but the British Government would not keep troops in India and would therefore be unable to carry out its treaty obligations to the Indian states. The latter would therefore be released of their obligations under the treaties.[2]

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Chhatari's term of office in Hyderabad was coming to a close in September 1944 but when he asked the Nizam to decide about his successor, the latter declined to relieve him, saying that his term of office was five years and not three. His great tact had enabled him to survive crises which would have brought down another man. The Majlis leaders were dealing directly with the Nizam. The Peshi Secretary, Kazim Yar Jang had become more powerful than many Members of the Council, as the Nizam left many important matters to him. In February 1944, Chhatari heard from W. V. Grigson, that the Finance Member of the Council, Ghulam Mohammad had told

Bahadur Khan that he would try to get him appointed as a member of the Council. Bahadur Khan confirmed this to Chhatari and even said he had been promised a particular portfolio. The matter seems to have blown over with Bahadur Khan's reluctance to accept such an appointment.

Chhatari took all these developments with equanimity. The death of Bahadur Khan in June 1944 did not affect Chhatari's relations with the Nizam. In August the same year the Nizam asked him to settle a dispute between one of his sons and the latter's wife. Chhatari was also carrying on a continuous dialogue with the British on behalf of the Nizam who wanted the return of Berar, access to the port of Marmagoa and the right to exploit the mines of Bastar. Although Chhatari did not obtain any concessions from the British, he retained the goodwill of both sides.

In October 1944, he learnt from Princess Durreshshavar in Delhi that her father, the former Sultan of Turkey and the Caliph, had died in France. She wanted to go to France, but the Government of India declined to take the responsibility of sending her to Europe during wartime. Finally, one K.B.Ashfaq was sent instead. The Nizam showed Chhatari the will of the Caliph saying that he should not be buried in Syria, where Sultan Abdul Wahid Khan was buried, because the latter was responsible for the downfall of the dynasty. He should be buried either in India or Beirut. The Nizam told Chhatari that the Caliph had expressly asked to be buried in Hyderabad and that he had desired in his will that his son-in-law, Azam Jah should succeed him as Caliph. Apparently this did not receive any publicity, probably because the ex-Caliph died while the war was still on, and in any case he did not command any widespread support during his later years.[3]

In June 1945, Chhatari asked the Resident why, in spite of the Nizam's great contribution to the war effort, the British attitude to him was still hostile. He replied that it was due to the Nizam's temperament. At one time the Nizam had tried to remove all British officials from his service. Chhatari pointed out that India would soon be independent and these old differences should now be forgotten. The Resident was despondent and had no answer. Sir Conrad Corfield succeeded Wylie as Adviser to the Viceroy in the Political Department, and Chhatari went to meet Wylie at Delhi before his retirement.

It became increasingly clear to Chhatari that the Nizam had decided to appoint Sir Mirza Ismail as his President of Council but the British were unwilling to give their consent. They wanted Chhatari to stay on. In August 1945, the Nizam wanted to give Chhatari an extension of six

months to one year, if the war continued, and also asked Chhatari to stay on as Chief Adviser to the Prince of Berar after his retirement. Chhatari declined the offer as he felt it would create problems for his successor. Muslims would create problems for Mirza Ismail, using Chhatari's name. A continuous dialogue was going on with the Residency about the projected reforms, but it did not lead to any positive result, because of the lack of consensus between the Nizam and the Council on the ratio of Hindus and Muslims that should obtain in the Legislative Council. The Nizam did not want to displease the Majlis. According to Badar Shakeb who belonged to a group of the Majlis opposed to Qasim Razvi, the Nizam was afraid of Razvi, who was in control of the party machinery.

In December 1945, the older part of the Secunderabad Cantonment, consisting of the bazar and other areas between the Secunderabad parade ground and the Hussainsagar lake, was returned to the Nizam. This was a culmination of negotiations over several years. However, the Bolarum and Trimulgherry Cantonments still remained with the British and were designated as the Secunderabad Cantonment.

In January 1946, inflammatory speeches were made at the meetings of two all-India organizations, the Arya Samaj and the Khaksars in Hyderabad. An Arya Samaj leader from the Punjab, Puranchand, was asked to leave Hyderabad. Pandit Narenderji was tried, and the Khaksar Abdul Jabbar-al-Muslim was arrested under the Defence of Hyderabad Act. This led to a crisis in the relations of the Nizam with the Council. The Nizam wrote a confidential demiofficial letter to the Council, passing strictures on it for its failure to control with courage the provocative speeches of the Arya Samaj. The Council now took up the challenge and submitted to the Nizam that they had already brought the facts of the provocative speeches to the Nizam's notice in an *arzdasht*, that his strictures were 'entirely unmerited', and that he had deeply hurt the feelings of the Council members by his remarks. They argued that firmness tempered with moderation and foresight was needed, and continued, 'if Your Exalted Highness still adheres to these views, we would prefer dissolution of the Council to continuing under these circumstances.'

This unexpectedly strong letter from a hitherto pusillanimous Council gave rise to two very dissimilar reactions. The Resident was disturbed at the new development and sent a message to Grigson, that he should not resign, as he had been appointed by the Viceroy. Lothian even told Chhatari that since his appointment as Sadr-i-Azam had been made with

the Viceroy's consent, his resignation should also be with the consent of the Viceroy. Chhatari however maintained that there was nothing in the constitution of Hyderabad or in the agreement with the British to support the stand taken by the Resident.

The Nizam told Chhatari that he did not want their relationship to deviate from its old cordiality. In writing, however, he took a firm stand, refusing to change his ideas, referring to the language in the *arzdasht* as being, 'such that I am not afraid of it.' It was not a question of loyalty to the ruler and the State as of the procedure of the Council. He felt that the Council had to be restructured in view of the changed political scene. Such restructuring would have taken place had the war not started, or had ended earlier.[4]

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The credibility of the Chhatari government received an irreparable blow from the Dichpally Mosque incident, which led to the burning and looting of the houses of the Police Member, Grigson, and the President of Council, Chhatari himself. An American Christian mission had been given land by an earlier Nizam for a leprosy hospital. The Muslim patients asked for the construction of a mosque in the hospital premises, and Chhatari was negotiating the request with the Majlis leadership and the mission authorities. The government agreed to the construction of the mosque, but deffered the choice of the site. It was proposed to hold a public meeting to discuss the issue. This was communicated to Chhatari on 14 March when he returned from a trip to Bombay and was asked for an appointment by some Majlis leaders. When Moin Nawaz Jang, a member of the Council informed Chhatari, the latter told him that the Majlis leader, Abdul Rahman Rais, could come the next day, as it was late. He was assured that there was no need for a public meeting since the government had taken a decision in favour of the request to construct a mosque. In spite of this assurance that the mosque would be constructed, the public meeting was held that night.

On 15 March, the meeting with Abdul Rahman Rais was held at Chhatari's official residence. There was talk about the former coming with a crowd. Grigson reported this to Chhatari, but the police were not informed, as no serious trouble was anticipated. When Abdul Rahman Rais met Chhatari, he wanted a written assurance that the mosque would be constructed. He went to inform the crowd about the stage of negotiations. Chhatari later felt that his departure from the meeting was a signal

for the crowd to start the destruction and burning of the President's house, Shah Manzil (now the Raj Bhavan of Andhra Pradesh.)

A strong suspicion was cast on the Nizam and the Kotwal, Deen Yar Jang, of having permitted the attack by ensuring that the police would be inactive. Although Grigson was Police Member of the Council, the city police was under the Kotwal, who reported directly to the Nizam. The President and the British Member of Council were left to the mercy of the mob. Although Chhatari wrote that no member of his family was touched, it was widely reported that Chhatari's whiskers were pulled contemptuously by some of the lumpen elements in the crowd. In any case it is clear that neither Osman Ali Khan nor the Nawab of Chhatari took strong action against the troublemakers. Although the importance of the incident was sought to be played down, the Nizam's government was obviously playing to the tune of the Majlis leadership. Chhatari himself was unable or unwilling to take firm action. His only response to the serious incident was to submit his resignation.

Chhatari also received reports from other sources that the Nizam was behind the attack. The Peshi Secretary, Kazim Yar Jang told Chhatari that if Grigson had been removed as the Nizam had desired, no such incident would have taken place. However Chhatari promptly submitted his resignation. To his surprise it was not accepted, on grounds that the Cabinet Mission was expected shortly.[5]

The Nawab of Chhatari met the Cabinet Mission at New Delhi. He was accompanied at the discussions by Sir Walter Monckton, Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam. They reiterated the Nizam's earlier demand for retrocession of the territories ceded to the East India Company, and added a new claim for a free outlet to the sea. They wanted the assistance of the British Government in Hyderabad's negotiations for access to the seaport of Goa from where goods received would be imported by rail across British Indian territory. Chhatari also announced that in the event of the country being partitioned, Hyderabad would remain independent as it could not join Pakistan for geographical reasons or India for ideological reasons. It would be easier for Hyderabad to join a united India provided a central government were limited to foreign affairs and defence and if communal parity existed in the central government. The question of the return of Berar was deferred for later discussions along with other outstanding issues.

Sir Walter Monckton, who was advising the Nizam on the future constitutional set-up of the State, visited India three times during 1946 from England. The first time was between January and February 1946, just before the Cabinet Mission arrived in March, the second time from April to June, to participate in the discussions with the Hyderabad delegation led by Chhatari, and the third time in November-December 1946, for discussions with the Viceroy, Lord Wavell. Being a Conservative, his sympathies were with the Nizam and the Nawab of Chhatari rather than with Mirza Ismail and the Congress.

Monckton was deeply disturbed that the British were planning to withdraw from India without making arrangements for the protection of their old allies, the Indian states, and were strengthening the hands of their enemy, the Congress, which had stabbed them in the back during the 1942 movement. He wrote to Sir Conrad Corfield in January 1947 urging that the princes be, 'told straight what is intended with regard to Paramountcy and the implementation of treaties', and allowed to, 'strengthen themselves for the purpose of political and economic defence,' although it was late in the day for this. This would make the British policy,'of letting down our friends in order to appease our Congress enemies... more tolerable.' The Princes, he said, were deeply angry at the Cabinet Mission plan and especially at Cripps' attitude.' However, he advised the Nizam to build up his internal strength by devolving some power to representative institutions, or at least to reduce the number of Muslim members of the Council, and increase the number of Hindus. The ratio till then was ten Muslims and one Hindu, while the population was eighty-nine per cent Hindu. Unfortunately , he found the Nizam still living in an 'ivory tower'.

Monckton's resentment of the Congress stand however, remained unabated, in spite of his realization that his relations with the Nizam were those of a, 'nurse to a difficult child of suicidal tendencies, my main task to prevent or postpone the suicide.' He saw dangers ahead for the 'Muslim ruling clique', but still argued, 'they might last longer than Congress. There is no certainty. It is anyone's guess.'

It was clear that Chhatari could not stay on for long after the Dichpally Mosque incident. The Nizam now took the unusual step of appointing a person who did not command the full support of the British officialdom and was strongly opposed by the President of the All-India Muslim League, M.A. Jinnah. This was Sir Mirza Ismail who had served as Diwan of Mysore for many years and had subsequently been Diwan of Jaipur.

His successful service in the two Hindu states seems to have created a suspicion in many minds that he would not adequately subserve the interests of the Muslims of Hyderabad some of whom were beginning to consider themselves a ruling class.

Chhatari wanted to be relieved by 1 July, and although the Nizam requested him to stay on, he left by the middle of July, before Mirza Ismail took over the post. The Nizam of his own accord sanctioned a compensation of Rs 1.5 lakhs to Chhatari and Rs 75,000 to Grigson for the loss caused to them by the destruction of their properties arising out of the Dichpally Mosque case.

Notwithstanding the aggressive and unreasonable attitude of the Majlis leadership, the Nizam's principal advisers, Chhatari and Sir Walter Monckton felt the Nizam's interests lay with the All-India Muslim League rather than with the Congress. Monckton found that his conversation with Jinnah was an easy one, because his interests and Hyderabad's marched comfortably together. Chhatari wrote to Monckton in June, deploring the British Government's coming closer to the Congress. Moreover, 'he surrendered all his British honours and insignia as a gesture of protest against the decline of the British Raj and the manner of its passing.' [6]

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The appointment of Sir Mirza Ismail to the presidentship of the Nizam's Council was welcomed by the Hyderabad Hindu élite, who knew his record of service with the Maharajas of Mysore and Jaipur. However, it did not meet with the approval of the Majlis leadership or the rank and file in Hyderabad.

Jinnah's relations with the Nizam were not the same after Bahadur Khan's death. He had declined to visit Hyderabad when the Nizam had invited him repeatedly between November 1945 and March 1946. However, he was evidently so disturbed at the appointment of Mirza Ismail that he now took advantage of the earlier invitation, and arrived in Hyderabad, as a guest of the Nizam.[7]

During May and June 1946 the rumour began to spread in Hyderabad and elsewhere that Sir Mirza Ismail, who was at that time the Diwan or Prime Minister of Jaipur, was being appointed the Sadr-i-Azam of Hyderabad State by the Nizam. On 1 May the Nizam wrote to Jinnah

discussing who should be appointed to succeed the Nawab of Chhatari. Among the names suggested by Jinnah on 27 April were: Sir Khwaja Nazimuddin and Ghulam Mohammad, former Finance Member of the Nizam's Council. The Nizam was unwilling to consider either of the names but seemed to be well disposed to the appointment of Sir Mirza although Jinnah had clearly expressed his opposition to such an appointment. In the second week of June there was correspondence between one Syed Alla Bux, former Private Secretary to Bahadur Yar Jang, and Sir Mirza Ismail on the one hand and M.A. Jinnah on the other, seeking to bring the two together by obtaining an assurance from Sir Mirza that he would serve the cause of Muslim supremacy in Hyderabad, and communicate the assurance to Jinnah. Sir Mirza wrote to Alla Bux on 14 June from Bangalore stating that the Muslims need have no fear that he would sacrifice their interests in any way. 'Indeed I flatter myself by saying that no Muslim administrator in India could serve the Hyderabad ruler and the Muslim cause more effectively and loyally than I would. If I come to Hyderabad it will be with that intention and no other — to do my best for the dynasty and its Muslim subjects.' On 19 June Alla Bux wrote to Jinnah stating that the Nizam had addressed Sir Mirza asking him to come to Hyderabad and take over charge as soon as possible. Alla Bux wanted Jinnah to bless the appointment so that it would receive the support of the Muslim community of Hyderabad and of India. Jinnah was not convinced by the pleadings of Alla Bux, and in fact refused to meet the latter in Hyderabad.

When the interview between Jinnah and the Nizam took place in July, it turned out to be very disappointing for the former. Jinnah made the mistake of approaching the Nizam in an arrogant manner instead of as a person with a favour to ask. This was obviously unwise as the ruler had already taken a decision to appoint Sir Mirza and the decision had been communicated to the latter. There was no strong argument which Jinnah could have brought forth in order to persuade the ruler to change his decision. The Nizam took objection to the manner in which Jinnah behaved, spreading his legs and smoking a cigar before the ruler. The Nizam exploded and demanded angrily : 'Do you know who I am? Is this the way you behave towards the Nizam of Hyderabad?' Jinnah was flabbergasted. He withdrew his legs, threw away the offending cigar and apologized. But the storm having burst, apology did not ease the situation. The Nizam swamped him with angry questions. ' What do you want?

What do you want to tell me?' and so on and so forth. Jinnah sought to say something against the appointment, but before he could utter a few words, the Nizam said — 'I do not want any outside interference in my affairs. I can take care of the interest of my own people. I do not wish to discuss this matter with you.'

The whole palace resounded with the Nizam's angry voice and the oldest servants said they had never seen their ruler in such a temper before. Jinnah retaliated by warning the Nizam that the Muslim League would not support Hyderabad in its internal affairs or in the Constituent Assembly if his advice was ignored. This made the Nizam even angrier. 'What do I care? You were never helpful. I am not going to ask for your help.' When Jinnah tried to say something about the constitutional reforms the Nizam declined to discuss the details and referred him to the Minister in charge. 'Anything more? No? Then good-bye.'

Although Jinnah stayed a week longer in Hyderabad after this incident he did not come to see the Nizam again. He took advantage of the opportunity to have detailed discussions with the Majlis leaders in Hyderabad and doubtless urged them to take a more obdurate stand in regard to Muslim rights. He left Hyderabad in a bitter mood. He had talks with the Resident, Lothian, and sent a telegram and letter to the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, pointing out that the Nizam was taking shelter under the plea that the appointment was being made because of the wishes of the Resident and that the final word rested with the Viceroy. Since Wavell and Lothian had separately told Jinnah that the Government of India was not behind the appointment he wrote : 'I can only repeat that it will be most unfortunate if this appointment is not prevented as it is bound to create problems. I have, as I told you, no desire to put up any particular individual...' He urged Wavell to refuse consent to Sir Mirza's appointment but his efforts were unsuccessful. It was in the same month of July 1946 that he withdrew his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's plan.[8]

Mirza Ismail started his career in August 1946 with an advantage. The reforms which has been hanging fire since before the war had been revised and finalized by Chhatari after tortuous negotiations. Since Chhatari refused to announce the reforms for fear of raising a storm, and Ismail refused to take over as Diwan till they were notified, they were actually notified after Chhatari's departure and before Ismail's arrival by the acting President of Council, Sir Mahdi Yar Jang, on 27 July 1946.

The announcement was based on a compromise formula which, according to Ali Yavar Jang, made matters worse for both Hindus and Muslims, as it, 'represented a half-way house between the published scheme and the unpublished assurance.' The assurance was that the Nizam would appoint Muslim representatives from the Sarf-i-Khas and thus maintain the supremacy in numbers of Muslims over other communities in the Legislative Council. Thus the formula finally adopted was identical with the demand of Bahadur Yar Jang in Akbar Hydari's time.

Sir Mirza soon made an impact on the capital of Hyderabad State by touring the city regularly and ordering improvements, including the removal of unsightly walls around the Bagh-i-Aam or Public Gardens, lowering the tank bund of Hussainsagar lake, and making it a promenade, the widening of some key roads, and by ordering the construction of two elegant Chatris on Naubat Pahad and Kala Pahad. Few people appreciated these changes. Many citizens ridiculed him with the nickname *Tod-phod* Jang (the destroying Nawab). Ali Yavar Jang reported that Mirza Ismail had progressive views, and was able to take quick decisions, although he was inclined to be a little dictatorial with his colleagues in the Council.[9]

Although Mirza Ismail had been a successful Diwan in Mysore and Jaipur, the Hyderabad Government as a whole did not realize the extent to which the political situation had changed in India. Reforms which might have been acceptable to the people of Hyderabad in 1937 were no longer acceptable to the Congress leadership of the State or the country in 1946. Mahatma Gandhi wrote to Mirza Ismail, describing the reforms as a step backward instead of forward. He urged the state to consult Jawaharlal Nehru, the President of the States Peoples' Conference. He was not satisfied with Sir Mirza's reply that the solution to Hyderabad's problems was a complex one and would have to be sought by a special method. The State Congress was also disappointed with Mirza's approach. Although the ban on it had been lifted, the Congress boycotted the elections to the Legislative Assembly after negotiations to amend and liberalize it failed to modify the stand of the Nizam's government.

The Majlis took part in the elections to the Assembly after consulting Jinnah, and won all the forty-two Muslim seats. Qasim Razvi was elected the leader of the Majlis in the new Assembly. The Hindu seats were occupied by newly formed organizations, some of which were friendly to the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen, and one of which, the Depressed Classes

Organization led by B.S. Venkat Rao, was 'completely under Ittehad influence.'[10]

Notwithstanding his somewhat nationalistic views, Mirza Ismail's tenure in Hyderabad was used by the Majlis to strengthen itself as a force in the State. Representatives of the Assembly, two elected members, one Muslim, Abdul Rahim of the Majlis, and one Hindu, Pingle Venkatarama Reddy, an independent, were appointed members of the Executive Council. They later joined the Mir Laik Ali Cabinet, and held office till the Police Action in September 1948.[11]

Sir Mirza invited Congressmen to join his Cabinet but they declined to do so. In December 1946, Razvi was elected President of the Majlis-Ittehadul Muslimeen, and thereafter was elected leader of the Majlis in the Assembly.

Unlike Chhatari, Mirza made a positive attempt to tame the Majlis. He tried to limit the power of Laik Ali, the financier of the Majlis who had a virtual monopoly of industry in Hyderabad, and of Moin Nawaz Jang, the Majlis supporter in the Cabinet who was Laik Ali's brother-in-law. Moin was shifted to the Speakership of the Assembly, and Laik Ali's industrial fortunes were not allowed to increase. But they took the opportunity to spend more time and energy on building up the Majlis. Another Majlis-minded official, Syed Taquiddin of Bihar, was forced to resign. He took his knowledge of official secrets and his capacity for intrigue to the Majlis, and became the right-hand man of Qasim Razvi.[12]

During the ten months that he was in Hyderabad, Sir Mirza Ismail initiated a move for Hyderabad to purchase the territory of Goa from Portugal. The proposal seems to have been first discussed between him and Sir William Barton, a former Resident at Mysore (1921–1925) and at Hyderabad (1925–1930). Ismail had been Diwan of Mysore from 1926-41. He knew Barton well, having been a prominent member of the Mysore Civil Service before his appointment as Diwan.

It is likely that Barton suggested Sir Alexander Roger for a key role in this delicate and secret mission. Roger, a British businessman residing in London, was a director of companies which had large interests in Portugal, Venezuela and the West Indies. He had known Barton at least

since 1940–41, when they were both members of a Ministry of Supply Mission which visited India.

Roger was a major actor in the dramatic episode involving an Indian ruler who wished to acquire a port, probably the first and last attempt by a state to alter the map of India, which had remained unaltered since the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, after the suppression of the Revolt of 1857. In his belief that this could be done by the simple device of buying the Portuguese territories in India, Mirza Ismail was doubtless egged on by the Nizam, who had always been keen to assert his independence by whatever means. Jose d' Almada was Roger's main Portuguese contact, as Sir William Barton was his contact in India. d' Almada was well-acquainted with a high Portuguese official, Antonio Bastroff Silva, who evidently had access to the Prime Minister, Jose Antonio Salazar.

Barton, who was staying at the Hotel Imperial, New Delhi, requested Ismail to authorize Roger to, 'discuss informally with the Portuguese government the possibility of Hyderabad Government acquiring Goa or the right to use the port and railways.' Accordingly, Ismail cabled Roger on 25 March 1947 authorizing him to, 'act on behalf of Hyderabad Government in matter under discussion.' He also informed him that funds were being placed at his disposal for the purpose in hand. Mirza Ismail referred to a point raised by d'Almada in a letter dated 8 March 1947, and made it clear that 'Mysore should be kept out of negotiations with the Portuguese as Hyderabad would, prefer to be the sole owner.' In a letter sent the very next day, Ismail confirmed the cablegram and asked Roger to make use of the argument that independent India would not tolerate a foreign foothold on Indian soil and therefore Portugal would be well advised to sell Goa to Hyderabad.

Mirza Ismail in his capacity as Sadr-i-Azam, authorized Roger to undertake negotiations on behalf of Hyderabad State. He was told by Mirza Ismail in a letter dated 28 March 1947 that Hyderabad State was primarily interested in the port and the territory around it. He was authorized however to negotiate first for the purchase of the State of Portuguese India and failing that for the port and its environs. Only as a last resort was he instructed to negotiate for the use of the port of Marmagoa. 'If it is only the question of the right to use the port and railway, the proposal will lose much of its attraction for us. But if it is a

question of sale, Hyderabad is quite prepared to make it worth the while of the Portuguese Government.'[13]

A conference at London between the Hyderabad representatives and Sir Alexander Roger was to be followed by talks in Portugal in early April 1947 between Roger and the Portuguese authorities. These talks were delayed due to the illness of a key person in the negotiations, presumably Salazar himself. After another round of discussion it was decided that Sir Walter Monckton would visit Lisbon on 24 April 1947 to pursue negotiations along with Sir Alexander Roger. There is no direct evidence that the meeting was held, but on 25 May 1947 Monckton sent a detailed note to the Nizam on the question of a sea-port for Hyderabad. This letter makes it clear that the Nizam's claim to British support for the use of a sea-port either at Marmagoa or at Bhatkal was to be based on the commercial Treaty of 1802 which gave the Nizam a right to the use of Machchlipatnam port. Since the use of Machchlipatnam has been denied to the Nizam he had a moral claim to British support for access to the sea. Such support would also imply two more concessions from British India viz; 'total or substantial exemption from sea-custom duty and secondly, permission to cross the Indian territory which is in transit to the sea-port to the state.'

Another issue on which the Nizam was very keen was the return of Berar. Sir Mirza Ismail visited Berar and had discussions with politicians there, and later with Sir Frederick Bourne, the Governor of Central Provinces and Berar. Bourne told Sir Mirza that the Nizam's sovereignty over Berar was undoubted, but there was no need for a public statement as the treaties already made it clear. Sir Mirza told Bourne that the Nizam intended Berar to be a separate province under his suzerainty. The Governor felt that the advantages of remaining with the Central Provinces were greater than the advantages of joining Hyderabad, even if the Nizam were to spend a good deal of money on the province. He felt Sir Mirza had been influenced by His Exalted Highness, who had a strong sentimental attachment to the recovery of Berar, and that the non-Brahmin faction of Berar politicians, who were opposed to the Brahmin domination of the Central Provinces, had influenced Sir Mirza's thinking. Bourne suggested to Sir Mirza a short-term treaty of ten years with the new Indian Government, coincident with the lapse of paramountcy, maintaining the status quo, with fresh negotiations after that. Sir Mirza could see the point but

Bourne felt doubtful that he could convince the Nizam to take a reasonable view of the subject.[14]

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Sir Mirza Ismail had brought a breath of fresh air into Hyderabad's fossilized bureaucratic machinery. He announced that he would be available two mornings in a week to all who wanted to see him. He made enquiries into complaints and grievances made to him at these interviews. This put a check on corruption. At the same time it roused the jealousy and hostility of conservative and communal forces in the State. He was accused of, 'hobnobbing with Congress leaders in lobbies of the Constituent Assembly,' and of greeting them with folded hands with words like 'Namaste' and 'Namaskaram'. He was supposed to have said that, 'Hindus being in a great majority would rule in the long run despite all difficulties.' He found that it was impossible for him to stay on in Hyderabad, as the, 'Nizam was bent upon independence,' and so was, 'that wretched band of foolish Muslims called the Ittehadul- Muslimeen.'

On 15 May 1947, Mirza wrote to the Nizam from Bangalore, where he had gone for 'summer recess', that he had,'found that even senior officers of the state, many of them, had lost their heads.' He felt that he would be, 'a thorn in the flesh of these people,' if he were to stay on, and even the Nizam would not regret his departure. In his letter he pointed out that he had come to Hyderabad full of enthusiasm and with, 'deep attachment to Your Exalted Highness's person and dynasty.' He had hoped to devote his, 'lifelong experience and the capabilities which God has given me to the right solution of the many problems with which the future of the Dominion is beset.' He felt, he could only succeed in such a task with the full support and sympathy of the Nizam. But unfortunately, he felt that he had lost that confidence. He said: 'The intrigues and agitation to which I refer are, I firmly believe, directed as much against the interest of Your Exalted Highness as against myself. But,while a word from you would have stopped the campaign at once, you have maintained silence, and the agitators have given the impression that they enjoy Your Exalted Highness's goodwill and patronage.'

The Nizam, on receipt of this letter, sent Hosh Bilgrami and Shahid Yar Jang to request Mirza Ismail to come to Hyderabad for a few days to meet him, but Mirza declined to do so. Evidently he felt that the Nizam was not serious about considering his complaint, and was still under the influence of the Majlis. An additional factor which might have weighed with the Nizam in allowing Sir Mirza to go was the failure of the latter to obtain any concession from the British in regard to the restoration of Berar, in spite of having made a special trip to Berar and to Nagpur for the purpose.[15]

Mirza Ismail's departure created a vacuum which was difficult to fill. No administrator, Hindu or Muslim with any self-respect would have accepted the invitation to take over the post of Sadr-i-Azam at this juncture, when the real power behind the throne was Qasim Razvi and the Majlis.

However the Nizam wrote to Chhatari on 27 May 1947 that the Resident, Herbert had suggested that Chhatari should be invited to return to his old post, as it would be difficult to, ' select a capable and trustworthy man from outside the state since no one is fit for such a high post in Hyderabad.' It was felt that even if such a person was found it would take him time to get an insight into the working of the Nizam's government. There were important matters to be handled which would not brook any delay. He therefore requested Chhatari to return to Hyderabad for a year as Sadr-i-Azam.

Chhatari accepted the invitation in spite of the fact that his 'mildness and lack of strength' was now made worse by, 'the loss of self-confidence and reputation which followed the last show-down at Shah Manzil. People spoke contemptuously of his return and his stock was as low as it could be. His defeat was only a year old. He was soon to realise that he should never have returned.'

Chhatari's second term was even more traumatic for him than the first. He kept losing and gaining the Nizam's confidence from time to time. He submitted his resignation more than once, but was asked to stay on. He even hosted a farewell banquet,expecting to leave Hyderabad but was asked to cancel his departure at the last minute. Sir Walter Monckton also suffered the humiliation of being slandered by what he called, ' the organised Moslem opinion in the State,' but was prevailed upon to withdraw his resignation by the Nizam as well

as by Lord Mountbatten, both of whom regarded him as indispensable for different reasons.[16]

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Till May 1947 Hyderabad's prospects of getting access to the sea at Marmagoa were remote. It was only in June that the proposal began to take concrete shape. A meeting was held between the Nizam's newly appointed Agent-General for Hyderabad in London, Mir Nawaz Jang, and the representative of the Portuguese Prime Minister, Salazar. The meeting evidently took place in the first week of June 1947. Both Portugal and Hyderabad were concerned that the meeting should be held under strictest secrecy, as both were concerned with the possible consequences of premature leakage of information. Portugal was afraid that the new Dominion of India would take strong objection to the transaction, while Hyderabad was afraid that public opinion in India would link up the issue with Hyderabad's claim for independence. This fear of Indian suspicion also prompted both Hyderabad and Portugal to feel that the negotiation should be completed before 15 August 1947 when India was to become independent. After that date it was felt that Hyderabad could not get access to Goa as transit facilities would be denied by the new Indian Government if they were not in existence before that date.

Mir Nawaz Jang's letter points out that Hyderabad would gain some benefits as well as incur some obligations under the agreement which was an arrangement for mutual benefit. The Marmagoa port had great potentialities but had remained undeveloped. Goa badly needed hydro-electric projects. The Portuguese would greatly benefit from the development and expansion of the railway, the harbour, and the port of Goa, and the execution of hydro-electric projects in Goan territory which would all be partly financed by the Hyderabad Government. The Portuguese would also get profits from freight on railway and trade concessions in Hyderabad State. Both Hyderabad and Goa would benefit from the use of each other's airfields. Hyderabad would get the use of Marmagoa as a free port for ships flying her flag.

In the first week of August 1947 the Nawab of Chhatari told Hyderabad's Agent-General in London to inform the Portuguese that Hyderabad was agreeable to the proposed conversion but would finalize it only at a later date. This reply came as a jolt from the blue for the

Portuguese, who had thought that the matter would be finalized before India achieved independence. In the same month of August a payment of 10,000 pounds was made to Sir Alexander Roger to compensate for the work done by him.

Chhatari's reluctance to enter into an agreement in June 1947 was evidently due to the uncertainties about the outcome of the negotiations with the interim government. In September 1947 Mir Nawaz Jang elicited from the Portuguese a, 'non-committal answer that Portugal desired to wait until negotiations with India were complete.' Evidently, the British Foreign Office had hinted to the Portuguese that it would be unwise to pursue the matter at that delicate stage when negotiations between Hyderabad and India were still at its initial stages. Mir Nawaz Jang was himself facing difficulties with the British who were in two minds whether to support Hyderabad's claim to an independent status. His attempt to bring pressure on the Portuguese was therefore ill-advised although there were elements in the Portuguese government who wanted the agreement with Hyderabad to fructify.

In November 1947 Sir Alexander Roger visited Lisbon and met Dr Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, one of the highest officials of Portugal. The Portuguese had altered their earlier proposal in three respects. First, Hyderabad must enter into a direct understanding with the Dominion of India on the passage of goods between Goa and Hyderabad across Indian territory. Second, the development of railways and harbour and the execution of the hydro-electric project would not be a joint venture of the Portuguese and Hyderabad governments, but would be carried out by a joint stock company formed by a 'group of people concerned'. Third, Portugal now declined to give an assurance about the free import and export of Hyderabad goods at Marmagoa; the concessions, if any, would be made to the joint stock company and there was no guarantee that the company would give some concessions to Hyderabad.

Mir Nawaz Jang continued to be optimistic in spite of this rebuff, which was evidently the result of the emergence of India as an independent entity. By 11 December 1947, Mir Nawaz Jang was even more optimistic, pointing out that Portugal's attitude had changed because an agreement between the Southern Maratha Railway and the West of India Portuguese Guaranteed Railway which had been entered into in 1902 and renewed periodically had only expired in 1947. Moreover, the Standstill Agreement between Hyderabad and the Indian Government had been

signed on 29 November. The only outstanding issue was the granting by India of the right of passage to move goods across Indian territory from Goa to Hyderabad.

On 2 January 1948 Sir Alexander Roger wrote to Mir Laik Ali, the Prime Minister of Hyderabad, advising the State to secure participation of business groups in Portugal, Britain and Hyderabad in the development of railway and harbour in Goa. The involvement of British business interests in Goa would, he hoped, 'act as a safety valve both for Portuguese, India and Hyderabad, since 'influential business circles do influence their countries foreign policy to a certain extent'.

On 15 March 1948, Laik Ali replied to Roger praising his efforts and promising to get in touch with him as soon as Hyderabad was free to take up the matter again. On 24 March 1948 Roger wrote again to Laik Ali, still enthusiastic about Hyderabad acquiring the port of Marmagoa and telling the latter of his planned visit to Portugal late in April 1948. However the relations between Hyderabad and India deteriorated as Qasim Razvi acquired more and more power, and the matter evidently could not be pursued.[17]

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In reply to the Cabinet Mission plan, which was announced on 16 May 1946 and a Memorandum on States' Treaties and paramountcy which had been handed over to the Chancellor a few days earlier, the Nawab of Bhopal wrote to Lord Wavell asking for clarification on the rights of the states in relation to the Union Government. Lord Wavell sent a non-committal reply. When the Nawab persisted in asking for further details he was referred to Sir Conrad Corfield, the Political Adviser, who had the rank of a Member of the Viceroy's Council. Corfield urged the Chamber of Princes and its various committees which met in Bombay between 8 and 10 June to take advantage of the lapse of paramountcy and to appoint a negotiating committee to determine the conditions under which the princes would join the Constituent Assembly.

In January and February 1947 the princes, under the leadership of the Nawab of Bhopal, reiterated this stand. When they met the Viceroy, Lord Wavell he mentioned that it was intended to retain the monarchical form of government and the boundaries of the states would be altered only in consultation with them. However, after the negotiations for Indian

independence reached a deadlock, Prime Minister Attlee declared on 20 February 1947 that the British would transfer power to responsible Indian hands not later than June 1948. Moreover the resignation of Lord Wavell as Viceroy was announced. The new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, arrived in India on 22 March and took charge two days later from Wavell, making it clear that he had a mandate to transfer power to Indian hands speedily and smoothly.

The spokesmen of the Indian states, such as Sir Walter Monckton, were sorry to see Wavell go, as he had been sympathetic to the states. However his taciturn manner had lost him some goodwill. Much was expected of Lord Mountbatten, a member of the British royal family who had many friends among the Indian rulers. He was also a personal friend of Monckton's. The latter was however soon to be disappointed at Mountbatten's lack of response to the demands of the states. He had a clear mandate to withdraw from India at an early date, and nothing was going to stand in the way of this objective.

A split now occurred among the princes. The Nawab of Bhopal and his followers insisted that rulers should enter the Constituent Assembly only after the understanding between the negotiating committees was ratified by the Constituent Assembly. On the other hand, the Maharajas of Bikaner and Patiala chose to join the Constituent Assembly without waiting for such a ratification. On 18 April 1947, Nehru, addressing the All-India States' People's Conference, declared that any state which did not come into the Constituent Assembly would be treated by the country as a hostile state. The Muslim League leader, Liaquat Ali Khan appealed to the states to, 'disregard the idle threat.' Nevertheless, representatives of Baroda, Bikaner, Cochin, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Patiala and Rewa took their seats in the Constituent Assembly on 28 April 1947.

During an interview with Nehru on 26 April 1947, Corfield took a very 'correct' stand, declining to prejudge whether states like Hyderabad would or would not join the Indian Union, and discussing the consequences in either case for Hyderabad's claim on Berar, for access to the sea, and for the question of Bastar. Chhatari had mentioned that Grigson, a British member of the Nizam's Council, had spoken to the Raja of Bastar, who had probably been his ward at one time, about the possibility of Hyderabad exploiting the iron ore of the state, subject to the proprietary rights being retained with the Raja, and shares worth in the Nizam's State Railway worth twenty-five lakhs. The existing railway line would be

extended to the capital of Bastar. When Nehru expressed the view that it would be dangerous to link Bastar with an inefficient place like Hyderabad, Corfield put up a strong defence of Hyderabad's irrigation department, railway system, and industrial development as well as its town-planning and labour housing policies, arguing that Bastar's interests would not suffer from a railway run by Hyderabad to extract iron ore. Nehru was apparently unconvinced by Corfield's arguments, but evidently kept his own counsel, realizing that Corfield was on his way out.

The Political Department of the Government of India, headed by Sir Conrad Corfield, was probably behind a move to form unions of states, a proposal to which Nehru at first agreed conditionally upon responsible government being granted in the states. Later, however, he changed his mind, stating that states which could not possibly form economic units should be absorbed into neighbouring provinces rather than with other states. Thus the Political Department was working at cross-purposes with the Interim Government headed by Nehru. Technically the Political Department was correct, as paramountcy was to lapse by June 1948, and the Government of India would have no *locus standi* in the states, unless they had acceded to the Union already.[18]

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Meanwhile events were moving towards a climax. The British Government realized that they would not be able to maintain order in India for long. This was made clear by the great Calcutta killing late in 1946. On 3 June 1947, Lord Mountbatten made the startling announcement that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to relinquish power to two governments, India and Pakistan, on the basis of Dominion Status, and that this transfer would take place much earlier than June 1948. The announcement did not make any change in the position regarding the Indian states, but introduced an element into the situation which caused events to move very much faster than expected.

Mountbatten pointed out to the States' Negotiating Committee on the evening of 3 June that the two new dominions would not have such weak centres as had earlier been expected. Second, both had agreed to accept Dominion Status. His implication was clear — the states would now be well advised to join one or the other dominion. The next day at a press conference he said in reply to a question that it was not the intention of

His Majesty's Government to confer Dominion Status on a state which declared itself independent.

This statement implied, although it did not clearly say so, that His Majesty's Government would not recognize the independence of a state which opted out of both the dominions. The reason for the ambiguity became clear only later. Taking advantage of the lack of clarity, both Bhopal and Hyderabad made announcements within a few days, of their intention to be independent. Both the states were landlocked. Both had Muslim rulers and a large Hindu majority, while a small Muslim minority enjoyed a privileged position in the state. The Nawab of Bhopal made an additional announcement that he was resigning the Chancellorship of the Chamber of Princes, which he said formed part of a constitutional machinery that would become *functus officio* in the new dispensation.

The All-India States' People's Conference passed a resolution on 11 June demanding that the Political Department and its agencies be handed over to the new Government of India, or alternatively a new central department be set up to discharge the functions hitherto performed by it. The second alternative was adopted by the Government of India a few weeks later, when V.P. Menon took over as the first Secretary of the new department on 5 July 1947.

Meanwhile, a confrontation took place between Nehru and Corfield, with Jinnah supporting the latter, at a meeting of political leaders on 13 June, presided over by Mountbatten. Nehru, who had consulted constitutional experts, argued that the Political Department was going beyond the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12 May 1946 and the statement of 3 June 1947, by winding up the Department. He made a personal attack on Corfield, who he said was trying to 'Balkanise' India, and should be indicted before the Federal Court for malfeasance. Nehru insisted that there were many issues to be dealt with by the Government of India, apart from questions arising out of paramountcy, and wanted the department to continue. Corfield argued on the other hand that the Memorandum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy had a passage in which it was stated that, 'the void will have to be filled, either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them.'

It is significant that Jinnah supported the Political Adviser in this controversy. He argued that the states had every right to declare that they would remain sovereign, and not join either Constituent Assembly. Evidently a strategy had been worked out between the Muslim League leader on the one hand, and the Nawab of Bhopal on the other, according to which the latter would not only declare his independence but would try to bring the contiguous states of Indore, Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaisalmer into a united front of princes, also referred to as the 'Third force'. In all probability, Corfield was behind this move, and was in touch with Jinnah through the Nawab of Bhopal, if not directly. Had this move succeeded, this independent third force could have acceded to Pakistan.

Certainly the Maharaja of Jodhpur, a Hindu state that bordered Pakistan, was anxious to accede to that country; and it was only with the greatest difficulty that Mountbatten and V.P. Menon could get him to change his mind. The Maharaja's decision was contrary to the advice of his Diwan, C.S. Venkatachar. He had decided to accede to Pakistan when Jinnah met him in Delhi, gave him a blank piece of paper, and asked him to state his own terms. Since Jinnah was playing his cards so astutely through the Nawab of Bhopal, with the full support of the Political Department, the new Indian leadership could not confine its activities to strictly constitutional persuasion, but had to resort to coercion in order to prevent India from being Balkanized.

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In such a critical situation that India faced, even a civil servant could leave the impress of his personality on major events. V.P. Menon now proposed to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel that India should ask the states to accede only on defence, external affairs and communications, without any other commitments. Defence would include internal security as well. Both Patel and Nehru agreed to this proposal. Mountbatten also agreed but there was very little time. Menon had not yet taken charge of the States Department and Corfield was naturally opposed to the new proposal.

Before meeting the princes, Sardar Patel issued a statement drafted by Menon and based on Lincoln's first inaugural address. Patel pleaded with the rulers to join the Constituent Assembly in a spirit of friendliness and cooperation without insisting on treaties, and promising that the approach of the government would be one of cooperation rather than

domination. The alternative to such an approach, he pointed out, would be anarchy and chaos.[19]

Corfield and Menon clearly had divergent views on the need for certain provisions in the Indian Independence Bill, and on the interpretations of those provisions which were included. A fundamental point on which they differed was the right of states to stay out of either dominion, a question that had immediate bearing on the future of Hyderabad. Corfield held that no power whatsoever related to the states as it devolved on the successor governments. The Secretary of State for India agreed with Corfield's view, saying that it was in accordance with the British Government's policy contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum. Even after Mountbatten took up the matter with His Majesty's Government, the Secretary of State did not accept the Indian view and insisted that the states, however small, should have the right to denounce the provision of any earlier agreement between the Government of India and the rulers.

At a meeting called by Patel, several Diwans, among them the distinguished K.M. Panikkar and C.S. Venkatachar, working in Bikaner and Jodhpur respectively, urged him to declare a 'new paramountcy' on behalf of independent India, thus nullifying the lapse of British paramountcy. Patel's speech also had its own effect. Many states supporting the Indian view, decided to join the Union on three subjects, and suggested how other states could be persuaded to join.[20]

Meanwhile the Muslim League leaders and the Political Department were trying their best to discourage many states from joining the Union and encouraged them to join the Nawab of Bhopal's third force or to join Pakistan directly. Among the states which caused the greatest anxiety to Menon and Patel were Travancore (whose Diwan was Sir C.P.Ramaswamy Ayyar), Jodhpur, Bhopal and Indore. Eventually however, the tables were turned; and there was a feeling, as the Nawab of Bhopal put it in V.P. Menon's *Integration of the Indian States*, that they were being, 'invited like the Oysters to attend the tea party with the Walrus and the Carpenter.'[21]

Serious problems arose with regard to three states — Junagarh, Kashmir and Hyderabad. Junagarh was located in the heart of the Kathiawar states in Gujarat, and had a majority of Hindus, like its neighbours. But the Nawab acceded to Pakistan. The administration of the state soon collapsed, as a result of an internal revolt. The Nawab flew to Karachi with most of his family and the entire cash balances of the

state. The Indian forces entered the state at the instance of the Diwan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who had earlier worked for accession to Pakistan. A referendum was held in February 1948. Out of a total of 2,01,457 registered voters, 1,90,870 exercised their franchise. Of this number only ninety-one cast their votes in favour of accession to Pakistan.

Kashmir's was a more complicated story. The Hindu ruler had not made up his mind whether to join India or Pakistan when armed raiders from Pakistan entered the state on 23 October 1947, and nearly overran the entire state. The Maharaja promptly acceded to India with the full backing of the National Conference leader, Sheikh Abdullah, who was the unchallenged leader of Kashmiris, both Muslim and Hindu. A war between India and Pakistan was halted by a cease-fire which left the state divided between the two countries. The matter was referred to the United Nations by India, and has been debated there several times over the years. The main issue on which an agreement could not be reached was the implementation of India's undertaking, given at Mountbatten's instance, to hold a plebiscite. India holds the view that Kashmir's accession to India is final, and several elections have been held in the Indian-held portion of the state. Pakistan's contention that a Muslim majority area is likely to opt for Pakistan is based on the two-nation theory which India rejects. Kashmir has its own Constitution, the only state in India to have one. Since Jammu and Kashmir is the only state in the Indian Union with a Muslim majority, some in India regard its continuance as a test-case of Indian secularism.[22]

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Hyderabad also became a special case when the Nizam, soon after the announcement of His Majesty's Government's plan of 3 June 1947, issued a firman declaring his intention to resume the status of independent sovereign on 15 August and that therefore he would not be joining either Pakistan or India. He protested against the provision in clause 7 of the Indian Independence Bill under which Dominion Status could not be granted to any Indian state. He said that this amounted to the British Government abandoning its old ally and forcing him to sever his ties which bound him in loyal devotion to the King Emperor.

At a preliminary meeting held on 11 July 1947, the Hyderabad delegation was led by the Nawab of Chhatari. Among the points discussed were Hyderabad's demand for the retrocession of Berar and its desire for Dominion Status. The delegation firmly declined the offer to accede to the Indian Union on three subjects without financial commitments, as suggested by Lord Mountbatten and V.P. Menon. The delegation asked for the negotiation of a 'Standstill Agreement' without executing an Instrument of Accession. On 8 August the Nizam wrote to Lord Mountbatten stating that he would be prepared to confirm all India standards for railway communication, contribute troops for the defence of India, and conduct the external affairs of the State in general conformity with India's foreign policy. This accession however was to be limited by three conditions, First, Hyderabad would be neutral in case of a war between India and Pakistan, second, Hyderabad would have the right to appoint Agents-General wherever it thought fit; and third, if India withdrew from the Commonwealth, Hyderabad would be free to review the situation afresh.

The Government of India began to receive regular reports about the Hyderabad Government's attempts to buy large quantities of arms from Western countries. For example on 9 July 1947 Nehru wrote to Vallabhbhai Patel that he had received information that Hyderabad had placed an order for four crores of ammunition with Kral, of the Czechoslovak Government, and the Army Commander, Major-General Sayyid Ahmed El Edroos, had left for Europe to arrange for immediate despatch. A later message indicated that Monckton had advised Hyderabad to make Pakistan its agent for the purchase of arms and ammunition, and payment to the foreign supplier would be made by Pakistan on behalf of Hyderabad. This was evidently the procedure that was followed, as there was a regular traffic of arms from Pakistan to Bidar airport, about eighty miles from Hyderabad. The pilots were D.C.T. Bennett, an Englishman, formerly of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force, and Sidney Cotton, and Australian.[23]

On 15 August 1947, while India and Pakistan were celebrating their independence, the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen claimed that Hyderabad had become free of foreign domination, and was celebrating the event as the rebirth of an independent Hyderabad with the Nizam as its ruler. The celebrations were however not officially sponsored.

The next round of discussion at Delhi, which was scheduled on 25 August could not be held, because three leading members of the negotiating team, Sir Walter Monckton, Nawab Ali Yavar Jang and even the Nawab of Chhatari, were strongly attacked in some Hyderabad Urdu papers controlled by the leaders of Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen. All three dignitaries refused to continue, Sir Walter Monckton resigning as Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam, unless the latter publicly dissociated himself from the attacks by the Majlis. This the Nizam did through a firman which enabled the Nawab of Chhatari and his two colleagues also to withdraw their resignations.

Meanwhile the pressures were being built up by the Hyderabad State Congress, which attacked the Nizam's firman of June 1947 with the statement that 'the right to determine the relationship of the state with the Indian Union belonged to the people and not to the Nizam,' and urged Hyderabad's population, 'to resist any attempt at the imposition of an autocratic regime isolated from the rest of India.' The Hyderabad State Congress, it was declared, would only be satisfied with an immediate introduction of responsible government and accession to India. On the other hand, the Majlis, under the leadership of Qasim Razvi, strongly supported the Nizam's declaration of independence.

Intelligence sources reported that Majlis' banners and hand bills were plastered everywhere."Long live king Usman", "Free Hyderabad for Hyderabadis", "No pact with Indian Union" were the slogans they proclaimed. 'Lorryloads of volunteers, some from the bazaar and others from the college class-room, parade the thoroughfares of towns and make excursion through the rural areas shouting their slogans and firing shots in the Arab manner.'

The Majlis enjoyed the support of not only the Nizam but increasing numbers of Muslims, who regarded it as the bulwark of independent Hyderabad with a dominant position for the Muslims. They were also supported by the Depressed Classes' Association led by B.S.Venkat Rao, Shyam Sunder and J.H. Subbaiah. They also enjoyed the passive support of the feudal elements among the Hindus, such as an eminent landlord, Pingle Venkatarama Reddy.

The Andhra Mahasabha, a social reform movement which had existed since 1921, had been taken over by Marxists with strong grassroot

support in the districts of Nalgonda and Warangal, bordering the Andhra districts of the Madras Presidency. This agrarian revolt was primarily directed against the landlords in rural Telengana. It was intended to ensure tenancy and land ownership rights to the cultivator and end the traditional forms of exploitation through forced labour, grain levies, food procurement schemes and the like.[24]

When the negotiations between the Nizam's government and the Government of India were resumed in the second half of September, the Hyderabad delegation argued on behalf of the Nizam that Hyderabad was ready to enter into an association but not to sign an Instrument of Accession. The negotiations during September were unsuccessful because of the Nizam's continued stress on his sovereignty and right to independence as well as his persistent belief that Hyderabad's accession to India would lead to bloodshed all over South India. By the end of September the Nizam's attitude had considerably stiffened. This was ascribed by Sir Walter Monckton to the influence of Jinnah.[25]

By early October the law and order situation had further deteriorated. It was reported that some of the Samasthans or estates were thinking of joining the Indian Union. V.P.Menon's visit to the city scheduled for 8 October had to be cancelled as his safety could not be guaranteed. Between 11 and 22 October, detailed negotiations took place in Delhi, and the Hyderabad delegation returned with the draft of the Standstill Agreement which had been approved by Lord Mountbatten, Sir Walter Monckton and Sardar Patel. At Hyderabad the Nizam's Executive Council approved the Agreement and the Nizam gave his oral consent to it on 25 October. However he twice postponed signing the Agreement and finally agreed to do so on the morning of 27 October just before the delegation was to leave for New Delhi.

At three o'clock on the morning of 28 October a crowd of 25,000 to 30,000 persons surrounded the houses of Sir Walter Monckton, the Nawab of Chhatari and Sir Sultan Ahmed, which were adjacent to each other. The crowd was orderly, but determined to prevent the delegation from leaving for Delhi. This they succeeded in doing, although the three delegates and Lady Monckton managed to get themselves evacuated to the house of a British officer of the Hyderabad State Forces.

The same afternoon the Nizam saw the delegation, and advised them to stay on while he took stock of the situation. He rallied against Qasim Razvi and insisted that he would force Razvi to accept the Council's decision.

During the special meeting of the Executive Council held at King Kothi, General El Edroos and Aravamudu Aiyangar were present as special invitees. Aiyangar asked permission to put a few questions to the meeting. When the Nizam agreed he asked, 'Have we ever been as independent as England, France or Germany?' The unanimous reply was 'No'. He then asked how long Hyderabad could hold out if a conflict arose with the Indian Union. El Edroos replied, 'Not more than four days.' The Nizam butted in and said, 'Not more than two.' Aiyangar drove home the point and said, 'The wisest course then would be to sign the Standstill Agreement. We have secured much better terms than other states.' The Nizam agreed with this view and everyone expected him to sign the Agreement although three ministers including Moin Nawaz Jang and Abdul Rahim dissented. Although the Majlis' representatives were outvoted in the government the Razakars exercised a veto power directly on the Nizam himself.

Next morning the Nizam met the delegation again, and without any forewarning suddenly called Qasim Razvi into the meeting. Razvi pleaded for a chance to reopen negotiations with the Government of India through a fresh delegation to be sent to Delhi. When he was pressed to give reasons for his optimism that Hyderabad could obtain better terms, Razvi said, 'As the hands of the Indian Union are fully occupied with their troubles elsewhere, they would be in no position to do anything to us or to refuse our demands if we insist.'[26]

When Monckton, Chhatari and Sultan Ahmed found that the Nizam was not convinced by their advice and was inclined to accept Razvi's views, all three submitted their resignations. Following this meeting there were angry scenes at the palace when Monckton rebuked Deen Yar Jang, the Kotwal for his inaction when his house as well as those of Chhatari and Ahmed were surrounded. The latter replied that if ordered to intervene the police would have refused to resist the Muslim crowds. This reply was indicative of the Kotwal's involvement in the Majlis action, because the matter should have been taken up with the Police Minister, Moin Nawaz Jang, and if necessary the army should have been brought in.

The Nizam himself had by this time changed his role from that of a manipulator of the Majlis to its prisoner. It was clear both to Ali Yavar Jang and to K.M.Munshi the Agent-General of India at Hyderabad that the Nizam was no longer acting independently of the Majlis. Thus the crowds sent by Qasim Razvi to Shah Manzil early on the morning of 28 October could be compared to Mussolini's march on Rome when the Italian King, Victor Emmanuel, became a puppet of the fascist leader. The march 'proclaimed to the world that the will of the Nizam counted for nothing and that the police and government were theirs.'[27]

Hosh Bilgrami, also known as Hosh Yar Jang was Peshi Secretary to the Nizam. He repeatedly states that the Nizam tried to stem the activities of the Majlis, but failed to do so. From many sources we know of a speech by Qasim Razvi threatening that, 'if any hand rises against the State interests it will be cut off, and the person or persons behind that hand will be put to an end.' This was a direct threat to the Nizam, and was also linked up with the murder of a courageous Urdu journalist, Shoebullah Khan, as will be recounted later.

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The Nizam now sent two persons to Karachi, who returned on 29 October, evidently bringing a message of support from that country. On 31 October Sultan Ahmed arrived in Delhi carrying a letter from the Nizam containing a threat that if the negotiations with India broke down, he would immediately negotiate and conclude an agreement with Pakistan.

The Nizam selected a new delegation consisting of Nawab Moin Nawaz Jang, the Minister for Police and Information, as well as Abdul Rahim and Pingle Venkatarama Reddy. Moin Nawaz Jang had an informal interview with Mountbatten, at which the latter indicated his displeasure at the delegation trying to reopen negotiations on the basis of a document which had been rejected by the Government of India. By 29 October the position in Kashmir had altered in favour of India, the raiders having been pushed northwards from the Kashmir valley. At the formal meeting on 2 November Moin Nawaz Jang tried to justify the Nizam's volte face by reading out from earlier correspondence, but Mountbatten pointed out firmly that he had been able to persuade the Government of India to consider a Standstill Agreement

without accession. This was a great step forward, and there was no justification for the Nizam to have repudiated an agreement to which he was already committed. The concession had been because of the ruler's difficulties with the Majlis.

The delegation pleaded for some concession from the Government of India which would enable them to claim that their mission had not been a failure. They wanted to appoint political representatives in foreign countries and not just trade agents. Second, they wanted the right to import arms from outside. Third, they wanted it stated in the collateral letter that the Nizam suspended the exercise of his full sovereignty on the three subjects for one year only. None of these requests was acceptable to the Government of India except the last, which had been included in the agreement itself. Mountbatten made it clear to Moin Nawaz Jang that the Nizam must finally make up his mind one way or the other. The threat to conclude a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan had given the wrong signal. India was not in a weak position and could tackle the Hyderabad problem without difficulty, but for Hyderabad the consequences of continued defiance would be disastrous.

In a letter to Monckton, written just after he had signed the Standstill Agreement, Mountbatten expressed his appreciation of Monckton's contribution to this achievement, and commented that, 'you have won all along the line.' Nehru, however was more cynical about the Agreement, and told V.P. Menon when he met him in a corridor in the secretariat at New Delhi that, 'this means we shall have peace for one year.'[28]

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The ending of the Second World War and the possibility of the transfer of power evidently gave the Nizam the idea of appointing as President of his Council, Sir Mirza Ismail, former Diwan of Mysore and Jaipur, who was reputed to be closer to the Congress than to the British. He took the opportunity to do so, when Chhatari fell a victim to the arrogant machinations of the Majlis after the Dichpally Mosque incident.

Mirza Ismail's appointment was opposed by Jinnah, whose advice the Nizam had taken for several years between 1939 and 1944. Mirza attempted to purchase Goa for the Nizam and get back Berar. He implemented the long-delayed reforms recommended by the Aiyangar Com-

mittee. It was however a matter of too little and too late. The mood of the Congress had changed all over India, and Hyderabad was no exception.

Only the Nizam did not see the writing on the wall. His goals ran parallel with those of the Majlis, and he accepted Mirza's resignation without much protest. Chhatari was brought back as Sadr-i-Azam and the Majlis further strengthened its position. Qasim Razvi prevented a settlement, and it was only under great pressure that the Nizam signed the Standstill Agreement with India. The Majlis talked of signing a similar agreement with Pakistan. India thought it had bought peace for one year, but even this was too long a period to hope for the Majlis to control its uncontrollable cadres.

CHAPTER EIGHT

TELENGANA REVOLT AND THE FALL OF THE "INDEPENDENT" HYDERABAD STATE

Dayar-i-Hind ka woh rahbar Telengana
Banaraha hai nayi ek sahar Telengana
Bularaha hai ba simt-i-digar Telengana
Woh inqilab ka paigambar Telengana...

Larz larz ke gire saqf wa bam-i-zardari
Hai pash Nizam-i-Halaku wa Czari
Padi hai farq-i-mubarak pe zarbat-i-kari
Huzoor Asaf-i-Sabeh pe hai gashi tari

(Telengana is showing the way for India
Telengana is making a new dawn
It is calling us in a different direction
That prophet of revolution, Telengana...

The house of capitalism has trembled and fallen
The orders of Halaku and Czar are in pieces
A mortal blow has hit the auspicious head,
The seventh Nizam has lost consciousness)

- Makhdoom Mohiuddin

One day however a small bearded man in Razakar uniform shouted before a thrilled audience that he and his legions would march to Delhi and plant the Asafia flag on the Red Fort. There was an idea behind this threat, for, if Hyderabad could not integrate with India, why should not India be made to integrate with Hyderabad? The conquest was also to be from sea to sea as was made clear a little later when the same small bearded man in Razakar uniform declared that the waters of the Bay of Bengal would wash the feet of the Nizam. It was a strange mixture of roles, a combination of Emperor of India and King Canute, and it mattered little if the Nizam liked it or not. The new Hyderabad had to have its Mare Nostrum

- Ali Yavar Jang, in *Hyderabad in Retrospect*

The signing of the Standstill Agreement between the Nizam's government and the Government of India was differently interpreted, as we have seen, by different actors in the drama. The Nizam was still in close touch with dignitaries in Pakistan, but he tried to give the impression to the Government of India as if he was under great pressure from the Majlis in Hyderabad. A message was sent through Sir Sultan Ahmed to Lord Mountbatten that the ruler was forced to send Moin Nawaz Jang as the head of the delegation to Delhi due to public demand.

Mir Laik Ali was a Hyderabadi who had built up a career as an industrialist due to the patronage of the Industrial Trust Fund of Hyderabad. He had acquired considerable stature as an industrialist even before the Second World War, and had become acquainted with Jinnah at this time. He began to share the passion of Jinnah for the formation of Pakistan, although he had only a vague notion of what the concept meant, and he realized that even Jinnah had not worked out the details in his own mind.

Jinnah seemed to respond well to Laik Ali's idea that a Muslim state such as Pakistan would have to be a state-managed economy. Laik Ali was at one time trying to develop an iron and steel industry in Hyderabad with iron ore from Bastar. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, an active and influential Minister of the Government of India, persuaded Laik Ali to think of starting a ship-building yard at Machchlipatnam, but after the scheme had made some progress, Jinnah persuaded him to divert his attention to the building of a shipyard at Karachi instead. He agreed to do so, after getting the consent of Mudaliar, who guessed that Jinnah had played a part in Laik Ali's change of priorities.

In September 1947, a few weeks after the independence of India and Pakistan, Laik Ali was contacted on the telephone at Hyderabad by Jinnah, now Governor-General of Pakistan, who wanted him to go as Pakistan's delegate to the United Nations. This appointment was to be a cover for his real mission, which was the raising of funds for the development of Pakistan from financial circles in Europe and the United States of America. When he returned to India in October, he had some difficulty in visiting Pakistan, but managed to do so with the help of Zahid Hussain, the Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi, who had served as Finance Member of the Nizam's Council after Ghulam Mohammad's departure from the state. He was able to have a long and emotional interview with Jinnah, although the latter was in a poor state of health.

Although he did not hold any office at the time, Laik Ali helped in the negotiation of the loan of twenty crore rupees from the Government of Hyderabad to the Pakistan government, which was in dire financial straits. This loan was ultimately not availed of, as it proved a stumbling-block in India-Hyderabad relations, and Jinnah decided in March 1948, at Laik Ali's request, to make this concession in order to help Hyderabad State.[1]

The Nizam now accepted the resignation of Chhatari, who thus ended his second term as President of the Executive Council. In his place he appointed Mir Laik Ali. It is difficult to say if the appointment had been made at the instance of the Majlis leader, Qasim Razvi, or of Jinnah. Laik Ali himself claimed that Jinnah advised him against accepting the appointment unless both Hindu and Muslim leaders persuaded him to do so. He knew the Nizam's wayward temperament too well.

Qasim Razvi was now at the height of his power. He visited Delhi, calling on Sardar Patel as well as V.P. Menon. With his 'gleaming eyes, beard and fez, worn at a rakish angle,' he seemed to Menon to be in the grip of 'a fanaticism bordering on frenzy'. He told the latter that, if the Government insisted on a referendum, the matter would have to be decided by the sword. Despite this sabre-rattling by the Majlis leader, the Nizam signed the agreement and the collateral letter on 29 November 1947.

The Standstill Agreement was a transitional measure continuing in force all the agreements and administrative arrangements on matters of common concern, including defence, external affairs and communications, which existed between the Crown Representative and Nizam before the transfer of power. The two governments would appoint Agents at Hyderabad and Delhi respectively. The Government of India would not exercise paramountcy functions in their relations with Hyderabad. Once the agreement was terminated no benefit would accrue to either side. Any dispute arising out of the agreement would be referred to arbitrators, one appointed by each party, and an umpire selected by the arbitrators. The agreement would come into force immediately and remain in force for one year.

The most important provision in the Agreement was that the dominion of India did not have any obligation, nor enjoy any right, to send troops to assist in the maintenance of internal order or to station troops in the state, except in time of war. In a secret letter, the Nizam wrote to Lord Mountbatten that he would not accede to Pakistan, but in the event of a war between India and Pakistan, he would remain neutral.

If India left the Commonwealth, the Nizam would feel entitled to reconsider his decision.

There were several different views as to how affective the Standstill Agreement would be. Nehru felt that the agreement would purchase communal harmony and peace in the south for one year. Lord Mountbatten hoped that the Nizam would accede to India before the expiry of the agreement. Patel doubted the bonafides of that government; but Menon assured him that the Nizam would have either to accede or grant responsible government within a year, failing which the Government of India would have to reconsider the whole basis of its approach.

The Nizam and his advisers conceived the agreement as giving them breathing time during which Indian troops could be withdrawn from the State and they could build up their strength sufficiently to assert their independence. Although the Nizam later sought to give the impression that he had been for a long time a prisoner of the Majlis, it appears that he was at this time in full command of the situation. This was the view of Alan Campbell Johnson, Mountbatten's personal emissary, who visited Hyderabad on behalf of the Governor-General as late as February 1948.

Meanwhile the State Congress President Swami Ramanand Tirth had launched an agitation which encouraged villages on the borders of Hyderabad to declare themselves 'free zones' and pressed the Indian Government to recognize their *de facto* accession to India.

The Government of India were opposed to this piecemeal declaration of independence, possibly because the movement had been conceived and financed by socialist leaders of Bombay who had broken away from the Congress early in 1947. They had dropped the word Congress from their name, Congress Socialist Party. The socialists were opposed to the Standstill Agreement because, 'it conceded by implication the de facto paramountcy of the Nizam.'

Swami Ramanand Tirth after his release from jail on 30 November 1947 had issued bold statements supporting the socialist-backed agitation which was largely confined to the western borders of Hyderabad State with the Marathi-speaking areas of Bombay state. Sholapur, which had declared its independence from British India during the 1942 movement, was a major centre of activity on the Bombay side of the Hyderabad border. However, soon after a meeting with Sardar Patel in Bombay, Tirth issued a statement that, 'the border incidents had nothing to do with the

State Congress. They were not included in the programme of the State Congress.....our movement is strictly non-violent.'

This statement gave a shattering blow to the Socialist-sponsored movement. It created a rift between Socialist and Congress workers. In February 1948 at a conference of the Premiers of Bombay, Central Provinces and Madras under the auspices of the States Department, the Premier of Bombay stated that, 'some Socialists and Congressmen operating from the Bombay side of the border were using fire-arms,' and it had been decided that, 'whoever was using fire-arms on our side should be disarmed.'[2]

Not only did the Congress-Socialist alliance break down in the western, Marathi-speaking districts of Hyderabad, in the northern Telugu-speaking areas of Telengana, the short-lived alliance involving a United Front strategy, which had developed between the Congress on the one hand and the Communist-dominated Andhra Mahasabha on the other, also began to crumble. The goals of the two organizations were different. The Congress goal was to disrupt the State administration by defying State laws and a campaign of civil disobedience as chalked out by the Congress Committee of action. The aim of the Communists on the other hand was 'anti-landlord, anti-feudal agrarian movement aiming at what they considered a more equitable distribution of land in Telengana. Their locally recruited squads accordingly attacked and disposed landlords, occupied government waste land, and organised armed resistance to protect their spoils.'[3]

Both the Communists and Socialists now regarded the Standstill Agreement as, 'a stab in the back of the people, ...a betrayal of the Congress central leadership,' and a surrender to the Nizam.'[4]

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The Communist agitation in Telengana was being intensified and was spreading from the districts of Nalgonda and Warangal to parts of Karimnagar, Medak and Adilabad. The Madras Government tolerated Communist activity in the areas bordering Hyderabad State, on the assumption that once the Razakars were dealt with by bringing down the Nizam's government, the Communist threat could be dealt with. Meanwhile the Laik Ali government began to negotiate with the communists, hoping to come to an arrangement with them and dangling before them the prospect of an alliance against the common enemy, the Indian Government, which was

preparing for armed intervention. The lifting of the ban on the Communists and the withdrawal of warrants of arrest against their leaders disturbed the Indian Government and made them more determined to intervene in Hyderabad, rather than negotiating with the Nizam's government for a settlement.

Muslim opinion in Hyderabad was generally supportive of the Majlis stand. Having been fed on concepts of Islam as the only true faith, of Muslims as the *hukumran quam*, or the ruling race, many of them regarded the Majlis as the only hope for them in the face to a hostile India, which they felt had mounted a blockade against Hyderabad, thus denying them access to essential arms and other commodities. The Majlis support was no longer confined to the working class and younger Muslims, but extended to parts of the middle and upper classes. Civil servants and businessmen who were pliable or ambitious toed the Majlis, some of them playing an active part in supporting the Majlis. Innocent Hindus were sometimes killed by State forces, on the excuse of suppressing the Communist revolt.

The Razakar attacks on innocent villagers, looting, burning and murders, the weakness of the State administration and the fiery speeches of Qasim Razvi combined to instil, both among urban and rural Hindus, the feeling that they were under serious threat. As often happens in such situations, the reports of Razakar atrocities were probably exaggerated in the telling. The situation had a traumatic effect on the Hindu mind, which had traditionally supported the rule of Muslim dynasties in the Deccan. In the last couple of decades of the last Nizam's rule a doctrine had been put forth for a time which denied the Hindus a place in the power structure and threatened their livelihood and even their lives.

The opinion in the Marathwada and Hyderabad Karnatak areas was thus strongly against the Razakars, with which the Laik Ali government became increasingly identified. Except for some Harijan elements, mainly in the Marathwada area, who joined the Razakars as volunteers, the depressed classes in the rural areas of Hyderabad State were thoroughly against the Nizam's government. The Harijans of the Telengana area were strong supporters of the working class Communist revolt. Among the Hindus it was mainly the feudal class, represented by major landholders like Pingle Venkatarama Reddy, and a few merchant bankers, which maintained its traditional loyalty to the Nizam's government.

During the last few months, even the merchant class and the urban lawyers were no longer supportive of the regime. Men like the banker, Pannalal Pittie and L.N. Gupta, a civil servant who had risen to be Finance Secretary of the Nizam's government, were in touch with the Indian authorities. The courts were boycotted by the lawyers who were overwhelmingly Hindu, especially in the city of Hyderabad. A group of advocates in Hyderabad led by Vinayakrao Vidyalankar and Gopalrao Ekbote systematically put together newspaper reports in Urdu, Telugu and Marathi, translated them into English and sent them to Sardar Patel and Pandit Nehru in Delhi. The traditional loyalist, Aravamudu Aiyangar, who had chaired the Reforms Committee in the 1930s, was now sending confidential reports to Sardar Patel through N. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar in New Delhi.

This widespread opposition to the regime apart, there were a few in Hyderabad who played an active role in bringing down the Nizam's government. Among them were two brothers, Vandemataram Ramachandra Rao and V. Veerabhadra Rao, who risked their lives repeatedly to collect information about the Nizam's government's import of arms and ammunition with the help of Sidney Cotton, the build up of its armed forces and their equipment, as well as the recruitment of lumpen elements, especially Muslim refugees from the Central Provinces and elsewhere, into the Nizam's Army and the Razakars.[5]

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At the second congress of the Communist Party of India, held at Calcutta from 28 February to 6 March 1948, a new 'political thesis' was put forward in which Telengana was cited as a successful, armed insurrection of the people against the government through which revolution could be brought to India.

By March 1948 the Communist bands, ranging in strength from five hundred to two thousand men and armed with guns, rifles, and automatic weapons, had emerged victorious from several encounters with the police. They had been, 'seizing arms and ammunition from village officials and police outposts, wrecking motor buses and ... committing sabotage on the Nizam State Railway.' Grain which had been stored by officials was being looted, those who contributed grain had their cattle lifted, and their

agricultural implements broken. Atrocities such as, 'burying alive, torture, the blinding, maiming of victims,' were common.

The Communist leadership denounced the Indian Government, the princes and the Socialist Party as, 'bourgeois' and 'capitalist' as Communists were being suppressed in other parts of India. But the Madras Government had allowed the Communists to operate freely, and the police were asked to turn a blind eye to their activities. Evidently the Government of India and the Madras Government were taking a calculated risk and allowing a free hand to the Communist activity on the Madras side of the border because they were fighting the Razakars and helping to bring down the Nizam's regime. The enemy of one's enemy is one's friend. The State Congress was to go along with this approach, knowing that after accession the Government of India would help them if necessary in measures against the Communists.[6]

By March 1948, the United Front of left forces against the Nizam had collapsed and the Telengana revolt had become largely if not entirely an affair of the Communists. The Indian Government was demanding the disbanding of Razakars, whose depredations were given wide publicity. Mir Laik Ali the Sadr-i-Azam now sent feelers to the Telengana leaders to join hands with the Nizam's government against their common Indian enemy, who was preparing for military intervention. The deal was struck with Makhdoom Mohiuddin and Ravi Narayan Reddy, and on 4 May 1948 the Nizam's government lifted the ban on the Communist Party in Hyderabad. This pact completely reversed the position and turned the Communists into allies of the Nizam's government and its strong right arm, Razakars.

Although the Communist leader, P.Sundarayya denied such an agreement, the Hyderabad City Committee issued a statement to the press denouncing the Indian Government (described as a bourgeois-landlord government) as an ally of British imperialism, urging that the Indian Army's entry into Hyderabad be opposed, and the slogan of Azad Hyderabad raised. In June 1948 the Andhra Congress leader, A. Kaleswar Rao, wrote to Dr Rajendra Prasad that the Nizam's government was encouraging the occupation by the Communists of Munagala and Lingagiri, two Indian enclaves in Hyderabad State.[7]

The Communist movement had its base in the Nalgonda and Warangal districts (including the Khammam district, which was carved out from Warangal later). It spread its influence later to parts of Karimnagar, Medak and Adilabad districts. All these areas were in the Telugu-speaking

Telengana portion of the state. At the same time the Razakars had their strength in the small towns both in the Marathwada and Hyderabad Karnatak districts, as well as in Hyderabad city. In parts of Telengana it was widely stated that the Razakars were the rulers by day (*dinam doralu*) while Communists ruled at night (*cheekati doralu*).

The liberal Congress view was that the agrarian problem had to be tackled by legislation for land reform, and not by revolution. Jawaharlal Nehru put forth his view quite forcefully and wrote about it after the Police Action.[8]

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In February 1948 the sole Congress leader who had agreed to participate in Laïk Ali's Cabinet, G. Ramachar, resigned, declaring that in Hyderabad, 'Arson, loot and murder formed the normal events of the day...Village after Village was burnt down....There has been no security of life and property in the State...Do or die jehad (holy war) has been proclaimed against everyone who opposes (the Ittihad's) goal of the establishment of an Islamic State.'

However, the BBC representative in Delhi, R.Stimson reported that, 'Qasim Razvi organised a Razakar parade for me in Hyderabad city and told me that it would be a big show. I expected at least three thousand Razakars to attend the parade, since there is a majority of Muslims in Hyderabad city and since Hyderabad is Razvi's own headquarters. I counted fewer than four hundred of whom twenty or thirty were children under ten years age.

'Most of the Razakars were youths of 17 to 20 wearing, "a rudimentary kind of uniform, a Khaki bush-jacket or tin hat or a furcap or a leather belt. The weapons on parade included a muzzle-loader, few 12-bore rifles, two revolvers and an, "assortment of steel-tipped lances, bamboo poles and canes." Except for Qasim Razvi's two personal bodyguards of ten men each (one of them referred to as his, "Black Guards" because they were dressed in black) the units displayed, "very sloppy marching and sloppier arms drill and P.T. All in all it was a sorry exhibition."

'After the parade, volunteers drove off in three trucks, firing blanks into the air. Others marched away, 'behind a drum and fife band.' In half a dozen villages Stimson came across a couple of dozen young Muslims

with one or two muzzle-loaders, a few spears, and bamboo poles shambl(ing) bovinely out of step and looking very pathetic.'

Stimson discounted Razvi's estimate of 200,000 volunteers in the Razakars. His estimate was 30,000 to 50,000. Even Razvi estimated their arms at 3,000 to 4,000 muzzle-loaders, a few 12-bores and sporting rifles.[9]

It is necessary to ask how such a pathetic volunteer force had become a threat to the peace of the Nizam's dominions. Could the rural and urban Hindu population of Hyderabad have been terrorized by such a motley force? In the first few decades of the twentieth century, revenue officials like A.J.Dunlop and G.E.C. Wakefield and police officials like A.C.Hankin had maintained law and order with an iron hand, at least in the ryotwari (non-jagirdari) areas. It was said that no crime could remain undetected for more than twelve hours. An efficient system of espionage was operated by the Kotwal or Commissioner of Police in the city and the Director-General of Police in the districts.

Nevertheless, in the last years of the Nizam's rule, the prestige of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen and the deference shown to it by the Nizam and senior officials had demoralized the administration. The breakdown of the regular machinery of government made it possible for lawless elements belonging largely, though not entirely, to the Muslim community, to operate a reign of terror. In some districts, such as Bidar, the Majlis supporters included individuals belonging to the Hindu community who used to indulge in looting in conjunction with the Majlis. There were also Arabs (chaoosh) in different parts of the State who were part of the Razakar phenomenon, although not always uniformed.

Qasim Razvi was a rabble-rousing orator, but he did not necessarily exercise any effective control over the rabble that took advantage of his speeches. The BBC correspondent was obviously not shown these elements. The Arab dress of the regular Razakars recalled to the public mind the traditional fearlessness and capacity for revolt of the Arabs of Hyderabad. However the real damage to the body politic was, I suspect, caused not by the regular trained Razakars, but by these lumpen elements.

The strength of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen was much larger than that of the Razakars, which was its militant wing. The party commanded massive support in the Muslim community. This was seen from the attendance at Majlis' annual conferences. By March 1948 the total membership of the Majlis was reported to be 900,000, not a small figure

considering that the total Muslim population of Hyderabad including women and children in the 1931 Census was about 15,34,000 and in the 1941 Census about 22,00,000. The Majlis had fifty-two centres in the State each under an Area Commander (Salar).

The propaganda created by the Majlis, with the open or tacit support of the Nizam and the administration gave the impression that the Muslims of Hyderabad were in fact the *hukumran qaum*. This view was often accepted by the docile Hindu traders, jagirdars and merchants who were influential in the community. No wonder Ali Yavar Jang compared the dominant ideology of the Majlis to the Nazi theory of the Aryans as the ruling race of Germany.[10]

The signing of the Standstill Agreement brought to the fore a number of issues which dominated the relations between Hyderabad and India for the next eleven months. These outstanding issues were first, the appointment of agents by the two governments in their respective capitals and elsewhere, and second, the withdrawal of the Indian Army from Hyderabad, the building of the Hyderabad Army and the supply of arms and ammunition to the Hyderabad government. A third major issue was that of financial independence, and finally depredations of the Razakars and the 'verbal aggression' of the Majlis leaders.

Both sides' expectations from the Standstill Agreement were low. The Indian side wanted the agreement to pave the way for the acceptance by Hyderabad of full-fledged participation in the Indian Union; but it was not hopeful about it. The Kashmir crisis and the partition riots had left the Government of India with its hands full and they could not take on another crisis.

The Nizam and the Majlis leaders, however, felt that the agreement gave them breathing space in which to build up their armed forces, diplomatic position and financial independence, as well as to overawe the non-Muslims of the State into accepting a permanent dominating position of the Muslims.

As his agent in New Delhi, the Nizam sent Nawab Zain Yar Jang, a senior official and an architect of some distinction, who had also been Minister for Public Works of the Nizam's government. He maintained cordial relations with the Government of India and commanded its sympathy and support. The Indian Government sent K.M. Munshi, a Gujarati politician and litterateur who had served the Bombay Presidency

as Home Minister between 1937 and 1939. He was disliked by the Nizam's government because of his support for the Arya Samaj satyagraha, most of whose supporters came from Bombay.

Munshi himself saw his role as that of a successor to the British Resident. He therefore tried his best to have the old Residency building at Chadarghat which had been constructed in 1803, allotted for his use, or failing that the Bolarum Residency, now the Rashtrapati Nilayam, or residence of the President, for the south of India. The Nizam's government was however determined to scrap this idea and promptly rejected the request. Both the Residency buildings reverted to the state government when the British left.

However the buildings vacated by the British troops located in Bolarum and Trimulgherry near Secunderabad provided a solution to the problem of the Indian authorities. The Flagstaff House of the Army General was handed over to Munshi for his residence, and the Nizam's government could not object to this act. Thus India inherited the 'mailed fist' of the Army headquarters bungalow rather than the 'velvet glove' of the far grander Residency buildings. This event was a harbinger of things to come.

In the short run, however, the Indian position suffered a set-back. As a consequence of the Standstill Agreement, the Indian Army was withdrawn from Secunderabad, after being stationed there for nearly two centuries. There were many in Hyderabad who were deeply disturbed at this turn of events. Had the Indian Army stayed on in the city, they could have overawed the Majlis' raucous supporters in the city in a day's time, with a minimal use of force.

The Hyderabad Army had been deliberately prevented from becoming an efficient force by the British Government for generations. The desperate last-minute attempts by the British officers of the Political Department to build up the State as a bulwark of what they now called 'Indian India' were bound to fail, in the light of the lotus-eating atmosphere that prevailed in the Hyderabad Army, which affected both Indian and British officers in the Nizam's employ.

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Within a few days of the signing of the Standstill Agreement, 29 November, 1947, Chhatari left Hyderabad. The Majlis recommended first

Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance Minister of Pakistan, to hold the post of Sadr-i-Azam. As he could not be spared, the Majlis' second choice, Mir Laik Ali, was requested to accept the appointment. He did so after obtaining Jinnah's permission which was granted for a year only. Another name which had been mentioned for the post was that of Zahid Hussain, who had served as Finance Secretary and Finance Minister of Hyderabad and was later Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. He had been removed from the Finance Membership of the Nizam's Council by Sir Mirza Ismail.[11]

Laik Ali was a professional, an engineer and an industrialist who had risen from a junior post in the government to become one of Hyderabad's leading industrialists. He had good relations with many Hindus, and he began on a good note, releasing Congress prisoners, but his discussions with the Congress leadership did not lead to any effective results. The talks were conducted by Moin Nawaz Jang, his brother-in-law an able administrator with a narrow political outlook. The last government of Hyderabad State before the Police Action had Pingle Venkatarama Reddy as Vice-President, three Majlis ministers, and two other Hindu members, G.Ramachari and B.S. Venkat Rao.

The new regime was controlled by Qasim Razvi. The Razakar movement was expanded with financial support and government help, and its cadre included members from the depressed classes of Hindu. The organization was even permitted to overawe the police when clashes occurred between the two armed forces. Qasim Razvi's speeches became more and more bellicose and divorced from reality.

In January 1948 when Munshi arrived in Hyderabad there were about thirty thousand Razakars led by Qasim Razvi who appeared like a medieval hero, with, 'fiery eyes and passionate oratory,' a fanatic with a one track mind. His mission was to liberate the Muslims of the Deccan from the Indian Union, then to annex the circars, the eastern coastal districts of Madras Presidency so that, 'the waves of the Bay of Bengal wash the feet of our sovereign.' Finally the Muslim crusaders were to march to Delhi to plant the Asaf Jahi flag on the Red Fort . The Hindu to him was a 'Kafir' and, 'a worshipper of stone and monkey'; 'who drinks cows' urine and eats cow-dung in the name of religion'; who is, 'a barbarian in every sense of the word.' On the other hand, to Razvi, to be a Muslim was to invite danger; 'a Muslim is one who

would set at naught all the earthly powers and make the whole world his enemy.'[12]

Razvi was convinced that the medieval age, when Islam spread across continents like wildfire, had not ended. But behind him, and supporting him, were some bureaucrats, scholars and even the Army Commander, General El Edroos, who was related to Razvi. The Nizam's government supported the Razakars financially, and supplied them with lorries, jeeps and trucks. Razvi was allowed to broadcast on Deccan Radio. A number of daily and weekly papers in Urdu served as the Majlis' mouthpiece. The headquarters of the Razakars was located at the Dar-us-Salam, or abode of peace. Razvi worked there daily, and controlled the fifty-two centres in the State, through administration commanders. Razakars were recruited and trained mainly by retired soldiers.

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By February 1948, most of the Indian armed forces had left the Secunderabad Cantonment. Thus an occupation force which had been in position since the end of the eighteen th century was withdrawn. Detailed discussions were held between India and Hyderabad on the question of the military forces to be maintained by Hyderabad, the trade relations to be carried on by the State with foreign countries, the proposal of Hyderabad to join some international bodies, as well as the future political set up. A Constituent Assembly was to be established in 1949, after a plebiscite to be held on the basis of adult franchise, under impartial and independent supervision.

The Nizam's government now stepped up its activities for the obtaining of arms from abroad and appointed information officers, later called Agents-General, in London and Karachi. Attempts to purchase arms abroad had already commenced during Chhatari's second term, when Jinnah had refused to spare a single gun. The Army Commander was sent to London to negotiate a deal without referring the matter to the Executive Council. Among the harebrained schemes put forth by the Majlis in August 1947 had been the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance with United States and Britain, and another proposal to sign an agreement with Pakistan, entrusting the State's defence, external affairs and communications to that country, at the same time as they were being entrusted to India.[13]

The Nizam agreed to fly imported arms over Indian territories to Hyderabad. The intrepid Australian flyer, Sidney Cotton, flew planes regularly from Bidar airfield to Karachi and back. This was known to the Indian authorities but they did not consider it feasible to interfere. There were reports that Britain, America and Pakistan supported Hyderabad, but this was not correct. The State had to rely on its own resources for whatever arms it was able to import. Laik Ali told the Nizam to be prepared to be annihilated by superior arms, or alternatively to surrender to India. Laik Ali himself was a committed follower of Jinnah and had no intention of compromising with the Indian Union under any circumstances.

Ali Yavar Jang, who served the Hyderabad government both as a Secretary and as Member of Council till the end of Chhatari's second term, described the negotiations between India and Hyderabad as, 'a story of allegations of the breaches of the Standstill Agreement, of subversive or unbecoming propaganda, of raid into one another's territory of a loan to Pakistan and a discriminating currency ordinance on the one side and economic blockade on the other.'

Since the Standstill Agreement recognized 'the sovereign right of Hyderabad in regard to currency and coinage' the Indian Government was not on strong grounds when it rejected the Nizam's currency ordinance, passed in order to popularize the use of Hyderabad's own currency. India's objection to a loan of rupees twenty crores promised to Pakistan by Hyderabad was more justified as it involved relations with a foreign country. Moreover it was a breach of faith which had been negotiated while the Standstill Agreement was being finalized with India.[14]

Hyderabad made an appeal to the US and UK for help. The Nizam wrote to the President and the King, and Laik Ali wrote to Churchill, but the Standstill Agreement had five months to go and the US and UK could do nothing substantial. The Army Commander was over-optimistic, and the British High Commission showed no sympathy for Hyderabad, but on the other hand, sent an officer to incite the British and American civilians to give up their jobs and leave Hyderabad. They were evacuated by special flights. By mid-July all flights of Deccan Airways to Hyderabad from Bombay, Bangalore, Madras and Delhi were halted. Soon after that, the Grand Trunk Express was diverted, and telephone contact cut off.[15]

Mir Nawaz Jang was appointed Agent-General in London, and Mushtaq Ahmed Khan was sent to Karachi. The former met officials of the India office, but his talk of seizing the ports of Cocanada or Machchlipatnam and buying the services of a British armoured division and Spitfire aircraft gave an impression of immaturity and poor judgment. Sir Arthur Lothian and Sir Richard Chevenix Trench also told the British officials that he need not be taken seriously. The Nizam's government had ample funds and it was able to transfer funds abroad to purchase arms and win political support.[16]

Throughout his stay of about a year in Delhi, Zain Yar Jang enjoyed a close understanding with V.P. Menon. This was perhaps because, under the Majlis regime, he was kept out of the decision-making process in Hyderabad, and was not even informed of some developments. On the other hand, K.M.Munshi in Hyderabad took a high-profile role, meeting persons of all classes of Hyderabad society, from the Army Commander and high nobility to ordinary villagers, collecting information, negotiating with Laik Ali and the Nizam's government.

During his frequent trips across the border, Munshi made several speeches hinting at the future course of events. At a formal function in Vijayawada he is reported to have said that, 'India was the third greatest military power in the world,' and that, 'Hyderabad is India, bone of its bones and flesh of its flesh...the people of both are one and indivisible.' By March 1948 he was 'openly hinting' at the probability of an Indian military intervention in the State and even 'naming various dates for "D" day.'[17]

Sir Walter Monckton complained about Munshi's activities to Mountbatten, and the latter expressed his opinion to Campbell Johnson, who visited Hyderabad in mid-May 1948 that the post called for 'unusual diplomatic patience and non-communal objectivity' which, evidently Munshi did not possess. It would appear however that Munshi had been handpicked for the job by Sardar Patel. His somewhat aggressive manner proved an effective foil to the dovish attitude towards Hyderabad shown by Lord Mountbatten under the influence of Monckton, who was an old friend.

After Campbell Johnson's visit to Hyderabad he reported as follows about the situation:

> The Nizam's is the key man in the situation. As regards... relations with the Indian Union, nothing is being done without his approval

> or connivance.... Any agreement he finally enters into will be honoured, in the sense that his regime is strong enough to withstand opposition from any quarter. He is in a mood of aggressive fatalism, and ... is ready ... to try to perform a "Samson Act" on the Government of India; in other words if he goes under, full preparations have been made to ensure that the political and social structure of the State should go under with him. On the other hand, the Nizam is searching furtively and anxiously for an honourable settlement. He is a ruler of the old school; he has no liking for the trappings of the Constitutional Monarch and will put up the same kind of resistance to that status as Queen Victoria did. The tighter the resistance to, the more he will fall back on prerogatives. I do not believe that he will voluntarily accept an accession solution which makes him anything other than the official fountain-head of law and custom inside his own state.'[18]

Notwithstanding this report Mountbatten continued to press for a settlement. In a five-hour interview with Laik Ali on 25 May, Mountbatten made a last desperate effort to pressurize the Nizam's Chief Minister. He pointed out that he was leaving India in a few weeks, and if India were to decide on an armed intervention, the Hyderabad Army would be pulverized. Laik Ali agreed that the military position was unfavourable but, 'he considered accession ten times worse than Paramountcy.'

Nevertheless Laik Ali did have intensive discussions with V.P. Menon, and they jointly produced a new proposal of settlement under the innocuous title of 'heads of agreement'. The objection raised by the Nizam and his government to this carefully drafted eleven-point programme indicated that Hyderabad wanted to protect its interests very carefully.

For example, a clause in the first head of agreement stipulated that in respect of defence, external affairs and communications, the Hyderabad Government would pass such legislation as the Government of India might request them to enact. The Nizam wanted that such legislation be required only when it was similar to the legislation in force in India. Another example was that of the clause stating that the Government of India would not station their armed forces in Hyderabad except on the declaration of a state of emergency. To this the Nizam wanted a proviso

referring to Section 102 of the Government of India Act 1935, which made it clear that a state of emergency could be declared only when India's security was threatened by war or internal disturbance.

An important point on which Menon's report is silent is the question of holding a plebiscite in Hyderabad. K.M. Munshi as a lawyer pointed out to Patel that India could not prove that Hyderabad was a dependent state. The Nizam was insisting on an arbitration clause which would have implied an equality of the status of the two parties. Sadar Patel was not sure that a plebiscite would go in favour of India, Swami Ramanand Tirth had opposed the proposal for a plebiscite, presumably for the same reason. Hence Menon's account does not mention the proposal for a plebiscite.

The final text of a settlement based on the heads of agreement was communicated to the Nizam on 15 June 1948. The Nizam still refused to sign. Attempting an 'eleventh hour miracle', Mountbatten sent a long letter urging the Nizam to place his trust in the Government of India. Monckton arrived at Hyderabad at 6.30 a.m. on 17 June. At 1.15 p.m. he sent a telephone message to Mountbatten containing a single word 'lost'. Among the issues on which the Nizam rejected the agreement was the question of arbitration, on which he insisted. Another was that of the plebiscite, which the Indian Government was prepared to hold under international supervision, but only after accession of the state to India.[19]

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The British in India had regarded the states as allies to be protected against outside attacks as well as internal revolts. This protection was paid for by the states through the Subsidiary Allaince System. Armed forces were located by the British in the states the maintenance of which was bome by the latter. In fact these armed forces became armies of occupation. They represented the mailed fist behind the velvet glove of British diplomacy in states like Hyderabad.

A corollary to this position was that the states, although required by treaty to maintain armed forces in case of war, were in fact prevented from doing so by the policy of the Political Department. When Salar Jang I tried to build up an effective armed force in the 1860s it was regarded as an act of disloyalty by the Government of India. The weapons and techniques available to the Indian Army were not allowed to be duplicated in the State. The Revolt of 1857 had shown that the main threat in

Hyderabad came from the artillery. Gunners were therefore especially suspect. Curzon introduced the Imperial Service Troops scheme under which state forces were integrated under British direction and control. The State Forces Schemes of 1920 and 1937 further weakened the State forces. Military advisers were stationed in important states ostensibly to help the states to organize their forces but actually to watched the military developments in the regions.

Major-General Jayanto Chaudhuri of the Royal Indian Cavalry had come into contact with Commander El Edroos of the Hyderabad Cavalry Brigade. The latter, 'looked every inch a professional, a fine figure of a man, very impressive at the conference-table,' but 'left to himself, the Brigadier was far less sure of himself.' The drawing-room manners of Hyderabad Army officers was however impeccable. The Commander-in-Chief was none other than the heir apparent to the seventh Nizam, His Highness the Prince of Berar, Mir Himayat Ali Khan. In 1936 Sir William Barton had reported that, 'the physical degeneration of the Deccani Mussalman was seriously reducing his military worth.' It was however the same Deccani Muslim who provided the backbone of the State's army as well as the Razakar voluntary force of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen.[20]

In a cable to Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, Prime Minister Nehru objected to the remark by the British Foreign Secretary, Bevin, during the debate on Hyderabad in the British Parliament to the effect that India was developing a warlike spirit. He pointed out : 'It is Hyderabad, not India, which has shown warlike spirit, witness bellicose and provocative utterances of Hyderabad Government and Razakar leaders and warlike preparations against India, e.g., smuggling of arms by air of which you have knowledge.' According to a footnote to the report of a press conference addressed by Nehru at New Delhi on 10 September 1948, 'the armed forces of Hyderabad were rapidly being put on a war footing. The authorized strength of the Hyderabad Forces under the State Forces Scheme was 7,000. This had been raised to 13,000 in 1947. By April 1948, the strength of the regulars was 22,393, while 7,000 more men were under training and an additional force of 4,870 men undergoing training under different names such as the Customs Constabulary. The strength of the police force had also been raised to 38,000 men. There were 15,000 Home and Civil Guards.'[21]

The official history of the Indian armed action makes it clear that the, 'military potential of Hyderabad was as baffling as the political situation. The regular troops were strong in numbers but poor in training, had excellent morale but worthless logistics. Their Commander-in-Chief, General El Edroos, was energetic, experienced, rash, unrealistic, fanatical, courageous and (sic) probably loyal to the Nizam but a foreigner (Arab) and not above average in intelligence. The Army was likely to fight well at first for a communal cause, but could not stand up to sustained operations or heavy punishment. The area was far-flung and well-suited for guerilla operations and hit and run tactics against an advancing army.'[22]

The lack of an efficient fighting force did not unduly disturb the Nizam or his advisers, however. Among them were experts in constitutional matters who could write an excellent defence of the Nizam's claims for the use of Machchlipatnam Port under the treaty of 1802, for the return to Hyderabad of the province of Berar which had been taken away under threats of invasion in 1853 and of the northern circars, which had been ceded to the British in exchange for the protection provided to the Nizam by the Indian Army at Secunderabad. If Machchlipatnam could not be used by the Nizam as a port, obviously the British were morally bound to provide alternative arrangements on the west coast to enable the Nizam to import essential goods and army supplies.

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The departure of Lord Mountbatten from the Indian shores in June 1948 only three days after the final breakdown of negotiations between the Government of India and Hyderabad made Indian intervention, already a distinct possibility, inevitable. The Nizam had lost faith in Mountbatten and expected more sympathy from his successor, C. Rajagopalachari who had been sympathetic to Hyderabad and had presided over the convocation of Osmania University in 1943. But these hopes were illusory. Mountbatten had been entrusted with the negotiations with Hyderabad because he had built up an excellent rapport with Nehru and Patel on other major issues, and they had many more urgent matters on their agenda, such as the partition riots, the breakdown of law and order in Delhi, the war with Pakistan over Kashmir, and the subsequent assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. While Mountbatten was handling the negotia-

tions they gave him full support but they had their own reservations about the results. The primary role in events after Mountbatten's departure was taken neither by Rajagopalachari, who was a constitutional Governor-General nor by Prime Minister Nehru, but by Sardar Patel, the Home Minister.

The Nizam had perhaps forgotten that the new Government of India had inherited the Indian Army, with only a small part of it going to Pakistan. The British had dominated India for two centuries through their armed force. Paramountcy over the states was a consequence of this military dominance: it was an effect and not a cause. The post-independence scenario was therefore not likely to be much different from the events of the first half of the nineteenth century when the British were consolidating their hold over the Indian peninsula.

The law and order situation in Hyderabad State deteriorated considerably during the period from June to September 1948. The State administration was inert as a result of being overawed by the Majlis musclemen especially in the Marathwada area and the urban part of Telengana. Only a few district officials whether Hindu or Muslim were able to stand up to the extra constitutional authorities which the Majlis represented. One of them, Fareed Mirza, who had been appointed Tahsildar in 1941 resigned the government service on 15 July 1948 protesting against the subversive activities of the Razakars and the government's tacit support to them.

On 13 August 1948 seven courageous Muslims including Baqar Ali Mirza, Nawab Manzoor Jang, Ahmed Mirza, retired Chief Engineer, M.H. Jaffery, retired DPI and H.A. Muneem, retired Accountant-General, signed the statement along with Fareed Mirza. They urged the Nizam's State to accede to the Indian Union arguing that it would not lead to slavery and subordination but would only amount to a continuation of the Standstill Agreement. They pleaded for an early formation of responsible government as embodied in firmans of the Nizams and for a restoration of Hindu-Muslim unity by the disbanding of the Razakar organization. The appeal created a sensation in Hyderabad and was denounced by several 'patriotic' gentlemen, one of whom, a retired sessions judge, compared the signatories to traitors like Sir Rogers Casement, John Amery, Laval and Marshal Petain and wanted capital punishment to be accorded to them. Qasim Razvi suspected that the Nizam was behind the statement or at least had encouraged it.

On 22 August 1948, Shoebullah Khan, the courageous young editor of an Urdu paper, *Imroze* which was owned by Burgula Ramakrishna Rao was brutally murdered by persons unknown, evidently in fulfilment of the threat that any hand raised against the State of Hyderabad would be cut down. It was significant that the right hand of the young editor was severed from his body at the time of the murder.[23]

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The Government of India was watching the situation very carefully. There was a difference in perception on the part of Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru. Patel was evidently in favour of quick and strong action while Nehru was anxious to avoid an armed intervention as far as possible, for two reasons. First, he was concerned with the consequences for other parts of India in the form of communal riots. Second, he was deeply concerned about the international impact of the proposed military action by India against Hyderabad. It is possible that he was influenced in this regard by the views of Lord Mountbatten, with whom he carried on a correspondence after the latter's departure for England. It would however be incorrect to say that Nehru was opposed to the Police Action altogether. Like a far-seeing statesman he was concerned with the long-term consequences of the decision, and was not prepared to precipitate action without considering the consequences.[24]

The fateful decision to make an appeal to the United Nations Security Council on behalf of Hyderabad might have been the factor that triggered off Patel's decision to commence the Police Action. When the intention to make such a reference was known, and Sardar Patel was asked if the government would provide facilities for the Hyderabad delegation to the UN, he made the sarcastic comment that India would provide the same facilities as would be made for a delegation of zamindars of Madras state who might want to appeal to the United Nations against the takeover of their estates. It also appears that Patel was influenced in his decision by the seriousness of the Communist revolt in some parts of the Telengana region of the Nizam's dominions.

The complaint of Hyderabad came before the Security Council in Paris on 16 September 1948. The question of admitting the item was deferred till Monday, 20 September. The Chinese delegate asked for an adjournment till 20th so that he could obtain instructions from his Govern-

ment but was willing to have a discussion provided, 'a formal discussion regarding an adoption of the agenda should be postponed.' Sir Alexander Cadogan of Britain who was the President of the Security Council at that time, clarified at the request of the Soviet delegate that the suzerainty of the British Crown over Hyderabad and other Indian States came to an end on 15 August 1947. The powers previously exercised by the Crown were not transferred to the Government of India or Pakistan. Hyderabad had not subsequently acceded to either of those dominions but on 29 November 1947 the Nizam entered into a 'Standstill Agreement' with the Government of India for a period of twelve months. The conduct of Hyderabad's external relations was placed in the hands of Government of India during the currency of this agreement.

Moin Nawaz Jang presented his case at length and argued that the United Nations were confronted with the, 'most determined and most serious onslaught of its principles since the organisation was set up.' This violation of the Charter was, 'not the result of sudden eruption of passion' but was the result of, 'a pre-meditated plan the implications of which have been carefully weighed and deliberately accepted.' He went on to say that the, 'principles of independence and equality (of States) had been denied and Hyderabad's cause had now been identified with those principles.' He went on to say that it was, 'within the province and in the power of the United Nations to prevent the accomplishment of the criminal design.' He wanted, 'swift authoritative and determined action,' to be taken to, 'prevent and stop this threat to international peace and justice.'

He wanted action by the Security Council not only under Chapter VI of the Charter, which relates to the peaceful settlement of disputes, but also under Chapter VII, which enables the Security Council to enforce its decision for safeguarding world peace. He referred specifically to Article 39, which enjoined on the Council the duty of determining, 'the existence of any thread to the peace, breach of peace or active aggression,' and to take appropriate action.

Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar, the Indian delegate declined to go into the merits or demerits of the allegations but argued instead that Hyderabad was not a state, was not independent and, 'never in all its history did it have the status of independence, that neither in the remote past nor before August 1947 nor under any declaration made by the United Kingdom, nor under any act passed by the British Parliament,' had it, 'acquired a status

of independence which would entitle it to come in its own right to present a case before the Security Council.'

Mudaliar wanted time till Monday to present documents and put forth his case but when Monday came Hyderabad had surrendered and the Council postponed action indefinitely, as it turned out. The position stated by Mudaliar was confirmed by Sir Benegal Narsing Rao, then representative of India at the Security Council meeting in May 1949. He stated that 'Hyderabad was not a State in the international sense before the Indian Independence Act; she is not one now by virtue of the Standstill Agreement and the arrangements which followed it; and she cannot be one at any time in the future if India is to live. We cannot defy or ignore geography. It follows that any dispute with Hyderabad is not an international dispute. All matters relating to Hyderabad are now dealt with regularly by the Government of India as matters of domestic concern.'[25]

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Early in February 1948, the general staff at Army headquarters in New Delhi had considered the possibility of 'military intervention in Hyderabad' as a contingency plan, should the Government of India take a decision to this effect. Lieutenant-General Sir E.N.Goddard, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command was asked to draw up a detailed plan for the occupation of Hyderabad. He was given a choice of HQ1 Armoured Division or HQ5 Infantry Division. General Goddard selected the former. He was therefore allotted:

- one Armoured Brigade which included the Poona Horse;
- the 3rd Cavalry and the 9th Battalion of the 17th Dogra Regiment;
- the 9th Infantry Brigade, also consisting of three infantry battalions;
- three independent infantry battalions;
- three regiments of Field artillery, including one anti-tank regiment.

In addition there was one troop of the 18th Cavalry and the normal compliment of service corps and maintenance troops.

The plan prepared by the Southern Command in March 1948 visualized a two-pronged attack on Hyderabad. The main force was to move

along the Sholapur road, a distance of 186 miles from Hyderabad and a smaller force was to move along the Vijayawada road, 160 miles to Hyderabad. By the middle of April 1948 the HQ1 Armoured Division with one Armoured Brigade was moved to Southern Command with Major-General J.N.Chaudhuri as Division Commander and Brigadier S.D.Verma as Commander of the Armoured Brigade.

The 9th Infantry Brigade was moved from Ranchi to Bangalore at the same time. The estimate at the time was that the Razakars had 200,000 men and this report, together with the bravado of Qasim Razvi's bombastic speeches had given an exaggerated version of the power of his leadership. Qasim Razvi had told Sardar Patel in Delhi that if war came, he would be found on the frontiers of Hyderabad and except for a few untrained volunteers there is no serious participation by the Razakars in the armed action.

Goddard's estimate of Hyderabad's regular army was that the State's 'regular troops were strong in numbers but poor in training, had excellent morale but worthless logistics.' They were, 'likely to fight well at first for a communal cause, but could not stand up to sustained operations or heavy punishment.' General El Edroos was believed to be an outstanding soldier and a natural leader of men who could convert even a 'disorganized rabble into a first-rate fighting force.' Goddard however felt that El Edroos, though experienced and energetic could also be unrealistic and rash. While possessing, 'a certain fanatical courage' he was, 'not much above the average in intelligence or overall ability.' Major-General Chaudhuri, who had known, El Edroos well since 1938 agreed with Goddard's assessment.

It was by no means certain that the Government of India would carry out the plan of the Southern Command. When the All-India Congress Committee met in Bombay towards the end of April 1948, public opinion in the country was strongly against further negotiations with Hyderabad.

The Marathi press was particularly strident pointing out that negotiations had been going on for almost year without any outcome. Perhaps as a response to this public demand, Nehru made a blunt statement to the Bombay session of the Congress that there were now only two courses open to Hyderabad—accession or war. The speech according to Munshi, 'produced a thrill throughout the country': but Mountbatten was 'horrified'.

However when a delegation of Hyderabad Congressmen met Nehru at Bombay and urged early action to solve the problem in view of the

lawlessness and insecurity prevailing in the State, he explained his difficulties and pointed to the international implications of armed action by India.

On July 24 1948, a number of Razakars and some Pathans who had been employed to support the former cleared Nanaj of the villagers with the assistance of the local police and laid an ambush for Indian troops who were moving from Sholapur to the Indian enclave of Barsi, which was surrounded on all sides by Hyderabad territory. Six men were killed and another six wounded. The army captured the village and occupied it after a bitter fight. An inquiry committee consisting of Brigadier Singh of the Indian Army and Lieutenant-Colonel Weston of the Hyderabad Army blamed the Razakars for the incident.

Qasim Razvi was annoyed with Weston for signing the report and wanted General El Edroos to suspend him. He even went over the head of Edroos, and ordered the Commanding Officer at Osmanabad to send a company to recapture Nanaj. Edroos instructed the officer to ignore Razvi's order. The incident caused a serious rift between Razvi and Edroos which had its repercussions during the Police Action.[26]

Zain Yar Jang's appointment as Agent-General in Delhi was cancelled and the former Chief Secretary, A.M.Razvi was sent in his place. The Majlis suspected Zain Yar Jang of conspiring to get the Nizam to settle with India by claiming that Indian invasion was imminent while Laik Ali was told that it would take a few months more. The Nizam now began to use Sir Mirza Ismail, his former Sadr-i-Azam as a mediator with the Indian Government. Mirza strongly advised the Nizam to sign the Mountbatten proposals of June 1948, if necessary by-passing his own government, and to invite Indian troops back to protect himself. Rajagopalachari also advised the acceptance of Mirza Ismail's suggestions.

On 3 August the Prince of Berar, the *de jure* Commander-in-Chief of the Nizam's army suddenly began to attend the military headquarters and wanted Edroos to supply him with a copy of the military plans. El Edroos consulted Laik Ali and was told not to give him the plans. The prince now wrote an angry letter to Laik Ali protesting against the gross indiscipline of the Army Commander and threatening to resign unless Edroos was sacked.Edroos promptly submitted his resignation directly to Laik Ali. When the prince objected to this further act of indiscipline a fresh resignation letter was sent to the prince. Both Laik Ali and the Nizam considered El Edroos indispensable. The Nizam advised the prince not to

interfere in military matters whereupon the prince resigned as Commander-in-Chief.The Nizam and Laik Ali decided to suppress the matter but K.M.Munshi had come to know about it. All-India Radio announced the startling news of the prince's resignation and this spread demoralization in Hyderabad.[27]

By early September the plans and training for Operation Polo were complete. Southern Command estimated that there were 22,000 troops in the regular Army, equipped with modern weapons including eight 25-pounder guns and three regiments of armoured cars. It was also estimated that there were 10,000 regular troops, 10,000 armed Arabs and Paigah forces, 10,000 Police and Customs forces and about 200,000 Razakars. The Indian Army decided on 13 September 1948 as the day for commencing the invasion of Hyderabad.[28]

There were many brave statements from Hyderabad leaders. Qasim Razvi 'thanked' Patel and Nehru for having united thirty-five lakh Hyderabadis and made them a nation of fighters. He also declared: 'I may be here today, and may not be here tomorrow. But I can assure you, my brothers, if you want to see Qasim Razvi in the midst of your life-and-death struggle, look for him not in the palatial buildings of Banjara, or in the pleasant tea-parties, but in the midst of the battle-fields.' A member of Laik Ali's entourage was told in Delhi in June 1948 that a large number of Sherman and Stuart tanks were being readied for attack on Hyderabad. A classified map was shown and other details provided. When this information was purveyed to Laik Ali he dismissed it airily, stating that the Indian tanks were bottled up in Kashmir and the threat was not a real one. He was confident that the Indian Army could be held back for at least a few weeks, till help came from outside.[29]

At the end of the first day's fighting India's casualties totalled seven killed and nine wounded, of which one died later. Hyderabad casualties were estimated at 632 killed and fourteen wounded. 200 Hyderabadis were captured. This first day of action saw an assault on Naldurg. The bridge across the river Bori was reputed to be very well defended but it was captured without firing a shot. Laik Ali found to his surprise that the army had not blown up the bridge although ordered to do so.

After the first day the operation became more and more like the game of polo after which it had been called. There was only a token resistance by irregulars. Tuljapur and Umarga were also captured, bringing the Indian forces sixty-one kms inside the state territory. Two columns of the

mobile 'Jai Force' marched on Aurangabad-Jalna axis in the northwest. Meanwhile, in the eastern sector Gurkha troops had reached Kodad an important junction on the Vijayawada-Hyderabad highway. The defending Hyderabad Army had abandoned Kodad and fled to the nearest district town. The Gurkhas reached Munagala, an Indian enclave which was already in the hands of 9/2 Punjab.[30]

In the southern and northern sectors the story was the same. Troops advancing in Raichur and Gadag sectors took two important bridges in the Tungabhadra area. From the Jabalpur sub-area an attack was made in the northern sector by Punjabi troops. They were held up by irregulars on the first day but reached Jalna before noon on the second day. Smaller columns crossed the border at different points and seized allotted targets. The Royal Indian Air Force found itself unchallenged in the air as only a single bi-plane existed at Warangal and two decoy planes at Bidar. An anti-aircraft gun brought by Sidney Cotton was still wrapped in its packing case. Apart from Warangal and Bidar the Gulbarga airfield was bombed, as well as some ground forces of the Nizam's army from Naldurg in the west to Kodad in the east. During the next few days, Hyderabad lost 250 men from the regular and irregular armies while India lost a total of eleven.

The Hyderabad press and radio was dominated by the Majlis. There were at least seven Urdu newspapers which purveyed the Majlis line. Qasim Razvi had access to the radio at any time, although the Nizam and the Sadr-i-Azam seldom if ever spoke over the radio. The few independent English and Telugu language newspapers were not allowed to report facts freely.

Taking advantage of this monopoly, and depending on imaginary reports of battles won by Hyderabad forces, the papers came out with reports such as: "Hyderabad troops counter-attack the enemy on the Kurnool front," and, "Guerrilla squads of the Hyderabad army harassing the Indian Troops..." The people of Hyderabad city were thus quite unprepared for the shock of learning that the Indian Army was on the outskirts of Hyderabad within five days of commencing the action.

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K.M.Munshi had been placed under house arrest and suffered a good deal of harsh treatment during the military operations. He fully expected to be killed, but the Razakars turned out to be less dangerous than had been anticipated. Meanwhile Laik Ali found himself completely out of his

depth since he knew little or nothing of military affairs. He had relied on El Edroos' assurances. The Hyderabad Government hoped against hope that the diplomatic efforts in the United Nations would be effective, once the Indian forces were held back for a few weeks. However, Laik Ali discovered to his shock that even the Naldurg bridge had not been blown up and that the Public Works Department had to be called in to undertake this task when the army failed. He found that the Indian Army was moving from Kalyani to Bidar on a road which did not exist in the maps with the Hyderabad Government. Neither he nor the Army Commander knew of the existence of this road but it was confirmed by the Chief Engineer of roads, and the Indian Army obviously knew of its existence.

The General-Officer-Commanding, the Southern Command, Lieutenant-General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji, D.S.O. broadcast an ultimatum to Major-General El Edroos asking him to lay down arms in order to prevent unnecessary and useless loss of life. It appears that this message never reached the Hyderabad Army Commander.

Independently of this ultimatum, the Nizam now took matters into his own hands. He told Laik Ali bluntly that all his calculations had gone wrong. Pakistan had remained a silent spectator. Hyderabad's Army had put up a poor show. The U.N. Security Council had yet to meet and the Indian Army was racing towards Hyderabad. The Army Commander advised accepting whatever terms were available.

Hyderabad Radio announced the surrender of the Hyderabad Army. The Nizam started negotiations with K.M.Munshi. Laik Ali was told in the early morning of 17 September that the Indian Army was proceeding towards the capital along the Bibinagar-Hyderabad road and were near Bibinagar station less than thirty miles from Hyderabad on a straight undefended road. The reports from the United Nations received by code telegram from Hyderabad's Agent-General at Karachi in Pakistan were decoded and it was discovered that the Security Council at its meeting of 16th September had deferred the decision on the admission of Hyderabad complaint till Monday 20th September at the request of the delegate from China who was awaiting instructions from his government. Laik Ali had received reports of the massacre of Muslims by Indian troops during the operations. He was apprehensive of the possibility of communal clashes taking place in Hyderabad in case the Indian Army entered the city and indulged in massacres, as they were reported to have done in other places.

At 8.00 p.m. on the 17th Laik Ali met the Nizam, who warned him of the serious consequences in case the Indian Army entered Hyderabad. Laik Ali replied that he realized the consequences fully, but preferred death to surrender.

(His words, as recorded in his book, are, 'realized all that and much more and yet to me death for the cause of freedom was more welcome, but I said, I fully appreciated the Nizam's viewpoint, and did not propose to come in his way. I said I had decided to tender my resignation that morning and to advise my colleagues in the cabinet to do the same.' The words 'all that and much more' probably referred to the bloodshed that had occurred in places where local people and the Indian Army had allegedly indulged in massacres of Muslims.)

At the last meeting of the Nizam's Cabinet held the same morning at Shah Manzil, the Deputy Prime Minister, Pingle Venkatarama Reddy, made an emotional speech in which he offered to lay down his life for the country and its ruler. He went on to say that no one in the government had faltered in performing his duty under the stewardship of Mir Laik Ali. He expected that within a few hours he would be shot dead and this was therefore likely to be his last speech. He declared that he did not regret having followed the honourabe course, 'even though we have failed in our single-handed struggle and had to surrender to the overwhelming might of arms.' Finally he turned to Laik Ali and said if the latter resigned he would also resign immediately.

This 'brief but stunning speech,' as Laik Ali described it, was the signal for all members of the Cabinet to take a similar stand. The Cabinet submitted its resignation to the Nizam through a unanimous resolution stating that the government had done its best to save the country but surrendered to brute and overwhelming might of arms.[31]

At Laik Ali's request, Qasim Razvi made a broadcast appealing for peace. Munshi met the Nizam at the latter's request and advised him to withdraw the case before the United Nations and to announce the formation of a new government. The Nizam wanted Sir Mirza Ismail to head the government, but Munshi was not sure that the Indian Government would agree. It was therefore decided to announce a new government headed by the Prince of Berar who was still the *de jure* Commander-in-Chief of the Hyderabad Army. A broadcast to this effect was made by the Nizam followed by a broadcast by Munshi.

After the Cabinet meeting the Nizam again met Laik Ali and accepted his resignation. The latter advised him to have all confidential records destroyed. This was done and even some of the arms left over were destroyed at Laik Ali's instructions, although he had resigned the office. In an appeal broadcast from Hyderabad Radio the same afternoon (17 September) Laik Ali stated that Hyderabad was no longer in a position to resist the might of the Indian Army and the government had therefore resigned, having failed in its mission to defend the independence of the State. He appealed to people to prepare themselves for a new order of life very different from that to which they had been accustomed. He made an appeal for communal harmony and left the people under the protection of God. This was the account given in his own book on the subject. But the Indian version ascribes to him a sentiment that he did not mention. It said he pinned his support on the United Nations, and hoped to keep the flag of Hyderabad flying.

The same evening, the Nizam broadcast a message on the Radio which had been drafted by Munshi. It said that Hyderabad's application before the United Nations was withdrawn. It also announced the formation of a new Cabinet, to be headed by the Prince of Berar and including Major-General El Edroos, Nawab Deen Yar Jang, G. Ramachari, Abul Hasan Syed Ali and Pannalal Pittie. He also announced that he was inviting Sir Mirza Ismail, Nawab Zain Yar Jang, and Aravamudu Aiyangar to render advice in the new situation. The release of Swami Ramanand Tirth, the President of the State Congress was acknowledged. He appealed to the people to maintain calm and patience. He announced the withdrawal of the appeal before the Security Council of the United Nations he assured his people that the would to do his best to maintain the best traditions of the Asafia Dynasty of looking after all his people irrespective of caste or creed.

This announcement, the Nizam felt, would enable him to continue as ruler on the basis that he has been an unwilling victim of the previous government's actions and policies. Munshi also broadcast a message which made the same assumption. However, these expectations were far from fulfilled. Neither the Commander-in-Chief of the Nizam's army, the Prince of Berar nor K.M. Munshi was present at the surrender ceremony. Major-General El Edroos was present with one aide to surrender his army.

Major-General Chaudhuri said: 'I have been ordered by Lieutenant-General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji GOC-in-C, Southern Command, to take the surrender of your army.'

Major-General El Edroos replied in a low voice, 'You have it.'

Major-General Chaudhuri then said, 'You understand that his surrender is unconditional,' to which General El Edroos answered, 'Yes, I understand'.[32]

After the surrender ceremony took place on 18 September outside Hyderabad, the Indian Army entered the city and Indian Army Commander Chaudhuri drove to the Bolaram Residency, escorted by the Hyderabad Army Commander and other members of his staff in jeeps. The Nizam sent his personal envoys, Zulqadar Jang, Abul Hasan Syed Ali, Ali Yavar Jang and others to seek his approval for the announcement of the new government which he proposed to set up on the advice of Munshi.

The envoys however returned with grim faces. Major-General Chaudhuri made it clear to them that he intended to proclaim martial law and take over the government himself. 'What! What !' the Nizam exclaimed, and then turned round to me and screamed. 'But, Laik Ali, that is all against the understanding with Munshi.' 'What understanding?' I queried, but got no answer. I soon felt that I was an unwanted person in the conversations that were to follow and begged leave to depart. The Nizam asked me to meet him the next morning, which I promised to do but that never came about.'[33]

When the Government of India had learnt about the Nizam's and Munshi's broadcasts, Nehru sent a brief but firm message to the latter, asking him to refrain from participating in the surrender ceremonies and from interfering in the formation of a new government. Munshi claimed in his book, *End of an Era*, that he had advised the Nizam to take these steps in order to prevent blooshed in the city. He was unable to obtain any instructions from the authorities in Delhi because the Indian Army had not yet entered the city and communications had been cut off. He felt deeply humiliated by Nehru's message, but consoled himself with the thought that he had do his duty as a true karmayogi.

After he reached home, Laik Ali learnt that the Indian forces were to enter the capital on the 19th from the west as well as from the east. Later in the evening he received an order from the Military Governor communicating that he was under house arrest and should not leave his house. His family was sent away, but they reappeared the next morning, unable to stay away from him in his hour of trial. That night an officer of the Indian Army called on him and told him that he would be taken away next

morning. He asked the officer whether a firing squad would be ready. The officer asked to be excused from answering questions. Next morning a convey of military vehicles surrounded the house but no one entered it. It remained outside the house for some hours and finally went away in the same formation in which it had come. Laik Ali surmised that it had something to do with the fact that the Hyderabad case was still pending in the Security Council of the United Nations. He remained under house arrest for months and years, until he finally escaped, or was allowed to escape, in July 1950.

The original reports that there was no serious breakdown of law and order during the Police Action turned out to be incorrect. Jawaharlal Nehru, in a note to the Ministry of States dated 26 November 1948 said that he had received reports of killing of Muslims so large in number, 'as to stagger the imagination,' and lootings of Muslim property, 'on a tremendous scale.' There were no direct allegations against the Army, except that in a few areas like Jalna and Bidar the Army had connived at the looting. He was seriously concerned not only about investigating what had taken place, but also about restoring confidence among the Muslims of Hyderabad, who were suffering from a deep sense of fear, and many of whom were in danger of losing their livelihood.

It has been alleged that serious massacres, rape and destruction or seizure of property took place in Hyderabad State during and after the Police Action. A local advocate, Yunus Salim, contacted the respected journalist, a former editor of the nationalist paper, *Payam*, Qazi Abdul Ghaffar and a bitter critic of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen. When he learnt about the disturbances, Abdul Ghaffar contacted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Indian Minister of Education, who had been President of the Indian National Congress throughout the war. The latter was, 'profoundly saddened' by the account of the carnage, and persuaded Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister of India to appoint a team to visit the districts and towns in the affected areas.

The team consisted of Pandit Sundarlal, a North Indian Hindu with Marxist sympathies, Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, and Yunus Salim. Evidently Sardar Patel, the Minister in charge of Home Affairs as well as the States Ministry, did not agree to an official inquiry as it would have embarrassed Major-General Chaudhuri and the military generally. It appears that arrangements for the tour of the team were made by the military

authorities, without whom no one was allowed to enter or leave the districts of Hyderabad State.

In a cable to G.S. Bajpai, who was representing India at the United Nations, Nehru summarized the position in Hyderabad State on 12 December 1948. This was to enable Bajpai to hand over a factual statement about Hyderabad to the President of the Security Council, as an act of courtesy, in the expectation that this would make it possible to avoid a debate in the Council, for which India was not prepared.

'Hundreds of thousands of Hyderabad Hindus,' Nehru's cable said, 'had taken refuge in neighbouring Indian provinces. Nearly one hundred thousand non-Hyderabad Muslims had been employed in Army, Police and other state services. Nearly eleven thousand political prisoners were in jails. Illicit arms in large quantities were in the hands of, "irregular armed irregulars." ' The Indian Army entered Hyderabad to find, 'people stricken with fear, administration completely disorganised and State finances depleted.' Communications were already bad, and were worsened by heavy rains. Large numbers of officials who were pro-Razakar had deserted their posts, and left the people at the mercy of anti-social elements. In these circumstances there had been some disorder, in which Hindus had retaliated, evidently taking revenge for their sufferings under the Razakars. The situation had settled down by 15 October, when looted property was recovered and returned. Nehru also assured the United Nations Security Council through the Indian representative that Muslims continued to enjoy positions of importance and influence like Chairman of the Public Service Commission, Vice-Chancellor of Osmania University and Member of the Military Government.[34]

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There has been some criticism of the Indian Government's description of the armed operation in Hyderabad State as 'Police Action.' If it was merely a police action, why was it necessary to involve a Lieutenant-General, three Major-Generals and a whole Armoured Division in the operation. The implication was that India had committed aggression on a weak and practically unarmed state, whose only offence had been to assert its independence in accordance with international law.[35]

In order to examine this matter fully, it would be necessary to go into the entire controversy on the history of Hyderabad and its claim to

independence. We can only try to briefly explain here the circumstances in which the Police Action was undertaken.

India had been partitioned not on the basis of the two-nation theory put forth by M.A. Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League, but on the basis of the wish of the majority of people in a particular area, as expressed in the elections of 1946. Plebiscites were held in disputed areas like the Sylhet district of Assam and the North West Frontier Province.

So far as the Indian states were concerned, the rulers were given the option of deciding in favour of accession to one or other dominion. The British Government's view that paramountcy was to lapse would have looked like patchwork quilts. While Jinnah supported the view of Corfield in April 1947 that the states had a right to keep out of both dominions and declare their independence, in fact Pakistan did not allow the states within its jurisdiction any more autonomy than India did. So far as India was concerned, the right of the ruler to accede to either dominion was subject to the wish of the majority. In the case of Junagarh, a plebiscite was actually held, and it decided in favour of accession to India. In the case of Kashmir, the Maharaja acceded to India after his state was invaded by raiders from Pakistan. India's acceptance of his accession was based on the support his decision received from the popular leader of the National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah. The plebiscite proposal was originally mooted by India at the instance of Lord Mountbatten. It was opposed by Pakistan probably because it was felt that the result would be favourable to India, had a plebiscite been held at that time. Subsequently circumstances changed and the Government of India withdrew its consent to the holding of a plebiscite, probably at the instance of Sheikh Abdullah. Instead of a plebiscite, a separate Constituent Assembly for Kashmir was set up.

In the case of Hyderabad, as in the case of Kashmir, India had originally made an offer of a plebiscite or referendum to decide the question of accession. This proposal was later dropped, perhaps because of its implications for the Kashmir case.

Lord Mountbatten's role both in the Kashmir and the Hyderabad cases cannot be ignored. It was he who insisted on a plebiscite in Kashmir, and thus involved India in a long controversy, from which it is yet to emerge. In the case of Hyderabad, his close personal relations with Sir Walter Monckton, the Nizam's Constitutional Adviser, made it awkward for the Government of India to take a truly objective stand. For over a

year, they refrained from taking action in Hyderabad, which, according to Mountbatten's own opinion, was clearly bound to accede to India.

Hyderabad's Nizam did not choose to accede to either dominion, but declared his intention to remain independent. He had neither the internal support nor the armed force to enable him to maintain his independence. As Philip Mason put it, the rabbit had been a rabbit so long that it forgot that it was a rabbit.

Hyderabad had no international status at any time in its history, except perhaps briefly between 1748, when the first Nizam died, till 1800, when it signed a treaty of subordination to the British. Many British writers on Hyderabad express a guilt complex about their inability to ensure the Nizam's right to be independent. In fact Britons spoke with two voices. Mountbatten, a realist, did everything he could to make it clear to the Nizam that it could never be independent, but he faced difficulties not only with Winston Churchill, but with Lord Listowel, who succeeded Lord Pethick Lawrence, and became the last Secretary of State for India. Paramountcy was a theory invented by the British to justify their supremacy over territories which they had not conquered but with which they had treaty arrangements, and which were in fact protectorates. It is inconceivable that India would refrain from asserting a paramountcy relationship over states like Junagarh and Hyderabad, which fell in its legitimate sphere of influence. Kashmir was a separate case, as it was geographically adjacent to Pakistan as well as India, and the Maharaja could well have acceded to either dominion.

The Razakars had become a threat to the livelihood and some to times the lives of Hindus of Hyderabad State, who constituted about eighty-six per cent of the population. However, two factors seem to have precipitated the Police Action, and also determined the stand taken on it by the Indian government. One was the Telengana revolt which appeared to pose a long-term threat to the security of India and not just to Hyderabad State. Second, the complaint filed by Hyderabad before the United Nations added to the tensions generated by the Kashmir issue. From its own point of view, the claim to independence by the Laik Ali regime was a legitimate one. It may even have been upheld, had the Indian Government faltered in its stand. From any objective point of view, however, it would have been disastrous both for the ruler and people of Hyderabad had the Razakar-dominated regime led by Laik Ali succeeded in its claim of independence.

The Nizam of Hyderabad had practically become a prisoner of the Majlis during the last days of his regime. He was prevented from acceding to India in October 1947, and again in June 1948. It is said that in his last message from his sickbed, Jinnah urged the Nizam to accept the best terms he could and not to hold out against the Indian Union. Perhaps it was for this reason that the Nizam asked Sir Mirza Ismail to negotiate on his behalf with the Government of India, but this initiative came to naught because of the threat of Laik Ali's resignation, which would have led to a serious crisis between the Nizam and the Majlis had it been accepted.

The Nizam was physically prevented from seeing K.M. Munshi alone, and he took the courage to dismiss the Laik Ali government only when the Indian Army was about to enter the city. He withdrew the application to the United Nations as soon as he felt free to act.

The White Paper on Hyderabad issued by the Government of India did not point out that the Nizam was not allowed to follow his own wishes, because these facts only came to light much later, when the matter had ceased to be a live one. Ali Yavar Jang, K.M. Munshi and Hosh Yar Jang all point this out. In fact Nehru himself was not sure to what extent the Nizam was a party to the atrocities of the Razakar regime. The retention of the Nizam in office till 1956 was at least partly due to the exigencies of the international situation, including the reaction in Britain, the United States, Pakistan, and West Asia, which was highly critical of the Indian action in Hyderabad.

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The period from the Standstill Agreement till the Police Action of September 1948 was one of great tension and continual crisis with the replacement of Chhatari by Mir Laik Ali, an industrialist who was close to Jinnah and the nominee of Razvi. His government was packed with Majlis supporters and a few weak Hindu elements. The negotiation with the Government of India dragged on and there was little need to doubt the outcome.

Sardar Patel was awaiting the departure of Mountbatten before taking firm action. The attempt by the last head of the Political Department, Sir Conrad Corfield, to prop up Hyderabad and other states was supported by Monckton. Mountbatten's attempt to work out a compromise failed because of the strong opposition of the Majlis.

There was considerable expenditure on the missions opened by Hyderabad abroad and on the purchase of arms and ammunition. However, there was very little of Army buildup, and the public was not prepared to oppose the Indian Army. The sympathies of Hindus and Muslims were on different sides. Although the situation in the cities was comparatively calm, the law and order situation in the districts, especially in Marathwada, was very bad, with the Razakars indulging in rape, looting and murder.

The support promised by Pakistan failed to materialize and the appeal to the United Nations Security Council, instead of helping Hyderabad, probably precipitated the attack. The other reason why armed intervention by India was inevitable was the Communist revolt in Telengana, which, had it succeeded, would have had serious repercussions all over the country.

CHAPTER NINE

THE LAST YEARS OF HYDERABAD STATE AND OF THE SEVENTH NIZAM

Zamane ke halaat ka hai asar
Meri zeest mujh par giran hogai

(This is the effect of today's condition
My life has become a burden on me)

–Mir Osman Ali Khan

Unka jo kam hai, woh ahl-i-siasat janen
Mera paigam muhabbat hai, jahan tak pahunche

(What their work is, politicians alone know,
My message, so far as it will reach, is that of love)

–Jigar Moradabadi

On 19 September 1948 Major-General J.N.Chaudhuri began to function as Military Governor of Hyderabad. Civil administrators who had been selected in advance took charge two days later after being instructed by the Military Governor. On 18 October a Cabinet was formed consisting of the Military Governor who was responsible for the Army, Police and communications, D.S. Bakhle India's Chief Civil Administrator, who was in charge of Political Services, Home, Railways, Supply and Law, D.R.Prabhu, India's Additional Chief Administrator, who held charge of Finance, Revenue, Commerce, and Industry, Zain Yar Jang (formerly Hyderabad's Agent-General in Delhi), who was responsible for the Public Works Department, Rural Reconstruction and Labour, and Raja Dhondi Raj, a District Magistrate, who held charge of Customs, Excise Rehabilitation and Education. The advisory committee constituted by the Nizam at the time of surrender was dissolved. The Legislative Assembly was also dissolved, and steps were initiated to draw up electoral rolls for a Hyderabad Constituent Assembly.

These actions were carried out by a firman of the Nizam, in whom the government of the State continued to be vested. The Nizam began to

personally receive the Military Governor, General Chaudhuri and sign papers at his instance, like a constitutional ruler. This pattern was evolved because the Government of India was anxious to make it clear that the Nizam's status had not been altered in any way by the Police Action. In a note recorded on the day of the surrender, 17 September 1948, Nehru pointed out that the action against Hyderabad was justified, as it was not a foreign independent state at any time. The Police Action had achieved two 'principal objectives, that is, the stationing of our troops at Secunderabad, Bolaram, etc., and the banning and disbandment of the Razakars.' Moreover it had established, 'the fact that the Government of India is the dominant and paramount authority so far as Hyderabad is concerned, and in fact so far as all states in India are concerned. That is a great gain which cannot be challenged now anywhere.'

Since the paramountcy of India had now been established, the new Government of India could afford to be generous. In fact Nehru urged that, 'a far-seeing and generous approach could, far from weakening us, strengthen us in every way and rebound to our credit. It would go a long way in reducing the communal tension not only in the Indian Union but also in Pakistan. It will give greater security to the minorities wherever they might be. It would undermine the policy which Pakistan continues to pursue against us and I think that it would improve our position in Kashmir. Abroad it would mean a feather in our cap.'

Although the note as recorded does not clearly say so, Nehru appeared to be arguing against a proposal that the Nizam should follow the Mikado of Japan,who had, 'suffered final and full defeat in a terrible war.' Neverthless he had been allowed to continue as the titular ruler with strictly limited powers. Unlike the Mikado, the Nizam of Hyderabad was not, according to India,an independent ruler, and the military operation had lasted just four-and-a-half days before surrender. It was the Hyderabad State Army which had surrendered, and not the Nizam. The Nizam could not in fact be expected to surrender to the paramount power.

In the circumstances, no effort should be spared, Nehru felt, to ensure that it was clear to the people of Hyderabad that they were to be treated as full citizens of India, and not as a conquered people. Although some of the people of Hyderabad may have rebelled against India, the whole of Hyderabad State could not therefore be treated, 'as if it was beyond the pale.' The Military Commander would be in charge of the administration or some time, but this would be purely a temporary measure. Any major

change, such as the removal of the dynasty, would have to be left to the Constituent Assembly. He urged that the Nizam should not be deposed. At most, the Nizam may be persuaded to abdicate in favour of his elder son.

'The strictly legal position is that the Nizam continues to be ruler of Hyderabad with all his old powers, but he cannot exercise these powers in view of the military situation that has arisen. Though in law and theory he is still the fountain of authority, in fact he is powerless and can only function within the limits we lay down.' While the Government of India had the power to depose him he did not feel they should exercise this power as it would mean either putting some one else in his place or taking some more radical steps, which, 'would not only produce complications but also appear vengeful and unwise.'[1]

In February 1949 the Nizam's personal estate, the Sarf-i-Khas, worth twenty-five to thirty million rupees, was taken over by a firman. A compensation of twenty-five lakhs rupees per annum was fixed at a later date, in lieu of the income that the Nizam lost on this account.

In August 1949 the decision was announced that all jagirs in the State, comprising 6,536 villages and covering an area of 25,600 square miles, would be taken over immediately through the Jagir Abolition Regulation. The jagirdars, Samasthans, and other feudatory nobles were given a maximum of fifteen days to study the scheme. Finally, a commutation amount was fixed for the jagirs providing for a payment of compensation over a period of five to ten years. Compensation for mansabs, inams and cash grants were also paid for a limited period.

An Agrarian Reforms Committee was set up to make recommendations for land reforms for the entire State. As a result, the Pattadari system was overhauled. Protected tenants were given full rights over lands cultivated by them. Individual and family holding of agricultural lands were restricted. Forest lands were taken over by the government. The separate postal system and coinage of Hyderabad were both abolished.

On November 24 1949 the post of Military Governor was abolished, Major-General J. N. Chaudhuri left Hyderabad and a popular government consisting of M.K. Vellodi, ICS (who had succeeded V.P.Menon as Secretary to the Ministry of States) was appointed Chief Minister with a Cabinet consisting of official and non-official members.

On 25 June 1950, (one day before the inauguration of the Indian Constitution) the Constitution was extended to Hyderabad through a

firman, which also made provision for the payment of a privy purse of fifty lakh rupees to the seventh Nizam for his lifetime, free of all taxes. Second, he was guaranteed the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all the jewels, shares, securities and other private properties both movable and immovable. Third, the privileges enjoyed by the ruler and his family before 15 August 1947 were to continue. Finally, the succession to the gaddi of Hyderabad and the rights, privileges, dignities and titles of His Exalted Highness the Nizam was guaranteed. On 8 February, 1950 an additional amount of fifty lakh rupees per annum was sanctioned as a result of representation made by the Nizam.

On 26 January 1950 at the Republic of India ceremony the Nizam read out the proclamation of the 'commencement of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of India.' On the same day he was sworn-in as the Rajpramukh of Hyderabad. He occupied this office till the formation of Andhra Pradesh in November 1956.

On 23 March 1952 the Nizam inaugurated the Hyderabad Legislative Assembly, consisting of elected representatives on the basis of adult franchise. The Nizam had no influence on the composition of the ministers that governed Hyderabad until 1956.[2]

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The Government of India, as we have seen, had been quite generous in its treatment of the seventh Nizam after the Police Action. This attitude was no doubt motivated largely by considerations of self-interest, connected with the internal and international repercussions in the case of Hyderabad . Nehru was perhaps perturbed at the thought of communal riots recurring in other parts of India and Pakistan. He was also concerned about the implications of the Hyderabad issue being raised again and again in international fora. The Government of India had already faced a number of difficulties due to the Kashmir case which was already before the United Nations.

Meanwhile the Nizam had not entirely given up hopes of continuing his international status. Although it is difficult to establish his motivations at that time, it is nevertheless clear that he was still anxious to play some role in world affairs.

Hyderabad's Agent-General in Pakistan was Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, the son of Nawab Fakhr Nawaz Jang, a distinguished official of

Hyderabad, and belonged to a family with a reputation for integrity. He had formerly been an official of the Nizam's State Railway. On the morning of 17 September 1948, he received instructions from the Laik Ali government that he should immediately transfer all the money in his custody into his own name. At 8.30 a.m. he received yet another message in which he was asked to tell Mir Nawaz Jang, the Agent-General in London, to transfer 5,000 pounds in Moin Nawaz Jang's name. After half-an-hour he received another message that all the money was being transferred in his name for the continuation of the freedom struggle. Within a few minutes another message came stating that if possible, a parallel government should be formed under the leadership of Moin Nawaz Jang, and both of them could continue to fight the case. This was the last message, and the code was being burnt.[3]

According to Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, the Government of India was very much perturbed about the money in Pakistan. On 21 September 1948 he received an order from the Military Government that he should suspend all his activities immediately and there was a ban on the withdrawal of money from the bank. He gave only one reply to the many orders by the Hyderabad Government. This was to the effect that, 'the legal Government of Hyderabad nominated me as its representative, and I have fulfilled my duty honestly in accordance with the instructions of the government. I am sorry to say that I am not bound to obey the orders of a government which is illegal to me.'

The Government of Hyderabad had a letter written by the Nizam to Mushtaq Ahmed, in which he asked him to return to Hyderabad. 'You have no credentials to be a representative. You should not give any statement.' Mushtaq Ahmed thought over the matter, and decided to send a reply to the Nizam's letter on the following lines:

'I have received Sarkar's order. I have always been faithful to you and your family and I have always worked in the interest of Hyderabad. Now it appears that your signature was put against your will and wish. I may be excused for any discourtesy.'

In July 1950 Mir Laik Ali escaped from his house detention in Hyderabad along with his family, and flew from Bombay to Karachi. This created a sensation in India. However, some held the view that the news was not entirely unwelcome to the Indian authorities, who were unwilling to place Laik Ali on trial. His arrival in Karachi was known in advance to Ghulam Mohammed, the former Finance Member of the Nizam's

Council, who was then Finance Minister of Pakistan. He told Mushtaq Ahmed that he would hear good news after a few days. When the news broke Mushtaq Ahmed wondered why Laik Ali's escape had been kept a secret from him. There was a report that the operation had been planned by an American citizen.

On 4 August 1952 the Nizam sent a letter in English to Mushtaq Ahmed, as Hyderabad's Agent in Karachi saying that Ashfaq Ahmed (his brother, who was evidently retiring from Hyderabad Civil Service, or had already done so), would give him a gist of his talks with the Nizam's Agent and a description of conditions in Hyderabad. The Nizam expressed his anxiety about the view that was being taken about the Agency of Hyderabad in Karachi which, 'appears most inconsistent with stand taken so far.' He wondered how the new approach could be justified , and said, 'it will also mean the last nail in the coffin of what my dynasty and my state has stood for.' He went on to instruct Mushtaq Ahmed to place adequate funds at the disposal of Ashfaq Ahmed in order to enable him to carry on negotiations on behalf of the Nizam in Europe.

On 25 January 1953 the Nizam wrote another letter to Mushtaq Ahmed stating that he had received a report from Ashfaq Ahmed, and was very perturbed at the way in which he had been let down by his Prime Minister and others in Pakistan. He hoped that he would be, 'able to make a stand for rights of the subjects of my state from a far away land. I have very strong hopes of assistance from high international circles, if it can be made worth their while.' He asserted that he was doing this not for himself as he did not have long to live, but for the sons of the soil of his beloved State, for whom he was prepared to sacrifice all he possessed.

In a letter to Ashfaq Ahmed sent in April 1953 and addressing him still as Secretary Bab-i-Hukumat, the Nizam expressed his deep sense of disquiet at the threat to close down the Agency and to take over the funds belonging to Hyderabad from his accredited representative, which were only in trust with them.

One can only surmise at the nature of the negotiations which the Nizam was carrying on with foreign powers. These negotiations were connected with the case of Hyderabad before the Security Council, which was pending decision even as late as September 1979. Already in December 1948 Moin Nawaz Jang wrote to Mushtaq Ahmed from a Paris hotel discussing the possibility of withdrawing the case from the Security Council and handing over the funds in London provided the Prime

Minister and other high officials are released. This is an indication of a difference of opinion among various representatives of Hyderabad overseas. Some of them wanted to retain the case before the Security Council while others wanted it to be withdrawn.

It should be noted that between 1950 and 1956 the Nizam was occupying the position of Rajpramukh of Hyderabad State under the Indian Union. The Nizam's participation in these negotiations is an indication that he still hoped in some way to revive his dynasty and to assert the independence of Hyderabad. Although he had been let down by his Majlis officials and advisers, both in India and in Pakistan, this did not cause him to alter his conviction that he could assert his independence as a ruler in his own right without the support of the Majlis, which he had taken during a temporary phase of his long period as a ruler.[4]

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The military government through its Civil Administrator, K.M.Nanjappa, played an important role in the restoration of normal conditions in the unsettled districts of Hyderabad. So far as the Marathwada and Hyderabad Karnatak districts were concerned, the major threat to law and order had come from Razakars and the lawless elements among Muslims and depressed classes who had threatened the peace and terrorized the rural population. In the Telugu-speaking districts of Telengana, the Communist Party had become a powerful force by taking up the cause of the landless elements who had been mobilized in volunteer groups known as *dalams*. Villagers had joined these *dalams* enthusiastically in the districts of Nalgonda, Warangal and Khammam which were their strongholds as well as in parts of Adilabad, Karimnagar and Medak districts.

We have seen that this lifting of the ban on the Communist Party in May 1948 had made it easier for the movement to secure arms and ammunitions from any source whatsoever.

The Police Action was followed by the outlawing and banning of Razakars, which had created anarchic conditions in the State and posed a serious threat to the neighbouring Indian states. Once the Razakar menace was controlled, the Indian Army turned its attention to the peasant revolt in the troubled districts of Telengana. In February 1949, the Government of India made it clear in its pamphlet, *Communist Violence in Hyderabad,* that its suppression was one of the major factors in the

government decision to undertake the Police Action in Hyderabad. Over two thousand peasants and party workers were killed. In August 1949, 25,000 Communists and active participants had been arrested. By July 1950, the number of detenus was ten thousand.

The Telengana revolt had been mounted by peasants belonging to different social classes. The leading Communists, both in Andhra delta and Telengana, were well-to-do peasants who belonged to the Reddy or Kamma caste, and directed their movements against the handful of large absentee landlords, jagirdars and deshmukhs. Their programme of action included the abolition of landlordism, the opposition to large-scale eviction of tenants, the ending of forced labour (*vetti*) and the demand for increased wages. So far as the grain levy was concerned, the absentee landlords and deshmukhs were castigated for avoiding the levy but the rich peasants who were with the party and sympathetically met the demands of share-croppers, or labourers were not touched, and their lands and paddy stock went unscathed.

Thus there was an alliance between the middle peasant on the one hand and the poor peasant and the landless labourers on the other against the absentee landlord deshmukhs and jagirdars. The latter were closely aligned with the Nizam's government, as is symbolized by the position of Pingle Venkatarama Reddy as Vice-President or Deputy Prime Minister of the Nizam's Executive Council. This coalition or allaince began to break down after the Police Action as a result of three factors. First, the ruthless suppression of the revolt through armed action; second, the feeling among the middle peasantry that their interests would be protected by the new government; and third, the conciliatory gestures of the Congress leadership and the mediation of Acharya Vinoba Bhave, along with the prospects of an election in 1952 which ultimately led to the introduction of land reforms and remarkably progressive tenancy legislation.

In these circumstances it is possible to understand why the Communist Party of India formally declared the struggle to be withdrawn in October 1951.[5]

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The administration headed by Major-General Chaudhuri continued till December 1949 when M.K.Vellodi took over as Chief Minister of

Hyderabad. The other members of the Cabinet remained unchanged. The change from the Military Government to a government headed by a civilian Chief Minister was apparently the result of representation made by Ramanand Tirth and others to the leadership in Delhi. They complained against the arbitrary nature of the decisions taken by Major-General J. N. Chaudhuri.

Even after the change-over, there was a feeling that the government was overloaded with persons from outside Hyderabad. After a further representation made to leaders in Delhi, four additional members were appointed to the Vellodi Cabinet. All these were members of the State Congress: B. Ramakrishna Rao, Vinayak Rao Vidyalankar, Phoolchand Gandhi and V.B. Raju.[6]

The first election ever held in Hyderabad under adult franchise was that in 1952. The legendary leader of the Telengana movement, Ravi Narayan Reddy has described how, after his release from jail, he was introduced to M.K. Vellodi at the Collector's residence in Warangal on 14 December 1951 and the Chief Minister agreed to release permanently all the prisoners who were on parole. Ravi Narayan Reddy won the Nalgonda Parliamentary seat as well as the Bhongir Assembly seat.

When the election results in Nehru's constituency were announced the All-India Congress Committee declared that he had polled the highest number of votes in the country. The Communist Party of India promptly challenged this, and announced that Ravi Narayan Reddy had obtained the largest number of votes, over 300,000. The Harijan member in his double member constituency, Sunkam Achalu, also polled more votes than Jawaharlal Nehru. The latter obtained about 200,000 votes.

The magnitude of the Communists in the areas affected by the revolt is seen from the fact that in Nalgonda districts all the fourteen Assembly seats, and both Parliamentary seats were won by the Communist Party. Apart from the impact of the agrarian revolt, this result was ascribed by Ravi Narayan Reddy to the attacks of the Indian Army on the party supporters after the Police Action in Nalgonda district, with the intention of wiping out the Communist Party totally.

Ravi Narayan Reddy resigned the Assembly seat in Bhongir, and retained the Parliament seat. The candidate of the People's Democratic Front, Govind Dass Shroff, was defeated by two hundred votes by a Congressman. In the next elections of 1957, Ravi Narayan Reddy again stood from Bhongir and defeated his brother-in-law, V. Ramachandra Reddy

(who had become famous as the first donor in the Bhoodan Movement), the Congress candidate, by eight hundred votes.

The Bhoodan movement was born in Pochampalli village in Bhongir taluka. Acharya Vinoba Bhave, a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, camped there during his padyatra and local Harijans brought to his notice their need for land. Vinobaji asked if there was someone in the audience who would donate land to the Harijans V. Ramachandra Reddy immediately announced the donation of one hundred acres of land. Thus began the Bhoodan movement which later spread to different parts of the country. Lakhs of acres of land were donated to Vinoba Bhave and his followers. They were placed in trust and the revenue records were altered to indicate the transfer of land to the new recipients, mostly landless labourers.

The supporters of the Bhoodan movement claimed that the handing over of land to landless peasants was the result of a change of heart on the part of landlords and was thus in keeping with Gandhian ideologies of non-violence, Sarvodaya and trusteeship. Ravi Narayan Reddy however argued that the change of heart was a direct consequence of the pressure exerted by the peoples' struggle. He pointed out that V. Ramachandra Reddy's father, V. Narsimha Reddy, (who was Ravi Narayan Reddy's father-in-law) had instructed his son during his last days to donate some land in his name after his death. This was done under the impact of the peoples' struggle for land.

Ravi Narayan Reddy felt that the land problem had assumed significance in Asia only after the success of the Chinese Revolution, and it was for this reason that Mahatma Gandhi did not take up the Bhoodan concept during his lifetime. He said Vinoba also warned that there would be a peasant revolt unless landlords came forward to donate land. He met Vinoba Bhave and explained his views on Bhoodan to him and the latter accepted them.[7]

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In 1950 the Government of Hyderabad appointed a committee with A.D. Gorwala, a retired ICS officer, as Chairman to recommend reorganization of the State administration. The recommendations were intended to save an expenditure of three hundred and fifty lakh rupees per annum. Some of the recommendations could not be carried out, because of the Communist revolt in some Telengana districts. However by 1952 the Vellodi

Ministry was able to balance the budget of the State by implementing some of the committee's recommendations and taking other measures to tighten up the administration.

During the three-year period of dominance of Central rule in Hyderabad, V.P. Menon claimed that complete confidence was restored among the Muslims. The Razakars were disbanded and many of them detained under Public Safety Regulations. Many of the Razakars and other detenus were released provided they had not been involved in serious crimes. Qasim Razvi was one amongst these to be brought to open trial. He was found guilty in the Bibinagar Dacoity Case and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

Menon also claimed that the people in Telengana districts were afraid of the Communists, and it was for this reason that the government had to suppress the Communist menace. An example he gave was as follows: 'In a village consisting of several huts the Patwari's house had been burnt down and looted and his wife murdered. This happened twenty yards away from the villagers' huts, but when I asked their owner whether they had seen the burning of the Patwari's house, they feigned complete ignorance. I was told that for fear of the Communists the villagers invariably behaved like that.' [8]

There was widespread dissatisfaction at the three-year rule by the Government of India officers in Hyderabad. Among the complaints made were those of Hyderabad officials, especially Muslims, and injustice done to them in the course of the reorganization of Hyderabad services. The Muslim civil servants had enjoyed high positions in the Nizam's services, and hence it was inevitable that the position should change. However the hardships suffered by individual Muslims caused great resentment.

The leader of the Socialist Party in Hyderabad, B.S. Mahadev Singh stated that both Hyderabad and Kashmir were to have Constituent Assemblies to draw up the Constitution in accordance with the wishes of the people. In the case of Kashmir such a Constituent Assembly was set up but in Hyderabad the demand was not conceded. The Prime Minister of India did not agree with the proposal for the Constituent Assembly, saying that the matter should be left to the Government of India. The proposal for a plebiscite was also shelved, evidently after the reference of the Hyderabad case to the United Nations.

The son and daughter of Sarojini Naidu, both members of the first Indian Parliament expressed their dissatisfaction with the post-inde-

pendence regime. In April 1951, Padmaja Naidu spoke about the atrocities committed by the police, the dismissal of government servants on communal grounds and the growing unemployment in the State. In July 1952, Dr Jaisoorya referred to the killing of two thousand persons and the death of fifty persons in prisons and in 'concentration camps'. He also referred to the arrest of fifty thousand persons, the burning of one thousand houses, the destruction of property, raids on villages and the raping of women.

There was a student agitation in 1952 connected with the spread of unemployment, evidently arising out of the importation of outside officials, the sacking and downgrading of local officials, and the disbanding of jagirs, mansabs, inams etc. Although some people alleged that the Razakars were behind this movement, there was no evidence to support this view, as Razakars were in disarray and disgrace.

As a result of the election, the first popularly elected government took office in Hyderabad State. The People's Democratic Front, including the Communist Party , won a large number of seats in the Assembly from the Telengana districts and a few from Marathwada, but the Congress won an absolute majority and was therefore able to form the government. The Chief Minister who took office was Burgula Ramakrishna Rao. The Cabinet included all the four ministers who had taken office earlier as well as Konda Venkat Ranga Reddy, Dr G.S. Melkote, Mehdi Nawaz Jang, Jagannath Rao Chanderki, Dr M.Chenna Reddy, D.R.Bindu and Anna Rao Ganumukti. Later on Gopal Rao Ekbote, M.S.Rajlingam and Sangam Laxmi Bai were taken as Ministers or Deputy Ministers.

There were allegations of corruption and communal favouritism in the Congress ministry. The Communist Party had gained strength not only the in rural areas of Telengana, but also among the educated classes, both Hindu and Muslim. The People's Democratic Front had taken up various popular causes and the agitation against non-Mulki elements increased the feeling of discontent.[9]

The abolition of the jagir system, was purely an administrative reform, having little to do with land reforms. One revenue-collecting agency was substituted by another. No land was distributed to the people. Jagir abolition meant an extension of government authority to erstwhile jagir areas, which covered about one-third of the State and had an income

of one hundred lakhs annually. The Nizam, 'himself escaped with an annual payment of about one-fifth of the annual net surplus he had taken from the Sarf-i-Khas in land revenue.'

One result of this change was the decline of the, 'old jagirdar class with its prestige of nobility, blood and culture,' but which was also 'ill-educated, untrained, orthodox, feudal in its outlook and unadaptable.'[10]

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Politically, the most active group in the State of Hyderabad was the Marathi-speaking population; but it was the Telugu speaking population known as Andhras which was the main factor in the break up of Hyderabad State. Telugu speakers in the Nizam's State of Hyderabad had been galvanized into action by the Andhra Mahasabha, which, as we have seen, was born in 1920 when a Telugu speech by an advocate was cut short by the proponents of the Urdu and Marathi languages.[11]

Some officials of the Nizam's State of Hyderabad twitted the leaders of the Andhra Mahasabha with having ambitions of unifying the 'Andhra' area of Hyderabad State with the Telugu-speaking districts of Madras Presidency. Hanumantha Rao, the cautious leader of the Mahasabha stoutly refuted these allegations. The name of the organization was changed to Nizam Andhra Mahasabha in order to set these speculations at rest. However those who knew the culture and language of the Telugus realized that the crores of Telugu speakers in the Madras Presidency and the State of Hyderabad could not remain disunited for ever. There was an irredentist movement for the revival of the glory of the Andhra Satavahanas, the rebuilding of old literary and cultural contacts, and re-establishing old ties of blood and friendship across the State barriers, after centuries of separation.

Such a movement was not confined to the Andhras. Just as the different linguistic groups constituting the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire began to seek a common identity and to form nation-states, the linguistic groups of India began to recall their ancient literary, cultural and ethnic ties. The Andhras were the first to assert their identity in a forceful way. Madras city itself had originally been founded by Telugus, having been part of the Qutb Shahi kingdom of Golconda, but the Andhras had felt unwelcome in Madras Presidency for about a century, as the Tamils stole a march on them in bureaucratic, cultural, and

economic spheres of activity. Dr Pattabhi Sitaramayya, a leader of the Indian National Congress made the prophetic statement that, 'the British would grant us independence sooner than the Tamil Ministers would give us a separate province.'[12]

Although the Indian National Congress itself had been committed to linguistic states since the 1920s and had organized its provincial committees on a linguistic basis, the efforts of the Andhra Congress leaders to wrest a separate Andhra did not fructify in spite of numerous committees' recommendations. The so called J.V.P. (Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Sitaramayya) report of 1949, recommended the formation of Andhra state without Madras. This recommendation did not satisfy the legislators from Rayalaseema, who could not reconcile themselves to the loss of Madras city which they considered as the natural capital of Andhra. The issue continued to dominate subsequent discussions. The new Constitution of India came into force on 26 January 1950, but the Andhra politicians continued their game of playing politics over the control of the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee. A fast unto death by Swami Sitaram also did not achieve any result. It was called off after thirty-five days on 20 September 1951.

The 1952 elections greatly increased the strength of the Communist Party in the State of Madras generally and in the Andhra districts in particular. The United Democratic Front which included the Communists, was the largest single party in the Madras legislature. In spite of this, C.Rajagopalachari, the last Governor-General of India before the new Constitution was enforced, was made Chief Minister on behalf of the Congress. His policies of diverting the waters of the Krishna river to Tamil Nadu created an uproar in the Andhra region of Madras Province. Potti Sriramulu began his fast unto death which led to his death on 15 December 1952. The entire Andhra area was plunged into chaos for three days. Seven persons lost their lives in the disturbances and in police firing. On the fourth day, 19 December, Prime Minister Nehru announced in Parliament the formation of the Andhra State, excluding the city of Madras.

The new state was inaugurated at Kurnool, its capital, by Jawaharlal Nehru on 1 October 1953. A coalition government of the Praja Party and the Congress took office. The Nagarjunasagar irrigation project was launched, and a new barrage constructed on the Krishna river, which was named after the first Chief Minister, Tanguturi Prakasam, an eighty-one year old legendary figure from coastal Andhra who had sacrificed a

lucrative career at the Madras bar for the freedom struggle. The government was however defeated in the Assembly on 6 November 1954 on the issue of prohibition. Bezwada Gopal Reddy became the new Chief Minister, continuing as such till the formation of Andhra Pradesh on 1 November 1956.

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The example of Andhra caused other linguistic regions to demand separate linguistic states for themselves. The government of Burgula Ramakrishna Rao in Hyderabad soon became an anachronism in a state whose three major linguistic groups were being pulled in different directions. The Marathi-speaking districts of Hyderabad State were increasingly drawn towards their counterparts in the Bombay Presidency, and the Kannada speaking districts were drawn towards the State of Mysore, parts of which had been ruled for centuries by a native Kannada-speaking dynasty, the Wadiyars, since the fall of Vijayanagar (with two breaks during the reign of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan in the late eighteenth century, and the British takeover between 1830 and 1880.) These pressures of an all-India nature forced Prime Minister Nehru to appoint a States' Reorganization Commission (SRC), headed by Justice Fazl Ali, and including the Servants of India Society member and statesman, H.N. Kunzru, and the well-known diplomat-historian, K.M. Panikkar.

The Telugu-speaking people, both in Andhra and in Hyderabad looked forward to the recommendations of the commission in the hope that it would lead to the formation of a united state of 'Visalandhra'. It was also hoped that the Telugu areas of Mysore, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh would be incorporated in the new state. Similar sentiments were felt among Kannada and Marathi-speaking élites, who wanted to be reunited with their counterparts in the States of Mysore and Bombay.

The SRC visited Hyderabad in June-July 1954, heard the views of different individuals and organizations, and received representations from them. In its report which was submitted on 30 September 1955, it stated its finding that, 'public sentiment, both within and without the state, is overwhelming and insistent on the need for disintegration of the state.' It went on to say, 'we are not impressed by the claim that during the last two hundred years a specific Deccan culture has developed in the whole area and that this culture is a major contribution to the unity of India. The

common culture of Hyderabad, like the unity of this state, is something that has been imposed from above.'[13]

In view of this strong feeling the commission recommended the disintegration of Hyderabad State, involving the incorporation of the Kannada-speaking areas with Mysore state, and the Marathi-speaking areas with Bombay state. The question that now arose was whether to retain the Telengana districts (of which Hyderabad was one) as a unit, or to merge it in a new Visalandhra State.

In favour of a large Andhra State, the SRC pointed to the large hinterlands with power and water resources, mineral wealth and raw materials. The twin cities of Hyderabad-Secunderabad would be the ideal capital for the new Visalandhra. The new state would also make possible the implementation of the plans for exploiting the water resources of the Krishna and Godavari rivers, a major part of which flowed through the Telengana area and the Andhra State. There was also a good deal of economic complementarity between the two regions. The Andhra area had no coal, while the Telengana area had the Singareni Collieries. Andhra on the other hand was surplus in food, while Telengana had a deficit in this area. It was felt that a unification would reduce the costs of two separate state administrations and longstanding public sentiment would also be satisfied.

However the commission also pointed to the disadvantages of the merger. Financially, Telengana was in a stronger position and there was a fear among the people of the region that they would be, 'swamped and exploited by the more advanced people of the coastal area... . The real fear of the people of Telengana is that if they join Andhra they will be unequally placed in relation to the people of Andhra and in this partnership the major partner will derive all the advantages immediately, while Telengana itself may be converted into a colony by the enterprising "Coastal Andhras." '

Keeping in view these factors, the SRC therefore recommended the formation of a separate Telengana state, to be known as Hyderabad. This was followed by intensive lobbying by those in favour of, and those opposed to the decision. Some leaders of the Telengana area like K.V. Ranga Reddy wanted a separate Telengana state while others opposed it. B.Ramakrishna Rao had been made Chief Minister of Hyderabad because he was a Telugu, even though the Congress did not attain an absolute majority in the Telengana area. Nevertheless, knowing that he had limited

support even in his own Telengana area, Ramakrishna Rao worked hard for the creation of a state which would bring together all Telugu-speaking people.

The top Congress leadership called a meeting of Andhra and Telengana leaders at Delhi on 20 February 1956. B.Gopal Reddy, N.Sanjiva Reddy, G.Latchanna and A.Satyanarayana Raju represented the Andhra leadership while B.Ramakrishna Rao, K.V.Ranga Reddy, J.V. Narsing Rao and M.Chenna Reddy represented the Telengana region. A 'gentleman's agreement' was worked out, whereby protection was given to the Telengana region with regard to the utilization of revenues from the two parts of the state, the provision of educational facilities, the recruitment to services, domicile rules, the provision of a Regional Council for the Telengana region, the alternation of Chief Ministers from the two parts of the state, and the choice of ministers.

This agreement was confined to representatives of the Congress in the two regions. However the Communist parties of the two regions were also a force to reckon with. They had worked together in the Telengana struggle. Arms and ammunition were brought from the Vijayawada office of the Communist Party to the Telengana region, but the ideas inspiring the struggle were worked out in the course a the dialogue between the leaders of the two regions, who had been working together since the late Thirties.

The two Communist parties took a strong stand in favour of Visalandhra, which they saw as a 'nationality' in the same sense as the nationalities of the Soviet Union. A vote was taken in the Hyderabad Legislative Assembly on the question of Visalandhra. Out of one hundred and seventy-four members in the House, One hundred and forty-seven expressed their views. One hundred and three of them supported Visalandhra; twenty-nine wanted a separate Telengana and fifteen remained neutral.

In Andhra almost all leaders, except N.G. Ranga, supported Visalandhra. However the Communists in Andhra were able to secure only fifteen out of 196 Assembly seats in the mid-term elections of 1955. This was because the creation of Andhra was no longer an emotive issue. Moreover there was a difference of opinion, though not an outright split, in the Andhra Communist Party, one group supporting the new policy of detente in the Soviet Union which favoured the Nehru government and the Congress, and the other favouring the Chinese line of confrontation

with the liberal democracy of Nehru and a demand for basic land reforms. Moreover there was a fear in the public that the Communists were wedded to violence, as seen from the Telengana experience and felt that this pattern may also extend to the Andhra area.

Thus the Communist movement declined in power in the Andhra area. In Telengana area, land reforms were introduced in a substantial way by the government of B.Ramakrishna Rao and this took away some of the basic support of the Communist Party in that region. The elections of 1957, not long after the formation of Andhra Pradesh saw a further diminution in Communist support in the Telengana region as well.

One of the major factors which was working towards a unification of the two Telugu-speaking areas was the emergence of a common body of literature. A part of this literature, which expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo was widely read and influenced a whole generation of Telugu-speakers, cutting across state borders. The most important forces working for the integration were in all probability not politicians or administrators, but literary men. Among the classics on the Andhra side of the border were *Malapalli* by Unnava Lakshminarayana (1921), a novel which denounced the exploitation of labour, and *Kanyasulkam*, a social play of outstanding merit by Gurazada Appa Rao which ridiculed the practice of old men marrying young girls, including babies. On the Telengana side most of the leading participants in the Andhra movement were writers of note, including Madapati Hanumantha Rao, Burgula Ramakrishna Rao, Ravi Narayan Reddy and Suravaram Pratap Reddy. The last-named was an editor, a politician, and a poet who made use of historical source-material, and also a historian who wrote on the social history of the Andhras. The writer, Kaloji Narayan Rao inspired people with his writings and speeches. The plays which were produced during the Communist revolt also played a part in the movement. A few Urdu writers like Makhdoom Mohiuddin not only took active part in the movement but inspired others to do so through their writings. Although the Communist Party and its allies failed to capture power in Andhra Pradesh, they played an important part in the development of a peoples' ideology, and continue to do so even today.

In contrast to the new Telugu literature, rooted in local problems, the vast body of Urdu literature produced as a result of patronage by the court of Hyderabad was a hot-house plant. It was often deep and profound in its inspiration, and in the references it made to the high culture of Islam,

but lacked the earthy quality which was needed in an age when the masses were demanding a share in the citadels of power. Moreover it was written in a language which was beautiful but was losing ground, as literacy became widespread.

Thus the centre of gravity had moved away from the court culture of Hyderabad. The formation of linguistic states was a reflection of these new trends. In the new states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka it would be the rural élite who would influence the urban scene and not the other way round. The court culture of the Nizam was becoming increasingly irrelevant in the period after 1956.[14]

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The new Government of India was more generous to the Nizam with regard to his accumulated wealth than the Political Adviser Wylie would have been. After the Police Action, an agreement was entered into by the Government of India with the Nizam whereby the Nizam was guaranteed an annual privy purse of fifty lakh rupees per annum free of taxes and a further twenty-five lakh rupees to be paid every year for the upkeep of his palaces and an additional twenty-five lakh rupees per annum in lieu of income hitherto received from Sarf-i-Khas estates. There was also a payment of twenty-five lakh rupees by way of civil list for the two princes, two princesses, two grandsons and the brother of His Exalted Highness, Nawab Basalat Jah. Thus an annual payment of Rs. 12.5 lakhs was guaranteed by the Military Governor under the instructions of the Government of India. However, it appeared that the annual payment of twenty-five lakh rupees for the princes, princesses, grandsons and brother of the Nizam had never been made. Moreover in 1954, the Nizam received a letter from Prime Minister Nehru beginning with the words 'Dear Friend' asking for a voluntary cut in the civil list and pointing out that the privy purses had become anachronisms in the context of India's economy. A similar letter was addressed to other rulers. The Nizam replied with due respect that, 'he failed to see how what was a solemn agreement in 1949 could become an anachronism in 1954.' To this Nehru had no reply.[15]

The Nizam's financial adviser recorded a careful note pointing out that the compensation of twenty-five lakh rupees paid annually in lieu of his income from the Sarf-i-Khas estates was grossly inadequate. In fact, he felt that if the same principle had been adopted for the Sarf-i-Khas as had been done for the jagirs after their abolition the compensation for

Sarf-i-Khas would have amounted to Rs 1,22,500,000. If this amount had been spread over twenty equal annual installments it would have amounted to Rs 62.5 lakhs per annum, as against twenty-five lakh rupees per annum paid to the Nizam for his lifetime alone.

The Government of India's lack of consideration for the financial hardships of the Nizam did however have a positive effect, which benefited those who were lucky enough to be recipients of his largesse. D. F. Karaka records that, 'in view of the uncertainty which faced his family, his heirs and dependants and such charitable causes as he wished to safeguard during and after his lifetime, the Nizam decided to liquidate part of his wealth and transform it into a series of Trusts which would achieve this object.' Of the thirty-two trusts created, two were for his sons Prince Azam Jah and Prince Moazam Jah, each for Rs 18,200,000. The trusts for the two princesses were of Rs 30,00,000 each. There was a joint trust of Rs 21,200,000 in favour of the two grandsons, Prince Mukarram Jah and Prince Mufakham Jah, sons of the prince of Berar. A trust of Rs 50,00,000 was created for the Nizam's brother, Sahibzada Basalat Jah. In addition to these trust for his immediate family, there was a general family trust of Rs 10,00,00,000 approximately. There was also the Nizam's Housing Accommodation Trust for approximately Rs 5,00,00,000 and the Nizam's Religious Endowments Trust for Rs 45,00,000. Trust No. 12 was called HEH the Nizam's Stepsisters' Trusts, amounting to Rs 6,00,000.[16]

The Nizam's Sacred Relics Trust was not in cash. It was intended to protect certain articles of value. The Pilgrimage Money Trust for Rs 22,00,000 was to finance pilgrimages to holy shrines. There was no Family Pocket Money Trust of Rs 55,00,000, a trust of Rs 1,25,000 for the publication and sale of his Urdu and Persian poems, a trust of Rs 10,00,000 for keeping the Nizam's jewels in repair.There were also the separate Mader-i-Deccan Memorial Trust, the Azakhana Zehra Trust, the Bibi-ka-Alam and the Koh-i-Moula Trusts totalling Rs 9,00,000 between them. There was a Nizam's Grandsons of Pocket Money Trust Rs 2,15,000 and two trusts for the wedding gifts of his two grandsons' and his two grand-daughters, the boys getting only fifteen thousand rupees and the girls Rs 3,25,000 allotted to them. The remaining ten trusts were the Nizam's Jewellery for Family Trust, twenty-five thousand rupees; the Supplementary Religious Endowment Trust, Rs 80,00,000; the Supplementary Sacred Relics Trust without any cash allotment; the

Supplementary Family Trust Rs 6,00,000; a further Jewellery Trust for two lakh rupees; a second trust for his son Moazam Jah with Jewellery; the Sahibzadi Anwar Begum Trust Rs 4,00,000; the Sahibzadi Anwar Begum Mehr Trust, one lakh rupees; the Sahebzadi Oolia Kulsum Trust, three lakh rupees and finally, the Sarf-i-Khas Charity Trust for Rs 500,00,000. The cash Trusts together totalled Rs 29,36,05,000. The value of the jewellery and the sacred relics were in addition to this sum.

The cash trusts were started with the proceeds of the sale of gold which had been lying around the palace in the form of bars and of sovereigns presented to the Nizam as nazars during his rule. The gold bars had come into his possession, according to Karaka, when the Government of India official looking after the State finances, Sir Reginald Glancy, faced a shortage of silver and offered to pay him in gold. The price of gold at the time was twenty-one lakh rupees per tola and the price of a sovereign was about thirteen rupees. The gold was carried to Bombay in trunks worth a few shillings each and secured with locks worth five shillings each. The total value of the gold when sold in Bombay was Rs 6,00,00,000 amounting to 4.4 million pounds. The sale price of gold was one hundred and fifteen rupees and three annas which was over five times the price paid for it by the Nizam. The Nizam showed complete confidence in the integrity of the official who sold the gold in Bombay, refusing even to look at the account. He was however very concerned that the trunks and the locks should be brought back from Bombay. They were shipped back from Bombay by air and the Nizam was satisfied.[17]

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The States' Reorganization Commission had not only recommended the ending of the State of Hyderabad, it had also urged the winding up of the post of Rajpramukh. The last Nizam of Hyderabad, who had functioned for eight years as a constitutional Head of State, who had gone to the airport to receive Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, although earlier he had not even met Viceroys at the airport, finally bowed out of public service, and confined his future activities to the palace. He declined the offer of a Governorship. His public appearances after this were limited to visits to the mosque in the Public Gardens and also to the Judi Masjid.

He continued to issue statements in the *Nizam Gazette* till the early Sixties and when it ceased publication, in the *Rahnuma-i-Deccan*, conveying messages and warnings to his numerous progeny and dependants.

For the last thirty years of his life, the Nizam's personal physician was Colonel K.N.Waghray, a Kayasth Hindu. The relationship between the two was personal, rather than that of doctor and patient. There was mutual respect between them. Many times the Nizam chided Dr Waghray in anger, but the latter never complained. The very next moment after administering a scolding, the Nizam would be talking to him about his personal and family matters as if nothing had happened. Waghray would often speak about the affection, kindness, implicit faith which the Nizam showed in him.

Exactly a fortnight before the Nizam died in February 1967, Waghray breathed his last. The Nizam was deeply moved by the doctor's illness, and would make enquiries about his health every day. When another doctor, G.P.Ramayya, reported to Waghray about the Nizam's anxiety, the dying man burst into tears and became very emotional. He regretted his helplessness and asked Ramayya to convey his respects to the Nizam.

On the morning after Waghray's death, the Nizam sent for Dr Ramayya, and plied him for an hour-and-a-half with details about Waghray's death, the people who were present, and who came to offer condolence, the status and condition of his family members, and other details too numerous to recount.

The Nizam was getting weaker day by day and Waghray's death was perhaps the last blow. During his last illness he stopped taking nourishment, and had no will to live. He would allow doctors to take his temperature, and blood pressure and do a routine check up, but firmly refused all medicines. His ECG could be taken and antibiotics given only when he was drowsy due to high temperature. Even though he was comatose, his pulse, blood pressure and respiration remained steady for seventy-two hours. The doctors were even suspected of suppressing the news of his death. Dr Ramayya felt the monarch was waiting for the proper day and time to die. His condition suddenly took a turn for the worse on Friday, 24 February 1967. Within forty-five minutes all was over. He died as the afternoon prayer call (azaan) was being given in a nearby mosque.[18]

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

Isne kitni tabahiyan dekhin
Iske zakhmon ka kuchh hisaab nahin
Bawajood iske is zamane men
Haidarabad ka jawab nahin

(Hyderabad has seen so much destruction
There is no account of its wounds
In spite of this, in this age
There is no place like Hyderabad)

–Raghavender Rao Jazb Alampuri

Haidarabad nageena
Andar mitti, oopar choona

(Hyderabad is a jewel
Mud underneath, and plaster on top)

–A saying in Hyderabad

It is imperative to look at some major issues arising out of the study of twentieth century Hyderabad and of the last Nizam. Before examining these issues it is proposed to consider the broad contours of the changes in the Nizam's Dominions as it was officially called, from the beginning of the second decade of the century, when Mir Osman Ali Khan became the seventh Nizam, till the middle of the century when the State became a part of the Indian Union, and officially adopted the Constitution of India.

Once the broad contours of the twentieth century Hyderabad have been laid down, the following three issues will be considered. First, what was the last Nizam's view of the world? Did he succeed in leaving the impress of his personality on his state? Could Hyderabad be described as a well-administered state in which people were generally contented, or did it leave a good deal to be desired?

Second, what was the significance of the claim that Hyderabad was (or should be) an Islamic state, or one which gave special privileges to

Muslims? To what extent was this a factor in the success or failure of the Nizam's assertion of his special position, and of the ultimate fate of Hyderabad?

The last issue to be examined is the claim to independence by the last Nizam, the extent to which it was justified legally, morally and politically, and the reasons why the attempt to assert his independence ultimately failed. Is it possible to visualize a set of circumstances in which the Nizam could have survived as an independent monarch, or at least as a constitutional ruler under an Indian Federation?

The changes that occurred between 1911 and 1950, a fairly long period during which the seventh Nizam ruled in Hyderabad, can be understood better if we divide it into four sub-periods.

During the first and formative period, from 1911 to 1919, the young Nizam dominated the administrative setup, and gave a personal touch to the changes in the State. Mir Mahboob Ali Khan had been forced to introduce a measure of financial discipline by Lord Curzon, who insisted on the appointment of Sir George Casson Walker as Financial Adviser, and later as Assistant Minister of Finance. At the same time, the revenue and police were administered by competent British officials, who were able to restore the credibility of the administrative system, without however taking up any major developmental schemes.

During the first few years of his reign, the young Osman Ali Khan sought to tighten up the administrative system by banning malpractices like the institution of Devadasis, (women dedicated to temples), the supply of dancing girls to officials while on tour, and the practice of begar. He dispensed with his Diwan, Maharaja Kishen Pershad, after a year, and appointed Salar Jang III, the scion of a distinguished family, but this did not give him his confidence. The appointment was probably made to gain the goodwill of the British. The latter did not press him to retain Salar Jang when they found that the two did not work well together. Ironically, during this first period of his reign, Mir Osman Ali Khan distinguished himself by his administrative competence and willingness to undertake new developmental projects on the one hand, and being prone to pecuniary temptation on the other.

During the second period from 1919 till 1937, when Osman celebrated his Silver Jubilee, the State was administered through an Executive Council, which the British hoped would limit some of the arbitrariness

and malpractices which had characterized the personal rule of the Nizam from 1914 to 1918. Sir Akbar Hydari proved himself both as a distinguished financial administrator and a diplomat. He also contributed greatly to the building of educational institutions including the Osmania University, and the State Archaeological Department. However, economic and social unrest could not be contained by mere adminstrative reform. The larger areas under jagir remained untouched by changes in the revenue system. Meanwhile political movements had taken the form of regional organizations like the Andhra Mahasabha or communal organizations like the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen, mainly because of the suppression of legitimate demands for participation in the political system.

The third period 1937 to 1946 commenced with an upsurge of protest by the Arya Samaj, with the tacit support of most educated Hindus against the emerging communalism of the State machinery, in support of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen's demand for declaring Hyderabad as a Muslim state. Throughout the war however the Majlis built up its position, with support from the All-India Muslim League as well as the Nizam himself.

The fourth period 1946 to 1950, began positively with the appointment of a Diwan who had the capacity to understand the new forces at work in India, and to work with them. For ten months in 1946–47 Sir Mirza Ismail tried to restore the political process, while building up the Nizam's position in the country, but lost power because of the short-sighted obduracy of the Majlis leadership and rank and file, which was determined to assert the independence of the Nizam as well as the Islamic character of the State.

After India became independent on 15 August 1947, events in Hyderabad moved rapidly towards a climax. The armed intervention by the Indian Union in September 1948 known as the Police Action, or Operation Polo, was made inevitable by the increasing power in the State of the Razakars, the volunteer wing of the Majlis on the one hand and the armed agrarian revolt led by Marxist intellectuals and workers in the Telengana area on the other. The reference of the Indian threat to the United Nations precipitated the action, while the death of M. A. Jinnah made it unlikely that Pakistan would, open a second front. The ending of the operation within five days made it clear that the armed threat from the Razakars and the Hyderabad Army was less serious than had been expected. The Army now turned its attention to the suppression of the Communist revolt, which was called off only in 1951. Meanwhile

Hyderabad State had formally become part of the Indian Union and joined the Constituent Assembly.

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Having outlined the main perimeters of events during the last Nizam's rule, we now turn to the first question, that is the extent to which Mir Osman Ali Khan was able to transform the State in the direction which he hoped it would go. Did Hyderabad have a place among the well-administered states of India?

We are faced here with the problem of judging the work of a major figure in twentieth century Indian history without having access to his personal archives. Although we have made use of archival sources in the National Archives of India and in other repositories in Hyderabad and in London, we have not been able to refer to the personal archives of the Nizam himself.

We now take a brief look at Mir Osman Ali Khan's vision of Hyderabad, as it emerges from this study. The position of the Nizams of Hyderabad had always been a most delicate one. They were descended from the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan and therefore enjoyed some measure of respect, if not reverence, from Indians of all communities who looked back to Mughal rule as the last genuinely Indian empire. It was true that during the Revolt of 1857, the Nizam had supported the British, but this was simply to ensure the survival of his state. With the deposition of the Nawab of Oudh in 1856 and of the Mughal court of Delhi in 1858, Hyderabad became a major place of refuge for literary figures and persons of good families seeking employment. The great nineteenth century statesman, Salar Jang built up Hyderabad as an Indian state commanding prestige in India as well as abroad. The sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan retained the tradition of Hyderabad and permitted some degree of technical innovation.

Mir Osman Ali Khan came to the gaddi with high hopes. He had inherited the goodwill which his father had received from the common man. He often said that he regarded the Hindu and Muslim communities as his two eyes. Unfortunately some of his subjects commented that he must be, 'blind in one eye,' because he did not hold the scales even between the two communities. The fact that the Hindus constituted around eighty-six percent of the population of the state did not concern him much,

as he felt that popular rule and majority government had no place in a state like Hyderabad, where the ruling family had a divine right to rule, and had deep roots in the affections of the people of all communities.

Hyderabad State had enjoyed the highest status of a twenty-one gun salute in the hierarchy of Indian princes under British rule. However, the British kept the rulers of Hyderabad in a kind of thraldom, to which even minor princes were not exposed. Not only the succession of the ruler but the appointment of Diwans (Prime Ministers), Ministers, and even Members of the Nizam's Council, had to receive the prior approval of the Residency and Government of India. Through a variety of techniques, including the sending of oral messages, the Residency maintained its supremacy over the Nizam's government. By establishing the Imperial Service Troops, Lord Curzon made it unnecessary for states like Hyderabad to have an efficient army . Thus the Nizam was made to depend only on British-controlled troops for defence against both internal and external enemies. The Nizams had always chafed under these restrictions, as had other Indian rulers, but they had been emasculated by generations of easy living and lack of physical and mental discipline.

In spite of the humiliation to which the Nizams had been exposed over many generations, the seeds of ambition had been sown in the mind of Mir Osman Ali Khan, as a result of the boost given to him during the First World War. He began to assert his position both within the State and in relation to the British. He felt that the British would eventually have to withdraw from India and hand over power to an Indian government. He was convinced however that the principle of kingship would continue to play a dominant role in India as it had done in the Orient for millenia. He felt that by demonstrating his loyalty to the British government, he would be able to obtain their continued support. Like most of the rulers of Hyderabad State, he hoped to isolate Hyderabad from trends in British India, by limiting, if not entirely halting, the process of social change. Even the spread of education was visualized as subserving the long-term goal of maintaining the traditional political, economic and social order.

Mir Osman Ali Khan was by nature a shy and diffident person, who became ruler through intrigue, after his father had decided to remove him from the succession. On the death of the sixth Nizam, Osman Ali Khan succeeded to the gaddi, but he evidently felt insecure because of this early challenge to his right to succeed.

During the First World War he contributed generously to the British war effort and made an appeal to Muslims to support the British, even though Turkey and the Caliphate was on the side of Germany. The British felt that they had made an adequate compensation to the Nizam by honouring him with the titles of His Exalted Highness and Our Faithful Ally. However, the Nizam was very keen to acquire the title of King, and eventually to become King in his own right. In this respect he was deviating from the traditions of his ancestors, one of whom had refused the title of King when it was offered to him by the British. The founder of the dynasty himself had never declared his independence, having sworn loyalty to the Mughal Emperor.

In 1926 the seventh Nizam received two major blows to his prestige. In 1923 he had written a letter to the Government of India that the Berar issue be referred to arbitration, since the two governments were at par, except in relation to external matters. He received a stinging reply from Lord Reading, a Viceroy who had earlier served as Chief Justice of Great Britain, pointing out that no state could claim to the be equal of the Government of India, and that paramountcy could not be defined, as it was not limited by treaties. Later, he was told by the new Viceroy, Lord Irwin, that he would have to accept senior British officials, nominated by the government to fill the posts of Revenue Member of the Nizam's Council, Director-General of Police and Director-General of Revenue.

In spite of these serious setbacks, Mir Osman Ali Khan continued to plan for the day when he would assert his independence and thus found an independent Asaf Jahi dynasty. He ignored the family tradition which gave his family only seven generations of rule. By marrying his two sons to the daughter and niece of the last Caliph of Turkey he evidently hoped to acquire legitimacy for the revitalized Asaf Jahi dynasty.

How did he hope to assert the dynasty's independence and what steps did he take to further this long-term goal? First, he realized the need for access to the sea. He sought to assert his claim to the use of the port of Machchlipatnam, as laid down in the Commercial Treaty of 1802 with the British. At a later date, he sought to lay a railway line to Marmagoa, and made a determined bid to purchase Goa from the Portuguese. He continually asserted his claim to Berar and would have liked to get back the northern circars. From the time of the Nawab of Chhatari, an attempt was made to obtain access to the iron ore reserves of Bastar, a tribal state, now a district in Madhya Pradesh.

He used his position as the leading Muslim prince in India and in the British Empire to claim a status much above those of other Indian princes so that he would not participate in their discussions with the Government of India, but carried on separate negotiations. Several factors militated against his assertion of independence. Although he was regarded as one of the richest men in the world, he was not considered a statesman. Some of the men he employed were outstanding in calibre, and upheld the dignity of the State, but he himself always constituted an alternate centre of power. It was difficult even for his Executive Council to predict his reactions to any proposal. Unlike his father, he was a good administrator, but he was widely believed in his own state to be parsimonious to the point of miserliness. On ceremonial occasions, he would accept, and expect, a tribute of gold ashrafis from lower officials, and more elaborate presents from higher dignitaries.

In assessing the personality of Mir Osman Ali Khan we have to take into account the fact that he has come to symbolize, for the post-independence generations of Indians, and especially for Hyderabadis, the Asaf Jahi dynasty as a whole. There are those who were critical of him when he was a ruler, but defended him when he ceased to be one. When he was in power there were many who would criticize him in private and praise him in public. Given the culture of flattery and sycophancy which prevailed in traditional India, this phenomenon is not difficult to understand. A few of his subjects were bold enough to criticize him in articles published anonymously or pseudonymously in British Indian newspapers, but none could dare to do so in the Hyderabad press. Some of those who criticized him in the press outside were discovered and had to leave the State.

Considering the tenacity with which the seventh Nizam pursued his goal of full independence for Hyderabad, it is strange that he did not make a serious effort to ensure the loyal support of his people, or even to build up an effective armed force. His policy of supporting the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen, a party devoted to the goal of achieving and maintaining the supremacy of the Muslim community in the Deccan, lost him the support of the majority of his subjects, who saw nothing incongruous in accepting a Muslim ruler, provided he followed Indian traditions. Still more surprising was the failure to build up an effective army. The Hyderabad Army was unable to hold up the entry of Indian forces in Hyderabad beyond the four days required for it to move from the State's borders to the capital.

A few Razakars lost their lives in a futile attempt to fight the invaders. The people at large regarded the entry of Indian troops as an act of liberation. Nevertheless, there was a feeling of sadness, and indeed of desolation, that the State had been defeated, and that the era of the Nizams had come to an end.

The question has been asked as to why the Indian states failed to become effective foci of loyalty among their people, as did the European nations, many of which have survived since the medieval period. In independent India, members of former ruling families who stood for election have often found themselves carried to office by a wave of popular emotion. Had the states continued to exist after independence, adapting themselves to the new forces at work in the country, a continuity with the past would have been preserved, and the transition would have been less traumatic. In the case of Hyderabad, a good deal of the responsibility for the failure to adapt to the changing times lies with the Nizam. He had a streak of native shrewdness, but this was not rooted in an understanding of the forces at work in the world. He tended to see institutions and social forces as mere obstacles to be removed from his path.

Thus Mir Osman Ali Khan's vision of Hyderabad was that of an absolute despotism, although a benevolent one. The extent to which this vision visualized the concept of social justice will be seen from the condition of the Nizam's administration towards the end of his thirty-seven-year rule.

Mir Osman Ali Khan's commitment to the institution of absolute monarchy did not exclude a feeling of sympathy for his subjects, especially for the common people of Hyderabad. We have seen that he mixed freely with his humble dependants and took great care of the Khanazads and other members of the family, especially in his later years. The poor people and those of working class origin who surrounded him always treated him with the greatest of respect, and even reverence. The contact which Osman had with individual members of the working class who were around him was not however translated into a concern for the problems of society as a whole, or the part which the common man played in the social and economic process. He lacked a social and political philosophy which could have provided a basis for the transformation of society in any desired direction.

The awe that surrounded a medieval monarch was very much a part of his image. Even those who poked fun at his miserliness, his greed for

nazaranas, and his shabby clothes were deeply influenced by his steely eyes, his kingly hauteur and his commanding presence. Few people who met him would have dared to give him advice on how to run his kingdom. He was surrounded by courtiers who gave him advice which they thought would be most acceptable to him but the handful who dared to exceed these parameters usually paid dearly for their gumption.

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A balance-sheet of the administrative achievements and failures of the last Nizam's reign is necessary in order to assess the extent and nature of his achievement, as well as that of others during his long reign. Any assessment at this point can only be tentative, as a great deal of work still needs to be done in the State Archives before a balanced view can be arrived at. For want of adequate studies utilizing the State Archives, we must base our interim judgment on the assessment of British administrators, whose bias has to be noted.

The financial management of the Nizam's government was at a high level, thanks to the dedicated work of Akbar Hydari and others during his tenure of office as Finance Member of the Nizam's Executive Council. There was also a high level of competence in the Irrigation Department. The Railways were well administered, as were some of the technical departments like Mining, Archaeology, Cooperation and Industry. Hyderabad had a highly ambitious plan for the development of an industrial belt in northern Telengana, After the British intervention of 1926, considerable improvement had been made in the key departments of Revenue and Police, and in the allied departments like Excise and Tribal Welfare.

As pointed out earlier, the Government of India was seriously concerned in 1944–1945 as to the steps to be taken when the Nizam died. In May 1945 the Resident, Sir Arthur Lothian, discussed with Chhatari and Grigson the major points to be raised with the new Nizam when he succeeds to the title. The points listed by the Resident constitute a strong indictment of the seventh Nizam's administration from the point of view of a British-Indian administrator. The Resident felt that it would be impossible to get the seventh Nizam to agree to any structural changes, and the only hope was to persuade the Prince of Berar to accept the changes while approving his succession. Although he was, 'indolent and far from bright' the prince was, 'benignant rather than malevolent in

disposition.' He would have to be persuaded to agree to these proposals in exchange for the gradual withdrawal of the restrictions placed by the British on the seventh Nizam since 1926. However the withdrawal should be gradual, as the Prince was not a strong character. Self-indulgence and personal enjoyment his characteristic.

Although the reforms visualized by the British officials were not accomplished till after the merger of Hyderabad in India, and in some respects the position is little or no better forty-three years after the Police Action, the detailed assessment of the Nizam's administration by thoughtful British officials throws a flood of light on the conditions prevailing after four decades of the last Nizam's rule.

The administrative reforms which had been introduced at the insistence of the Government of India, operating through the Residency and the British nominees to the Nizam's government since 1926 had not made a fundamental difference to the economic and social structure of the State. This was because of the power of the major jagirdars and of the Nizam, whose personal stake in the continuance of the traditional hierarchical structure, based on economic and social exploitation, prevented any major restructuring of the political system, which was a prerequisite for the evolution of a more egalitarian economic and social structure.

Both British and Indian members of the Nizam's Executive Council were cautious about changing the time-worn traditions of the Nizam's dominions. Even when they agreed to take a prudent forward step, they had to consider the strong reactions of the Nizam who was committed to the concept of an absolute monarchy, and regarded the Council at best as a necessary evil, imposed upon him by the continued exercise of British paramountcy.

In view of the delicate issues involved the Resident wanted only a gradual withdrawal of powers enjoyed by the British Government of India under the arrangements of 1926. The British Revenue Member should not be withdrawn till the Sarf-i-Khas, Paigah and jagirs were reorganized. The appointment of Indian Ministers should continue to require the prior approval of the Viceroy till the new ruler was willing to show that he would leave things to the President of the Executive Council. The British Director-General of Police was not to be withdrawn till police forces were reorganized and the city police was taken over from the Nizam.

The main thrust of Lothian's proposal was to get the Nizam to delegate most of his power to the Executive Council. The views of British officialdom were not directed towards the delegation of power to a responsible government. The Resident wanted the initiative in selecting candidates for membership of the Council to be transferred from the Nizam to the President of the Council. The Nizam usually proposed pliable persons as Members of Council and once a name was suggested there was little scope of having it dropped. The Resident felt that the Nizam should have a veto power over the appointment, but the initiative should come from the President, who would naturally consult the Resident before taking up the matter with the Nizam.

The Resident also wanted that the Nizam should be required to accept a recommendation made by a two-third majority of the Council. The ruler should not be able to play off political members against the others. He felt it was necessary to do away with the Nizam's Peshi Officer eventually, in the meantime changing it to a State secretary under the control of the Council. The chief source of corruption would thus be checked.

He also proposed the incorporation of Sarf-i-Khas, Paigah and jagir estates into the Diwani for administrative purposes. Forty per cent of the State was not under Diwani, ten per cent being Sarf-i-Khas and thirty per cent jagir. The opposition of the Palace and jagirdars had prevented the incorporation of these in the State, except in regard to excise, drugs and police administration. Police functions had been taken over for Sarf-i-Khas and two Paigahs, while only six out of seven estates retained police. Big estates retained individual powers, except for High Court control over judges and magistrates. There was no separation of judiciary and executive in most cases.

Wartime regulations of food and cloth, the regulation of money-lenders, debt conciliation, public health etc., were not enforced in the jagirs. The qualify of administration was very poor and corruption was rife.

The Sarf-i-Khas fetched the Nizam two crore rupees annually. This was a rough estimate, as no budget was published. Annual expenditure was sixty lakh rupees. If the Sarf-i-Khas were to be taken over, the Nizam would be compensated at two crore rupees. This takeover was highly desirable to prevent the Nizam dangling employment in Sarf-i-Khas before officials as a post-retirement benefit. Except by compulsion the

new ruler may not agree to reduce his claim to full compensation for the Sarf-i-Khas income.

Another important reform visualised was the abolition of the Palace police, the separation of city from district police, and the fusion of all into one service. The 300-400 strong Palace CID was paid from the city police budget. Reports on zeanana ladies and highly-placed citizens and officials were wrong in principle. (They were moreover often inaccurate). The city police was not under the Director-General of Police, a British officer, because the Kotwal was reporting to the Nizam for three hours a day. This was a medieval use of the city police. The code regulating succession to jagirs and inam lands was necessary. Succession was now based on caprice or goodwill of the Nizam (for example, any competent member of the Paigah family could be appointed Amir-i-Paigah by the Nizam). The Resident felt that the principles of Atiyat law governing succession to jagir and inam lands—family shares and allowances—should be embodied in an Atiyat code. Just as the Nizam accepted the recommendation of Judicial Committee, he should be made to accept the decision of an Atiyat Appeals Committee.

In regard to the safeguarding and disposal of His Exhalted Highness' treasury, the President of the Executive Council and the Police Member, with Chief of Army Staff were working out plans for the protection of the Nizam's property on his death. It was desirable to have British troops in the Hyderabad Residency compound. It was necessary to compute the Nizam's wealth. This was to be done by a committee including expert jewellers, a banker or accountant of repute, a representative of the new ruler, and the President of Council, but not the Residency.

The Resident also listed some additional items to be taken up with the new ruler after he took charge. First he suggested the introduction of constitutional reforms under the Aravamudu Aiyangar Report. Second, he wanted judicial reforms. A strong Chief Justice, with Urdu as his mother tongue was proposed to be brought over from British India. Judicial procedure needed to be overhauled throughout the State especially in the High Court. Reforms of the Bar, a review of the separation of judiciary from the executive, inspection of and tightening up of Sessions Judges, especially in the Sarf-i-Khas, were also considered necessary.

Palace influence was very strong in the appointment of High Court judges, of whom there were twelve—some corrupt, almost all dilatory. The average judicial knowledge and capacity was less than that of a

Munsif in the courts of the administered areas. Half the number could do the same work with a strong energetic Chief Justice. A Judicial Committee would be a useful safeguard against the vagaries of an inefficient High Court. Third, the Resident proposed an increased delegation of powers to the Council. His Exalted Highness still had powers of appointment to posts of Rs 1,000 or more per month, the creation of posts of five hundred rupees or more per month, the imposition of new taxes and duties the transfer of fund from one head to an whose appointments required the Nizam's consent. It was felt that schedules A, B and especially C of the Constitution needed to be recast with much more delegation to Ministers. Many matters were referred to the Council and the Nizam which could be handled by the Ministers. The excessive powers enjoyed by the Nizam were being misused to shield corrupt, inept and lazy officials. The Nizam was also misusing the power to give honours and titles to his subjects.

The position regarding taking of nazars was not quite satisfactory. The circular of 12 January, 1927 needed to be changed permitting nazars to be taken only once a year on the Ruler's birthday. In the last three years an amount of one lakh rupees per annum had been acquired in nazars. The Prince of Berar was not free of the taint. A comprehensive set of rules should be laid down and enforced. [1]

It is a matter of some surprise to note that the Resident's note does not make mention of the unrest developing in the Telengana region, which was quite severe by 1944. This unrest led eventually to the Telengana revolt, which was at its height between 1946 and 1950. Although it covered only a few districts of the Telengana area, it had a fundamental impact on the thinking of peasants and landlords as well as of intellectuals not only in Andhra Pradesh but all over India. The very existence of the revolt and its considerable success constituted an indictment of the Nizam's rule. Some believe that the Police Action of September 1948 was triggered off more by the Telengana revolt than by the power of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen in the State. The Government of India lost little time in suppressing the revolt. As their efforts met with success, the alliance between the middle peasantry and the landless labourers, which had been the cause of the revolt's early successes, began to give way. The less radical leaders contested the State and Parliamentary elections of 1952 and asserted their right to participate in the political process on an equal basis. The break-up of Hyderabad State in 1956 was in some measure due to the attitude of these radical elements, who considered linguistic states

on the Soviet model as highly desirable. The strong consciousness built up in the Telengana are a for a regional identity since 1921 was paralleled by the regional consciousness in the Marathwada and Hyderabad Karnatak areas. The break up of Hyderabad State in 1956 was thus an inevitable product of the failure of the Nizam and his government to build up a loyal and devoted following at the Hyderabad State level after the First World War ended.

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We now turn to the second issue, that of Hyderabad's status as a Muslim state, a question on which there has been a certain amount of confusion, caused by a failure to define what is meant by the term 'Muslim state'. British statesmen in the nineteenth century such as the Marquis of Salisbury, who was Secretary of State for India and later Prime Minister of Great Britain, habitually referred to Hyderabad as a 'Mohammadan state,' presuming that it had a great deal of affinity with the Ottoman Empire of Turkey, and implying that there was a distinct possibility of a conspiracy among Muslim states ganging up against the British Empire, however far apart and whatever differences they may have between them. It was on this basis that Salisbury declined to restore the province of Berar to the Nizam in the time of the first Salar Jang.

It is ironic therefore that just before the commencement of the First World War, the Government of India used the good offices of the Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Pinhey, to persuade Mir Osman Ali Khan to make an appeal to the Muslims of India and elsewhere to stand firm in support of the British and against the Ottoman Empire, which was on the verge of joining the war on the side of Germany.

The Nizam did make the appeal, although he was very apprehensive about the consequences it would have on his position in India. He feared that it would expose him to attacks by his co-religionists, and especially by orthodox elements who would regard his stand as betrayal of Islam. Having made the appeal however, he decided to draw the maximum advantage from the situation and to use it to build up his position as a monarch. However, when the First World War ended, a number of Indian Muslim leaders joined hands with Mahatma Gandhi, who was emerging as a national leader in his own right, to demand from the British Govern-

ment that it should offer better terms to the Turkish Empire, which had been on the losing side in the war.

The Khilafat movement, as it came to be called, however was faced with a sudden crisis when the Turkish reformer abolished the Caliphate, declaring Turkey as a secular state. The Nizam of Hyderabad showed compassion for the last Caliph, now exiled in France, and settled on him a person of three hundred pounds per annum.

There are indications that, even at this stage, the young Nizam was being persuaded by advisers, both from inside and outside Hyderabad State, to stake a claim eventually to the title of Khalifa or Caliph, the head of the Islamic world. This title had gone through many vicissitudes in the course of the history of Islam. There was nothing inherently improbable in an Indian ruler succeeding to the title of head of Islam, which had been held by rulers of Egypt, Iraq and Spain in the past. The Nizam would however have faced serious obstacles due to internecine jealousies in the Muslim world, and the possibility of other rulers putting forth their claims.[2]

It is doubtless for this reason that Mir Osman Ali Khan did not make a bid for the title till many years later, and even then in the indirect manner of marrying his two sons to the daughter and niece of the last Caliph of Turkey. This marriage was seen in the Hyderabad of the early Thirties as an act of generosity to the leading Muslim family and an implicit statement of the status of the Nizam's dynasty as a potential claimant to a world status in Islam.

It has often been pointed out that the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, was extremely solicitous of the traditions and sentiments of Hindus, who constituted the vast majority of the population of his State. He made no distinction between his Hindu and Muslim subjects and treated both alike. He had no difficulty in observing Hindu rituals when they were required to tackle a situation. For example, when the floods of 1908 had to be pacified, he performed a *puja* which according to legend, caused the flood waters to recede.

Mahboob's son, Osman, was in many respects an heir to and a follower of the same tradition. When Mir Osman Ali Khan became Nizam in 1911, there was practically no political consciousness in the State. This position remained practically unchanged till 1948. Many in Hyderabad continued to revere the ruler till the end as the embodiment of divinity,

and would not dare to question any of his actions. The rise and decline of political movements touched only a very small sector of society, and even that to a marginal extent. Mir Osman Ali Khan is often accused of having perpetuated the dominant position of Muslims in the civil service, the judiciary and the army and prevented Hindus from enjoying their due share in administrative and political posts. There is some evidence in support of the claim, which cannot be altogether rejected.[3]

At a personal level however, Mir Osman Ali Khan enjoyed the full support of the Hindu nobility and officials to whom he had entrusted high offices, and he also treated them with the same consideration that he showed to his Muslim courtiers and officials. The last Nizam's personal relations with his Parsee or Zoroastrian subjects was especially good, and they had the greatest respect if not reverence for him. He was greatly attached to the Hindu physicians who treated him till his last illness. He attended Christian church services every year at Christmas time with members of his family and placed no obstacles on the spread of the Christian faith in his dominions. There is no reason to believe that his tolerant attitude to people of other faiths was motivated by political considerations. However the preference he showed for Islam was probably so motivated.

After the First World War, the last Nizam took it for granted that he was a leader of the Indian Muslims. For example, when he was offered the Chancellorship of Aligarh Muslim University by the Government of India he took the offer as an indication of his position as the leading Indian Muslim ruler. At the same time he regarded himself as far above the other rulers. For this reason, he did not participate in the affairs of the Chamber of Princes set up by the Government of India after the First World War.

We have seen that the Thirties and Forties were characterized by a rise in communal consciousness both among Hindus and Muslims. However, this phenomenon was largely limited to political ideas which had not penetrated the social consciousness to any substantial extent. Bahadur Yar Jang, the leader of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen asserted the superiority of Muslims in Hyderabad, but was highly regarded by Hindus and Muslims alike, and had all the social graces of the old feudal class to which he belonged. There is no doubt that Mir Osman Ali Khan furthered the career of Bahadur Yar Jang and helped to build up the Majlis as a political force.

We have seen that as early as 1930 the Nizam lifted the ban on the entry into Hyderabad of Mohammad Ali Jinnah which had been imposed in 1919 when he was still a leader of the Indian National Congress. During the late Thirties and early Forties the Nizam relied greatly on Jinnah's advice in regard to his dealings with the Majlis and particularly Bahadur Yar Jang. Probably the alliance between the latter and Jinnah was itself a product of the Hyderabad situation to which the Nizam had contributed in no small measure.

The Nizam probably felt by 1947 that Jinnah had used Hyderabad State as a pawn in his goal of achieving Pakistan and was not willing to help Hyderabad in return. Nevertheless there was no one else to whom he could turn for help. His last Sadr-i-Azam, Mir Laik Ali, although born and bred in Hyderabad, had a Pakistani passport having served on the Pakistan delegation to the United Nations.

Late in 1940, when Sir Akbar Hydari was still Sadr-i-Azam, Jinnah was consulted and contributed to the solution of the impasse regarding the Aiyangar Committee reforms—a solution which ultimately led to a stiffening of the Majlis attitude and their continued demand for an excessively high share of the seats in the new legislative body to be set up under the reforms. It was this obdurate attitude of the Muslim party in Hyderabad which made the Police Action inevitable.

Due to the partisan attitude of the ruler in favour of the Majlis, the repeated attempts by a series of competent Diwans to bring the constitutional crisis to a favourable conclusion came to naught. Sir Akbar Hydari, a product of the composite Hindu-Muslim culture of Gujarat and Bombay, a kinsman of Badruddin Tyabji, one of the first Presidents of the Indian National Congress, was Sadr-i-Azam from 1937 till 1940. In his last months in office he was pressurized into agreeing to the Majlis demands for an absolute Muslim majority in the legislature, as against the Aiyangar Committee's proposal for parity of Muslims with Hindus, with the Parsee and Christian representatives holding the balance.

Even after giving in to the Majlis' demand, Hydari was eased out of office by the Nizam's intrigue with the British Government, which offered him the high-sounding but comparatively powerless post of Information Member of the Viceroy's Council. Had he declined, his position in Hyderabad would have been precarious. His successor, the Nawab of Chhatari, the blue-eyed boy of British officialdom, proved to be a shrewd

analyst of events, but too weak as an administrator to stand up to the machinations of the Nizam and the Majlis. The Congress was effectively sidelined during the Second World War, secular public opinion received a setback, and as we have seen, regional consciousness in Telengana moved in the direction of political activism against the feudal system.

It should be clear from our analysis of the relations between the Nizam and the leaders of the Majlis that while there was no particular identity of views, there was nevertheless a convergence in their thinking which was remarkable. The Majlis, as its name implied, was a coalition of religious groups which had come together, despite differences, in order to work for the achievement of their common goals. The most important of these was the maintenance of the supremacy of the Muslim community in the Nizam's dominions. In accordance with an old Islamic concept, the community was declared to be the repository of political power and the King was only its representative. Osman Ali Khan was sought to by won over be declaring him to be His Majesty the King of the Deccan.

The Nizam, whose ambitions had been inflamed by the British using him to counter the Turkish monarchy in the First World War, welcomed this accretion to his dignity and potential power. However, he was unwilling to concede the real power of the State to the people, even if it meant the Muslim community. He was convinced that he could use the political support of the Muslim community to counter the British presence in India and to wrest internal autonomy from them. He did not take the Congress leaders seriously, nor did he consider the Telengana revolt as a serious threat to his kingdom. His frequent consultations with Bahadur Yar Jang, Abul Hasan Syed Ali, and Qasim Razvi were indicative of his alliance with them, with each side using the other in order to fulfil its own purposes. He also consulted Jinnah frequently on the same assumption.

In keeping with his overall strategy, Osman Ali Khan did not permit the Majlis to take over the affairs of Hyderabad entirely. In 1946 he appointed Sir Mirza Ismail as Sadr-i-Azam against the advice of Jinnah. He evidently felt that Sir Mirza, as a loyal civil servant and good Muslim, would be a more reliable ally in the new dispensation where the British were leaving India and the Congress were expected to form the government. This was a shrewd move on his part. Sir Mirza had good relations with the Congress leadership, and had an excellent track record as a loyal servant of the Hindu Maharajas of Mysore and Jaipur. He was a good administrator and a shrewd politician. He happened to be a Shia, and the

Nizam had Shia sympathies, but this was only incidental to his overall mission, which was the maintenance of his dynasty and himself in power, and if possible the achievement of an independent Hyderabad State.

Sir Mirza was however jettisoned when it was found that he could not command even the grudging support of the Majlis. His attempts to keep the Majlis' agents within the government in check led to the strengthening of that party as a political force outside the government. Osman Ali Khan was once more thrown back on the support of his old allies, with whom he had a love-hate relationship over a period of several years.

In October 1947 he had not been permitted to sign the Standstill Agreement with the Indian Union. The drama that Osman Ali Khan went through at this time makes it difficult to say precisely whether he was manipulating the Majlis or vice-versa. It was probably a little of both. The Executive Council headed by the Nawab of Chhatari became a laughing stock because as the delegation consisting of Chhatari, Sir Walter Monckton and Sultan Ahmed was about to leave for Delhi it was prevented by crowds outside their gates. Prior to this the ruler had agreed with Aravamudu Aiyangar that the Standstill Agreement should be signed but after this incident he brought in Qasim Razvi into the Council meeting and allowed him to put forth the view that Hyderabad should hold out for better terms. The double game played by the ruler could not be more obvious. The agreement was eventually signed after the Majlis supporter, Moin Nawaz Jang, was made the head of the Hyderabad. No further concession was made by the Government of India to save the face of the Majlis negotiators.

After the Laik Ali government took over in December 1947, there were several reports implying that the Nizam was feeling increasingly uncomfortable with his Majlis allies, as they asserted themselves forcefully after the formation of the Laik Ali government in October 1947. The Nizam was not allowed to meet K.M.Munshi alone, and some have described him at this time as a prisoner of the Majlis. Although he continued to believe in the independence of Hyderabad as a goal and resisted joining the Indian Union for a time, he finally agreed to do so but was prevented from carrying out his own wishes in June 1948, just before Lord Mountbatten's departure from India.

It is clear that the Nizam was physically prevented from fulfilling his wishes on several occasions. It is also likely that he would have been in physical danger had he tried to take a step which would place him in

opposition to the Majlis leadership. The situation was known to him, and it acted as a constraint on his activities and decisions. However he was not literally a prisoner of the Majlis. It is for this reason that a few weeks before the Police Action he permitted Mirza Ismail to negotiate on his behalf with the Government of India. This amount of independence could not have been exhibited had be been a prisoner, literally, of the Majlis.

The Nizam's Agent-General in Pakistan, a civil servant of good reputation, was entrusted with a large sum of money to be utilized for furthering the interests of Hyderabad abroad. The appeal to the United Nations was approved by the Nizam, and it is unlikely that he did so under duress, although this was at the time when he was supposed to be a prisoner of the Majlis. It is likely that the Nizam was convinced that the appeal in the United Nations would receive the support of several countries apart from Pakistan, and that it would lead to the recognition of Hyderabad as an independent or semi-independent state. Thus he went along with his Majlis supporters, even though he had earlier agreed to join India.

It is clear from the Nizam's willingness to negotiate with K.M.Munshi while the Police Action was still going on, that he had withdrawn his support to the Majlis as they had failed to deliver the goods. He told Mir Laik Ali that the Hyderabad Army had not been able to hold up the Indian forces, Pakistan Lod not come through with any concrete help, and the debate in the United Nations was yet to be taken up. He would therefore have to pursue a fresh line of action. He wanted to constitute a government under Sir Mirza Ismail, thus reverting to his earlier strategy which in all probability would have succeeded if it had been undertaken at the proper time. Munshi however advised against involving Sir Mirza and as a result the Nizam then announced a new government to be headed by the Prince of Berar. This government never took office because the Indian authorities insisted on the surrender of the Hyderabad forces and the takeover of Hyderabad by the military authorities under Major-General J. N. Chaudhuri.

At this last stage of his period as an independent ruler, the Nizam demonstrated his fickle nature by changing his strategy more than once, deviating from the principle of independence for Hyderabad which he had put forth some decades earlier when he celebrated the anniversary of the so-called declaration of independence by the first Nizam. Had circumstances permitted, he would have asserted his independence. He continued to hope that such a goal could eventually be achieved, even as

late as 1952. In a recent book published by the Nizam's former Agent-General in Pakistan, letters from the Nizam have been published asking the Agent-General to continue to work for the independence of Hyderabad. At the same time he expressed his lack of confidence in the Majlis leadership including the last Sadr-i-Azam, Mir Laik Ali. Evidently Mir Osman Ali Khan still nurtured hopes that the independence of Hyderabad would become a reality at some future date, and that his family would be restored to a position of glory and power. It is significant that although he had given up his faith in the Majlis, he reiterated his commitment to the independence of Hyderabad. Thus the two issues of Muslim dominance and of Hyderabad's independence were clearly separate in his mind. He was willing to work for the latter, although how he hoped to do so remains still unclear.

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We have now to examine in some detail the arguments put forth on behalf of Hyderabad State for its claim to independence. The questions raised in the course of this debate have been discussed, by Clyde Eagleton under the heads, the international status of Hyderabad, the effect of the Indian Independence Act, recognition, and whether it was a domestic question. On the international status of Hyderabad, Eagleton cites two cases, Mighell versus the Sultan of Johore and Duff Development Company versus the Government of Kelantan in which the states concerned were held to be sovereign states, although they were not allowed to negotiate or enter into treaties with a third power.

An authority on Islamic Law, Mohammed Hamidullah, gives further details on the States of Johore. The Secretary of State for Colonies had held that Johore was an independent state and the defendant was the present sovereign of that state. The Sultan maintained armed forces at land and sea, organized a postal system, founded knightly orders, bestowed honorary titles and generally exercised the powers of a sovereign ruler.

Eagleton had pointed out that Hyderabad gradually achieved its independence after the breakdown of the Mughal Empire. Hamidullah who based his argument largely on the Islamic theory of the state, also argued that the Deccan enjoyed freedom under Muslim dynasties since the time of Allaudin Khilji in the early fifteenth century. The territory had remained independent of Delhi except for a brief period after Aurangzeb's conquest in 1687, towards the end of his long reign. The title of the first

Nizam had been inherited by subsequent rulers of the state and the dynasty was referred to as Asaf Jahi. The Mughal Emperor had issued letters of investitures till the deposition of Bahadur Shah Zafar in 1858. Among the other traditional symbols of feudal sovereignty in Islam were the issuing of coinage and the performance of prayers in mosques in the Mughal name.

Hamidullah argued that it was common in Islamic history for the nominally dependant ruler to exercise *de facto* independence. Thus Muslim Spain was independent of the Baghdad Caliphate in 756, but the rulers waited till A.D. 929 before claiming the titles of Caliph and Amir-ul-Momineen. Even after capturing the capital Baghdad, dependant rulers continued to recognize the superior position of the Caliph. The Emperor Tughlaq got letters of authority from the shadow Caliphs. The Mughals claimed to be the Indian Caliphs; no wonder that the Nizam of the Deccan treated his Caliph with the appropriate amount of devotion. At the same time, he exercised all the rights of an independent sovereign, both internally and externally. The name of his superior ruler did not come in. The Mughals became the 'kept prisoners' of the British, just as the Abbasids of Baghdad became the puppets of the Mamluks in Cairo.

Hamidullah therefore argued that the Nizam was independent from 1729 to at least 1800, when the second Nizam accepted British restriction on his external sovereignty. Hamidullah points out that the transfer of the northern circars first to the French and then to the English was done by the Nizam without reference to the Mughal Emperor in his sovereign capacity. The Nizam lost actual control over the districts in question but not his sovereignty over the area.

In the year 1800, Hamidullah continued, the Nizam undertook, under the heading 'Treaty of Eternal and General Defensive Alliance' something which de Vattel has styled as an unequal alliance, wherein the Nizam agreed to recognize the English East India Company as a permanent arbitrator if there were any differences with a third power. He also undertook not to negotiate with any third power except in consultation with the British Government. The Company's government however declared that it had no interest in the Nizam's subjects, employees etc. Hamidullah quotes de Vattel as well as Aristotle regarding unequal alliances between two states. Aristotle had said that, 'it gives more honor to the more powerful, but renders greatest assistance to the weaker state.'

Referring to the Nizam's claim for the restoration of Berar in 1923, Hamidullah referred to the fact that Britain's reply to the Nizam was based

more on the question of prestige than those of rights and gratitude. The reference made by Lord Reading in his reply to the Sanad of 1862 was inappropriate, he argued, because the recognition of the right to adopt an heir in the absence of a natural heir was the result of the Revolt, which followed Dalhousie's disastrous policy based on the Doctrine of Lapse. The belated recognition of the right of adoption as long as the ruler was loyal to the Crown would not have impressed the State. The right existed even before the letter was issued.

Hamidullah held that Reading's letter also referred to the British Government's right to interfere in the Indian states, should the interest of the Empire be involved or the general welfare of the population required it. The Nizam did not accept this position, and did not reply to the letter. His claim was that the stronger government was both a party to the dispute as well as the judge.

Hamidullah said that since the British always accepted the decisions of the nobles of Hyderabad in regard to succession, this custom was a contributing factor towards consolidating Hyderabad's right, although as a weaker partner the Nizam could not always enforce his right against the stronger government, as happened in Berar's case and the coastal case. The title of Exalted Highness given to the Nizam and His Highness given to the Prince of Berar clearly put the Nizam above other rulers of India. The decision of the King Emperor in this regard could not by superseded by the letter of Lord Reading, who was a mere Viceroy. The Maharajas or Jaipur, Jodhpur and Orchha were jagirdars under the Nizam.

Hyderabad, he said, had its own currency, customs, its own army, postal administration, laws and independent judiciary. The decision of the High Court were final. It had its own official language, Urdu, its own calendar, and its own university founded in 1856 as the Darul Uloom, and renamed Osmania University later. He also claimed that there was a democratic government with an elected assembly and a Cabinet, and that Hyderabad was a secular State with absolute equality for all citizens, irrespective of race and religion.

The second major point raised by Eagleton was the effect of the Indian Independence Act on the status of Hyderabad. He argued that as far back as the Government of India Act of 1935, promises were made to the Indian states that paramountcy functions would not be transferred to self-governing India without their consent. Section 7b of the act stated that ,

> ...the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of the Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise. (10 and 11 Geo.6., Ch. 30 [July 18, 1947].)

On 16 July 1947, Lord Listowel, Secretary of State for India said in the House of Lords that, 'the appointments and functions of the Crown representative and his officers will terminate and the states will be the masters of their own state.' He went on to say that the states would be, 'entirely free to choose whether to associate with one or the other of the Dominion governments or to stand alone.' While the British Government would not try to influence their decision in any way, he felt that, 'it would be in the best interests of their own people, and of India as a whole that in the fullness of time all the States should find their appropriate place within one or the other of the new Dominions.'

A similar statement was made by Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 10 July 1947 in the House of Commons. There was however a difference in emphasis. A little over a year later on 30 July 1948, Winston Churchill the leader of the Conservative Opposition made a statement in the House of Commons, quoting a speech by Nehru in which he said, 'If and when we think it necessary, we will start military operations against Hyderabad State.' Churchill compared Nehru's threat to the language which Hitler might have used before 'the devouring of Austria.' He warned ministers that their honour and good faith obliges them, 'not to allow a State which they have assured has a declared and sovereign status to be strangled, stifled, starved out, or actually overborne by violence.'

Eagleton cited the White Paper on Indian States, the speeches of Lord Mountbatten and a speech by the Indian representative in the United Nations speaking on the Kashmir issue on 15 January 1948 ; all these statements supported the view that it was for the states to decide whether to join one or the other of the two dominions or remain independent.

Hamidullah argued that when England granted Dominion Status to India in 1947 and annulled the treaties with the native states of the subcontinent,

the British rights were not transferred to the successor governments that is, India and Pakistan. The State obligations to England were abolished, but Hyderabad could not restore status quo simply because the departing British Government did not restore to it the passage to the sea.

Hyderabad thus became an enclave of India, *de facto* if not *de jure*. Hamidullah further argued that the unilateral denunciation by Britain of its treaty obligations to Hyderabad was a breach of faith in view of the fact that, as pointed out by Sir A.C. Lothian, 'the relation between the bigger states and the Crown were determined by agreements which were repeatedly declared unbreakable.' On 9 July 1947 the Nizam wrote a dignified letter to the Crown Representative, pointing out why he was reluctant to join India, citing his common background and links with Pakistan as well as his longstanding claim to autonomy, both in internal and external matters.

Hamidullah rejected India's claim that Hyderabad could not be independent because of its landlocked condition, stating that the Nizam had been illegally denied the restoration of his lost territories, including the northern circars which would have given him access to the sea. He cited a former Resident in support of his claim that at least the northern coast of the circars and the province of Berar should have been restored to the Nizam when the British left India.[4]

Eagleton's third point was in regard to recognition. Sir Benegal Narsing Rao, the Indian delegate to the United Nations, had observed that Hyderabad had not obtained recognition from any states and quoted Sir Hartley Shawcross as saying on 14 July 1947 that Britain did not propose to recognize the states as international entities on 15 August, when the Bill came into operation. Eagleton pointed out in reply that since the states had not taken a decision to claim independence, recognition could only take place after such a claim was put forth. In fact such recognition would logically flow from the claim to independence by a particular state. He argued that the Indian occupation of Hyderabad should not be recognized under the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine, which stated that the United States would not recognize the legal changes brought about by the use of force contrary to the treaty and the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. He also pointed out that a recognition of Hyderabad as a state by other countries was not a prerequisite to being heard in the Security Council. There were precedents in the case of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Indonesian movement for independence being heard in the Security Council.

Finally, Eagleton argued that there was no legal basis for India's contention that Hyderabad was a part of India, as, 'India herself had interpreted the Indian Independence Act as meaning that Hyderabad could remain independent.' The Indian claim that the matter was now a domestic question, 'would amount to an admission of aggression and claim to title through conquest.' He compared the Indian claim to that of the Netherlands that her colonies' problems were entirely domestic matters and, 'the United Nations had no right to interfere; yet India insisted upon that right (in the case of Indonesia) and prevailed.' How could a different interpretation be applied to the case of Hyderabad, he asked.

We have already discussed briefly Hyderabad's case before the United Nations in the sixth chapter in connection with Operation Polo launched by the Indian armed forces and referred to as the Police Action. It is now proposed to consider at greater length the arguments put forth against India by critics in this regard, especially Eagleton and Hamidullah. The historical account put forth by Hamidullah is broadly correct as well as the parallels drawn with other Islamic states in the past. The difficulty with this kind of analysis however is that it ignores the fact that India with a population which is overwhelmingly Hindu in composition can never become an Islamic state. Indian Islam has evolved its own institutions, concepts, and traditions derived from the Indian ethos. Hyderabad was an heir to this tradition, and we have seen that not only the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, even the seventh Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, followed this tradition of tolerence and harmony. So far as this writer is aware, neither of them accepted the view that Islam was the only true religion and the only way of ordering society.

However, the seventh Nizam's obsession with the attainment of independence led him into a dangerous alliance with a fanatical political movement which incorrectly asserted that Hyderabad was an Islamic state, and thus had to be governed by Islamic principles of governance. Bahadur Yar Jang's vision of the Nizam's dominions as a state run on Islamic principles with Hindus and other communities functioning as second class citizens was a concept that not only violated the historical tradition of the Nizam's state throughout its history, but was politically inconceivable in the twentieth century with the rise of democratic institutions and the demand of Hindus, who constituted eighty-six per cent of the population, for participation in all aspects of public life.

The Nawab of Chhatari asked in his autobiography how the Indian states could have continued autocratic traditions when British India had progressed to self-government and become politically conscious. Sir Walter Monckton frequently urged the Nizam to build public support by nurturing institutions which provided for public involvement in the State's activities. The Nizam's government did enjoy for a long time the support and loyalty of influential and powerful Hindus in the statesmen like Pingle Venkatarama Reddy, Aravamudu Aiyangar, and Pannalal Pittie. The Chief Justice of Hyderabad State, Sripatrao Palnitkar, was a member of the Hyderabad delegation to the United Nations. But the vast majority of the Hindu population was being increasingly alienated from the State by the atrocities of the Razakars and the free hand allowed to them by the Nizam's administration, especially during the last year of its existence. This included the backward classes and landless labourers, although the Nizam's government made a special effort to involve them in the political process by offering them concessions including a seat in the Executive Council. In the Telengana area, the revolt was directed not against the Razakars but against the exploitative economic system whose main representatives were powerful landed interests, including many Hindus.

It has been argued by Eagleton and Hamidullah that the Indian Independence Act provided for the lapse of paramountcy and that India accepted this position without demur. India could not therefore argue that Hyderabad was a part of India. Churchill compared India's occupation of Hyderabad to Hitler's attack on Czechoslovakia, indicating that India did not have a shred of a claim on Hyderabad State. It is true that India accepted the act of the British Parliament which declared that paramountcy had lapsed. This was however done under compulsion. The Indian Independence Act would not have passed in the House of Lords without Churchill's support as the Conservatives had an overwhelming majority in the upper house. India and Pakistan agreed to join the Commonwealth, and this mollified Churchill to some extent. The lapse of paramountcy was probably the additional price which the Attlee government had to pay in exchange for Conservative support of the Indian Independence Act. The Indian leadership had hardly any time to think about the legal consequences of this provision.

Both Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel were convinced about the need to integrate the states in the Indian Union, although the extent of autonomy to be allowed to them was as yet unclear. The proposal by V.P. Menon

that India should offer the states accession on three points—defence, foreign affairs and comunications—came in hand as a compromise formula. It proved acceptable to most states, but as V.P. Menon admits in his book, a good deal of arm-twisting had to be resorted to with some of the states. While technically accepting the lapse of paramountcy, the Indian Government in effect declared a new paramountcy, based on its control of the Indian Union.

Although for tactical reasons Jinnah supported the states in their claim to assert their independence, his treatment of the states in Pakistan after the Partition was no different from that of the Indian Government with its states. The breakdown of law and order in north India and Pakistan was of such a magnitude that a loose Federation would have led to further disasters and weakened both India and Pakistan. Rather than comparing India's action to that of Hitler, Winston Churchill could have compared it to that of the British proconsuls like Lord Dalhousie who had consolidated India under British rule. The British constitutional expert, Reginald Coupland, referring to the importance of Hyderabad for the unity of India had commented that India could conceivably exist without its limbs, but could hardly exist without its heart. India's assertion of its right to national unity in Hyderabad, Goa and Sikkim had a certain compulsion about it, because it was a part of the process of consolidation of nationhood.

It was not impossible to conceive of the survival of the Indian states after independence in some form or other. The Malaysian states survived and have played a part in the political process, although at a ceremonial level. The Indonesian states too survived for a time. The rulers of Nepal, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco who survived the Second World War, achieved the transition from being subordinates or semi-independent rulers under the protection of the French or British Empires through a combination of circumstances which was different in each case.

It was quite conceivable for the Nizam of Hyderabad to have retained his internal autonomy for several years or decades, had he played his cards differently. It was a matter of personality rather than of consitutional niceties which prevented the Nizam's state from surviving. His assertion of independence in the face of the emergence of a strong Indian state was an act singularly lacking in wisdom. One of the British officials in Delhi told the Nawab of Chhatari, when he asked that the Nizam be given the title of King, that the title of King was not "given". Sir Walter Monckton once commented that if the Nawab of Bhopal, who was an able and

flexible negotiator, had been in the position of the Nizam of Hyderabad, he would probably have been able to save the Indian states from being obliterated after Indian independence.

Brought up from childhood in the close atmosphere of the harem, the seventh Nizam never outgrew this upbringing. All his life he was surrounded by sycophants. His knowledge of history, and the social and physical sciences was minimal. He had lived through two world wars, and seen the collapse of several empires including the German, the Russian and the Turkish after the First World War. Cataclysmic changes had taken place in China. By 1948, Communism, an ideology unheard of when he ascended the gaddi of Hyderabad in 1911, had ruled Russia for decades and was fast conquering China. The Japanese emperor had emerged from the Second World War as a pathetic figure. Nazism and Fascism had risen and fallen in Germany and Italy. The British Empire and the French Republic had survived the ordeal of the Second World War greatly weakened, and were rapidly losing their overseas territories. The USA and the USSR (now the Commonwealth of Independent States) were emerging as the world's Superpowers. But the Nizam, whose dynasty had, according to popular tradition, been given by a holy man only seven generations to rule, pinned his hopes on the future. Urdu poetry can be heady. If Osman's own poetry is to be taken as an indication of his desires and hopes, he wanted his dynasty to rule for ever. He did not consider himself as a mere Viceroy of the Mughals or a feudatory of the British, but as an independent Muslim king. Moreover, his rule was to be absolute, and power was not to be devolved on the people. No wonder even his close advisers, some of whom at least were fully aware of trends in the outside world, could not save him from the consequences of his actions.

In conclusion it must be pointed out that there has been a continuity in the Indian state system throughout its history. It is true that India has been disunited for long periods in its history, but the concept of unity, both cultural and political has always been there. It is because of this concept that it has been possible for the greatest of Indian rulers to make a bid for the establishment of an Indian empire. The last of these great dynastic attempts to unify India was the Mughal. The British concept of paramountcy was derived from the Mughals. Queen Victoria was declared Empress of India only in 1876, some years after the demise of the last Mughal Emperor in his Burmese exile. The British withdrew from India due to the loss of internal strength during the Second World War.

Apart from the ideology of the Indian National Movement which had influenced the British Labour Party, the British Empire was crumbling because it could not recruit competent civil servants and military personnel. The American pressure during the Second World War added to these internal weaknesses and made the withdrawal of the British inevitable. However the rhetoric of the Empire continued to dominate British thinking, and not only in the Conservative Party.

The declaration of the lapse of paramountcy had no legal or moral justification, and could not have been enforced without stationing a British armed force in the subcontinent, which would have permanently embittered relations with the successor dominions. The argument put forth in their memoirs by some British colonial officials, especially former Residents, that the withdrawal of paramountcy should have been enforced, was a sentimental plea which ignored the loss of British power after the Second World War. Hyderabad, like other Indian states, could have survived only by coming to terms with the reality of the power structure in the Indian subcontinent.

Perhaps the most eloquent commentary on the disastrous doctrine of the lapse of paramountcy was the dispute over Kashmir, which has worsened relations between India and Pakistan since the end of 1947 and prevented the South Asian region from settling down to a peaceful coexistence of states. The Hyderabad issue was the obverse of the Kashmir issue. The majority of the Muslims of Kashmir had no say in the affairs of state, just as the majority of Hindus were sought to be removed from positions of power by the Majlis during the last years of the seventh Nizam's rule. The experience of the Indian Union with the Kashmir issue during 1947–48 was no doubt largely responsible for the decision to undertake the Police Action, once the Hyderabad issue was referred to the United Nations by the Laik Ali government. Had the matter got bogged down in the United Nations like the Kashmir issue, it would have become a festering sore in the heart of India. Nehru's correspondence during and after the Police Action shows that the generous treatment meted out to the Nizam by the military government was partly motivated by the desire to influence world public opinion in favour of the Indian action. The last Nizam, like Emperor Hirohito of Japan, was allowed to continue on the gaddi as a constitutional ruler, but all real power was taken away from him. He was however allowed to retain his personal fortune,

in spite of the allegations made against him of amassing illegal wealth which, as we have seen, were not unjustified.

The decision to merge the three linguistic regions of Hyderabad State with the neighbouring states was taken in 1955, possibly with the knowledge that the Nizam still had some idea in his mind, however vague, of reviving his lost dominions. One cannot defend every action of the Government of India with regard to Hyderabad State, but if one looks at the alternatives open to it during the period 1947 to 1956, it would be difficult to suggest an alternative course of action which would have served its own interests and those of the people of Hyderabad, including the Muslim minority, more effectively.

The people of Hyderabad State have contributed to the building up of the mosaic of Indian society after independence in substantial measure. Diplomats like Nawab Ali Yavar Jang, economists like A.M. Khusro and Hanumantha Rao, and political figures like P.V.Narasimha Rao, Veerendra Patil and S.B.Chavan have emerged from the Hyderabad political tradition, most of them graduates of Osmania University. Their emergence as all-India figures has been a tribute to the tenacity of the culture of Hyderabad which enabled them to communicate on a footing of equality with their peers from other parts of the country. Notwithstanding the political conflicts that marred the last years of Hyderabad State, there has been little or no hostility between Hindus and Muslims. There have been warm personal friendships among members of all religious communities in Hyderabad city and in the three states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra. The ability of political leaders to communicate in more than one language of the region has been a major asset in the building of their political careers. This is particularly true of the present Prime Minister of India, P.V.Narasimha Rao.

At the start of this volume we described the funeral of Mir Osman Ali Khan and asked the question whether the hundreds of thousands who thronged the streets were mourning the last Nizam as a person, or whether it was the institution of kingship that was being mourned. At the end of the book we can assert that there was a little of each. Most important of all, however, was the fact that the crowds were mourning the passing of an era which, whatever its defects, was an integral part of them. It had produced values of mutual tolerence, and permitted the coexistence of faiths on a footing of equality, although this ideal had been threatened during its last few years. It had enabled persons of different communities

and class origins to strive for a better life through the education system, although there was criticism of the medium of instruction. It had preserved certain graciousness of manner which had originated in a feudal society, but had not lost its relevence in the democratic age. The last Nizam, whatever his personal failings and idiosyncrasies, had come to symbolize an era that was regarded with nostalgia, as it receded into the past.

A military government was set up by the Government of India under Major-General J.N. Chaudhuri after the Police Action. This government functioned under the formal orders of the Nizam who thus became a constitutional ruler. On 26 January 1950 he was sworn-in as Rajpramukh of Hyderabad and continued in the office till 1 November 1956.

Once the Razakar threat to law and order was checked, the new government took steps to control the Communist revolt in the Telengana region. The abolition of jagirs and tenancy reforms accomplished drastic changes in the administration. The military government gave way to a civilian government headed by Vellodi, and then a popular government under Burgula Ramakrishna Rao. Elections were held in 1952 and 1957.

The Nizam seemed to be going through a traumatic phase of disillusionment with his Majlis allies. He was trying to assert his position on the international scene in some way, but without the support of the Majlis leadership, which had failed to protect the interests of the Nizam's Dominions in Pakistan after the partition.

The State of Hyderabad after the Police Action failed to hold together the members of the three linguistic groups. The pulls from the various regions were too strong. The States' Reorganization Commission recommended its abolition.

The interests of the Nizam and his family were preserved by the setting up of numerous trusts for the disposal of his property.

The Telugu-speaking people were reunited in the new state of Andhra Pradesh. Similarly the Kannada and Marathi-speaking people were united in Mysore and Bombay states respectively. Hyderabad State ceased to exist on 1 November 1956.

A Note On Sources

In recent years a large quantity of scholarly work has been done on Hyderabad State. Several doctoral and other theses have been completed, utilizing original archival material. There has also been an increase of books and monographs, not only in English, but in Urdu, and to a lesser extent in Telugu and Marathi. While it has not been possible to mention in this note every book or article that has appeared, an attempt has been made to cover the major sources which merit the attention of the serious student of Hyderabad State.

This note does not seek to replace the detailed bibliography which has already been published in my study, *The Nizam between Mughals and British: Hyderabad under Salar Jang I,* published by S. Chand & Co. in 1986. The second and revised edition of the book is being published by S.Chand shortly.

This note also supplements the information contained in the footnotes to the chapters in the present study, by indentifying the major sources that have been utilized. It comments on the utility of various sources which are now available for the study of twentieth century Hyderabad. In this respect it provides a partial update of my article entitled "Some Problems in the Study of Hyderabad State" in the first issue of *Itihas*, Volume I, No. 1, (1973), pp. 145-158. The journal is published by the Andhra Pradesh State Archives at Hyderabad.

The absence of a critical analysis of sources has been a major obstacle to research in the past. One hopes that other scholars will share with their readers their readers their opinion of the value of important sources, and thus help future researchers to avoid the tendency to accept uncritically the opinions of writers or informants who may be, consciously or unconsciously, prejudiced in their opinions, or in their recounting of events, or their opinions.

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K. M. Pannikar's *Indian States and the Government of India,* published in London by Martin Hopkinson Ltd., in 1932 provides a good introduc-

tion to these 'petrified monarchies' and their problems under British rule, from the point of view of an Indian intellectual who worked in diplomatic and administrative capacities with some of them. A. P. Nicholson's book, *Scraps of Paper: India's Broken Treaties, Her Princes and the Problem,* published in London by Ernest Benn in 1930, provides a convenient summary of the reactions of the Indian states and their protagonists in Britain to the official views of the Political Department of the Government of India, which sought to keep the states under subjection, by suitably interpreting the provisions of the treaties, and sometimes by twisting the facts of history to suit official purposes, as for example with regard to the taking over of Berar from Hyderabad in 1853 through coercion.

For the official view of the relations between the Indian states and the Government of India during the British period, the most commonly-used sources are William Lee-Warner, *The Protected Princes of India,* London, Macmillan & Co., 1894, and C.L.Tupper, *Our Indian Protectorate: An Introduction to the Study of the Relations between the British Government and its Indian Feudatories,* published in London in 1893. For the text of the treaties, one could refer to C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India,* published by the Government of India, J.L. Kingham, Foreign Department Press, Calcutta, 1864, which went into several editions. It should be noted however, as pointed out by Nicholson in his Foreword to the book *Scraps of Paper,* that the selection of material for this compilation has sometimes been motivated by a desire to subserve imperial interests.

Sir Terence Creagh-Coen published a book *The Indian Political Service* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971.) The book was commissioned by the Indian Political Service (Retired) Association and thus forms part of the same genre of literature as Philip Woodruff's two volumes. *The Men Who Ruled India,* published by Jonathan Cape, London, in 1953. The memoirs of the last head of the Political Department of the Government of India, Sir Conrad Corfield, *The Princely India I Knew* were published by the Indo-British Historical Society of Madras in 1975.

A compilation of articles on the Indian states edited by Robin Jeffrey, *People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Princely States,* was published by Oxford University Press, Delhi in 1978. Another set of articles "Princely India and the Raj", was published in an issue of *Indo-British Review* (Volume 15 No.2, December 1988) under the editorship of Dr Barbara Ramusack of the University of Cincinati.

Among the Indian sources on the states, I would recommend V.P. Menon's *Integration of the Indian States* (Hyderabad; Orient Longmans, 1985), Urmila Phadnis, *Towards the Integration of the Indian States* (Bombay: Asia, 1968), D.R. Mankekar, *From Accession to Extinction : The Story of Indian Princes* (Delhi: Vikas, 1974), and Vanaja Rangaswami, *The Story of Integration: A New Interpretation in the Context of Democratic Movements in the Princely States of Mysore, Travancore and Cochin, 1900–1947,* (Delhi: Manohar, 1981).

A number of articles throwing light on the integration of the Indian *states* will be found in C.H. Phillips and Mary Doreen Wainwright, editors, *The Partition of India* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970). Of special interest are the articles by E.W.R.Lumby, Francis Wylie, and Sir Conrad Corfield. Another collection of articles, written from an Indian point of view, is Amit Kumar Gupta, ed., *Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India,* 1945-47 (Delhi: Manohar, 1987).

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The period 1869 to 1911 covers the reign of Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, the sixth Nizam of Hyderabad. An account of Mahboob Ali Khan's life will be found in *The Days of the Beloved* by Harriet Ronken Lynton and Mohini Rajan, published in Berkeley by the University of California Press, in 1974. The book which is based partly on archival sources, but mainly on interviews, contains a good deal of valuable information. It is however sometimes difficult to assess the authenticity of the data, for want of footnotes. Another source covering the same period is Sheela Raj's *Medievalism to Modernism: Socio-Economic and Cultural History of Hyderabad* (Bombay : Popular Prakashan, 1987). The book contains a good deal of information but does not take into account the criticism of Mahboob contained in my work *The Nizam Between Mughals and British.* The failure of the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, to maintain the state finances at an even keel, and the consequences for the state in the signing away of Berar in 1902, were also pointed out by Krishnaswamy Mudiraj in *Pictorial Hyderabad*, Volume 2, Hyderabad: Chandrakanth Press, 1934, pp.1-3.

A source which will repay a careful reading is *Life's Yesterdays: Glimpses of Sir Nizamat Jang and His Times* by Zahir Ahmed (Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1945). A former member of the Nizam's Executive

Council, Sir Nizamat Jang's comments on personalities and events in old Hyderabad State are of great interest. The book captures the mood of the last years of Mahboob Ali Khan's reign and the early years of Osman Ali Khan's reign with apparent authenticity.

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We turn now to works on cultural and intellectual history. The vast mass of material on twentieth century Hyderabad will be found in the English and Urdu languages.

By the end of the 19th century, Urdu had replaced Persian as the official language in Hyderabad and was fat becoming the language of education. The establishment of Osmania University in 1918 gave a further fillip to the language. The Translation Bureau set up by Osmania University was instrumental in bringing out scores of scientific and literary works on a wide range of subjects. Urdu was the medium of instruction in all University courses, including technical subjects like engineering and medicine. Other languages of the state, Telugu, Marathi and Kannada were neglected by the state authorities, although they were spoken by a majority of the population.

Although Osmania University produced some good scholars in many fields, including history and the social sciences, the faculty did not produce any great body of literature in these fields. One does find translations of standard text books into Urdu, and a few original histories of the medieval period, such as Abdul Majeed Siddiqui's *Tarikh-i-Golconda*, (Hyderabad: Idar-i-Adabiyat- i-Urdu, 1924, 2nd edition.)

We are left for the most part with compilations of data relating to the Nizam's government such as Manik Rao Vithal Rao's *Bustan-i-Asafia*, published by Matbae Anwar-ul-Islam, in Hyderabad in 1337 Hijri. We also have, as primary sources, the literary works of Mohiuddin Qadri Zore and a number of his disciples. The journal *Sabras*, published by the Idar-i-Adabiyat-i-Urdu, was an important mouthpiece for such writing. Roy Mahaboob Narayan's book *Guzishta Hyderabad*, (Hyderabad: Adabi Trust, 1985) and Tamkin Kazmi's *Hyderabad Kabhi Aisa Bhi Tha* (Hyderabad: *Siasat* Daily, 1988), both depict the social and cultural life of Hyderabad, its Diwankhane or drawing rooms, its servants and black magic, its prostitutes and goondas. They provide an accurate picture of a

decadent princely state in its last years. Both books were published by *Siasat*, the Urdu newspaper of Hyderabad, in 1985 and 1988 respectively.

In the post-independence period, we find many biographies and memoirs by individuals who lived through the last phase of Asaf Jahi rule. Among these may be mentioned *Maharaja Kishen Pershad ki Zindagi ke Haalath* by Mehdi Nawaz Jang, Hyderabad: published by the author, 1950, Ghulam Panjatan's *Hyderabad ke Bade Log*, (Hyderabad: Idar-i-Adabiyat-i-Urdu, 1957) and Hosh Bilgrami's *Mushahidat* (Hyderabad: Inquilab Press and Osmania University Press, 1950). Naziruddin Ahmed's three volume biography in Urdu of Bahadur Yar Jang titled *Sawaneh-i-Bahadur Yar Jang* was published by the Bahadur Yar Jang Academy of Hyderabad in 1986. It glorifies the personality of the leader and thus cannot be described as a balanced biography. More critical is Shaz Tamkanat's biography *Makhdoom Mohiuddin—Hayat aur Karname* which was published by Maktab-i-Sher-Wa-Hikmat at Hyderabad in 1986.

An early novel by Aziz Ahmad, who migrated to Pakistan and later to Canada, entitled *Aisi Bulandi, Aisi Pasti*, was a satirical account of a social class before the Police Action. Jeelani Bano, a novelist and short story writer resident at Hyderabad, has recently written *Baarish-i-Sang*, (Karachi: Maktab-i-Daniyal, 1985), a novel which throws light on the life in Hyderabad, both before and after the Police Action. However, if one were to look for a critical analysis of the events leading up to the Police Action and the ending of Hyderabad State, one would not find it in Urdu or English books published by Hyderabadis living in India.

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Among Hyderabadis who have migrated to Pakistan as well as to North America, or who have lived and worked in the Middle East, there is a strong sentimental attachment to the State of Hyderabad. This harking back to a 'golden age' is reflected in the publication of a compilation of articles in Urdu, *Mamlekat-i-Asafia*, which has gone into two editions in Karachi, in 1978 and 1986. The compiler is Dr Mohammad Abdul Hai and copies are available at Honey Palace, F1-3-1st Floor, University Road, Gulshan-i- Iqbal, Karachi.

During a private visit to Karachi in December 1989, I had the opportunity of visiting the Bahadur Yar Jang Academy, which has been

founded and is run by migrants from Hyderabad now residing in Karachi. The Academy has published a number of books on the life and work of Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang, as well as on other aspects of Hyderabad history.

Among the books published by the Academy is the life of the leader titled *Hayat-i-Bahadur Yar Jang*, edited by Ghulam Mohammad (1974). A collection of articles about Bahadur Yar Jang was published in 1976 under the title *Bahadur Yar Jang Mushahir ki Nazar mein.* The letters of Bahadur Yar Jang — *Magatib-i-Bahadur Yar Jang* were published in 1984. In addition, the Academy published *Taqarir wa Nigarishat* by Qaid-i-Millat Bahadur Yar Jang (1987), which contains some of his speeches and writings under the following heads: 1) Religious speeches, 2) Political speeches, 3) Hyderabad Deccan, 4) Personalities, and 5) Articles. The diary of Bahadur Yar jang's travels in the Muslim countries entitled *Siahat-i- Mumalik-i-Islamia—Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang ka Roz-namcha*, edited by Shahid Hussain Razaqi was published in 1988.

Among other publications of the Academy may be mentioned *Armugan-i-Dakhan* which contains prose and poetic contributions by Dakhani poets and writers about Dr Mohammad Iqbal. It was published during his centenary year (1977). In 1984 the Academy published a book on Osmania University called *Jamai Osmania* by Raziuddin Siddiqi, a former Vice-Chancellor of the University.

In the book *Taqarir-wa-Nigarishat* another of the Academy's publications, are reprinted three speeches by Bahadur Yar Jang which contain an explanation of the opposition of the Majlis to the introduction of democratic institutions in Hyderabad in the context of the Aiyangar Committee Report on constitutional reforms. The leader argued that since the Hindus were 85 per cent of the population and the Muslims only 11 per cent, any attempt to introduce democratic institutions would deal a mortal blow to the superior position of the Muslims in the political system of Hyderabad and the ruler would become like a king in a game of chess (Shah-i-Shatranj) (p.202).

A large number of Urdu books have been published in Pakistan, mostly in Karachi and Lahore, on the last phase of Asaf Jahi rule. These include several memoirs and autobiographies, such as Ibrahim Jalees' *Do Mulk Ek Kahani*, and Badar Shakeb's *Hyderabad Ka Urooj o Zawal.* Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, who served as Hyderabad's Agent-General in Karachi, has written an important memoir, *Hyderabad ke Zawal Ki Unkahi Dastan.*

Zafrul Hassan was an announcer on Deccan Radio during the last years of Asaf Jahi rule. He wrote many short books about Hyderabad, including *Dakhan Udaas Hai Yaro* and *Zikr-i-Yar Chale.* His books give a vivid personal account of the events of the period especially of the actual collapse of the Hyderabad forces. The books were published first in Pakistan and reprinted by the Hussami Book Depot at Machli Kaman, Hyderabad.

Sibt-i-Hasan, a progressive writer, educated at Aligarh, worked from 1935 till 1939 as an assistant to Qazi Abdul Gaffar, who was the editor of the only Urdu nationalist paper of Hyderabad, *Payam*. His book *Shahr-i-Nigaran*, published by Maktab-i-Daniyal in Karachi in 1984, is a description of the social and political life of Hyderabad, containing a chapter on the seventh Nizam. When he first came to Hyderabad, Sibt-i-Hasan found that Hyderabad was not in tune with the changes occuring in the rest of the country. There were no student movements, and no organizations other than religious ones. Most religious figures, he felt, were being patronized by the Nizam. There are character sketches of individuals like Sarojini and Padmaja Naidu, Raj Bahadur Gour and Makhdoom Mohiuddin. The author also wrote about his second visit to Hyderabad in 1970.

The impression one gets from these three important memoirs, published in Pakistan several years after partition, is that the Majlis, and the Nizam's attempt to assert Hyderabad's independence proved a failure, and the state itself collapsed due to the idiosyncratic leadership of the Majlis' leader Qasim Razvi as well as the of the seventh Nizam.

An account of the events in Hyderabad during the last ten years of the state's history will be found in an Urdu book, *Mushahidat* (Observations) by Hosh Bilgrami, who was the Peshi (Private) Secretary to Mir Osman Ali Khan, and thus saw the events from the vantage point of King Kothi. Although he was known as a courtier and flatterer of the ruler, his account is critical of Mir Osman Ali Khan, and appears to put the blame for the collapse of the kingdom jointly on the Nizam and the Majlis. He was highly supportive of Mirza Ismail.

The autobiographies by two Presidents of the Nizam's Executive Council, Ahmed Saeed Khan, Nawab of Chhatari (in Urdu) and Sir Mirza Ismail (in English) deserve mention here. Chhatari's book in three volumes is titled *Yaad-i-Ayyam*. The third edition of the first volume,

published by the author at Aligarh, bears the date 1974. Sir Mirza Ismail's book, *My Public Life: Recollection and Reflection* was published in London by George Allen and Unwin in 1954. Both were Diwans who came from outside Hyderabad. Chhatari spent considerable time in the state while Mirza Ismail stayed only a few months. Both Chhatari and Mirza Ismail held the Majlis responsible for the collapse of Hyderabad. They were less critical of the Nizam, who had appointed them and supported them in their attempts, though not consistently.

The last Diwan, Mir Laik Ali's memoir in English, *The Tragedy of Hyderabad* published in Karachi by Pakistan Cooperative Book Society in 1962, does not read like a defence of the Majlis, as one would have expected, but rather like a dispassionate account of the events of his Presidentship of the Council. He has however indulged in considerable amount of *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*. He was unwilling to admit his gross incompetence and lack of preparation for the post, and the pressures from Qasim Razvi to which he and the Nizam too often succumbed.

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An excellent bibliography of works in English on Hyderabad, entitled *Hyderabad State under the Nizams 1724-1948: A Bibliography of Monographic and Periodical Literature* by Omar Khalidi was published in 1985 by the Hyderabad Historical Society, Wichita, Kansas, USA. Khalidi is Aga Khan Librarian at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The third volume of *The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad* (*A Connected Account*) covers the period 1885-1920 and was published by the Hyderabad State Committee for the History of the Freedom Movement in Hyderabad in 1957. In 1966 the fourth volume, entitled *The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad (1921-1947)* was published by the same committee under the editorship of N.Ramesan. Another volume, *Highlights of the Freedom Movement in Andhra Pradesh* by Dr Sarojini Regani, was published by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in 1972. These volumes can be described as compilations of source materials, which bring to the notice of scholars, materials in the State Archives which were previously unknown. They tend to take a nationalist view of the events, and are generally

unsympathetic to the Nizam's government in the events leading up to the Police Action.

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Among dissertations which deserve the serious attention of scholars for the period prior to the Police Action, I would like to particularly mention three. The first is T.V.Haranath Babu's biographical study "Right Honorable Sir Akbar Hydari (1869-1942)—A Political Biography", (Ph.D., Poona University, Dept. of History, 1978). The second is Muneer Ahmed Khan, "Muslim Politics in Hyderabad", (Ph.D., Osmania University, Dept. of Political Science, 1980), and the third is Lucien D. Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration: Political Development in Hyderabad State, 1938-1948", (Ph.D., University of Western Australia, Dept. of History, 1985). I have made extensive use of these theses, as will be seen from the text of this volume.

Studies of the economic conditions of Hyderabad State are difficult to find. In 1951, the Economic Advisor to the Finance Department, Government of Hyderabad issued *A Review of Hyderabad Finance* with an introduction by C.V.S.Rao, Finance and Commerce Minister. It was printed at the Government Press in Hyderabad. Although the book has no index, it constitutes a valuable tool for the understanding of the state's economic and financial system. The State Archives of Andhra Pradesh published in 1973 under its regular monograph series, a book, *Finances and Fiscal Policy of Hyderabad State 1900 to 1956: A Study in Economic History*. The book contains an analysis of the monetary and budgetary system, the pattern of revenue and expenditure and local finances. There is also an interesting comparison with other states, and a retrospect of the state finances.

Two earlier books by Dr B.K. Narayan deserve mention here. The first, entitled *Agricultural Development in Hyderabad State 1900-1956: (A Study in Economic History)* was published by Keshav Prakashan, Secunderabad in 1961. The other book, *A Survey of Industries in Telengana* was published by Keshav Prakashan in 1962.

So far this author author is aware, there has been only one scholarly biographical study of the seventh Nizam. Zubaida Yazdani's study,*The Seventh Nizam: The Fallen Empire* was published for the author by Cambridge University Press in 1985. A review by this author, along with *Hyderabad After the Fall* edited by Omar Khalidi, appeared in the

Economic and Political Weekly of October 6 1990.

A number of articles dealing with the events just before and after the Police Action, or with the problems of the Muslim community of Hyderabad after the Police Action, have been compiled and published by Omar Khalidi in his book *Hyderabad After the Fall,*published by the Hyderabad Historical Society at Wichita, Kansas, USA in 1988. These articles include Clyde Eagleton's, "The Case of Hyderabad Before the Security Council", Wilfred Cantwell Smith's, "Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy" and extracts from books by Mir Laik Ali, Zahir Ahmed, and Zubaida Yazdani.

The official view of Hyderabad's position as an independent state will be found in the publications of the Government of Hyderabad, which are difficult to get hold of in India. These generally put forth the view that Hyderabad had in fact been independent from the very beginning of its existence. These views began to be stressed with greater force during the last Nizam's reign. A book that dealt with this subject was Mirza Ali Yar Khan's, *External Relations of the Hyderabad State.*(Prepared for the External Relations Committee of His Exalted Highness the Nizam's government, Hyderabad, n.d.) A longer version of the same book has been referred to by Omar Khalidi in *Hyderabad: After the Fall*, p. 203. The longer version is cited by Khalidi as *Hyderabad's Relations With India* volumes, (Hyderabad 1948). I have not been able to locate these volumes in Delhi or Hyderabad.

A book by D.F. Karaka, *Fabulous Mogul: Nizam VII of Hyderabad* was published in London by Derek Verschoyle in 1955. It is a readable account written by a journalist for whom all doors were opened during his visit or visits to Hyderabad, at least so far as the Nizam's family and the nobility of Hyderabad were concerned. The Acknowledgements express gratitude *inter alia,*to, 'Khan Bahadur Taraporewala, Financial Adviser to His Exalted Highness, for his generous response to the idea from the beginning and his invaluable help throughout.'

At the end of his interview with the Nizam, described in the fourteenth chapter, "Meeting The Fabulous Mogul", Karaka commented that the latter was,'a Mogul to the tips of his fingers, Karaka comments that as he, 'watched the venerable expression on his (Osman Ali Khan's) face and those deep, piercing eyes of his,' he 'came closer to the belief which now hold, that he is on his way to a Caliphate'. This somewhat laboured

attempt at the creation of a myth must be read along with what has been said in the tenth chapter of this book.

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The views of Sir Walter Monckton on developments in Hyderabad during the period 1936 to 1948 will be found summarized in Lord Birkenhead, *The Life of Sir Walter Monckton of Brenchley*, London: Widenfield and Nicolson, 1969, pp.222-225. The account by Nawab Ali Yavar Jang will be found in *Hyderabad in Retrospect*, published by Bennett, Coleman & Co., Ltd., The Times of India Press, Bombay, (1949?). The book was published anonymously under the name 'An Ex-Official of Hyderabad'. In 1983, a few years after his death, *Ali Yavar Jung: Commemoration Volume* was published by Popular Prakashan, Bombay for the Abul Kalam Azad Oriental Research Institute, Hyderabad. The volume contains *Appreciations of the late Nawab,* as well as *Selected Writings,* including the essay, "Hyderabad in Retrospect".

Both Sir Walter Monckton and Nawab Ali Yavar Jang had tried to steer the Nizam away from his alliance with the Majlis. Their loyalties were to the state's interests as they saw them, and not to any particular ideology. Perhaps the most effective critique of the last Nizam can be found in these accounts by sympathetic observers, who could not prevent him from destroying the state, and thus condemning his own dreams of an independent Hyderabad to oblivion.

Among the Indian accounts of the period, one may mention K.M.Munshi's *End of an Era,* Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1957, Major-General J.N. Chaudhuri, *An Autobiography as narrated to B.K.Narayan*, Delhi: Vikas, 1978, and the official account of *Operation Polo: The Police Action Against Hyderabad,* Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, and Manager of Publications, Government of India, New Delhi 1972. These require to be supplemented by a careful reading of the relevant portions of the Nehru and Patel papers. See Sardar Patel, *Select Correspondence, 1945-1950,* Volume 1 and 2, (Ahmedabad; Navjivan Publishing House, 1977) and *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*. One should also read the Government of India's *White Paper and Supplement to the White Paper on Hyderabad* (Government of India Publications, 1948, New Delhi) and the *White Paper on Indian States.*

These accounts give the standard Indian view of Hyderabad State, but with many nuances which require to be read carefully in order to understand the differences between the approaches of Nehru, Patel and Munshi. On the whole, Munshi sought to protect his place in history by keeping out much that was unfavourable to him. I have seen no evidence of major differences of opinion between Nehru and Patel on Hyderabad affairs, although the former was clearly more concerned about international opinion than was the latter.

Lastly, we come to accounts by a few important Hyderabadis representing two different groups in the Congress. Swami Ramanand Tirth was a dedicated person, who tended to be impatient. He was justifiably disturbed at the lack of commitment by some of the state Congress leaders to the cause of an early transfer of power from the Nizam. After the police Action, the Congress leadership split, and an uneasy alliance was arrived at, as will be seen from the Patel papers cited above. The Swami's book, *Memoirs of the Hyderabad Freedom Struggle,* Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1967, does not tell the full story about the events leading to the Police action (for example, the extent of his alliance with the Socialists in Marathwada and the Communists in (telangana). Yet this book remains an important document for an understandig of the period.

Another book published recently by a supporter of Ramanand Tirth is V.H. Desai's *Vande Mataram to Jana Gana Mana: Saga of Hyderabad Freedom Struggle*, (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1990.) The book contains some interesting statistics and documents on the birth and growth of communalism, the history of the Legislative Council and the education pattern of Hyderabad State. The fifth chapter and the appendices contain some factual information on the freedom struggle in Hyderabad, but on the whole, the book is disappointing to those who are looking for new insights into the last years of Asaf Jahi rule.

M. Narsing Rao's account "Fifty years of Hyderabad" has been published in Telugu and awaits publication in English. The account shows great insight into the historical forces that were changing the world in general, and India, and Hyderabad in particular. Another person who had a similar understanding, judging by his memoirs, was the Nawab of Chhatari. Unfortunately neither of them could leave his mark on events in the state. We thus have at

least two insightful autobiographies which have yet to be published in English.

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An important book was published in Marathi in September 1987, bearing the title *Hyderabad cha Swatantrya Sangram ani Maharathwada* (Marathwada and Hyderabad's Freedom Struggle). It was published by Govinddas Shroff on behalf of the Swami Ramanand Tirth Research Institute and printed at Bharat printers and Publishers Ltd., Aurangabad. The distributor is Mauz Publications, Khatauwadi, Bombay.

The book supports the view of Swami Ramanand Tirth and his followers that the moderates in the Congress, by their lukewarm attitude to the political problems of the state, delayed the emancipation of the state from the Nizam's rule. There is however an important omission in the book. While it gives adequate coverage to the Razakar atrocities in the Marathwada area, it does not highlight the massacres of Muslims in the wake of the Police Action. These massacres have been admitted by Ramanand Tirth, and recently during discussions with me, by H.C Heda and Sri Gopal Rao Ekbote, both of whom played a prominent part in the Congress and state affairs after the Police Action.

The Telengana revolt was a major event which requires detailed study in order to understand agrarian condition in Hyderabad State in the last phase of its existence. Among the insiders' accounts may be mentioned P.Sundarayya, *Telengana People's Struggle and its Lessons,* Calcutta, Communist Party of India (Marxist), 1972 and Arutla Ramachandra Reddy, *Telengana Struggle: Memoirs.* Translated from Telugu by B. Narsing Rao. Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1984. See also B. Narsing Rao ed., *Telengana: The Era of Mass Politics,* Hyderabad: Ravi Narayan Reddy Felicitation Committee, 1983.

The secondary accounts include Barry Pavier, *The Telengana Movement, 1944-51* Delhi: Vikas, 1981, and a Ph.D. dissertation by Ian Bedford, "*The Telengana Insurrection: a Study in the Cause and Development of a Communist Insurection in Rural India, 1946- 1951",* Canberra: Australian National University, 1967. An excellent summary of the events during the Telengana revolt will be found in the eighth chapter of D.N.Dhanagare, *Peasant Movements in India, 1920-1950*, Delhi: Ox-

ford University Press, 1983. The footnotes in this chapter are also worth looking into in some detail.

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In 1968 this writer sent to the press a Guide to the State Archives of Andhra Pradesh. The material which had then been prepared under my guidance with the support of Sri A.N.Baji, the then Assistant Director, and other staff of the State Archives has since been incorporated in a volume which bears the title *Archival Organization and Records Management in the State of Andhra Pradesh (India)* Volume I. Although the volume bears the date April 1980, it was formally released only on January 1992 by the Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh State Archives.

The material useful for the study of the twentieth century history of Hyderabad will be found primarily in Chapters 5 and 6 of the volume. The materials relating to the Executive Council (Bab-i-Hukumat)are discussed on pages 113-114 of the volume and Constitutional Affairs Secretariat on pages 116-117. These records however suffer from the handicap that no detailed lists of files are available other than the manuscript Urdu transfer lists. Unless the State Archives is able to divert staff for the detailed listing of these records, they cannot be adequately utilized for research. Rather than spending the time to call for individual files on the chance that they will contain the material required for his research, a scholar will prefer to work at the National Archives or the India Office Library and Records (IOL & R.)

Not only does the IOL & R have the official records of the Secretary of State for India but also a large number of private collections such as the Tasker collection (the papers of Sir Theodore Tasker, former Director-General of Revenue and Member of the Nizam's Executive Council), the papers of Sir Arthur Lothian and Sir William Barton, former Residents, and other collections.

I was able to make some use of these collections during my short stay in the UK in 1982, and to select further materials for detailed study, which were, after some delay, requisitioned by the State Archives of Andhra Pradesh. Needless to say, these papers now form part of the State Archives collection, and are available to all scholars for research.

I was also able during my stay at Cambridge to see the papers of Sir Alexander Pinhey. A former Resident at Hyderabad, and of Mr R.M. Crofton, an official of the Nizam's government.

In addition to these important collections, the India Office Library houses most of the important files of the Government of India relating to the Nizam's dominions, or the State of Hyderabad. These were evidently taken from New Delhi to London at the time when the transfer of power from the British to independent India was imminent. The accession of Hyderabad to India did not take place till September 1948 as a result of the Police Action. It was therefore understood that officials of the Political Department of the Government of India were unwilling to hand over these records to the Indian authorities. What is surprising however is that they were not returned to New Delhi even after Hyderabad State had become an integral part of India.

Many years later some microfilms of records of the Government of India were made at the India Office Library in London and copies sent to the National Archives of India. These microfilms are made available to research scholars at the National Archives under conditions of some difficulty.

The task of the scholar becomes even more difficult as the material is arranged without any apparent logic in individual reels which bear Accession numbers. The lists available are often inadequate. Thus the scholar has to wade through a lot of irrelevant matter in order to find material relevant to his research.

Inspite of the difficulties, I was able to collect very valuable material from the National Archives of India which threw considerable light on events in twentieth century Hyderabad. It was of course necessary to make allowances for the fact that these records represented the British view rather than an Indian view of events. As against this, an advantage of reading these records was that the British were discussing these matters among themselves and not for public consumption. They would not deliberately write something which was not in accordance with fact because they had no desire to misled their own colleagues. Generally the facts in the British records can be taken as correct, although one may differ with their judgements.

The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library at New Delhi houses an excellent collection of books and journals on modern Indian history as well as a large number of dissertations in the field. The Museum's collection of manuscripts also deserves the serious attention of scholars working on Hyderabad State. Among the collections relating to the State of Hyderabad are the papers of Syed Hussain Bilgrami, the Faridoon Jang

collection and the Padmaja Naidu papers. There is also a collection of papers relating to the States Peoples' Movement. As these papers were only of secondary importance to my work, I had to deny myself the pleasure of looking at them in any detail.

The State Archives of Andhra Pradesh has been good enough to obtain copies of certain important materials from the India Office Library at my request. It has also initiated a policy of building its collection of Archives from several different sources. It is sincerely to be hoped that the impetus given to the Archives during the two-year term of the present Commissioner, Sri H. Rajendra Prasad, who is on deputation from the Postal Department of the Government of India, will not be dissipated by the state authorities of Andhra Pradesh, who have yet to formulate a rational policy for the recruitment of Directors of the State Archives.

The Jinnah papers constitute a very large body of research material useful for the study of twentieth century India. Jinnah carried on correspondence with many people in Hyderabad and on Hyderabad affairs. These included the Nizam and Bahadur Yar Jang. I was fortunate to be given access to the Jinnah papers in the possession of the Bahadur Yar Jang Academy in Karachi and also the Shamsul Hasan collection, also in Karachi.

Interviews

Interviews are grouped as follows: Members of the old Hyderabad nobility, such as jagirdars; officials who worked in the Nizam's government; officials who worked in the Government of India, both before and after independence; historians and other research scholars; lawyers and judges, writers and journalists, and others who do not fall into the above categories. It has not been possible to give the precise dates for the interviews, which were spread over a long period of about twenty years.

Members of the Hyderabad Nobility

Nawaz Jang of the Salar Jang family, the son-in-law of the seventh Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan

Nawab Mandoor Khan, jagirdar, brother of Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang
Nawab Ahmed Yar Jang of the Paigah family
Nawab Ahmed Yar Khan
Shri Moazam Hussain, of the Khan-i-Khanan family

Officials of the Nizam's Government

Nawaz Jang
Nawab Ali Yavar Jang
Shri Taqi Bilgrami
Shri Naqi Bilgrami
Shri Sethu Madhav Rao
Shri K.I.Vidyasagar
Shri B. Pratap Reddy
Shri Zaheer Ahmed
Shri Hashim Ali Khan
Shri Syed Hashim Ali Akhtar
Shri Abid Hussain
Shri Mahmood bin Mohammed
Shri A.Krishnaswami Aiyangar
Shri Anil De
Shri Hasnuddin Ahmed
Shri Ruknuddin Ahmed
Shri G.D.Quraishi
Shri N.K.Guruswamy
Shri Najaf Alî Khan
Shri K.B. Lal
Shri D.N. Capoor
Shri S.G. Pothan (formerly of the Nizam's State Railway.)
Shri Ghulam Yazdani (first Director of Archaeology, Hyderabad State.)
Col.C.E.Cox
Shri J.W.Edwards
Shri Syed Ali Akbar
Shri Fareed Mirza
Shri Hurmuz Kaus
Shri Mustafa Sherwani

Officials—Government of India

Mr E.P. Moon
Lord Humphrey Trevelyan
Shri S.B.Bapat
Shri C.S. Venkatachar
Shri P.S.Rao
Shri P.K.Dave
Shri P.V.R.Rao

Historians and other scholars

Prof. H.K.Sherwani
Prof. Abu Nasr Khalidi
Shri Omar Khalidi
Dr Urmila Phadnis
Shri Syed Mohiuddin
Dr Suryanath Kamath
Shri H.Rajendra Prasad
Prof. Karen Leonard
Prof. Barbara Ramusack
Prof.Theodore Wright
Mrs Harriet Ronken Lynton
Shrimati Mohini Rajan
Dr S.V.Desikachar
Shrimati Zubaida Yazdani
Shri B.R.Nanda
Prof. S.Nurul Hasan
Prof.Sarojini Regani
Prof. Syed Sirajuddin
Prof. M. Naimuddin
Prof. Taqi Ali Mirza
Prof. A.M.Khusro
Dr Sam Bhajjan
Dr Oudesh Rani
Prof. Waheeduddin Khan
Prof. Bashiruddin Ahmed
Prof. Anwar Moazzam
Shri Fazlur Rahman
Shri A.N.Baji

Lawyers and Judges

Shri Gopal Rao Ekbote
Shri Sardar Ali Khan
Shri Jagan Mohan Reddy
Shri Ataur Rahman
Shri Manohar Raj Saxena
Shri Raman Raj Saxena
Shri Danial Lateefi

Journalists and Writers

Shri Abid Ali Khan
Shri Akhtar Hassan

Freedom fighters and their Families

Shri V.H. Desai
Shri and Shrimati H.C Heda
Shri K.Vaidyanath
Shri Kashinath Rao Joshi
Shri M.S.Rajlingam
Shri B.L.Vaidya
Shri Akbar Ali Khan
Shri Younus Saleem
Shri Abid Hasan Safrani
Dr Raj Bahadur Gour
Shri Jawad Razvi
Shri D.Ramanuja Rao
Shri Kaloji Narayan Rao
Shri Gurucharan Das Saxena
Shri Khande Rao Kulkarni
Shri K.S. Iyengar
Dr Renuka Chattopadhyaya

Notes

Prologue

The Hyderabad Urdu newspaper *Siasat* came out with a special edition on the day of the Nizam's death, 24 February 1967. Other newspapers reported the event and subsequent developments.

The Tasker collection in the India Office Library has been utilized extensively for this account. It contains clippings from *The Times*, London, and the *Deccan Chronicle*, Hyderabad.

1. Dynasty

1. See Karaka, D.F. *Fabulous Mogul : Nizam VII of Hyderabad*, London: Derek Verschoyle 1955, pp 155-158, for the account of Karaka's interview with the Nizam. The comparison of Mir Osman Ali Khan with Aurangzeb in connection with Abu Bakr will be found in Mishra, D.P., *The Nehru Epoch: Living an Era*, Volume 2, Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978, p, 101.

In another respect Mir Osman Ali Khan resembled the last Mughal Emperor. He was trained by his religious instructor in an orthodox school of Islam. The story is told that his tutor told the sixth Nizam, Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, that the young man had been trained to defend the traditional values of Islam against the values of the Hindu faith. Mahboob is supposed to have retorted that in that case, the tutor had violated his instructions, and would be doing great harm to the future of the state.

2. An English translation of Nizam-ul-Mulk's Last Will and Testament will be found in Khan, Yusuf Hussain, *Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I, Founder of the Hyderabad State*, Mangalore: Basel Mission Press, 1936, pp. 184-220.

3. See Bilgrami, S.H. and Willmott, C., *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of the Nizam's Dominions*, 2 Volumes , Bombay 1884. Volume. 1, pp 95-103. A detailed account of the French role in Hyderabad will be found in Bawa, V.K. , "The French in India: The Case of Hyderabad", in *Studies in the Foreign Relations of India (From the earliest times to 1947)*, Prof. H.K.Sherwani Felicitation Volume, Hyderabad: State Archives of Andhra Pradesh 1975, pp. 257-291.

4. For a discussion of the early history of the Nizam's regimes, see Bawa, V.K., *The Nizam between Mughals and British: Hyderabad under Salar Jang I*, Delhi : S. Chand and Co., 1986, pp. 3-29. The text of the treaties will be found in Aitchison, C.U., *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India*, Volume 9 and 10, Calcutta, 1929-30.

5. See Thompson, Edward, *The Making of Indian Princes*, London: Oxford University Press, 1943.

6. The tribal background of the Mughals and Turks was Central Asian. Thus, although Persian was the court language, there was a continuity with the Central Asian traditions of administration. In accordance with this tradition, the ruler had enormous powers over the nobility. Clavijo, the Spanish Ambassador at Timur's court, reported that, 'if a noble became an object of displeasure of the Emperor. His Highness will seize whatever that lord may possess, and very probably in addition put him to death, for such is the rule and ordinance.'

The individual tribes were integrated into the empire of Chengiz Khan and Timur. The nobility were required to take an oath of loyalty to the ruling family. The nobles, even if they were more powerful than the princes, did not claim to be Mirzas (or Amirzadas), who were from the princely class. While the eldest son of the ruler had some claim on the throne, there was a tradition that the nobility could elect a ruler.

The tribal chiefs were thus an instrument of the dominance of the ruling family. The election could be considered as confirmation of the dominant role of the ruling dynasty, but at the same time it introduced an element of choice, to enable the nobility to reject a thoroughly unsuitable member of the ruling family in favour of a more suitable one. 'The Mongol nobility was thus a mediating agency between two sociological and evolutionary identities, tribe and class.'

Chengiz Khan and Timur, who were statesmen as well as conquerors, had laid down detailed instructions on court procedure, based on ancestral rights. The individual classes or tribes were grouped for military purposes in order to muster the required troops at short notice. Each group was headed by chiefs who were trusted personally and constituted the Kurultai (or assembly of nobles) which was called at least once a year, or whenever an important decision had to be taken.

A sensitive analysis of the Jagirdari system and its Central Asian origins will be found in Imadi, A.K., "The Nobles of Hyderabad : A Study in Social Change", Ph.D.Thesis, Osmania University, Dept. of Sociology, 1977.

7. For a detailed analysis of the Jagirdari system in Hyderabad State at the time of its abolition, see Khusro, A.M., *Economic and Social Effects of Jagirdari Abolition in Hyderabad*, Hyderabad: 1958.

In Hyderabad, the Diwan or Prime Minister was almost invariably chosen from a noble family. If any one not of such a family was appointed to the position of Diwan or Sadr-i-Azam of the Nizam's Executive Council, he was invariably given a title. When Akbar Hydari, a plebian member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, who had come to Hyderabad as Accountant General, rose to be Finance Member of the Nizam's government, he was honoured with the title of Nawab Hyder Nawaz Jung. When the British felt it proper to confer a title on him, he became Sir Akbar Hydari to the English speaking world, but remained Nawab Hyder Nawaz Jung in the Nizam's dominions.

8. See the Section Umra-i-Uzzam in Mudiraj, K. Krishnaswamy, *Pictorial Hyderabad,* Volume 2, Hyderabad: Chandrakanth Press, 1934, pp.93 ff.

9. Hyderabad's relations with British India during the nineteenth century are discussed in Briggs, Henry George, *The Nizam: His History and Relations with the British Government*, 2 Volumes, London: 1861, and Fraser, Hastings, *Our*

Faithful Ally, the Nizam, London: 1865. See also Bawa, V.K., *The Nizam Between Mughals and British,* pp. 14-18 and passim.

10. For details see Bawa, *The Nizam between Mughals and British,* pp. 33-64.

11. Temple, Sir Richard, *Journals Kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim and Nepal*, Volume 2, London: 1882. Sir Richard Temple was a Resident at Hyderabad in 1867-68. He was succeeded by C.B.Saunders who was Resident from 1868 to 1872. For an account of the arrangements for the Regency during the minority of Mir Mahboob Ali Khan, see Bawa, *The Nizam between Mughals and British*, pp. 51-55.

12. Bawa, *The Nizam Between Mughals and British*, pp.211-222.

13. For K.M. Panikkar's views on the relations between the Government of India and the Indian states see *An Introduction to the Study of Relations of Indian States with the Government of India*, London: Martin Hopkinson, 1952. An earlier book by the same author was titled *Indian States and the Government of India*, London: Martin Hopkinson, 1932. Panikkar also published a book, *His Highness The Maharaja of Bikaner: A Biography*, London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1937. Lord Lytton's comments on the Delhi Darbar of 1877 will be found in Lytton Papers, India Office Library, Minutes and Notes, 1876-77, p.668, Official Dispatch.

14. See Ashton, S.R., *British Policy Towards the Indian States,1905-1939*, London: University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1982, p. 24.

15. See Ramusack, Barbara N., *The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire: Dissolution of a Patron-Client System,1914-1939*,published for the University of Cincinnati by the Ohio State University Press, Columbus: 1978, pp. xxvii - xxviii. The book contains a good general discussion of the relations between the Government of India and the Indian states. See also a later study, Ashton, *British Policy Towards the Indian States, 1905-1939*, which has been cited above.

16. Even after the last Nizam had ceased to rule, the conventions of addressing the ruler with these titles had become so deeply ingrained that it continued for several years afterwards.When D. F. Karaka visited Hyderabad in 1955, he found that a Paigah noble had printed stationery on which he formally addressed the Nizam in flowery language, even if he merely wanted to go to Poona for the races. When asked to explain what the content of this elaborate message was, the Nawab explained to his questioner, D. F. Karaka, that it could be summed up simply in two words, 'Dear Sir'. Karaka, *Fabulous Mogul* , pp. 97-99.

17. See Bahadur, Server-ul-Mulk, *My Life*, London: Arthur H.Stockwell, undated, pp. 100-102.

18. See Bilgrami, Hosh, *Mushahidath,* Hyderabad: Inquilab Press, Title & Blocks printed by Osmania University Press, 1950, pp. 202.

19. In fact, the Nizam seldom spoke to his sons and grandsons but communicated messages to them through the Vakil, even when both were together in the same room. In 1955 Moazam Jah, the younger son of Mir Osman Ali Khan told the latter's biographer, D.F.Karaka that he could never speak to his father directly but only through an intermediary such as Ali Pasha, the Nizam's son-in-law. Even

when they met face to face the Nizam would tell Ali Pasha, 'I think Junior Prince should do this and that, or take this and that medicine, or anything that comes to his mind .... Then AP (Ali Pasha) will repeat it to me, right there, saying, ''Sirkar says that you should do this and that or take this and that medicine.'' After that, he explained to Karaka, 'I will reply to AP, who will give my answer to father.' Karaka commented, 'It was the sort of three-way conversation that travels faster than sound, for before the message had officially reached the Nizam, he had heard it.' However, he soon realized that Moazam Jah did not follow the same etiquette with his children. Just then his three daughters burst into the room shouting 'Daddy! daddy !' Karaka, *Fabulous Mogul*, pp. 169-170.

For a younger member of a ruling family to visit the ruler was, 'like going to see the Pope.' When the cricketer Pataudi visited his grandfather, the Nawab of Bhopal, he described it thus: 'You got dressed up in your finery, you went through corridors of servants and bodyguards, and eventually the boss was sitting there with his hookah and you paid your respects and you sat there feeling thoroughly uncomfortable for fifteen or twenty minutes and then you left.'Allen, Charles, *Lives of the Indian Princes*, London: Arrow Books, 1948, p. 27.

20. N.A.I. F, & P Dept., 1920. Intl. (Secret) Proc. June 1920, No. 53.

2. The Making of Seventh Nizam

1. Yazdani, Zubaida, *The Seventh Nizam: The Fallen Empire,* Cambridge: Printed for the author by Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 41-42; Lynton, H.R. and Rajan, Mohini, *The Days of the Beloved,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 66-67; Bawa, *The Nizam between Mughals and British,* pp. 205-7.

2. Lynton and Rajan, *The Days of the Beloved*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974, p. 67.

3. Yazdani, *The Seventh Nizam,* p. 42.

4. Interview with Nawab Kazim Nawaz Jang, Hyderabad, 1989. The quotation is from Hosh Bilgrami, *Mushahidath*, p. 183. The views expressed in the subsequent paragraph are mine.

There are some other, fairly widespread, stories current in Hyderabad about Osman's origin. According to one of these, Osman was not the son of Mir Mahboob Ali Khan at all, but was born to a Shia or Hindu woman, who was taken into the harem when he was already three or four years old. I am not aware of any reliable evidence to support such a story, but it deserves further investigation, if for no other reason, in order to lay it at rest.

5. Yazdani, *The Seventh Nizam,* p.41-46. See also Karaka, D.F.,*Fabulous Mogul,* 52. See the photograph of Mir Osman Ali Khan as a young man in Allen and Dwivedi, *Lives of the Indian Princes,* fifth photograph following p. 136.

6. See N.A.I., Foreign Dept. Proceedings, January 1898, Nos. 11-26, and March 1898, Nos. 48-51. The last paragraph is based on Yazdani's, *The Seventh Nizam,* pp. 42-43 and 47- 48, with additional data from Hosh Bilgrami's *Mushahidath,* pp. 187-88.

7. Karaka, *Fabulous Mogul,* pp. 50-51.

8. Interviews with the late Hurmuz Kaus of Hyderabad and with George Bento, who carried on business dealings with Mir Osman Ali Khan on behalf of John Burton & Co. Secunderabad gave me insights into the personality of the seventh Nizam, and his relations with his parents. Regarding the proposal to educate the young prince outside the state, and the reason for its being dropped, see Yazdani, *The Seventh Nizam,* p. 48. See also Mudiraj, K. Krishnaswamy, *Pictorial Hyderabad,* Volume I, Hyderabad: Chandrakanth Press, 1929, p. 84.

9. See N.A.I., Foreign Dept. Intl. B, Nos 14-15 of 1894 for a detailed account of Server-ul-Mulk's activities and the situation in Hyderabad during Mckenzie's Residentship.

10. See Bawa, V.K., *The Nizam between Mughals and British,* pp.211-222, and the sources cited therein, for an account of the events after the death of Salar Jang I in 1883. A pamphlet, *The Lakh Bribery Case, Hyderabad Dn.*, a compilation of a series of articles published in several issues of the Bangalore *Evening Mail,* was printed in Bangalore at the Caxton Press, 17, South Parade, in 1895. See also Foreign Dept., Intl. B, Nos 36-38 of 1893. For an account of the Jacob Diamond Case, see Khan, Mohammad Ikramullah, *Viqar-i-Hayat* (in Urdu, a life of Mushtaq Hussain, Viqar-ul-Mulk), Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1925, pp. 262-268.

11. *The Constitutional Rules of H.E.H. the Nizam's Government,* Hyderabad : Government Press, 1925 contains several pages on the *Qanuncha Mubarak* of 1310 Hijri, 1302 Fasli (1892). See also Bawa, V.K., "Salar Jang as a Reformer: Administrative Change in Nineteenth Century Hyderabad", in *India Past and Present,* Bombay, Volume III, No. 1, 1986, pp. 87-114.

12. This story had been denied by Haroon Khan Sherwani, the historian of the Qutb Shahis, but has been confirmed as correct by a recent biography of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah. See Luther, Narendra, *Prince, Poet, Lover, Builder: Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, The Founder of Hyderabad,* Publications Division, Government of India, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 76-85.

13. See Alam, S. Manzoor, *Hyderabad-Secunderabad (Twin Cities) —A Study in Urban Geography,* Hyderabad, Osmania University Press, 1965. See also Bawa, V.K. *Indian Metropolis: Urbanisation, Planning and Management,* Delhi: Inter-India, 1987, pp. 75-79 and passim.

14. A note on the coins and currency notes of the Nizam's dominion will be found in Khan, Raza Ali, *Hyderabad 400 Years (1591-1991)*, Hyderabad: Zenith Services, 1990, pp. 154-159. For a detailed account of the growth of the postal administration in Hyderabad State, see Nayeem, M.A., *History of Postal Administration in Hyderabad,* Hyderabad, Bright Publications, 1970. See also his earlier work, *Postal Markings,* Hyderabad: Bright & Co., 1967.

15. For accounts of intellectual life during the post-Mughal period in India, with special reference to the role of Islam, see Ahmad, Aziz, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment,* published in Oxford, 1964, and Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis,* Lahore: Minerva Book Shop, 1943.

16. An account of the eminent persons, both poets and writers, who came to Hyderabad from North India, will be found in Ashraf, Syed Dawood, *Berooni Mashahir-i-Adab Aur Hyderabad,* Hyderabad: *Siasat* Publications, 1990.

17. Nizami, K. A., *Sayyid Ahmed Khan,* Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1966. See also Baljon, J.M.S., *The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan,* Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1949. For an account of the career of Syed Ross Masood in Hyderabad, see Furbank, P.N., *E.M. Forster: A Life New York:, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, especially, pp. 99-101,* 217-218.

18. The information contained in this and preceding paragraph is based on interviews with a number of knowledgeable persons in Hyderabad.

19. Munir, Ahmed, *Maulana Abul Ala Maududi,* Lahore: Atish Fishan Publications, 1989. See also Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, *Modern Islam in India,* for a discussion of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the progressive movement, the reactionary movement and Islam in relation to Indian nationalism.

20. The poem "Walker Nama" will be found in Baig, Mirza Akbar Ali, *Mohammad Aziz Mirza: Shaksiat, Hayat Aur Karname,* Hyderabad: Idarae Sher-o-Hikmat, 1987. See also Jafar, Sayyada, *Mashaire Adab, Hyderabad mein.* The information about Casson Walker's comments on writers and poets in Hyderabad has been extracted from files in the State Archives of Andhra Pradesh by Syed Dawood Ashraf. For a discussion of the Mulki movement, see Leonard, Karen, "Hyderabad: The Mulki-Non-Mulki Conflict", in Jeffrey, Robin, ed., *People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States,* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 65-106.

21. Aghorenath Chattopadhyaya's youngest son Harindranath once met the great Bengali scientist, P.C. Ray in a train, and the two struck up a conversation. Aghorenath's son did not reveal his identity till the train was leaving. P.C. Ray told the young man: 'Aghorenath is one of our greatest geniuses, one of the very greatest Bengal has given to the world. But he should have come straight to Bengal after his return from Europe. Instead of that he went and settled down in the Nizam's dominions where he has not been appreciated as he would have been in Bengal ! But he is a great scientist, one of our very greatest.'

Rabindranath Tagore told Harindranath in 1939 that he had described his father at the very start of his story "Hungry Stones" as,'one who was the very Lord of the Universe, for he talked as if he was in touch with every detail of it !' Harindranath carried the analogy further by saying that his father, 'literally answered to the description. He would often say,"Baby, I am God ... you are God !" and we children would feel quite hurt, since we were brought up in a Christian school, the St. George's Grammar School where we were taught that God was in the heavens; yet, somehow, the only detail in which God resembled father was, perhaps, his long flowing beard ! Of course, as we grow older now, we realise the great truth of the statement: I am God, you are God, ... Aham Brahma, An-al-Haq, "I am that I am". Chattopadhyaya, Harindranath "Sketch of Father", in Saksena, S.P., ed., *Indian Autobiographies,* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1965 edition, pp 42-53.

22. Yazdani, *The Seventh Nizam,* p.49, and Mudiraj, *Pictorial Hyderabad,* Volume 1, p.84.

23. Yazdani, *The Seventh Nizam,* pp. 57-58.

24. Lynton and Rajan, *Days of the Beloved,* pp.245-248

25. Schwerin, Kerrin Grafin, *Indirekte Herrschaft und Reformpolitik im Indischen Furesten starat Hyderabad 1853-1911* Wiesbaden: Franz steiner Verlag, 1980, p. 216. As authority for this account, Schwerin cites pages 246-248 of Lynton and Rajan's book, *The Days of the Beloved.* The latter book is based on interviews of persons who were living at the time the book was written. The account is, in all probability, correct.

26. See Lynch-Blosse, *Hyderabad Political Notebook,* in the Tasker Collection. IOR, MSS Eur. D 798/43, pp. 183-4.

27. Yazdani, *The Seventh Nizam,* pp. 52-53

28. Ibid., p.59. However, see also the Papers of Lt. Col. Sir Alexander F. Pinhey, K.C.S.I.,C.I.E., in the University of Cambridge, South Asian Archives. Contrary to Zubaida Yazdani's assertion, Pinhey did not accept the Nizam's contention that the papers produced by Lal Khan were genuine. His diary while he was Resident at Hyderabad includes an account of the handwriting expert, Hardless' visit to Hyderabad, and the Diwanship of Salar Jang III.

29. This account is based on Karaka, D.F., *Fabulous Mogul, Nizam VII of Hyderabad,* pp.50-57. The book was evidently commissioned by the Nizam's financial adviser Khan Bahadur Taraporewala. Karaka had access to the Nizam's son Moazam Jah, and leading Paigah nobles and was invited to tea by His Exalted Highness the Nizam.

30. See the Pinhey Papers at Cambridge, cited earlier, for a detailed account of Salar Jang's Diwanship, his relations with the Nizam, administrative matters coming up and the appeal made by Mir Osman Ali Khan against intervention by Turkey on the German side in the First World War.

31. See "Biographical Sketch" by Bilgrami, Edith Syed Husain, (nee Edith Boardman) at p.xi of *Addresses, Poems and other Writings of Nawab Imadul-Mulk Bahadur (Sayyid Husayn Bilgrami,* C.S.I.) Hyderabad: Government Central Press, 1925.

32. Yazdani, *The Seventh Nizam,* pp. 102-106.

33. See Prasad, Rajendra, *The Asif Jahs of Hyderabad: Their Rise and Decline,* Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1984, pp. 164-165.

34. Yazdani, *The Seventh Nizam,* pp. 71-74.

35. Lynch-Blosse, *Hyderabad Political Notebook* See also Schwerin, Kerrin Grafin, *Indirekte Herrschaft and Reformpolitik.*

36. State Archives of Andhra Pradesh, Pol. Dept. Inst. 79, List 5, File No. 629, 1930.

37. Blunt, W.S., *India under Ripon: A Private Diary,* London: T.Fisher Unwin, 1909, pp. 327-331.

38. Ahmed, Hasanuddin, *Jamai Osmania.*, Hyderabad: Abadi Trust, 1989.

39. *Hyderabad Civil Service* A Souvenir published by the H.C.S. Association. A copy will be found in IOL, T13155. R 23/2/96.

40. Bilgrami, Hosh, *Mushahidath,* pp. 208-209.

41. In January 1943, the Resident at Hyderabad, Sir Arthur Lothian, wanted to shoot a tiger. A shoot was arranged in the forests of Warangal district. His wife and daughter accompanied him. Chhatari and Lady Lothian in a third, as she also wanted to shoot a tiger.

When the first tiger appeared, Chhatari did not wish to shoot, and the Resident shot the tiger. Chhatari had arranged for very good Shikaris to sit next to Miss Lothian's machan, in case something went wrong. When she shot at the second tiger, shikaris also fired, but she got the credit for killing the tiger.

Chhatari later came to know that both the tigers were being given opium daily to prevent them from leaving the forest. This was to ensure that the moment the drums were beaten, the tigers would come to the machans. Needless to say, Chhatari and the Lothian family were in no danger from the tigers, who had been turned into opium addicts. Nawab of Chhatari, *Yaad-i-Ayyam,* Delhi: Kohinoor Printing Press, 1974, Volume 3, pp. 130-31.

42. Another incident which took place much later, indicates the respect which the Nizam had for the Parsee community. In August 1955, the Nizam's Financial Adviser, Khan Bahadur C.B. Taraporevala, was critically ill. The Nizam wrote in the *Shiraz* weekly expressing concern at the illness, and mentioning that he was personally visiting the Khan Bahadur to enquire about his health. Some Urdu newspapers reported that H.E.H. was contemplating appointing a retired Muslim official as his Financial Adviser. The next day the Nizam wrote, denying that he had any such intention, and saying that he hoped Taraporevala would resume his duties, but in case he was unable to do so, he would appoint a suitable Parsee Zoroastrian to the post. This indicated the 'trust the Nizam reposed in Parsis.' Chenoy, Naoshir S., "HEH Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII", in *The Medico* (Journal of Gandhi Medical College, 1966-67), Supplement on H.E.H Nawab Mir Osman Ali Khan, Nizam-ul-Mulk Asif Jah VII, Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar. p.XLIV. See also the articles by Dr B.S. Surti and Dr G.P.Ramayya.

3. The Turkish Connection

1. There was even a joke that the poem was Jaleel's and the opinion was the Nizam's. This was unfair, as the Nizam was a fairly competent poet. Moreover according to Dr B.S.Surti, Jaleel was an orthodox Sunni, while Osman's poetry expresses Sufi sentiments, which would have been heresy for an orthodox Sunni like Jaleel. 'It is quite possible that Jaleel might have made a few corrections in the grammar, rhyme, metre, etc in exercise of his prerogative as the Court Poet, but such corrections can in no wise change the authorship of a poem.' Surti, B.S., "Osman" the Poet, in *The Medico,* 1966-67. Supplement p. xxxiii.

2. See Montagu, Edwin S., *An Indian Diary,* London: William Heinemann, 1930. p.212.

3. Lynch Blosse, *Hyderabad Political Notebook*, in the Tasker Collection. I.O.R MSS Eur D 798/43. See also Schwerin, Kerrin Grafin, *Indirekte Herrschaft und Reformpolitik.*

4. *Constitutional Rules of HEH the Nizam's Government 1925* includes a summary of and discussion on the *Qanuncha Mubarak* of 1893, as well as that of 1919.

5. Ramesan, N., *The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad,* Volume 4 (1921-1947), Hyderabad Andhra Pradesh State Committee Appointed for the Complation of History of the Freedom Struggle in Andhra Pradesh, 1966. pp.1-6. See also Ahmed, Zahir *Life's Yesterdays: Glimpses of Sir Nizam at Jung and his Times,* Bombay, Thacker & Co, 1945, pp. 215-222, and Singh, Sant Nihal "A Great Muslim Nationalist: Personal and Political Reminiscences of Sir Syed Ali Imam", in *The Modern Review,* December, 1932, pp.616-624. Akbar Hydari, then Finance Member of the Council, had communicated to Abdullah Khan of Khasmandi a note on the management of the State's Finances which criticised the Council. Nawab Zulqadar Jang, an official of the Nizam's government obtained a copy and handed it over to Sir Ali Imam. The Nizam made a pretence of taking action against Hydari, but all Ali Imam pressed his resignation when he was asked to take action against his informant Zulqadar Jang. After Ali Imam's resignation, Akbar Hydari was back in the good books of the Nizam, and received an extension of his appointment as Finance Member, in which post he continued till 1938.

N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 54. F.No 1060 Internal (Secret) Resignation of Sir Ali Imam, President of the Exeutive Council of HEH the Nizam's government.

6. *The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad (A Connected Account), Volume. 3* (1885-1920), Hyderabad: The Hyderabad State Committee Appointed for the Compilation of a History of the Freedom Movement in Hyderabad, 1957, passim, especially pp. 62-73, 151-169, 216-234. For the role of Maulana Shaukat Ali and Akbar Hydari in the alliance, the Residency's view on the subject, and their warning against Hindu disaffection, see N.A.I. microfilms Acc. No 57-F.No 538 P (Secret) of 1931. Serial No. 1-26.

7. *The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad*, Volume 3, pp. 241-249

8. See *The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad*, Volume 4 (1921-1947), Ramesan, N., editor, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh State Committee Appointed for the Compilation of A History of the Freedom Struggle in Andhra Pradesh, 1966, pp. 29-42.

9. See the chapter "Nationalism in Telengana and the Andhra Mahasabha", Ibid., pp. 43-52.

10. See letter from H.E.H. The Nizam to the Viceroy dated 13 June 1920, Ibid., pp. 32-34.

11. This was notified in a Gazette Extraordinary No. 52, Ibid p. 26.

12. Ibid., pp. 58-60.

13. Ibid., p. 67.

14. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No.58, File No.417-P Secret S-1, 1926-27. F & P Dept.

15. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No.55, File No 610 - P (Secret) of 1927. Barton, Resident to Government of India, 27/31 March 1927.

16. Ibid., See also Acc. No 56, D.O. Barton to Viceroy, No, 26 R/S, 17 April 1928, and Acc. No.57. F.No. 59.-P (Secret), 22 December 1929 for other examples of Mir Osman Ali Khan's ill-treatment of his brothers, Salabat Jah and Basalat Jah.

17. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 57. No 192. F & P Dept., F.No. 1554-P Secret. D.O.No. 602, dated 15.1.1923 and subsequent correspondence.

18. Singh, Sant Nihal, in *The Hindu,* 4 August 1923, N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No.54. Rao, D. Raghavendra (editor), *Misrule of the Nizam* (Being extracts Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur, the Nizam of Hyderabad (Deccan). Madras: Swarajya Press, undated pp. 4-10. In a recent article, ''The Press in Andhra and the Princely States, 1920-30", K. Subramanyam describes the role played by *The Hindu, Andhra Patrika, Krishna Patrika* and other papers of Madras Presidency which published articles criticizing the 'autocratic rule of the Nizam'. *The Hindu* published a series of articles in August, September and October 1923 by the famous journalist Nihal Singh under the caption 'Hyderabad Today'. In these articles the Nizam's government was praised for separating the executive from the judiciary which he described as,'one of the greatest reforms effected during recent years in the Nizam's dominions'. The journalist was however critical of the Nizam's personal rule, and he pointed out that even the Executive Council of Hyderabad did not enjoy any real autonomy.

19. Ahmed, Zahir, *Life's Yesterdays,* p. 217.

20. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 57, File 13-P of 1924, Fortnightly Reports for 5/1/24, and 16/1/24 and 28/3/24

21. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 60, F & P. Dept. File No. 13-P (secret) and 28/3 24, 1924-26.

22.Trench, Richard Chevenix, *Viceroy's Agent,* p. 187.

23. N.A.I. microfilms, C.R. Papers, Hyderabad, Acc. No. 55, F. No 610-P (Secret.) of 1927. For details of events during the Residency of C.L.S. Russel, see F. No 1317-Pol. (Secret,) 1928, F & P Dept., Hyderabad Affairs, and also Reel 20, F & P Dept (Secret) Internal Proc. July 1921, Nos 54-58 and Oct. 1921, Nos. 8-9.

24. See the N.A.I. files of 1921 cited earlier. The article by G.R. Abhyankar, "New Era In Hyderabad", will be found in *The Hindustan Review,* 1927, pp. 335-7.

25.Reddy, Suravaram Pratap, *Life of Raja Bahadur Venkatrama Reddy,* Translated from the Telugu by Anand Rao Thota. Publishers: Raja Bahadur Venkatarama Reddy Celebrations Committee, Reddy Hostel Building, Hyderabad, 1972.

26. N.A.I. Acc. No 54, pp.1-3

27. N.A.I. Acc. No.54, File No. 49 - P 1929 GOI, Political Dept.

28. The Princes were not only afraid of their father; they were terrified of their mother. 'They seem to think she might even be disposed to poison them. It was suggested that she had tried to do so on one occasion. I asked why. The answer

was that she was determined to succeed the Nizam. All Nizams died before their wives, the Begum of Bhopal ruled Bhopal. Why should she not rule Hyderabad?' This fear of the two boys must be understood in the context of the widespread belief that their mother, Dulhan Pasha, was not of sound mind. It is reported that shops in the Abids area of Hyderabad used to down their shutters when they saw her car coming, as she was known to purchase expensive items and run up huge bills which would later remain unpaid. N.A.I. Acc. No. 57, Barton Resident, No. 126-C, 31-1-1930.

29.Mudiraj ed., *Pictoral Hyderabad*, Volume 2, pp. 16-19.

30. N.A.I. Acc. No. 51, F.No. 29-P Secret of 1930, S.No. 1-6 Successor to Sir Kishen Pershad, p. 14 ff.

31. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 50 Fortnightly Reports for 7/2/35 and 25/8/31.

4. The Twilight Years

1. See Lynton, *Days of the Beloved,* pp.110-112; 120-127. The meeting between Kishen Pershad and the son of Bahadur Shah Zafar is described on p.125. For an account of Maharaja Kishen Pershad's life by his former Private Secretary see Jang, Mahdi Nawaz, *Maharaja Kishen Pershad ki Zindagi ke Haalaath* (Urdu), Hyderabad: 1950.

2. *A Review of Hyderabad Finance* - with an introduction by C.V.S.Rao, Finance and Commerce & Industries Minister, Hyderabad Government, issued by the Economic Adviser, Finance Department, Hyderabad Government, Hyderabad, Government Press, 1951, pp. 46- 66. 91-92.

3. For an account of the Hyderabad Civil Service, see *Hyderabad Civil Service,* A Souvenir.

4. See IOR. D 798, Tasker Papers.

5. *A Review of Hyderabad Finance,* pp. 213-217, 227, 232-233.

6. For an account of the progressive movements in Hyderabad State and specifically the comrades Association and the student movement, see Razvi, S.M. Jawad, *Political Awakening in Hyderabad: Role of Youth and Students (1938-1956),* Hyderabad: Visalandra Publishing House, 1958. The book has a Foreword by the late Ravi Narayan Reddy, one of the main leaders of the Telengana armed struggle.

7. Hassan, Syed Abid, *Whither Hyderabad?: A brief study of some of the outstanding problems of the Premier Indian State.* Madras: the B.N.Press, (1935), p. 58 and passim. For a detailed account of the Mulki movement in Hyderabad, see Leonard, Karen, Hyderabad: ''the Mulki Non Mulki Conflict'', in Robin Jeffrey ed., *People Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely states,* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 66-67 and 80-95.

8. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No.45, Fortnightly Reports for the first half of May 1935, dated 16 May 1935.

9. Rao, M. Narsing, Fifty Years of Hyderabad, Volume 1, Book 4, p.7.

10. Krishnamachari to Bajaj, 3 May 1940, Bajaj Papers. Quoted by Ian Copland "Communalism in Princely India: The Case of Hyderabad, 1930-1940'', in *Modern Asian Studies,* 22, 4 (1988), p.811.

11. Ahmed, Nazeeruddin, *Sawaneh Bahadur Yar Jang, Hyderabad : Bahadur Yar* Academy, 1988, pp. 22-24. See also Mohammad, Ghulam, *Hayat-i- Bahadur Yar Jang,* Karachi: Bahadur Yar Jang Academy, 1974, p. 218.

12. For accounts of the rise of Bahadur Yar Jang in English, see Khan, Munir Ahmed, ''Muslim Politics in Hyderabad'', Ph.D Thesis, Department of Political Science, Osmania University, pp. 48-51, and 65-75, and Lucien D. Benichou, ''From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-48", Ph.D.Thesis, Department of History, University of Western Australia, pp. 133-155. See also Kulkarni, Khande Rao, "Majlis Ittehadul Muslimeen'' in Sarma, M. Radha Krishna, et al, eds., *History of Hyderabad District, 1879-1950*, Volume 1. Hyderabad: Bharatiya Itihasa Sankalana Samiti, 1987, pp. 73-77.

13. The figures are taken from Khan, Muneer Ahmed, "Muslim Politics in Hyderabad'', Ph.D Thesis, Department of Political Science, Osmania University, 1980, pp. 40-45. In an article by D.G. Deshpande Jafarabadkar in *History of Hyderabad District, 1879-1950,* p. 47, citing the Government Gazette of 1932, the following figures are quoted:

High ranking officals in the state

Community	Army	Other departments	Total
Hindu	39	223	262
Muslim	459	1635	2094

Community-wise break up vis-a-vis low ranking jobs:

Community	Army	Other departments	Total
Hindu	6495	16873	23367
Muslim	54149	58588	112737

It should be noted that in Jammu and Kashmir, an Indian state with a Hindu ruler and an overwhelmingly Muslim population, the position was reversed. In a recent book *Kashmir: Behind the Vale,* (Delhi: Viking, 1991, p. 173), M.J. Akbar cites the following statement from Vashishth, Satish, *Sheikh Abdullah Then and Now* (Maulik Sahitya Prakashan, 1968):

> The state was then ruled by a Hindu Dogra. The doors of military (sic) were closed against the Muslims. The regiments of the maharaja were formed of Dogras from Jammu, Kangra Rajputs and Punjabi Sikhs. Similarly in the civil administration higher appointments were particularly reserved for outsiders or were manned by educationally advanced and technically qualified Kashmiri Pandits. Frustration was writ large on Muslim youngmen (sic).

Some papers in Madras Presidency accused the Nizam of deliberately excluding Hindus from government appointments. The accusation of Nihal Singh to this effect in the Hindu gave rise to a controversy in that paper. A high official of the Nizam's government, Raja Indu Kiran Singh argued that there was no neglect of

Hindus. Dr B.Ramakrishna Rao, in a letter to *The Hindu* expressed the following view: 'There is no deliberate exclusion of Hindus as such from the offices of the state, but the fact cannot be controverted that the proportion of the Hindus on the civil lists is very meagre..... The fact remains that a Hindu youth is at a double disadvantage at Hyderabad and I can testify to the fact that some discontent is being felt at any rate by the middle class Hindus.' Subramanyam, K. "The Press in Andhra and the Princely States, 1920-1930", *Itihas* Volume 17, No.1, Jan-June, 1991, p.90.

14. Ramesan, *The Freedom Struggle* Volume IV, pp. 126-29.

15. Ibid., pp 87-89, 116-125. See also *History of Hyderabad District,* p.50.

16. Ibid., pp. 43-52. See also Rao, M. Narsing, Fifty Years of Hyderabad, Volume 2, Book III.

17. Ibid., pp. 78-86.

18. Ibid., p.86. See also Bhalerao, Anant, *Hyderabad cha Swatantrya Sang Ani Marathwada,* (Marathi)Aurangabad, Swami Ramanand Tirth Research Institute and Bharat Publishers Ltd.

5. Silver Jubilee and the Aiyangar Report

1. An Urdu newspaper of Hyderabad, the *Rahbar-i-Deccan* published on 14 February 1937 a detailed account of the Jubilee celebrations. See also Rao, M. Narsing Fifty Years of Hyderabad, Volume 1, Book 4, pp. 21-26. Narsing Rao was a distinguished journalist who wrote his memoirs in Telugu. There is an English typescript which was kindly lent to me by his son-in-law, Sri Ranganath Rao of Hyderabad. The quotations are from this English typescript.

2. M.Narsing Rao discusses the aims and objects of the Majlis on pp. 14-15 and pp. 41-42 of Volume 1, Book 4. His comparision of the Majlis with the Muslim League will be found on pp. 24-25.

The official history of the Majlis was published in 1941 under the title *Tarikh Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen, Mamlekat-e-Asafia Islamia* (Hyderabad: Darul Ishat Siyasia Majlis Ittehadul Muslimeen.) A former Majlis leader who migrated to Pakistan, Badar Shakeb wrote a book, *Hyderabad ka Urooj-wa-Zawal*(Karachi: 1946). This book is critical of Majlis policy, especially of the later leadership of Majlis i.e. Qasim Razvi. Nazeeruddin Ahmed's *Sawaneh Bahadur Yar Jang* (2nd edition), is an adulatory and uncritical biography of the leader who died in 1944, allegedly by poisoning.

3. The discussion is based on the account by M. Narsing Rao.

4. See the correspondence between M.A. Jinnah and Mir Osman Ali Khan on the one hand, and between Jinnah and Bahadur Yar Jang on the other, in the Shamsul Hasan Collection, available at Karachi. This correspondence covers the period April 1941 till July 1943. In this exchange of letters, the Nizam addresses Jinnah almost as an equal, but speaks condescendingly of Bahadur Yar Jang. Some of these letters have been reprinted in the correspondence of Jinnah, published in New Delhi after independence.

It is also clear from this correspondence that Bahadur Yar Jang was using Jinnah as an intermediary for obtaining certain favours from the Nizam or earning his goodwill.

After Bahadur Yar Jang death in 1944, the relations between the Nizam and Jinnah seem to have cooled down somewhat, but the Nizam repeatedly invited Jinnah to visit Hyderabad. The latter kept postponing his visit.

5. Rao, M. Narsing, Fifty Years of Hyderabad, Volume1, Book 3, pp. 46-50 and Book 4, pp.2-3.

6. Rao, M. Narsing, Fifty Years of Hyderabad, Volume 1, Book 4, p.8

7. Copland, "Communalism in Princely India: The Case of Hyderabad, 1930-1940", in *Modern Asian Studies*, Volume 22, No. (1988) 4, p.800

8. A summary of the events of this period will be found in Prasad, Rajendra, *The Asif Jahs of Hyderabad,* pp. 208-212. For details, see N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 53. Arya Samaj Agitation in Hyderabad State.

9. Rao, M. Narsing, Fifty Years of Hyderabad, Book 4, pp. 42-44.

10. Ramesan, N., *ed.,The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad,* Volume 4 (1921-1947), Hyderabad: The Andhra Pradesh State Committee Appointed for the Compilation of a History of the Freedom Struggle in Andhra Pradesh, 1966, p. 109.

11. For an account of the episode see *The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad,* Volume. 4, 1921-1947, Ramesan, N, editor. The Andhra Pradesh State Committee Appointed for the Compilation of a History of the Freedom Struggle in Andhra Pradesh, 1966, pp. 103-115. For details see N.A.I. Acc. No. 53, File No. 6(20) P(S)/Part I, Agitation in Hyderabad State — Vande Mataram.

12. Interview with K.L. Mahendra, Communist leader and a participant in the agitation, New Delhi, May 1990.

13. N.A.I. microfilms, C.R. Papers. Acc. No. 53, Nizam's Trust for Family, 1938.

14. For a detailed account of the reforms agitation and the political developments connected with it, see Benichou, Lucien, "From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-48", Unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of Western Australia, Department of History, pp. 87-124. See also Rao, M. Narsing, Fifty Years of Hyderabad, Volume 1, Book 4, pp. 40-50, and Volume 2, Book 5, pp. 1-49. This includes his reflections on his negotiations with Bahadur Yar Jang, the visit of Sheikh Abdullah of Kashmir, and comparisons between Kashmir and Hyderabad.

15. *A Summary of Hyderabad's War Efforts, 1939-44*, Hyderabad: Government Central Press, 1944.

16. Gour, Raj Bahadur, *Makhdoom : A Memoir*, Delhi: Communist Party Publication, 1970, gives a personal account of the rise of the Communist movement in Hyderabad State as well as the Telengana movement led by the Communists.

17. Munshi, K.M., *The End of An Era: Hyderabad memories,* Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1957, pp. 24-25.

18. Babu, T.V. Haranath, "Right Hon. Sir Akbar Hydari (1869- 1942): A Political Biography", PhD. Thesis, Poona University, Department of History, 1978, Conclusion.

6. The Chhatari Era or the Nizam-Majlis Alliance

1.Babu,T.V.Haranath, "Right Honorable Sir Akbar Hydari (1869- 1942): A Political Biography." PhD. Thesis, Poona University, Department of History, 1978.

2.State Archives of Andhra Pradesh Inst. 47, List no. 10, File No. 230, 1932.

3.For an account of the rise of the Majlis Ittehadul Muslimeen in Hyderabad during the period 1938-1944, see Benichou, Lucien, "From Autocracy to Integration", Chapter 4,. pp. 133-166. See also *Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah's correspondence* edited by Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, 3rd edition., New Delhi, Metropolitan Book Company Private Limited.

4.Chhatari,*Yaad-i-Ayyam*, Aligarh: The Author, undated, Volume 3, pp. 84-93.

5.The above discussion is based mainly on the account by Chhatari. For a detailed account of the Cripps Mission to India in the context of Hyderabad State, see Yazdani, Zubaida, *The Seventh Nizam: The Fallen Empire*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 189-213.

6.For an account of the developments in Hyderabad State during the period 1939 to 1944 see Benichou,"From Autocracy to Integration", pp. 141-177 and pp. 192-227. See also Rao, M. Narsing, Fifty Years of Hyderabad, Book I, Chapter 9, 10 and 11.

7.See Chhatari, *Yaad-i-Ayyam*, pp. 135-137 and Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", p. 174

8.See Pirzada, *Jinnah's Correspondence*. The incident involving Bahadur Yar Jang's apology to the Nizam is mentioned in two theses. See Khan, Muneer Ahmed, "Muslim Politics in Hyderabad", Osmania University, PhD. Thesis, Department of Political Science, 1980, pp. 68, 85-86. See also Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", pp. 145-177. Neither of the thesis writers appeared to have been aware of the Nizam's having consulted Jinnah before accepting the apology of Bahadur Yar Jang, and even about the wording of the apology itself. The position is however clear from the correspondence between Jinnah and the Nizam, published in the volume cited above.

9.Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", pp. 174-76. See also N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 50 F.No. 82-P (S)/44 which deals with the activities of Mohammad Bahadur Khan in Hyderabad and the question of restoration of Jagir and honours. It also covers the death of Mohammad Bahadur Khan.

The following telegram was issued by the Nizam to Jinnah at Delhi, probably on 30 May 1943 (the date on the telegram is illegible): 'For obvious reasons I have asked Bahadur Yar Jang not to make speeches in and out of my dominions for one year on the other hand while he, accepting my advice represents to me that every year he, under your wishes makes on speech in the pendal of Muslim League and also since he is the President of the States Muslim League so he considers his duty

to make one speech more under these circumstances. I should like to know your personal views as friend whether I am to give him or not to give him the required permission. I trust you will let me know your views.'

On 29 June 1943, Mohammad Bahadur Khan wrote as follows to Jinnah from Hyderabad...' Since my return from Dellhi His Exalted Highness and his government have been deliberating upon lifting the ban imposed on me and restitution of my jagirs and honours. It is hotly whispered that this is to be done on the occasion of the birthday celeberations (sic). As I am taking no more interest in the matter, I have not tried to know the details. However, the ban imposed on me still remains. I am giving below, for your kind perusal, the text of the telegram received by me at Delhi regarding permission to speak from Muslim League platform.

"His Exalted Highness thinks no signs of any modification in the firman issued (stop) But since you have renounced all honours on your own accord now you have become a free man to do as you wish."

You had permitted me to speak after seeing this and if you hold that, in the light of this telegram, I may deliver public lectures, I have not the least hesitation in visiting whichever place you order me to...'

On 8th July Jinnah wrote as follows from Quetta to Bahadur Khan (whom he addressed as Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang) 'I have read your letter very carefully and I have come to the conclusion that I am not prepared to take the responsibility of asking you to go to North West Frontier Province for the purpose mentioned in my letter because I do not wish that there should be any serious conflict between you and His Exalted Highness.'

However Bahadur Khan persisted and asked Jinnah to write to the Nizam making a personal request that he may be specifically permitted to deliver public speeches in the N.W.F.P. It appears that Jinnah did write the letter asked for by Bahadur Khan. In any case it is clear from the correspondence quoted by Benichou on pp. 178-179 that the Nizam told the British that the wording of one of Bahadur Khan's speeches implied regret, and that he proposed to return Bahadur Khan's jagir and title by July next year. Shamsul Hasan Collection of Jinnah Papers, Karachi.

10.Chhatari, *Yaad-i-Ayyam*, p. 167.

11.D.G. Bindu to Sardar Patel. *Select Correspondence of Sardar Patel, 1945-50* Volume 2, Shankar, V., ed., Ahmedabad: Navjivan Publishing House 1977, pp, 152-3.

12.For an account of the industrialization policy of Hyderabad State and its connection with the plans for post war reconstruction, see Pavier, Barry, *The Telengana Movement, 1944-51.* Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981, pp. 47-63. See also Townroe, B.S., "The Modernization of Hyderabad", *Asiatic Review,* Volume 33 (1937), pp. 615-26. A recent article on the subject is by C.V. Subbarao, "Role of the State in Industrialization: The Case of Hyderabad", in Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi et al, (eds.), *The South Indian Economy: Agrarian Change, Industrial Structure and State Policy, c. 1914-1947,* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 208-241.

13.N.A.I. microfilms, Acc . No. 50, Pol. Dept. Supplement to Fortnightly Report, March 1940, Residency to Political Department.

14.N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 50, Pol. Dept., F.No. 342-P 1944.

15.N.A.I. Microfilms, Acc. No.51, File No. 242-P (S)/45 1945.Pol. Dept., Pol. Branch.

At formal occasions the Nizam's two sons would precede him, the younger prince in a Cadillac, his elder prince in a Rolls- Royce. The Nizam himself would follow in a ramshackle old,' 1934 model Ford Tourer which would not fetch more than $10.00 in a Detroit second-hand dealers, 'sale'. The number plate it bore said simply 'KING KOTHI (Hyd)O'

16. Prasad, *The Asif Jahs of Hyderabad,* p. 268. This account is based on the original Telugu version of M. Narsing Rao's autobiography which was consulted by Rajendra Prasad.

17. N.A.I. microfilms, C.R. Papers, Acc. No.51, File No. 242- P(S)/45 1945, Pol. Dept., Pol. Branch.

18. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 51, File No. illegible. Proposals by Sir F. Gauntlett (ex-ICS) to Nizam re-desireability of investing all or some of the Treasure in Hyderabad.

19. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 51, File No. E 125-Pol. (Sec.) 1936.

20. The Resident compared the share of the state revenues paid as privy purse to the Nizam and to the King of England, and came up with some starting findings. The total average net revenue of Hyderabad State for five years ending 1933-34 was Rs. 7,97,51,000 (HS). If Jagir revenue was added, the gross revenue was about Rs 11,16,51,400. The Nizam therefore took 27.3 per cent of the net and 19.5 per cent of the gross revenue of the state. At the same time the revenue of Great Britain was 804,629,050 pounds. The total civil list of King George V and the royal family was 734,917 (0.91 per cent of the revenue of the state). Ibid. See also *Note by Nizam,* March 1936, N.A.I. microfilms, Acc No. 51, F. No. 120-P (S) 1936. N.A.I., Acc. No.44, F.No. 195-P(S)/45/1945.

21. N.A.I. Acc. No. 44, F.No. 195-P(S)/45/1945.

22. N.A.I. microfilms, Acc. No. 51, F.No 242-P(S)/45. 1945 Pol. Dept., Pol. Branch. See also File No. 44-C.

7. Abortive Reforms And Deepening Crisis

1.The changes and the mood in India during and after the Second World War may be gauged from Spear, Percival, *A History of India,* Volume 2, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1970, pp. 204-220 and 230-237. See also Wavell, *The Viceroy's Journal,* Moon, Penderel, ed., Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1973.

2.For an account of the Indian states during the Second World War and during the Cabinet Mission, see Phadnis, Urmila, *Towards the Integration of Indian States, 1919-1947,* Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1968, pp. 152-164. See also Mankekar, D.R., *Accession to Extinction: The story of Indian Princes,* Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1974, pp. 23-62.

3.See Khan, Ahmed Sayeed, Nawab of Chhatari, *Yaad-i-Ayyam,* Volume 2, Aligarh, The Author, undated, pp. 172-173. Lothian reported to the Government of India that Chhatari had been shown the Will by the Nizam. See IOR: L/P & S/13/1236. Pol. Coll. 22/25. p.116.

4.See Chhatari, *Yaad-i-Ayyam,* pp. 186-187

5.M. Narsing Rao quotes a Majlis leader who later migrated to Pakistan as saying that the Kotwal or Police Commissioner was a spokesman of the Majlis in the palace, and it was on the orders of the Nizam that the police failed to protect Chhatari and Grigson and made no attempt to disperse the crowd or arrest its leaders during its three-mile march. I could not find this remark about the role of the Kotwal in the account of the incident in the book by Badar Shakeb, *Hyderabad ka Urooj O Zawal, Karachi* : Osmania Academy, 1964. Perhaps Narsing Rao saw some other work by Shakeb, or had a discussion with him.

See also the account by the political leader and journalist, M. Narsing Rao, in Fifty years of Hyderabad, Volume 2, Book 8, p. 47. He comments as follows '... it can be truly said that the Shah Manzil incident was the inaugural ceremony of the notorious Razakar movement which followed soon after. If on that day the State Police had resorted to one or two rounds of firing and dispersed the unruly crowd perhaps the history of Razakar movement would have been different. However we cannot imagine what would have happened,' Other accounts of the episode will be found in Jang, Ali Yavar [An Ex-official of Hyderabad], *Hyderabad in Retrospect,* Bombay: Bennett Coleman & Co., Ltd., 1949, pp. 7-10, and Benichou, L., " From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-48", PhD. Thesis, Dept. of History, University of Western Australia, 1985, pp. 238-239.

For Chhatari's account of the Dichpalli Mosque incident, see *Yaad-i-Ayyam,* Volume 2, pp. 187-192. (On p. 187, the date of the incident which took place on 15 March 1946 has been wrongly given as 5 April 1964.)

6.Birkenhead, Lord, *The Life of Sir Walter Monckton of Brenchley,* London: Widenfield and Nicolson, 1969, pp. 222- 225.

7.Once before Jinnah had suspected that the Nizam was on the verge of appointing Sir Mirza Ismail as his Sadr-i-Azam and had written to urge him against the proposal. See the correspondence in Shamsul Hasan Collection in Karachi, especially the letters between Jinnah and the Nizam in November 1941. Some of this correspondence has been reprinted in Pirzada, *Jinnah's Correspondence,* pp. 297-299.

On 21st June Jinnah wired the Nizam asking whether it was true that Sir Mirza was being appointed. The Nizam replied the next day: 'Your telegram matter referred to is correct = Nizam'. On 23rd June Jinnah wired that, 'appointment will lead serious consequences stop as promised hear me before finally deciding coming Hyderabad weekly (sic) please wire if that (sic) Jinnah'. The same day the Nizam replied to Jinnah at Delhi that he had received the telegram and would be free to see him, ' after first week in July namely eighth or ninth.' On 25th June Jinnah confirmed by telegram that he would reach on the eighth or ninth but, 'Please let me know whether the appointment is made finally or your promise that

you will hear me before you decide stands a matter very serious anxious reply = Jinnah.' The correspondence will be found in the Shamsul Hasan Collection and the Jinnah Papers in the Bahadur Yar Jang Academy in Karachi.

8.Ismail, Sir Mirza, *My Public Life: Recollections and Reflections*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1954. The account is based on a report to Sir Mirza by the Nizam's Personal Secretary, Hosh Bilgrami. See also Bilgrami, Hosh, *Mushahidath*, p. 301, and Jang, Ali Yavar, *Hyderabad in Retrospect*, p. 10. (Some Hyderabad observers have pointed out the Hosh Bilgrami was a typical courtier and not much reliance should be placed on his account of these events. However this is the only detailed account of the interview available to us. It is unlikely that in a matter of such importance Bilgrami would deliberately try to mislead such important figures as Sir Mirza Ismail and Ali Yavar Jang. Both of them, like Bilgrami himself, were Shias.)

Details of the events leading up to Jinnah's arrival in Hyderabad by plane from Delhi and his correspondence with Alla Bux and others in Hyderabad as well as with Lord Wavell in New Delhi will be found in the Jinnah Papers at the Bahadur Yar Jang Academy and in the Shamshul Hasan Collection at Karachi.

9. Jang, Ali Yavar·*Hyderabad in Retrospect*, p.10, Benichou, Lucien "From Autocracy to Integration", pp. 241-242.

10.Jang, Ali Yavar, *Hyderabad in Retrospect*, p.11.

11.Rao, M. Narsing, *Fifty Years of Hyderabad*, Book 9, pp. 14-16.

12.Jang, Ali Yavar, *Hyderabad in Retrospect*, p. 11. See also Shakeb, Badar *Hyderabad ka Urooj O Zawal*, pp. 159-60.

13.Patwardhan, Dileep, "Nizam-Portuguese Negotiations, 1947- 48", in the *Journal of Indian History*, Volume 52, August and December 1947, Parts 2 & 3, pp. 475- 480

14.See *The Transfer of Power in India*, Volume 12, Letter Nos. 218; 175. For an account of the claim by the Nizam on Berar, including also the activities of Mirza Ismail, see the chapter "Nizam covets Berar", in Mishra, D.P., *The Nehru Epoch: From Democracy to Monocracy*. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978, pp. 100-112. This is the second volume of the autobiography by a man who was Home Minister of Central Provinces and Berar at the time of independence. There was considerable anxiety in Berar about the Nizam's claim on Berar, and the people of the province were not entirely convinced by Mishra's arguments. At one of his meetings, he was asked, 'What about the Nizam's son being the Prince of Berar?' He replied to the effect that,'if Lord Mountbatten's being Mountbatten of Burma did not affect the independence of Burma, the Nizam's son could also call himself by any name without in any way affecting the people of Berar.' (p.112.)

15.See Ramesan, N., ed., *Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad*,Volume 6, pp. 275-8. See also Bilgrami, Hosh, *Mushahidath*, pp. 304-8 and Prasad, Rajendra, *The Asif Jahis of Hyderabad*, pp. 301-3.

16.Jang, Ali Yavar, *Hyderabad in Retrospect*, p. 13. See also Prasad, Rajendra, *The Asif Jahs of Hyderabad*, p. 328.

17.Patwardhan, Dileep, "Nizam-Portuguese Negotiations, 1947-48", in the *Journal of Indian History* Volume 52, August &December, 1974, Parts 2 & 3 pp. 475-492 and Volume 53, August 1975, Part 2 pp. 303-322.

18.This discussion is based upon facts recounted by Menon, V.P., *Integration of the Indian States,* Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1985 edition, pp.60 to 79. The interpretations are my own.

On the question of Bastar, see Corfield's record of his discussion with Nehru in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* Volume 2, pp. 279-281. Hyderabad had built up an industrial base in northern Telengana and was making a serious bid for access to the iron ore resources of the state of Bastar which was ruled by a family of tribal origin. In April 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru heard rumours about the Nizam's attempt to make Bastar an 'economic vassal' of Hyderabad during the minority of the ruler. of Bastar. He took up the matter with Mountbatten who wrote to Nehru on April 25, explaining that the Bastar Darbar was proposing to grant a prospecting licence and mining lease in respect of iron ore to the Nizam's government. A railway line was to be constructed by Hyderabad from the state border to Bailadilla, where the iron deposits of Bastar were located. The Viceroy as Crown Representative would protect the interest of Bastar and take the technical advice of other departments of the Government of India. Development could not stop because of the minority of the ruler, he pointed out. In the case of Bastar, unlike that of Goa, the Political Department of the Government of India was fully in the picture. As in the case of Goa, the Nizam's government was trying to rush the matter through before Indian independence. See also Volume 12 of the *Transfer of Power in India,* Document No. 218; Chhatari, *Yaad-i-Ayyam,* p. 170; and Mishra, D.P., *The Nehru Epoch,* p. 104.

19. Menon, *Integration of the Indian States,* pp., 96-100

20.Interview with C.S. Venkatachar, Bangalore, 1984.

21. Menon, *Integration of the Indian States,* p.118.

22.The Junagarh case is discussed in Menon, V.P., *Integration of the Indian States,* pp. 124-150. For the Indian view of the Kashmir issue, see Akbar, M. J., *Kashmir: Behind the Vale,* Delhi: Viking, 1991, pp.72 ff. and Khan, Rahmatullah, *Kashmir and the United Nations,* Delhi: Vikas, 1969.

23.Regarding the gun-running in July 1947, see *Sardar Patel's Correspondence,* Section 71, pp. 82-87.

The events of July 1948 will be found in a Note to the Secretary-General, Ministry of External .Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, New Delhi,6 July 1948. Jawaharlal Nehru Collection. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* p. 189. The following is an extract from the above source pp. 190-191.

> "2.In the course of the discussion the question of gun- running by air into Hyderabad was fully considered. Air Marshal Elmhirst gave it as his view that after full enquiry he had come to the conclusion that five Lancaster 4-engined aircraft,which had previously been bombers but had subsequently been altered for civilian use, were being used for this gun-running business between Karachi and

Hyderabad. (He was not quiet sure whether the number was five or possibly six).Of these five Lancasters three had British registration marks and two had Canadian marks."

4. These five Lancasters were continually making trips by night from Karachi to Hyderabad and back the same night.They could carry enough petrol for the double journey.It was not known what kind of cargo they carried,but evidently this must be of considerable value to those who wanted it as they were paying heavily for it.Probably it was arms as reported.There may be some fuel or aviation spirit also carried.Each Lancaster could carry about five tonnes of load.

5.This was obviously a smuggling racket and big money was being made by the smugglers out of Hyderabad. It was clearly against international law and the regulations made by the Government of India.This risk was deliberately taken by the parties concerned and no doubt they were heavily paid for it.

6.The Lancasters were not using the Pakistani airfield at Mauripore or the civil airfield but were using another airfield nearby which had been constructed during the war but was not now in regular use.

7. It was next to impossible for our aircraft to intercept these Lancasters during their night flight.We had no facilities or air craft suitable for the purpose. Only by the rarest chance could we come across them and even then it would be difficult to take any action as the Lancasters flew very fast, about 250 miles an hour.

8. It was learnt that the Pakistan Government had asked for facilities to be given to these Lancasters by the Pakistan R.A.F., but the British commander of the Pakistan R.A.F. had not agreed.In effect however, facilities in the shape of the use of the airfield and petrol were being given.The only facilities that were perhaps not being given were the loan of mechanics etc.The Lancasters, how ever,had brought some mechanics with them.

9.These Lancasters could not be easily converted into regular bombing planes as they originally were.This would require a heavy under-carriage being attached which could not be done here.But it was easy enough to use the Lancasters for make-shift bombing by dropping the bombs through a hold or through the door. Bennett was a very capable man and could easily fix this up.

10.The operation was carried through very secretively. But it is obvious that five Lancasters cannot function nightly without people getting to know about it.The Pakistan Government still formally deny all this but their denial is of no value at all when anyone can see these Lancasters and when even the markings of the Lancasters are known.

24.The quotation is from Benichou, Lucien, "From Autocracy to Integration", Chapter 6, p. 267. See also his discussion on the split between the moderates and the extremists, p.269.

25.Menon, V.P., *Integration of the Indian States,* p.325

26. On 23 October an invasion of armed raiders from Pakistan had taken place in Kashmir. Although disguised as a spontaneous action by irregulars, it was guided and directed by Pakistan Army Officers with the prior knowledge of the Governor-General, Jinnah. The Maharaja of Kashmir quickly acceded to India, and Indian troops were flown into Kashmir on 26 October. Both the Nizam and Qasim Razvi knew the situation and probably had advance intimation from Pakistan.

For brief accounts of these events, see Chhatari, *Yaad-i- Ayyam,*Volume 2, pp. 276-278, and Birkenhead, *Monckton,* pp. 234-239.

The account of the special meeting of the Executive Council and the discussions at which Aiyangar and later Qasim Razvi were present, will be found in Munshi, K.M., *End of an Era,* pp. 62-65.

27.Jang, Ali Yavar, *Hyderabad in Retrospect*, pp. 25-26. An almost identical account of these events will be found in Bilgrami, Hosh, *Mushahidath*, pp. 395-6.

28.For accounts of these developments, see Birkenhead, *Monckton,* p. 240, and Menon, *Integration of the Indian States,* pp. 314-336.

8. Telengana Revolt and the Fall of the "Independent" Hyderabad State

1. Ali, Mir Laik, *Tragedy of Hyderabad*, Karachi: Pakistan Cooperative Book Society, 1962, pp. 1-14. See also his article, "My reminiscences of Qaid-i-Azam", in *Pakistan Pictorial* (November 1976) pp. 63- 70.

2. See *The Hyderabad Problem—The Next Step,* pp. 61- 80. The Press Exchange of Hyderabad, 22 June 1948 has been quoted on page 80. See also Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", pp. 275-279 for an account of the joint action by the Socialists and the Communists at this time. The disclaimer by Ramanand Tirth is quoted on p. 276.

3. Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", p. 306. See also pp. 305-311, passim.

4. Rao, C.R., *The Historic Telengana Struggle,* Delhi : The Communist Party of India, 1972, pp.11,17.

5. Rao, V. Veerabhadra and Rao, V. Ramachandra, *India's Police Action against Hyderabad,* Gadwal: C. Mallikarjuna Rao, 1949.

6. I.O.L. L/P and S/13/1204, pp. 149-50 Intelligence Report, quoted by Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", p. 308. The account of Communist activity in Hyderabad State and Madras will be found in Benichou, pp. 308-311.

7. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence* Volume 7, pp. 214-15, cited in Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", p. 311.

8. A detailed account of the struggle from the Marxist point of view, written by a leading Marxist theoretician and the political leader, is Sundarayya, P., *Telengana*

People's Struggle and its Lessons, Calcutta: Communist Party of India (Marxist), 1972. The text of the Pledge which was taken by the guerillas who fought against the Nizam is reproduced below. This has been kindly sent to me by Dr Raj Bahadur Gour:

> I, a citizen of the glorious Telangana and a son of the great Andhra people, pledge myself not to lay down my arms till the destruction of Nizam's rule over my motherland is achieved. I promise to carry out the orders of my commanders unconditionally and to submit myself completely to the discipline of my squad. I will revenge myself against the Nizam's hordes, mercilessly and without hesitation for the pillage and destruction of our towns and villages, for the murder of our children, for the dishonour suffered by our women and tortures inflicted on our people. I will shed blood for blood and take life for life.
>
> I promise that I am prepared to die in battle against the enemy rather than live while my people and I are slaves under the blood thirsty tyranny of the Nizam.
>
> If, through cowardice or weakness I violate this pledge in any way and act against the interests of my people, I am ready to die the death of traitor at the hands of my comrades.

The following extract from a letter by Jawaharlal Nehru summarises his views:

> 'The Communists talk big about many things. But they are exploiting the economic distress among workers and peasants whom they easily mislead. Then we are asked; should we not do something to change this state of affairs apart from the question of maintaining law and order? The Communists are able to spread their insidious activities and make headway because of the conditions in which the poorer classes find themselves. But if they think that through murder, rapine and destruction, they can spread their gospel, I will tell them that they are mistaken. Such a state of things cannot be tolerated by any govenment. I want to tell them that the Indian Government will do everything it can to put this down at all costs. But the people should also cooperate with the Government in this respect. The people have a duty also in this connection. I understand that very many peasants and kisans in certain parts of the State are almost on the borders of serfdom. The people should therefore consider it their duty to do all they can to remedy this state of affairs. The law itself must be changed, wherever necessary, to help to improve their lot. Necessary reforms must be effected and changes brought about in the agrarian system which has till now kept them in that state.Years ago the National Congress decided that zamindari,jagirdari and other outmoded systems

> should go and compensation given. Madras, Bihar and the United Provinces have already undertaken legislation in this direction.There is no getting away from the fact that this feudal system can no longer remain.
>
> The military Government can initiate preliminary measures for such reform by appointing a committee and taking steps. There is no doubt that the Sarfikhas, Samasthans, zamindari and other varieties of feudal tenure should go and give place to necessary reforms which will ensure the agriculturist and the kisan his due.

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, p. 272.

9. See Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", pp. 316- 317, for an assessment of the strength of the Razakars. See also Khan, Muneer Ahmed, *Muslim Politics in Hyderabad,* pp. 92-95, where he discusses the origin, growth and decline of the Razakar organization, comparing it to the Khaksar organization. It mobilized youth, who were, 'required to pledge themselves to the supremacy of Muslim power in Deccan.' Although originally created by Razvi to counter challenges to his power in the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimeen, according to M.A. Khan, it, 'passed into the hands of mediocres and was ultimately captured by Goondas. Although there were not less than 2 lakh Razakars on the list, many had joined out of fancy and were fond of it to the extent of its dress. Very few, for instance, knew the way to operate guns and fewer could fire a shot. It became a "shock brigade" to suppress violent incidents by Congress supporters, and later by Communists. They were used to conduct espionage in neighbouring states and to harrass individuals. "Demonstrations and marches" were staged, 'for overawing the public. They were financed through voluntary and forcible contributions, careerist politicians, party funds and semi-government agencies. Even the officials were expected to patronise the Razakar organization and attend its functions.' Razakars became, 'a law unto themselves', and Razvi was himself unable to control the forces he had unleashed. The Razakars were, 'hated and feared and became unpopular even among some sections of Muslims.'

10. Bilgrami, Hosh, *Mushahidath,* p.303-4.

11. Jang, Ali Yavar, *Hyderabad in Retrospect,* pp. 27-29.

12. Munshi, K.M., *End of an Era,* p.36. A religious sect known as Deendars had been founded by a man who claimed to be the avatar or reincarnation of Chenna Basaveshwara the founder of the Lingayat sect of Hindus, claiming to have the same divine marks on his body as that saint. Siddiq Deendar had four lieutenants who declared themselves to be the Hindu divinities Vyas, Srikrishna, Narasimha and Veerabhadra. The Nizam was declared to be Dharmaraja, the god of the righteousness of the Hindu scriptures. His movement gathered force in the late twenties. He declared a Jehad or religious war or Jehad against the Hindu shrines, and issued a public appeal for one lakh volunteers and a loan of five lakhs for the purpose. A petition was submitted by some Hindus to the Nizam in January 1932 to check his activities, and some restrictions were placed on him. However he continued to be active till 1948. Razvi regarded him as a potential rival. 'Razakars looked upon the Deendars with contempt,' but, 'tolerated them as convenient allies for terrorisation of Hindus.' Munshi, K.M., *End of an Era,* pp.36-41.

13. Jang, Ali Yavar, *Hyderabad in Retrospect,* pp.21-23.

14. Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", pp 318-320. See also Menon, *Integration of the Indian States*, pp. 342- 343.

15.Ali, Mir Laik ,*The Tragedy of Hyderabad,* pp 235-245.

16. See I.O.L. & R.L/P&S/13/1843/Coll./48/6 for a discussion of Mir Nawaz Jang's activities in London.

17. I.O.L.,L/P&S/13/1204, Bombay weekly political report No.2/48,18-24 January 1948. See also Hodson, H.V., *The Great Divide,* p. 481.

18. Johnson, Campbell, *Mission with Mountbatten,* pp.338-339.

19. Benichou, "From Autocracy to Integration", pp.328-333.

20. Prasad, Rajendra, *The Asif Jahs of Hyderabad* , pp. 228-230.

21. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* p.241.

22. Prasad, S.N., *Operation Polo*, p.26.

23. Mirza, Fareed, *Pre and Post Police Action Days in the Erstwhile Hyderabad State: What I saw, felt and did*, Hyderabad: The Author, 1976, pp 18-26 and passim. See also Munshi, K.M., *End of an Era*, p. 204.

24. In a letter to Krishna Menon, dated 29 August 1948, Nehru accepted Menon's suggestion that the term 'Police Action' be used for the proposed military action. He declined to call it war although soldiers would be involved. 'The reported reference of the Hyderabad issue to the United Nations produces a certain complication, but that is hardly reason for our holding up action that would otherwise be justified.' He pointed out that the U.N. would probably delay a decision for a long time and this would have 'very bad results in many ways'. Obviously the Kashmir situation was at the back of his mind.

On 7 September 1948 Nehru made a speech in Parliament. Earlier in the same session, the Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel, had placed before the House a White Paper on Hyderabad. Nehru referred to the demand for 'popular responsible' government, the inevitability of a territory surrounded on all sides by the Indian Union to be part of the Union, the serious breakdown of law and order, the presence of private armies like the Razakars, and the criticism that the Indian government had been, 'too patient and forbearing', a criticism which he said, 'may have some justification'. Additional factors, mentioned in a letter to Krishna Menon dated 15 August 1948, were, 'the gun-running into Hyderabad, the blood and thunder speeches delivered by members of the Hyderabad Government, the constant intrigues with Pakistan or others against us and the open preparation for war against us' as, 'ample justification for us to take action in a military sense. We avoided this not so much for love of Hyderabad, but because of the possible consequences all over India and Pakistan.' (p. 207). The consequences in Pakistan included the possibility of massacres of Hindus in East Bengal.

Nehru pointed out that the Indian government was looking at the problem in an entirely non-communal way, that troops were to be sent to Secunderabad to ensure the security of all the people of Hyderabad, whether Hindus or Muslims, or belonging to any other group. Freedom was to be brought to all groups in Hyderabad, and not to any particular group alone. A few days later, on 10

September 1948, Nehru addressed a press conference, in which he reiterated his stand on these and other questions. He referred to the murder of Shoebullah Khan and said that, 'Hyderabad is sinking into a state of barbarity', notwithstanding the 'old would courtesies... soft living, and even some kind of culture', which survived, characteristics of a 'feudal autocratic regime'.

In a letter to the Nizam which was drafted by Nehru on 30 August 1948, the Governor-General, Rajagopalachari pointed out that a state of had been created for the vast majority of the people in Hyderabad and on the borders thereof. There was a rapidly growing feeling of insecurity among all classes of people and a demand for intervention by the Indian Union. The letter also mentioned the visit of Sir Mirza Ismail to New Delhi on behalf of the Nizam and urged the latter to note that, 'the Government of India have repeatedly given assurance that in a political situation your Exalted Highness's prestige and position would be safeguarded.' The Nizam was urged to, 'ponder over the situation and to do something courageous and wise to terminate the present state of alarm and insecurity and to restore full confidence ... There is no loss of dignity involved in doing what the happiness of the people demands.' See correspondence between Nehru and Mountbatten, Krishna Menon and others, his speeches in Parliament and the press conference, and other papers, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* pp. 222-247.

25. See Eagleton, Clyde, "The Case of Hyderabad Before the Security Council", reprinted from *The American Journal of International Law,* Washington D.C., Volume 44 (1950), pp. 277-302, in Khalidi, Omar, ed., *Hyderabad : After the Fall,* Hyderabad Historical Society, Wichita, Kansas, USA, 1988, p. 67.

26. Munshi, K.M., *End of an Era*, pp. 283-4. See also Ali, Mir Laik, *The Tragedy of Hyderabad* pp 240-43, for a different version of the episode, putting the blame on the Indian troops, defending the courage of the 'civic guards', and pointing out that the Hyderabad government was, 'avoiding a direct clash at all costs.'

27. For the intervention by Mirza Ismail, which had the strong support of Zain Yar Jang, the Nizam's Agent-General in New Delhi, see Nehru's letters to Mountbatten dated 1 August and 4 August 1948, and the footnotes to them, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* pp. 201-205. The Mirza initiative was dropped by the Nizam only after the strong opposition of the Sadr-i-Azam, Mir Laik Ali, who threatened to resign. Meanwhile Laik Ali had made a secret trip to Karachi where he consulted Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammad and Zafrullah Khan. As Jinnah was seriously ill, Laik Ali could not meet him, and the Pakistan leaders could give him no assurance of support. See Ali, Mir Laik, *The Tragedy of Hyderabad,* pp. 255-258.

According to K.M. Munshi, the Nizam was in such a weak position that even his younger son Moazam Jah wrote him a letter blaming him for alienating Mockton, Mountbatten and Munshi as well as Jawaharlal Nehru. 'If you make peace with the Indian Union, the people of Hyderabad will be happy,' he concluded, 'Hyderabad will be saved and the Asafia dynasty will continue.' Munshi, K.M., *End of an Era,* pp. 186-7, This story does not sound quite believable, considering the veneration with which the sons and grandsons of the ruler ordinarily treated their father.

28. Karaka, D.F., *Fabulous Mogul*, pp.118-120.

29.Prasad, Rajendra, *The Asif Jahs of Hyderabad,* pp.404-7.

30.For a detailed account of the war, see [S.N. Prasad] Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, *Operation Polo: The Police Action against Hyderabad, 1948,* Manager of Publications, Government of India, New Delhi, 1972, especially pp.44-103.

31. Ali, Mir Laik, "The Five Days War", in Khalidi, Omar, ed., *Hyderabad : After the Fall,* pp. 52-58.

32. Karaka, *Fabulous Mogul,* p. 121.

33. Ali, Mir Laik, "The Five Day War", in Khalidi, Omar ed. *Hyderabad: After the Fall,* pp.61-62.

34. See cables by Nehru to G.S. Bajpai, dated 7 and 12 December 1948, extracts from the report by Qazi Abdul Gaffar and Pandit Sundarlal, said to have been obtained in Khalidi, Omar, ed., *Hyderabad: After the Fall,* pp. 100-115. I see no reason to doubt the authenticity of these extracts. It is quite possible that such atrocities did take place and that the culprits were not only local Hindus who had suffered under the Razakar regime, but even some army personnel. There were probably Hindu and Sikh soldiers who had a desire to take revenge for the massacres and other atrocities of West Punjab before and after the partition. I do not however accept Khalidi's figure of 200,000 Muslims as having been killed. See my review article "Partisan Views on Nizam's Hyderabad", in the *Economic and Political Weekly,* 6 October 1990, pp 2249-51.

In booklet cited earlier, *Pre-and Post-Police Action Days in the Erstwhile Hyderabad State,* Fareed Mirza, a courageous Muslim who had protested at the Razakar atrocities, writes that Pandit Sunderlal enquired whether Hindus had not suffered murder, looting and rape before the Police Action, as the Muslims had after the Police Action. Some others kept silent, but Mirza replied that Hindus had suffered from atrocities, but not as much as the Muslims had after the Police Action. See pp. 37-38 of his pamphlet.

35. See Karaka, *Fabulous Mogul,* pp. 122-23, and Khalidi, *Hyderabad: After the Fall,* p. 200, where he cites Karaka.

9. The Last Years of Hyderabad State and of the Seventh Nizam

1. The Nizam in his broadcast on 17th September had announced that the Razakars were being banned, a ceasefire was being ordered, and Indian troops were free to enter Secunderabad. He also stated that, 'in the very nature of things, Hyderabad, 86 per cent of whose population are Hindus, cannot possibly become an Islamic state,' Nehru welcomed his attitude which he scribed to the military action and recorded the view that since the Nizam's broadcast had been, 'good and wisely worded', the Government of India, 'should at least appear to be as wise as he has shown himself to be at this moment and not appear to be childish...'*Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* pp. 251- 255.

2. See Yazdani, Zubaida, *The Seventh Nizam,* pp. 287- 291. These pages have also been reprinted in the section, "The End of an Era", in Khalidi, Omar, ed., *Hyderabad: After the Fall,* pp. 90-94.

3. In an Urdu book published in Pakistan, Mushtaq Ahmed Khan has reported that he withdrew two crore rupees from State Bank of Hyderabad (Karachi Branch), placed the amount in four iron boxes and brought it to his residence, as he did not want to keep such a huge amount of money in his account. He contacted Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, and said that the Government of Pakistan should take this money in its custody as his deposit, and the withdrawals would be made by him. Liaquat Ali Khan after much persuasion agreed to his proposal.

Besides two crore rupees in cash, there was a building at Victoria Road, Karachi. There were some imported goods lying in the Karachi port. Moreover some goods were lying in European ports and some consignments were coming through ships. Mushtaq Ahmed suggested to the Government of Pakistan that they take all such goods in their custody, determine their value, and pay for them in instalments over a period of five years. The Government of Pakistan agreed to his proposal.

When Major-General Chaudhuri heard that Mushtaq Ahmed had declined to transfer the amount to the Government of India, he was disturbed and discussed the matter with Mushtaq Ahmed's brother, Ashfaq Ahmed Khan, who was still working in the Hyderabad government service as Chief Secretary. He tried in different ways to persuade Mushtaq Ahmed to surrender the money. An officer was sent to Karachi to audit the accounts but Mushtaq refused to oblige him.

Soon after his arrival in Karachi, Laik Ali insisted on the formation of a trust with the Hyderabad funds, and the utilization of its income on the rehabilitation of Hyderabadi refugees in Pakistan. Mushtaq Ahmed opposed the proposal; he felt it would create jealousy among other Pakistanis against the refugees from Hyderabad. It would also be against the intention of the Hyderabad Government which wanted the funds to further the cause of Hyderabad's freedom. Liaquat Ali Khan told Mushtaq Ahmed that he did not want him involved in this painful affair (jhanjhat). An amount of eleven lakh rupees out of the total sum of two crore rupees was allotted to the agency for its expenditure. A trust was formed with an amount of Rs1,35,00,000. However the amount of eleven lakh rupees was further reduced by allotment of Rs 6,12,000 for the payment of pensions to Hyderabad pensioners in Pakistan. Mushtaq Ahmed protested at this, as he felt it was legitimate charge on the trust funds and not on the amount allotted for the Agent-General. See Khan, Mushtaq Ahmed, *Zawal-i-Hyderabad Ki Ankahi Dastan,* Lahore: the author, 1986.

4. After emerging from an interview with the seventh Nizam during the period that he was Rajpramukh, the Bombay journalist, D.F. Karaka, wrote as follows: 'He stood there before me for just a few moments more, a Mogul to the tips of his fingers. As I closely watched the venerable expression on his face and those deep, piercing eyes of his, I came closer to the belief which I now hold, that he is on his way to a Caliphate.' One wonders if the idea that Mir Osman Ali Khan, who to all intents and purposes, had ended his career, was a candidate for the Caliphate had been planted in Karaka's mind. The book it seems had been written with the

full support of several of the Nizam's close advisors such as Nawab Deen Yar Jang, Amir-i-Paigah Nawab Zaheer Yar Jang and Khan Bahadur Taraporewala, Financial Advisor to His Exalted Highness, who was thanked in the acknowledgements, 'for his generous response to the idea from the beginning and his invaluable help throughout.'

5. For accounts of the Telengana revolt, see Dhanagare, D.N., *Peasant Movements in India 1920-1950,* Delhi: Oxford University Press, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras 1986, pp. 180-212; See also Pavier, Barry, *The Telengana Movement 1944-51*, pp. 95-158, and Reddy, Arutla Ramchandra, *Telengana Struggle Memoirs* (Translated by B. Narsing Rao), Delhi: Peoples' Publishing House, 1984.

6. Tirth, Swami Ramanand, *Memoirs of Hyderabad Freedom Struggle,* Bombay: Popular Prakashan 1967, pp. 228-29. There was considerable difference of opinion between two groups in the Hyderabad State Congress, one led by Swami Ramanand Tirth and the other by Janardhan Rao Desai. There is a good deal of correspondence about these differences in Sardar Patel's correspondence during the years 1948-49. These differences appeared to have been patched up by officials of the Ministry of States, under the instructions of Sardar Patel. Burgula Ramakrishna Rao who became the first and the only Chief Minister of Hyderabad State after the Police Action, belonged to the Desai group. The difficulties appear to have arisen out of the earlier differences during the war years. On 5 February 1949 a final agreement was arrived at under which a single organization called the Hyderabad State Congress was to function under Swami Ramanand Tirth. The composition of the working committee was to be settled by 'mutual consultation'. The same matter would be adopted for deciding the rules for future enrolment of members. Existing members enrolled on forms issued by Janardhan Rao Desai were to be included in the State Congress membership. See *Sardar Patel Correspondence,* pp. 283-290. especially p. 287.

7. *Telengana: The Era of Mass Politics,* Hyderabad, Ravi Narayan Reddy Felicitation Committee, 1983, pp, 37, 43-45.

8. Menon, *Integration of the Indian States,* p. 384. It did not occur to Menon that the villagers might have been parties to the attack on the village officer, as they could have been sufferers under his regime.

9. For an account of the events and mood in Hyderabad during the period between the Police Action and the reorganization of states in 1956 see Ahmad, Zahir, *Dusk and Dawn in Village India: Twenty Fateful Years,* London, Pall Mall Press, 1965. An account by a Muslim who entered Parliament in 1952 from Hyderabad State is Khan, Sadat Ali, *Brief Thanksgiving,* Bombay, Asia,1959, pp. 36-47. For a critical account see Jang, Nawab Moin Nawaz, "Hyderabad in Fetters", reprinted from the *Dawn* Karachi, 2 November. 1952.

10. Bedford, Ian, "The Telengana Insurrection: a study in the causes and development of a Communist insurrection in rural India", 1946-1951, unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Canberra, Australian National University, 1967, pp. 304-5. The quotation about the old Jagirdar class is taken by Bedford from Khusro, A.M., *Economic and Social Effects of Jagir Abolition and Land Reforms in Hyderabad,* Delhi: 1958, p. 63.

11. The naming of the Andhra Mahasabha had a significance. The word Andhra harked back to the Satavahana dynasty which was first established in the Marathwada region of Hyderabad State (now part of Maharashtra) and later moved its base eastward to the area between the Krishna and Godavari valleys. R.G. Bhandarkar and other scholars had used the word Andhra desiyah and Andhra jatiya while describing the Satavahanas. Inscriptions of Asoka referred to the Satavahanas and Andhra Bhrityas. The Andhras had trade contacts with Rome, the export of muslins to that area being a regular practice. Rao, P.R., *Modern History of Andhra Pradesh,* Delhi: Sterling, 1978, pp. 2,19.

12. *Andhra Patrika,* 15 October 1937, quoted in Ibid., p. 117

13. States' Reorganization Commission Report, 1955, para 364.

14. For accounts of the political developments, see Rao, K.V. Narayan, *The Emergence of Andhra Pradesh,* Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1973, and Regani, Sarojini, *Who's Who of Freedom Struggle in Andhra Pradesh*, Hyderabad: State Committee for the Compilation of the History of Freedom Struggle in Andhra Pradesh, 1978.

15. Karaka, *Fabulous Mogul,* pp. 127-8.

16. Ibid., p. 130.

17. Ibid., pp. 129-135.

18. *The Medico,*1966-67. Supplement, p. XIV-1.

10. Conclusion

1. See the reference cited in chapter 6, especially the Resident's Letter No.115-C, dated 29-10-44.

2. See Chapter 3 above, as well as Zubaida Yazdani's eighth chapter, "Pan-Islamism, and its Effects on the Seventh Nizam's Future Policies", in the *Seventh Nizam,* pp. 102-106.

3. See for example, Peep into Hyderabad (Deccan) - A Survey of the Administration of Nizam's Dominions, 25th September 1938, which describes the discrimination against the Hindus in recruitment into the judiciary, the public services, extra.

4. Clyde Eagleton's article, "The Case of Hyderabad Before the Security Council", was published in the *American Journal of International Law*, Washington D.C., Volume 44, 1950, pp. 277-302. The article was reprinted in Khalidi, Omar, ed., *Hyderabad: After the Fall*, Hyderabad Historical Society, Wichita, Kansas, USA, 1988, pp. 64-89. See also the book by the former Resident in Hyderabad, A.C. Lothian, *Kingdoms of Yesterday*. London: John Murray, 1951 Appendix III, pp. 206-222 and passim. I have utilized an English translation which was specially prepared for me from a German article by Mohammed Hamidullah, titled "Hyderabad's Case in the Light of International Law". The author is an authority on Islamic Law. He was brought up in Hyderabad and is, I understand, residing in Paris.

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